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ABSTRACT
Methods are presented to assess the global risk of nuclear theft and nuclear terrorism,
to identify the nuclear facilities and transport legs that pose the highest-priority risks of
nuclear theft, and to evaluate policy approaches to strengthening security and accounting for
nuclear stockpiles worldwide. First, a qualitative assessment outlines the demand for black-
market nuclear weapons and materials; the plausibility of terrorist construction of an
improvised nuclear device; the global stocks and flows of nuclear weapons, plutonium, and
highly enriched uranium (HEU), with the global distribution of facilities where they exist; and
the widely varying standards of physical protection, control, and accounting in place to
prevent theft. Particular dangers of nuclear theft in Russia, Pakistan, and from HEU-fueled
research reactors are highlighted. Second, a mathematical model of the global risk of nuclear
terrorism is presented, with detailed assessments of what is known about the values of each of
the parameters, and of policies that could change each of the parameters to reduce risk. Third,
a methodology for identifying the nuclear facilities and transport legs posing the highest risks
of nuclear terrorism is presented, combining the security levels for each facility or transport
leg, the levels of threat they face, and the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable material they contain. Fourth, the global nuclear security system is described
and assessed as a complex, large-scale, integrated, open system (CLIOS). Based on past
experiences with different policy tools from negotiated international standards to on-the-
ground technical cooperation to install improved security equipment, options to improve
system performance in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism are assessed. A final chapter
offers conclusions and recommendations.
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1. Introduction
The inspectors arrived at the sprawling nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly
facility on a Thursday in October, to review the facility's security measures. They were
surprised by what they found. There was no portal monitor at the gate to detect nuclear
material being smuggled out, and no metal detector to prevent guns from being smuggled in.
In a test, inspectors playing the roles of thieves (including an insider) succeeded in smuggling
out enough mock nuclear material for a bomb. The facility was immediately closed for
security upgrades. It reopened the following Tuesday, with nuclear material detectors and
metal detectors in place.
This was not Russia in 1995. It was the United States in 1985. The facility was
Pantex, the United States' main plant for putting together and taking apart nuclear weapons,
in Amarillo, Texas - intended to be perhaps the highest-security nuclear site in the United
States, if not the world.' The Pantex inspection took place just after a special project team
had finished urgently reviewing security at every site in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex
managed by the Department of Energy (DOE). The team found scores of serious security
vulnerabilities and made 94 recommendations for action to improve security throughout the
DOE complex. The Secretary of Energy at the time launched a major initiative to implement
the steps the team called for - an effort that was dubbed Operation Cerberus, after the
mythological guardian of the gates of hell. Most of the team's recommendations were
implemented within less than a year, and nearly all were carried out within a few years, at an
estimated cost of $1.5 billion. The result was substantially and demonstrably improved
security - miles of impressive razor-wire fences installed, major barriers put in place,
upgraded access controls installed, guard forces beefed up, and more.2 Yet within a few
years, complacency was creeping back, security budgets were being cut, and DOE security
managers were warning that if immediate actions were not taken to correct the decline,
nuclear weapons and materials could not be adequately secured.3
'For discussions of the Pantex test (and others revealing remarkable vulnerabilities) see Committee on Energy
and Commerce, Nuclear Weapons Facilities: Adequacy of Safeguards and Security at Department of Energy
Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd Session,
6 March 1986. See, in particular, pp. 182-187.
2 For discussions of the special project team and Operation Cerberus, see Nuclear Weapons Facilities, pp. 39-54;
National Research Council, Material Control and Accounting in the Department of Energy's Nuclear Fuel
Complex (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1989), pp. 30-31; John B. Roberts, II, "Nuclear Secrets
and the Culture Wars," American Spectator 32, no. 5 (May 1999), pp. 34-39, 76. The $1.5 billion figure is from
the American Spectator account, which is an attack on allegedly lax security measures in the Clinton years, and
holds up Operation Cerberus as a counter-example from the Reagan years. The notion that all was well with
DOE security in the Reagan and Bush years does not stand up to the scrutiny provided in Nuclear Weapons
Facilities; President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Science at Its Best, Security at Its Worst: A Report
on Security Problems at the US. Department of Energy (Washington D.C.: PFIAB, 1999; available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/pfiab/ as of 13 December 2006).
3 By 1991, for example, DOE's annual report to the President on safeguards and security in the DOE complex
was warning that "significant improvements must be made immediately"; by 1996, the annual report was
warning of "severe budget reductions... which have undermined protection of special nuclear material." Both
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Fast forward two decades, to a world in which extreme Islamist terrorists are actively
seeking nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients - yet weapons-usable nuclear
materials and even nuclear weapons themselves in countries around the world are, in some
cases, dangerously insecure. Operation Cerberus was aptly named, for, as this dissertation
will argue, security measures to prevent nuclear weapons and materials from being stolen are
the most important gate barring the path to the hell of nuclear terrorism.
The urgent questions about nuclear terrorism that this dissertation attempts to answer
are "how big is the risk?" and "what policy measures would be most effective in reducing it?"
Unfortunately, the answers to both are "no one knows for sure." To help clarify the debate
over these questions, this dissertation will provide both qualitative and quantitative methods
for assessing the risk of nuclear terrorism; a methodology for identifying those nuclear
facilities and transport legs worldwide that pose the most urgent risks that nuclear weapons or
their essential ingredients could be stolen and fall into terrorist hands; and a description of the
complex global system of nuclear security (with its ingrained resistance to major policy
changes), with suggestions, based on past experience, of how best to achieve higher levels of
security for nuclear stockpiles around the world.
In essence, in this dissertation I seek to provide at least the beginnings of answers to
three questions:
* How big is the risk of nuclear terrorism?
* How can we identify the nuclear facilities and transport legs whose vulnerabilities
contribute most to that risk?
* What policy initiatives are likely to be most effective in improving the performance of the
complex global nuclear security system in reducing this risk?
Estimating the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
The importance of these questions can hardly be overstated. The one topic President
George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry agreed on in their Presidential contest in 2004 was
that the danger that terrorists could get and use a nuclear bomb was the biggest current threat
to the security of the United States.4 President Bush has said that this danger is urgent enough
to justify doing "everything in our power" to prevent it.5 The 9/11 Commission made the
same point, calling for a "maximum effort" to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons, to terrorists. 6 Mohammed ElBaradei, the
reports are quoted in the depressing appendix listing reviews of DOE security in President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, Science at Its Best, Security at Its Worst.
4 "The First Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida," Commission on
Presidential Debates, 30 September 2004.
' President George W. Bush, "President Delivers 'State of the Union.' (Washington, D.C.: The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, 28 January 2003; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/01/20030128-19.html as of 30 December 2006).
6 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, I st ed. (New York: Norton, 2004;
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/91 1/index.html as of 30 December 2006), p. 381.
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Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently went so far as
to warn that the world is in "a race against time" to prevent nuclear terrorism - in essence, a
race to lock down nuclear stockpiles around the world before terrorists and thieves can get to
them.7
Not everyone agrees, however. In many capitals, political leaders believe the United
States has been engaged in needless fear-mongering in focusing on terrorists gaining the
ability to set off crude nuclear bombs as a realistic threat. Karl-Heinz Kamp, a prominent
European analyst, expressed the view held by many: "religious zealots or political extremists
may present many dangers, but wielding nuclear bombs and killing hundreds of thousands of
innocent people is not one of them."8 This view is widespread in the nuclear industry itself.
As the deputy director for security of Rosatom, Russia's nuclear agency, put it, "we have to
bear it in mind that even having any nuclear material does not mean that an explosive device
can be made [by terrorists]. This is absolutely impossible." 9 Quantitatively, well-informed
observers have made estimates of the probability of terrorist use of a nuclear bomb on a major
city in the next decade that range from 1% to 50% or more (though as we will see in Chapter
3, even a 1% probability would be sufficient to justify major efforts to reduce the risk).'0
This dissertation uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches to elucidate the
issues in this debate over the size of the nuclear terrorism risk. First, it provides a qualitative
assessment, detailing several points:
* It is plausible that a capable terrorist group would be able to make at least a crude nuclear
bomb if they acquired the needed highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium;
* Such weapons-usable nuclear materials are inadequately secured at scores of sites around
the world (as are nuclear weapons themselves, in some cases);
* The al Qaeda terrorist network and elements of the global movement it has spawned have
made repeated attempts to get nuclear bombs or weapons-usable nuclear materials to
make them, and they have repeatedly tried to recruit nuclear weapon scientists to help
them; and
7 "Race against Time to Prevent Nuclear Terror - IAEA," Reuters, 8 November 2004.
8 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism Is Not the Core Problem," Survival 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998).
9 Aleksandr Khinshteyn, "Secret Materials," trans. BBC Monitoring Service, "Russian Central TV," 29
November 2002.
'0 Both Graham Allison and former Secretary of Defense William Perry have put the probability of a terrorist
nuclear attack within the next decade at about 50 percent. See Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The
Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004); Nicholas D. Kristof,
"An American Hiroshima," New York Times, 1I August 2004. By contrast, David Albright, who has written
some of the most detailed unclassified analyses of seized al Qaeda nuclear documents, puts the ten-year
probability in the range of 1%. See Corine Hegland and Gregg Webb, "The Threat," National Journal 37, no. 16
(15 April 2005; available at http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2005/0415nj I.htm as of 30
December 2006). For a poll of leading national security and foreign policy experts on this and related points, see
Richard G. Lugar, The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses (Washington, D.C.: Office of
Senator Lugar, 2005; available at http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
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* Nuclear materials are so difficult to detect - and the borders of modem states so porous -
that only modest reliance can be placed on measures to prevent nuclear weapons and
materials from being smuggled into a country.
At the same time, however, this chapter makes the point that, more than a decade after
the collapse of the Soviet Union and after the launch of al Qaeda's attempts to get nuclear
weapons, there is no compelling evidence that either a nuclear bomb or the materials to make
one have fallen into the hands of terrorist groups. Moreover, none of the fragmentary
evidence publicly available suggests that either the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo nor al Qaeda
- the two terrorist groups which have focused the most effort on acquiring nuclear ewapons -
have come close to putting together the capabilities needed to make a nuclear bomb.
That qualitative assessment indicates that the point at which policy measures have
their greatest leverage in reducing this threat is in keeping nuclear weapons and materials
from being removed from the sites where they are supposed to be in the first place - for once
they have been stolen, they could be anywhere, and the problem of finding them and
preventing their use increases by orders of magnitude. Hence, ensuring that all of the world's
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials are effectively secured against the threats that
terrorists and thieves have shown they can pose is central to the security of every country and
to the global effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. A range of programs are underway
to help countries improve security for their nuclear stockpiles, and these efforts have had real
and demonstrable successes. But as of late 2006, only a fraction of the nuclear stockpiles
around the world that are believed to be vulnerable have received substantial security
upgrades. As previous work has made clear, the scale and pace of these efforts fall far short
of meeting President Bush's "everything in our power" strandard.1"
Second, this dissertation takes a quantitative approach to the same problems,
presenting and analyzing a mathematical model of the global risk of nuclear terrorism. 2 After
presenting the mathematical model, I offer a numerical example of the use of the model;
explore what is known from the historical record or from other sources about the likely value
of each of the parameters in the model; outline policies that might change the values of these
parameters so as to reduce risk; and identify information whose collection and analysis could
reduce the current uncertainty in estimating the values of those parameters. This quantitative
approach provides a basis for highlighting the specific sources of disagreement about the
overall magnitude of the risk, a tool for assessing the potential impact of alternative policies,
and a structure for a research agenda to further clarify the risk and the effectiveness of
possible responses.
1 For an assessment of progress in securing nuclear stockpiles as of the spring of 2006, see Matthew Bunn and
Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006 (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard
University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006; available at http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb as of 23 July
2006). The current pace and scope of these efforts is not assessed in detail in this dissertation.
2 Throughout this dissertation, I define risk as the probability of an event times its consequences, rather than
attempting any more subtle or complex approach.
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Identifying the Highest-Priority Risks of Nuclear Theft
In a world of limited resources - not only of money and people, but also of political
attention to particular issues - how can the facilities that pose the highest-priority security
risks of nuclear theft, requiring the most immediate attention, be identified? When officials at
the IAEA, in the U.S. government, or in other donor states are seeking to allocate resources
for reducing the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism, what criteria should be used to determine
whether a small civilian facility in Western Europe, with enough HEU for one or a few bombs
and few guards, or a nuclear weapons facility in Pakistan, which is heavily guarded but in an
area where substantial armed remnants of al Qaeda continue to operate, poses a more urgent
risk to be addressed?
To some extent, the answers to such questions will always remain matters ofjudgment
- particularly judgment on matters such as whether a large armed attack by outsiders or a
covert theft attempt by insiders poses a more likely and worrisome threat at particular
facilities. But the grounds for uncertainty and debate in setting priorities can be greatly
reduced - and high-risk facilities that might otherwise go unnoticed can be identified - by
applying a rigorous framework for assessing risk. This dissertation lays out such a
framework, based on the quantity of nuclear material at a site, the quality of that material (in
particular, how difficult it would be for different types of groups to make it into a bomb), the
effectiveness of the security and accounting arrangements at the site, and the level of threat
in the area of that site (such as the presence of organized terrorist activity, the incidence of
theft and corruption, pay and morale among the facility's employees, and the like). Between
them, these factors make it possible to assess how the probability that nuclear material would
be stolen from a particular site and the probability that it could then be turned into a nuclear
bomb compares to those probabilities at other sites. (This approach only allows a ranking of
risk among different sites, not a calculation of the absolute magnitude of the probability of
nuclear theft and terrorism, because of the very large uncertainties in judging the probability
that theft will even be attempted at any particular site and the substantial uncertainties in the
other elements of the assessment.)
Using the limited data that are publicly available, I then assess nuclear theft risks in
several countries, as an example of the application of the method. This assessment makes
clear that some of today's most urgent theft risks are in Russia (where the world's largest and
most widely dispersed nuclear stockpiles have security measures that have improved from
poor to medium over the past decade and face high levels of threat, from both outside terrorist
attackers and insider thieves) and in Pakistan (whose nuclear stockpile is relatively small and
heavily guarded, but is exposed to enormous threats both from armed terrorist groups in the
country and from nuclear insiders with a demonstrated willingness to sell sensitive weapons-
related technologies). Research reactors fueled with highly enriched uranium (many of which
have enough HEU for a nuclear bomb, with very little security) also pose significant risks. Of
course, as one government or facility operator may be far more cooperative than another, in
setting priorities for action it is important to consider not only where the most urgent risks lie,
but also where the greatest opportunities for action may be - and this balance is addressed as
well.
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For this question, the dissertation applies a technology assessment methodology,
assessing how difficult it would be for threats of different types to overcome varying security
and accounting arrangements to steal nuclear weapons or nuclear materials and then assessing
how the quantity and characteristics of the material that might be stolen affects the probability
that different types of groups or states could use that nuclear material to make a usable
nuclear explosive.
Understanding the Global Nuclear Security System
and Options for Change
To achieve the goal of improving nuclear security arrangements quickly and
effectively it will be necessary to use effective policy tools for meeting that objective, and
these have to be identified. The United States and a number of other countries have now been
cooperating with the states of the former Soviet Union to improve nuclear material security
since 1993 - more than ten years. Other international efforts to improve security for nuclear
stockpiles stretch back decades. Hence, there is now a substantial base of experience to learn
from, in determining which approaches appear to work best - and under what particular
circumstances.
To provide a framework for analyzing the lessons of these past experiences and
understanding the likely effectiveness of different future initiatives, it is important to
understand the global nuclear security system as it has evolved and responded to past
pressures. Global nuclear security is a classic complex, large-scale, integrated, open system
(CLIOS). 3 It is complex in the sense that the system involves hundreds of different
components, whose interactions are not fully understood; it is large-scale in that it involves
hundreds of facilities in over forty countries managing tens of thousands of nuclear weapons
and thousands of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material; it is integrated in the sense that
each component is significantly influenced by the behavior of other components, with links of
influence (albeit weak ones, in many cases) stretching across the globe; and it is open in the
sense that the physical systems of fences and barriers and guards interact in crucial ways with
policy systems of regulation, financial decisions, and the like, and the total system is deeply
influenced by, and poses risks to, the rest of society in countries around the world.
In this dissertation I present an assessment of the shape and behavior of this system
and in particular the factors that cause and constrain changes in the system's overall
performance in providing high levels of nuclear security. I then review the record of various
policy tools for improving the nuclear security system's performance, rating their
effectiveness using a consistent set of criteria and drawing lessons for future initiatives from
the record of each policy tool.
13 For an introduction of the CLIOS concept, see Joseph M. Sussman, "Toward Engineering Systems as a
Discipline" (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 6
September 2000; available at http://esd.mit.edu/wps/esd-wp-2000-01.pdf as of 30 December 2006).
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Literature Review
The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
There is an extensive literature on the threat of nuclear terrorism. It is often forgotten
that this literature, and high-level concern about the danger of nuclear terrorism, stretches
back more than thirty years, to a time long before the fears over "loose nukes" provoked by
the collapse of the Soviet Union. John McPhee's 1974 book The Curve ofBinding Energy: A
Journey into the Awesome andAlarming World of Theodore B. Taylor presented a frightening
description of how straightforward it would be for terrorists to make a nuclear bomb if they
managed to get either plutonium or HEU, all described vividly by Taylor, one of the world's
leading nuclear weapons designers.' 4 Taylor's own book with Mason Willrich, Nuclear
Theft: Risks and Safeguards, provides additional analysis and details, particularly with respect
to approaches to reducing the threat.' 5 The issue had arisen even earlier, however: a 1967
report by an Atomic Energy Commission advisory committee chaired by Ralph F. Lumb,
Report of the Advisory Panel on Safeguarding Special Nuclear Materials, was the first
published U.S. government document that specifically called out the need to protect nuclear
weapons and weapons-usable materials against theft by "terrorist or criminal groups."16 In
1977, the U.S. Congress' Office of Technology Assessment, in its report Nuclear
Proliferation and Safeguards, provided one of the earliest and most perceptive official,
unclassified summaries of what would be required for terrorists to make and use a crude
nuclear bomb.' 7 Years later, the 1987 book resulting from the work of the International Task
Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism provided probably the best available unclassified
summary of the issue from the period before the collapse of the Soviet Union.' 8
During this early period, the literature included a great deal of concern over the then-
expected "plutonium economy" and the risks of nuclear theft that might be associated with
very large-scale use of separated plutonium. By the year 2000, it was expected that some
20,000 people in the United States alone would have access to separated plutonium in the
civilian nuclear power industry.' 9 The potential for theft or state diversion of plutonium has
been a consistent theme of discussions of reprocessing and recycling ever since, and remain
" John McPhee, The Curve of Binding Energy: A Journey into the Awesome and Alarming World of Theodore B.
Taylor (New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 1974). Some of the specific descriptions of how easy it
would be to make various types of nuclear explosives in this book are overstated.
" Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger,
1974). Another useful early account of the issue is Robert B. Leachman and Phillip Althoff, Preventing Nuclear
Theft: Guidelines for Industry and Government (New York: Praeger, 1972).
16 Ralph Lumb, Report of the Advisory Panel on Safeguarding Special Nuclear Materials (Washington, DC:
Atomic Energy Commission, 1967).
" U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, D.C.:
OTA, 1977; available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/disk3/1977/7705/7705.PDF as of 12 December
2006).
' Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1987).
19 See, for example, U.S. Congress, Nuclear Prohferation and Safeguards, pp. 199, 243-245.
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an important part of debates over the future of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle.20 The likely
effects on the risks of nuclear theft of increasing the number of sites where weapons-usable
nuclear materials are handled, of increasing the number of people with access to such
materials, and of increasing the total quantity of such materials in circulation are discussed in
Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Beyond that, however, the dissertation does to delve deeply
into the long-term future of nuclear energy and its impact on risks of nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism.
After the Soviet collapse, as stolen plutonium and HEU began appearing in Europe,
the issue of potential nuclear terrorism came to the fore again. Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 sarin
gas attack, as the first major, well-documented and well-publicized use of a particularly
deadly weapon of mass destruction by a terrorist group, crossed a psychological barrier and
highlighted the threat. Osama bin Laden has made his desire for nuclear weapons clear in
public statements. Al Qaeda launched a focused effort to get such weapons and the materials
and expertise to make them long before the 9/11 attacks, and this effort has continued since
the destruction of al Qaeda's Afghan sanctuary. Aum Shinrikyo made numerous mistakes in
its chemical and biological weapons efforts, which greatly reduced the casualties that the
1995 attack and other attempted Aum attacks might otherwise have caused. The 9/11 attacks,
by contrast, crossed another threshold, in demonstrating that those whose ideas led them to
want to kill huge numbers of civilians might sometimes be rational enough to carry out
effective means for doing so.
In the years immediately following the Soviet collapse, the nuclear terrorism literature
focused almost exclusively on the security for nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet Union.
The 1991 Harvard report Soviet Nuclear Fission offered an early summary of the dangers
resulting from the then-imminent breakup of the Soviet Union and provided part of the basis
for the establishment of the Nunn-Lugar program to address those dangers. 21 The follow-up
study also highlighted the potential dangers of loss of nuclear control in the aftermath of the
Soviet breakup and devoted a chapter to examining what should be done with excess nuclear
material in particular.22 A two-volume study from the U.S. National Academy of Sciences
similarly focused on what should be done with nuclear material no longer needed for military
purposes, but made clear that a broader regime to secure all plutonium and HEU worldwide to
stringent standards was urgently needed.
20 For a recent discussion, see, for example, Matthew Bunn, testimony in Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Energy and Water, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 2nd
Session, 14 September 2006.
2' Kurt M. Campbell et al., Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet
Union (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, 1991).
22 Graham Allison et al., Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds (Cambridge, MA: Center for
Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1993).
23 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Management
and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994; available at
http://books.nap.edu/html/plutonium/0309050421.pdf as of 30 December 2006); U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, Panel on Reactor-Related Options, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium:
Reactor-Related Options (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995; available at http://books.nap.edu/
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Within the U.S. government, two secret studies in early 1995 were particularly
influential in highlighting the dangers posed by insecure nuclear materials and the
inadequacies of then-current U.S. government efforts to address the problem. The first was a
survey of nuclear security in the former Soviet Union prepared by the Joint Atomic Energy
Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), which concluded that not a single facility in the former
Soviet Union had adequate safeguards in place to protect against nuclear theft.24 The second
was a report from a high-level panel of the President's Committee of Advisers on Science and
Technology (PCAST), which outlined the threat in stark terms and made a series of sweeping
recommendations for action to address it, many of which were incorporated in a secret
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-41) in September 1995.25 In 1996, Harvard's Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs published Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, outlining
the danger posed by insecure nuclear materials in stark terms, with a wealth of detail.26
During this period, there were also a number of important journal and magazine articles,
particularly from, for example, William C. Potter and his colleagues at Monterey's Center for
Nonproliferation Studies; Frank von Hippel and his colleagues from Princeton University's
Program on Nuclear Policy Alternatives; and Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher Paine from
the Natural Resources Defense Council.27
As time went on, the literature began to reflect more focus on terrorists and what they
might want to accomplish (and be able to accomplish) with weapons of mass destruction; as a
result, the literature became less narrowly focused on the specific case of nuclear security and
insecurity in the former Soviet Union (although that remained an important issue with a
html/plutonium/0309051452.pdf as of 30 December 2006). I directed this study; Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky
chaired the plutonium study and John P. Holdren (one of the present committee members) chaired the committee
and the panel.
24 In unclassified 1996 testimony, then-Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch described this conclusion as
the result of a "comprehensive evaluation" by the intelligence community, without mentioning the classified
JAEIC study specifically. See Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Global Prohferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part II, U.S. Senate, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, 13, 20,
and 22 March 1996.
25 Panel on U.S.-FSU Cooperation to Protect, Control, and Account for Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials,
President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, Securing Weapons-Usable Nuclear Materials in
the Former Soviet Union: Urgent Measures to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation (U). Secret/Noforn (Washington,
D.C.: Office of Science and Technology Policy, 1995). 1 directed this study; John P. Holdren chaired it. For a
summary of the report's recommendations, see Holdren's testimony in Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on European Affairs
Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Loose Nukes, Nuclear
Smuggling, and the Fissile Material Problem in Russia and the NIS, U.S. Senate, 104th Congress, 1 st Session,
22-23 August 1995. A distressingly accurate account of the secret briefing we provided to President Clinton can
be found in Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn, One-Point Safe (New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday,
1997). Much of the rest of that book, however, is filled with inaccuracies.
26 Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nulcear
Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
27 See, for example, William C. Potter, "Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear Leakage from the
Post-Soviet States," Arms Control Today October (1995); Frank von Hippel, "Fissile Material Security in the
Post-Cold War World," Physics Today 48, no. 6 (June 1995); Thomas B. Cochran, "Safety and Control of
Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Weapons," paper presented at Economic and Social Development in the Former
Soviet Union and the Problem of Nuclear Disarmament, Como, Italy, 3-4 July 1995.
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continuing literature addressing it). The book America's Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack,28 also produced at the Belfer Center, was an
early exemplar of this trend, as were Gavin Cameron's Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat
Assessment for the 2 1' Century, 29 Jessica Stern's The Ultimate Terrorists,30 and work by
Bruce Hoffman and others.3'
Many of these analyses made the point that while U.S. and international policy has
long been based on the premise that states can be deterred from using nuclear weapons by the
threat of retaliation, at least some terrorist groups may not be restrained either by fear of
retaliation or by the developing global norm against the use of nuclear weapons (which have
not been used in anger since 1945). As will be discussed in Chapter 2, many terrorist groups
are not remotely interested in the nuclear level of violence, for these and other reasons; but a
fraction of terrorist groups, with global ambitions or dreams of apocalypse, have actively
attempted to get nuclear weapons, and the risk that the probability that they would actually
use a nuclear bomb if they could get one is far higher than the probability that a nuclear-
armed state would do so.32
Concern about nuclear theft and terrorism increased substantially after the 9/11
attacks, when there were a number of important analyses of nuclear security (not only in the
former Soviet Union but around the world) and of al Qaeda's attempts to acquire nuclear
weapons. These included, for example, a series of reports by the present author and others
associated with the Managing the Atom project at the Belfer Center, including the 2002
Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action (which laid out
explicitly the need for rapid action to secure nuclear stockpiles not only in the former Soviet
Union, but in countries around the world); 2003's Controlling Nuclear Warheads and
Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (which again highlighted the global nature of the
threat and the actions needed to address it, described terrorist efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons, and laid out a step-by-step "terrorist pathway to the bomb" and actions governments
could take to block each of the steps on the pathway); 2004's Securing the Bomb: An Agenda
for Action (which provided a more detailed set of arguments against a series of myths about
terrorists and nuclear weapons that have led policymakers to downplay the nuclear terrorism
danger); 2005's Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (which provided an
updated threat assessment and the latest measures of progress in reducing the threat); and
2006's Securing the Bomb 2006 (which provided a detailed set of recommendations for a
28 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert Newman, and Bradley Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
29 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the 21st Century (New York: St. Martins Press,
1999).
30 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
31 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses," Nonproliferation
Review 4, no. 3 (1997; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol04/43/hoffma43.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
32 See, for example, discussions in Falkenrath, Newman, and Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack; Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for
the 21st Century.
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global coalition to combat nuclear terrorism and steps that could be taken to increase the sense
of urgency about the threat in countries around the world). 33
Other notable recent contributions in this category include Graham Allison's 2004
book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe;34 the work by Charles
Ferguson, William Potter and others at Monterey, The Four Faces ofNuclear Terrorism;35 the
pioneering work by David Albright and others analyzing al Qaeda's nuclear efforts;36 studies
by Frank von Hippel and others at Princeton and Stanford; 37 analyses by Peter Zimmerman
and colleagues; and a few European studies that have expressed a similar view.39 A notable
3 Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony Wier, Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials: Seven Stepsfor
Immediate Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard
University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2002; available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/
securingnuclear weaponsandmaterials May2002.pdf as of 2 January 2007); Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier,
and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Cambridge,
Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative,
2003; available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/cnwm/cnwm.pdf as of 2 January 2007); Matthew Bunn and
Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on
Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/
eresearch/analysis cnwmupdate_052404.pdf as of 2 January 2007); Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier,
Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on
Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2005; available at http://www.nti.org/
e_research/report cnwmupdate2005.pdf as of 2 January 2007); Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006.
3 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe.
3 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling, The
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling (Monterey, Cal.:
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004; available at
http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_4faces.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
36 David Albright, "Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents," Nautilus Institute
Special Forum 47 (2002; available at http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/
47_Albright.html as of 2 January 2007); David Albright, Kathryn Buehler, and Holly Higgins, "Bin Laden and
the Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 1 (January/February 2002; available at http://www.isis-
online.org/publications/terrorism/binladenandbomb.pdf as of 2 January 2007), pp. 23-24; David Albright and
Holly Higgins, "A Bomb for the Ummah," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 2 (March/April 2003;
available at http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/ma03/ma03albright.html as of 2 January 2007), pp. 49-55.
17 See, for example, Christopher F. Chyba, Hal Feiveson, and Frank Von Hippel, Preventing Nuclear
Prohferation and Terrorism: Essential Steps to Reduce the Availability of Nuclear-Explosive Materials (Palo
Alto, Cal.: Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford Institute for International Studies,
Stanford University and Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University, 2005; available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20855/
Prvnt Nuc _Prif _andNucTrror_2005-0407.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
38 Anna M. Pluta and Peter D. Zimmerman, "Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent," Survival 48, no. 2
(Summer 2006); Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis, "The Bomb in the Backyard," Foreign Policy, no.
157 (November/December 2006), pp. 32-39.
39 See, for example, Jeffrey Boutwell, Francesco Calogero, and Jack Harris, "Nuclear Terrorism: The Danger of
Highly Enriched Uranium," Pugwash Issue Briefs 2, no. 1 (September 2002; available at
http://www.pugwash.org/publication/pb/sept2002.pdf as of 3 April 2006); Morten Bremer Maerli, Crude Nukes
on the Loose? Preventing Nuclear Terrorism by Means of Optimum Nuclear Husbandry, Transparency, and
Non-Intrusive Fissile Material Verification (Oslo: Unipub AS, 2004; available at http://www.nupi.no/IPS/
filestore/MBM dissertation2004.pdf as of 4 April 2006); Frank Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Nation Books, 2004); Annette Schaper, "Nuclear Terrorism:
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analysis by Michael Levi is forthcoming. 40 There has also been a wide range of skeptical
analyses downplaying the risk over this period.41
There are many varieties of terrorism and of terrorist groups, with a wide range of
motivations and methods. This dissertation is not the place for a complete analysis of the
causes and risks of terrorism generally and how to reduce them; nor is it the place to debate
the age-old question of who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter. Most terrrorist groups
are focused on local issues and have modest capabilities; as a result, most terrorist groups
have little potential for escalating to the nuclear level of violence. In this dissertation, I
simply assume that use or threatened use of a nuclear bomb by a sub-national group
constitutes nuclear terrorism, and that any sub-national group that would engage in such
activity can fairly be described as terrorists.
This literature qualitatively assessing the nuclear terrorism threat is already rich. In
this dissertation, I draw on this literature and new research to provide an integrated discussion
of the key issues in a single chapter, with an updated assessment of the threat as it has evolved
in recent years.
By contrast, there have been only a modest number of attempts to model
mathematically the global risks of nuclear theft and terrorism, perhaps because of the
immense uncertainties in doing so. One model currently used to estimate terrorism risks for
the insurance industry includes nuclear terrorism among many other terrorist threats to
insured properties; but because it is a commercial product, none of its methods and
assumptions have been made publicly available. Some previous mathematical models of
nuclear terrorist risks assumed that each facility with potential bomb material had a fixed
probability of theft, so that the total probability increased linearly with deployment of more
facilities, 4 or that the risk posed by each category of nuclear material was proportional to the
Risk Analysis after 9/11," Disarmament Forum, no. 2 (2003; available at http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-
art1907.pdf as of 4 April 2006).
40 Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
41 See, for example, Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism Is Not the Core Problem"; Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great
Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy (Fall 1998; available at http://jya.com/superterror.htm as of 4 April
2006); Robin M. Frost, "Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11," Adelphi Papers, no. 378 (2005).
42 For two notable recent overviews, see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2006); Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Netvorks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2004).
43 For a general overview of the conceptual approach used in this model, developed by Gordon Woo and
colleagues at the firm Risk Management Solutions, see Gordon Woo, "Quantitative Terrorism Risk
Assessment," Journal of Risk Finance 4, no. 1 (October 2002; available at http://www.rms.com/NewsPress/
QuantitativeTerrorismRiskAssessment.pdf as of 22 May 2006). Somewhat more detail on some of the
terrorist scenarios included in the model can be found in Henry H. Willis et al., Estimating Terrorism Risk (Santa
Monica, Cal.: RAND, 2005; available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RANDMG388.pdf as of
6 May 2006).
44 Roger E. Avedon, "On the Future of Civilian Plutonium: An Assessment of Technological Impediments to
Nuclear Terrorism and Proliferation" (Ph.D. dissertation, Engineering Economic Systems and Operations
Research, Stanford, 1997).
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quantity of material in that category.4 5 The model presented here is simpler in its
mathematics than some previous models, but more realistic in its assumptions. It assumes
that there are a limited number of plausible nuclear terrorist groups who undertake a limited
number of attempts to acquire nuclear weapons or materials. This means that the relationship
between the risk and the quantity of facilities or materials is much less direct than in previous
models. The model presented here is more closely tied to past experience with the different
parameters than previous models and is focused specifically on its use for analyzing the
effectiveness of policy responses along the entire chain from the formation of groups capable
enough to contemplate nuclear terrorism to managing the consequences of a terrorist nuclear
explosion.
Identifying the Highest-Priority Risks of Nuclear Theft
The literature on this subject is thin. Previous authors have not attempted to lay out
systematic approaches to considering whether a facility in one country poses a higher or lower
risk than a different type of facility in another.
Indeed, it is a remarkable fact that no government or non-government study has yet
undertaken an in-depth effort to assess where the greatest risks of nuclear theft are worldwide.
(The first introduction to the general approach presented in this dissertation appeared in
2004's Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor Action, mentioned above.) No database exists
anywhere in the world, classified or unclassified, that includes all the essential elements of
such an assessment: estimates of all the facilities worldwide where nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable nuclear material exist; how much material, of what types, is at these facilities;
the quality of the security and accounting arrangements at these facilities; and the levels of
terrorist and criminal threats that these facilities face. There are, however, a variety of
databases, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the U.S. government, and
elsewhere, that contain pieces of this information. The U.S. Department of Energy has come
closest to putting together an integrated assessment, with a list of the facilities believed to
contain weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide, estimates of the amount at each facility,
and simple high-medium-low ratings for the quality of the material and the security level at
each site.4 6 The IAEA has detailed data on how much nuclear material, of what types, exists
at all safeguarded facilities around the world - but this does not include data on security
arrangements or on threats, and it excludes nearly all facilities in nuclear weapon states,
where most of the world's potential nuclear bomb material resides. Thus, laying out this
systematic approach to identifying the highest-priority facilities - and then using what
publicly available data exist to take a first cut at applying the method to a few countries as
examples - is a major contribution of this dissertation.
For decades, governments around the world have considered how the factors of
material quantity and material quality affect the risks that theft of these materials would pose
45 See Edwin Zebrowski, "Analysis of Risks of Diversion of Plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium,"
reproduced in Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Conversion of Research and Test Reactors to
Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Fuel, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 25
September 1984, pp. 60-74.
46 Interview with DOE official, November 2005.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 1
and on that basis have made decisions about what levels of security and safeguards to apply to
different types and quantities of nuclear material. In the Convention on Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, for example, and in the IAEA recommendations on physical protection,
there are tables that categorize nuclear material in three different categories of risk, with
Category I requiring the most intensive security and accounting measures.4 7 Any stockpile
containing more than 2 kilograms of unirradiated plutonium, or more than 5 kilograms of
uranium-235 contained in uranium enriched to 20% or more, is considered Category I
material in this approach.
Many countries have based their own domestic approaches to categorization on these
international standards, but others (including both the United States and Russia) have
implemented somewhat different approaches, which reflect a different assessment of the risks
posed by particular types of nuclear materials. In the U.S. Department of Energy system, for
example, a wide range of materials containing large amounts of plutonium and HEU that
terrorists might well be able to process for use in a nuclear weapon are placed in a category
requiring only modest security, because they contain less than 10 percent plutonium or U-235
by weight. This would include, for example, fresh plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX)
fuels and HEU research reactor fuels. There is an extensive literature, much of it from the
U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories, describing arguments for and against the quantity and
quality thresholds in the international standards and the standards used in the United States,
but much of that literature is classified or otherwise unavailable. Fortunately, for this
dissertation, I have been able to acquire a number of the underlying source documents relating
to these issues from within the U.S. government and have been able to acquire more
information through interviews.48 Substantial modifications to the U.S. categorization
approach, bringing it more closely in line with international approaches, are among the major
recommendations of that chapter of this dissertation.
Some approaches have also integrated evaluations of the effectiveness of security at a
site with assessments of the quantity and quality of the material there, into an overall
assessment of risk. At the facilities managed by the U.S. Department of Energy, for example,
security rules do require comparative assessments of overall nuclear theft risk, based on the
types and quantities of material present and the estimated effectiveness of each facility's
47 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (Vienna: IAEA, 1999; available at http://www.iaea.or.at/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.htmI as of 22 December 2006); International Atomic
Energy Agency, The Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/274/Rev. I (Vienna:
IAEA, 1980; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274rl.shtml as of 29
July 2005).
48 In particular, although various orders relating to nuclear security and accounting have been issued much more
recently, as of 2006 the document that still provided the underlying basis for determining which materials should
be put in which category within the U.S. Department of Energy system was U.S. Department of Energy, Guide
to Implementation of DOE 5633.3b, "Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials" (Washington, D.C.:
DOE, 1995).
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security and accounting systems.49 These estimates rely on systematic vulnerability
assessment methodologies originally developed in the 1970s and refined substantially since
then. These assessments are based on a conceptual approach similar to that which will be
outlined in this dissertation, but they are based on one overall threat estimate (the "design
basis threat") for the entire United States. No attempt has been made to assess threats as a
probabilistic spectrum of different possibilities, or to assess threats comparatively on a global
basis to determine where the highest priorities are for improving nuclear security to keep
nuclear material out of terrorist hands. The probabilistic approach to assessing threats is
another major contribution of this dissertation.
Of course, for such a global assessment, information about the level of security at
different sites is critical. The data on this subject that is publicly available is very limited, as
nearly every country regards the specifics of its nuclear security arrangements as closely
guarded secrets. The United States openly publishes more about its nuclear security
arrangements than any other country and has a particularly active group of non-government
organizations and reporters regularly finding and publishing additional information which had
not necessarily been intended for public release. While some specifics remain classified, by
combining published sources with interviews it is possible to gain a reasonably detailed
understanding of the state of nuclear security at many U.S. nuclear facilities.
In the former Soviet Union, the secrecy surrounding nuclear security is much more
extensive, but after more than a decade of international cooperation to improve security and
accounting arrangements, U.S. and other international experts have learned a great deal about
some aspects of nuclear security. A considerable amount of important information has been
openly published by either U.S. or Russian participants in these cooperative efforts,' and by
combining this information with interviews, a reasonable overview of the situation can be
developed, though significant gaps in the picture remain.52 Publicly available information on
4 For a brief discussion of these assessments, see, for example,U.S. Congress, Government Accountability
Office, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis
Threat (GAO, 200423 December 2006).
5 For some recent examples, see Project on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at
Risk (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2001; available at http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-0 I 1003-nuclear.html
as of 4 December 2006); Project on Government Oversight, Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voicesfrom inside
the Fences (Washington D.C.: POGO, 2002; available at http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-02090 1-
nukepower.html as of 2 January 2007); Project on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex:
Homeland Security Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2005; available at http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ho-
050301 -consolidation.html as of 30 December 2006); Daniel Hirsch, David Lochbaum, and Edwin Lyman, "The
Nrc's Dirty Little Secret," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (May/June 2003; available at
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art 
_ofn=mj03hirsch as of 5 February 2006), pp. 44-51; Daniel Hirsch,
"The NRC: What, Me Worry?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 1 (January/February 2002; available at
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.phpartofn=jf02hirsch as of 8 January 2007), pp. 38-44.
5 See, for example, the papers included in the proceedings of the annual meetings of the Institute for Nuclear
Materials Management, from 1997 to the present.
52 For an example of such overviews, see Matthew Bunn, "The Threat in Russia and the Newly Independent
States," in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington,
D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006; available at
http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/threat/russia.asp as of 2 January 2007).
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practices in most other countries is less detailed, but many countries have made public
presentations about their nuclear security approaches at a series of international conferences
and workshops in recent years, and these, too, can be supplemented with interviews.53
Finally, there is the problem of assessing the threat levels in different countries.
Threats that could lead to nuclear theft include terrorist activity, violent and organized crime
activity, and government corruption. Low pay and morale among nuclear workers, along with
insufficient funding for nuclear facilities, could contribute to the threat of insider theft. This
dissertation relies on published indices of terrorist activity, crime, and corruption (some of
which are prepared to help businesses assess the crime and terrorism risks they face in
different countries, which are closely related to nuclear theft risks) as indicators of the level of
theft threat in different countries; 54 in the absence of published data on pay for nuclear
workers and guards, this dissertation uses per capita gross domestic product (adjusted for
purchasing power parity) as a rough proxy for likely pay scales and the levels of resources
likely to be available to fund nuclear facilities.
Understanding the Global Nuclear Security System - and Assessing
Tools for Change
Over the years, there have been a number of assessments of particular programs at
particular times, generally focused on how to overcome specific issues within that program at
that moment.5 Some analyses have sought to review the record of one particular policy tool
5 See, for example, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Comparative Analysis ofApproaches to
Protection of Fissile Materials: Proceedings of a Workshop at Stanford University, 28-30 July 1997 (Livermore,
Cal.: LLNL, 1997); International Atomic Energy Agency, ed., Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials:
Experience in Regulation, Implementation, and Operations, Vienna, 10-14 November (V ienna: I A EA, 1997);
International Atomic Energy Agency, Security of Material: Measures to Prevent, Intercept, and Respond to
Illicit Uses of Nuclear Material and Radioactive Sources: Proceedings of a Conference in Stockholm, Sweden, 7-
11 May 2001 (Vienna: IAEA, 2001); International Atomic Energy Agency, Proceedings of the Symposium on
International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna, 29 October-2 November 2001
(Vienna: IAEA, 2001); Fritz Steinhausler, ed., Proceedings of Strengthening Global Practicesfor Protecting
Nuclear Material: Eu-High Level Scientific International Conference on Physical Protection, Salzburg, Austria,
8-13 September (Salzburg, Austria: University of Salzburg, 2002; available at http://www.numat.at/
list%20o0 /o2Opapers/gesamtproceedings.pdf as of 4 December 2006).
54 See, for example, Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 (Berlin: TI, 2004; available
at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/1532/7971 /file/media pack en.pdf as of 16 November 2006);
Transparency International, Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004
(Berlin: TI, 2004; available at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/1558/8065/file/
barometerreport_8_1 22004.pdf as of 13 December 2006); Guy Dunn, WMRC Global Terrorism Index
2003/2004 (London: World Markets Research Centre, 2003).
ss Many of these programs, for example, have been assessed at one time or another by the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, or other official or semi-official groups. As two
recent examples, see U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional
Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate US. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO-03-482
(Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2003; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03482.pdf as of 4 March 2005);
U.S Committee on Strengthening U.S. and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Research
Council, and Russian Committee on Strengthening U.S. and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Strengthening US.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2005; available at http://fermat.nap.edu/catalog/l 1302.html as of 2
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- from technical cooperation to install modem security and accounting systems at particular
sites, to efforts to negotiate more stringent global nuclear security standards - and to draw
lessons for making that tool more effective in the future.s6 But no previous analysis has
attempted to compare the record of different policy tools for improving nuclear security using
a consistent set of criteria, to learn lessons about which tools are most effective under which
circumstances. Moreover, there has been no previous effort to describe and assess the myriad
approaches to nuclear security that exist worldwide and their interconnections as a complex
global system, to help clarify how the performance of that system might be improved. Thus,
another major contribution of this dissertation is to provide an analysis of the structure of the
global nuclear security system and to combine that understanding with the history of past
efforts to improve nuclear security, generating at least preliminary judgments about which
policy tools are likely to be most effective in the future.
Boundaries and Limitations of the Study
This dissertation does not cover all the different possible types of nuclear terrorism,
from dispersal of radioactive material in a so-called "dirty bomb," to sabotage of a major
January 2007). There is also a large literature of academic and non-government-organization assessments of
particular programs in these areas. See, for example, the assessments of dozens of these programs (with
annotated links to the best information on them available on the internet) in Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier,
Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.:
Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative; available at
http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb as of 3 April 2006). For further examples, in addition to the annual
Securing the Bomb series cited above, see James Clay Moltz, "Special Report: Assessing U.S. Nonproliferation
Assistance in the NIS," Nonproliferation Review 7, no. I (Spring 2000 2000; available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol07/71toc.htm as of 4 December 2006); John M. Shields and William C. Potter,
Dismantling the Cold War: U.S. And NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to
Control Warheads and Fissile Material (Washington, D.C.: Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University,
and Non-Proliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/FullNextWave.pdf as of 2 January 2007); Matthew
Bunn and John P. Holdren, "Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United States and the Former
Soviet Union," Annual Review of Energy & the Environment 22, no. 1 (1997; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/mmup.pdf as of 6 February 2006).
56 For analyses of lessons learned from U.S.-Russian technical cooperation to install security upgrades, see, for
example, Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Kenneth N. Luongo, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations
for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Russian
American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2000; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/
documents/mpca2000.pdf as of 2 January 2007); Caitlin Talmadge, "Striking a Balance: The Lessons of U.S.-
Russian Materials Security Cooperation," Nonproliferation Review 12, no. 1 (March 2005; available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol12/121/12ltalmadge.pdf as of 2 November 2005); Matthew Bunn, "Cooperation
to Secure Nuclear Stockpiles: A Case of Constrained Innovation," Innovations 1, no. 1 (2006; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/INNOVOI10 lCooperationtoSecureNuclearStockpiles.p
df as of 4 April 2006). For analyses of efforts to impose tighter international standards for nuclear security, see,
for example, Bonnie Jenkins, "Establishing International Standards for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,"
Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 3 (Spring-Summer 1998; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/53/
jenkin53.pdf as of 19 July 2005); George Bunn, "Raising International Standards for Protecting Nuclear
Materials from Theft and Sabotage," Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000; available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol07/72/72bunn.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
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nuclear facility, to simple hoaxes. 57 These are real dangers that also have to be addressed; but
for reasons of time and resources, I have chosen to focus here only on preventing terrorists
from accomplishing the most devastating form of nuclear terrorism, the use of an actual
nuclear explosive. Similarly, this study does not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis
of everything that ought to be done to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons terrorism - from
offensive action against terrorist groups with potential nuclear ambitions to improved ability
to respond and recover in the event of such an attack - though the full spectrum of such
policies can be assessed using the mathematical model presented here, and the dissertation
does present some initial thoughts about initial actions that might be possible at each point in
the terrorist pathway to the bomb.58 Nor does this analysis cover everything that should be
done to improve the management of nuclear weapons and materials around the world - from
comprehensive declaration and monitoring of such stockpiles, to ending further production of
such dangerous commodities, to reducing the excess stockpiles that already exist.59 Instead, it
focuses primarily on ensuring that these stockpiles are effectively secured and accounted for.
This dissertation will make the case that this is the single point on the terrorist pathway to the
bomb where policy measures can accomplish the biggest reductions in the overall risk of
nuclear terrorism.
The limitations of available data and resources inevitably imposed significant
constraints on this study. As already noted, the specific measures taken to secure nuclear
stockpiles and facilities are closely guarded secrets in most countries of the world; hence, data
on the specific security measures in place at different facilities is spotty at best, available
primarily from actual visits to such facilities and discussions with others who have
participated in such visits. The number of nuclear facilities (and other types of guarded
facilities) I could visit during the period of the study was limited both by time and resources
and by the requirement to get official permissions for such visits, which are generally not
forthcoming for particularly sensitive nuclear facilities. (In Russia, in particular, facilities that
were quite open to visits by foreign academics in 1992-2000 are now generally off-limits to
people not participating in officially sponsored nuclear cooperation.) Nevertheless, after more
than a decade of work on these issues, I am confident that I have compiled sufficient
information to make a contribution to clarifying the key issues the world faces in attempting
5 For a recent account that includes these other types of nuclear terrorism, see Ferguson and Potter, The Four
Faces of Nuclear Terrorism.
58 For an earlier attempt to describe each step terrorists would have to take to get to the point of being able to
detonate a nuclear bomb in a major city and the steps that governments could take to try to block these steps
(dubbed "Blocking the Terrorist Pathway to the Bomb"), see Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear
Warheads and Materials, pp. 20-32.
5 For accounts of the status of these other issues and programs to address them, see Bunn and Wier, Nuclear
Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb. See also International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global
Fissile Material 2006: Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (Princeton, N.J.: Program on
Science and Global Security, Princeton University, 2006; available at http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/
site-down/ipfmreport06.pdf as of 24 January 2007). That report is the first of an expected annual series. For a
very recent account of potential regimes for monitoring total stockpiles of nuclear warheads and materials, see
U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Monitoring
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2005;
available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/I1265.html as of 8 August 2005).
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 1
to ensure that all nuclear stockpiles are effectively secured and accounted for. More
information on certain key points would surely change the picture painted here at the margins,
but the broad outlines would, I believe, remain the same.
Because of limitations of time and space, this dissertation provides only a brief first
cut at describing the history of the development of the global nuclear security system and the
factors that caused security upgrades to be undertaken in particular countries and particular
times (and that constrained those improvements from going farther than they did). This is an
area of ongoing research. For similar reasons, this dissertation does not go into great depth on
two areas that are critical to the future of nuclear security efforts: how to ensure that
heightened nuclear security measures will be sustained over time, and how to select, train, and
motivate staff to ensure that they give security the priority it deserves, forging an effective
"security culture." Excellent recent treatments of both sustainability and security culture are
available, 60 but there is considerably more research to be done.
This study is inevitably from an American perspective, and it must be acknowledged
that the perspective in the United States - which probably spends more on nuclear security
and has more stringent rules for securing its stockpiles than any other country in the world
and has probably the highest levels in the world of both public and elite concern over the
possibility of terrorist use of nuclear explosives - is quite different from the perspective in
many other countries.
Definitions
Only a few terms used in this dissertation require defining up-front:
Nuclear security and accounting. When I use the phrase nuclear security or security
for nuclear stockpiles, I am usually referring to the whole complex of measures designed to
reduce the probability of theft of nuclear weapons or materials from a particular facility or
transport leg. Most important among these are the measures often referred to as physical
protection, such as fences, intrusion detectors, guard forces, walls, vaults, and the like, which
are intended to detect, delay, and defeat actions by adversaries to steal nuclear weapons or
materials. Nuclear security, as used here, also includes what is sometimes known as
personnel reliability and access control measures - steps to limit access to particular facilities
or areas to individuals whose trustworthiness has been reviewed and who have been granted
appropriate clearances, and to continuously review the trustworthiness of cleared personnel.
Nuclear security, as used here, can also include those measures of material control and
accounting (MC&A) that are most relevant to preventing theft - though on occasion I also use
the phrase nuclear security and accounting, in contexts where the inclusion of the accounting
measures is especially important. MC&A includes approaches to accurately measuring and
60 See, for example, Igor Khripunov and James Holmes, eds., Nuclear Security Culture: The Case of Russia
(Athens, Georgia: Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia, 2004; available at
http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/Security%20Culture%2OReport%2020041 118.pdf as of 18 February
2005); Committee on Indigenization of Programs to Prevent Leakage of Plutonium and Highly Enriched
Uranium from Russian Facilities, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia, National Research Council,
Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 2005; available at http://fermat.nap.edu/catalog/l 1377.html as of 4 April 2006).
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 1
keeping account of nuclear materials on-hand, so that any substantial removal of nuclear
material would be noticed. It also includes material control measures, such as tags, seals,
security cameras, and the like, intended to ensure that any removal or unauthorized access
would be detected, ideally in real time. Combined, the whole system of physical protection
and MC&A technologies is referred to as material protection, control, and accounting
(MPC&A). While police, intelligence, and related measures play an important role in
reducing the probability that large conspiracies to steal nuclear material can carry out their
plans without being detected and disrupted, and complement the security and accounting
measures taken at individual sites, the activities involved in police and intelligence measures
are quite different and I treat them separately in this dissertation, rather than including them in
the general term "nuclear security."
Weapons-usable nuclear material. In this dissertation, I use the term weapons-usable
nuclear material to refer to material that contains material capable of supporting the fast-
critical nuclear chain reaction required for a nuclear explosive without further enrichment, in
forms that are not so radioactive that they would require complex remote-handling equipment
to process the material into a form usable in a nuclear bomb. Here, the term has essentially
the same meaning as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) term unirradiated
direct-use nuclear material.61 The principal materials concerned are HEU (defined both in
the United States and internationally as uranium containing 20 percent or more the isotope U-
235),62 and plutonium separated from fission products (in essentially any mix of isotopes
except those with extremely high concentrations of the isotope Pu-238).63 Weapons-grade
material refers to plutonium or HEU that has the mix of isotopes that weapon designers
prefer, typically more than 90% U-235 in the case of HEU, or more than 90% Pu-239 in the
case of plutonium; a much wider range of mixtures, however, are weapons-usable, even with
no more sophistication than needed to make a bomb from weapon-grade material, and
therefore of concern in addressing the risk of nuclear terrorism. 64 U-233 is also recognized as
61 The IAEA defines direct-use material as HEU, plutonium containing less than 80% Pu-238, and U-233.
Unirradiated direct-use material is material which "does not contain substantial amounts of fission products" and
hence "would require less time and effort to be converted to components of nuclear explosive devices."
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary (Vienna: IAEA, 2001; available at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/Start.pdf as of 19 July 2005), p. 33. For purposes of physical
protection against theft, the IAEA defines any material emitting more than 100 rad/hr at one meter as
"irradiated," and hence requiring less stringent security. International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical
Protection ofNuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the 100 rad/hr at I
meter standard (also used in U.S. regulations and in many national regulations around the world) should be
reconsidered in light of current, post-9/1 I threats.
62International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, p. 32. In principle, nuclear explosives can
be fabricated from uranium at enrichments below 20 percent, but the amounts required are quite large. See
Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of how the isotopic content of uranium affects the ease or difficulty of
using it in nuclear explosives.
63 In IAEA practice, all plutonium except plutonium including 80% or more of Pu-238 requires safeguards.
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, p. 17. Chapter 4 provides a more detailed
discussion of how the isotopic content of plutonium affects the ease or difficulty of using it in nuclear
explosives.
64 See Chapter 4 for an extended discussion of the barriers to making nuclear explosives posed by different mixes
of uranium and plutonium isotopes.
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weapons-usable in international practice, and there are a range of other isotopes which could
be used to fabricate nuclear explosives.65 Mixtures containing these materials that could be
chemically separated without remote handling, such as uranium-plutonium mixed oxide
(MOX) fuel, or uranium-aluminum research reactor fuel, are included in the term "weapons-
usable nuclear material."
Nuclear weapons, nuclear bombs, and nuclear explosives. In this dissertation, I
generally use the term nuclear explosive to refer to any device capable of generating a
substantial nuclear blast. I usually use the term nuclear weapons to refer only to the relatively
sophisticated nuclear explosives designed and built by states, generally intended to meet
specified standards for yield, reliability, and safety, and sometimes intended to be small, light,
and rugged enough to be launched on a ballistic missile or fired from a cannon. I use the term
nuclear bomb, by contrast, to refer to the relatively crude kinds of nuclear explosive that a
terrorist group might be able to devise, which would probably be large and heavy and have
unknown yield and reliability.
Plan of the Study
Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides a qualitative assessment of the global risks of
nuclear theft and terrorism, including:
" publicly available information concerning terrorist attempts to acquire nuclear weapons
and materials (and, to a lesser extent, the efforts of selected states to acquire stolen nuclear
materials for their weapons programs);
* the danger that terrorists could succeed in getting a stolen nuclear bomb or the plutonium
or HEU needed to make one;
* the size, distribution, and rates of change of global nuclear stockpiles; and
* current approaches to securing and accounting for these stockpiles and how they vary
from country to country.
This chapter also provides the essential background material supporting the remainder
of the dissertation
Chapter 3 introduces the mathematical model of the global risk of nuclear terrorism,
assessing each of the parameters of the model in detail. Chapter 4 then develops and applies
the risk-based framework for identifying and prioritizing those nuclear facilities posing the
highest risks. Chapter 5 analyzes the complex global system for securing nuclear stockpiles
and assesses the record of different policy tools for improving the performance of this system.
Finally, Chapter 6 offers conclusions and recommendations.
The single most important factor that has to change if high and lasting standards of
security for the world's nuclear stockpiles are to be achieved is that world leaders -
beginning, but not limited to, the presidents of the United States and Russia - will have to
develop a sense of urgency and decide to devote themselves to getting this job done. This
65 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of these other potentially weapons-usable isotopes.
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dissertation, however, is not intended primarily as a call to action - other publications have
66served that purpose. 6 Rather, this dissertation is intended to explore what the experience
gained so far suggests about what these leaders should do, if and when they decide to take
further action.
66 See, for example, Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005; Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate
Preventable Catastrophe.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 1
2. The Global Threat of Nuclear Theft and Terrorism: A
Qualitative Assessment
This chapter describes the current global threat of nuclear theft and nuclear terrorism.
The facts that frame this danger, each of which will be discussed in turn, are stark:
* Terrorist groups and hostile states are actively seeking stolen nuclear weapons and
materials and actively seeking to recruit nuclear expertise.
* Making at least a crude nuclear bomb is potentially within the capability of a capable
and well-organized terrorist group, if they could get the needed nuclear material.
Getting such material could also shave years off the time required for a hostile state to
get a nuclear weapon - and make the remaining activities needed to do so very
difficult to detect.
* Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and enough weapons-usable nuclear material to
make hundreds of thousands more exist in the world. These stockpiles are located in
hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries.
* Security and accounting arrangements for these nuclear stockpiles range from
excellent to appalling, with no binding global security standards in place. Weapons-
usable nuclear material that is not sufficiently secure to protect against the threats that
terrorists and criminals have proved they can pose exists in dozens of countries around
the world.
* As a result of these conditions, a substantial number of incidents of actual theft of
weapons-usable nuclear material have occurred.
There is no convincing evidence, however, that any terrorist group or proliferating
state has yet received a stolen nuclear weapon or stolen weapons-usable nuclear material.
Indeed, both al Qaeda and the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, the two terrorist groups that have
made the most substantial efforts to acquire nuclear weapons to date, have encountered a
variety of difficulties, demonstrating that nuclear weapons and the materials and expertise
needed to make them are difficult to acquire, even for large and well-financed terrorist groups
with ample technical resources.
The Demand for Black-Market Nuclear Material and Expertise
None of the confirmed cases of seizures of stolen nuclear material includes clear
evidence of a particular buyer - whether a state seeking nuclear weapons or a terrorist group.
This section is largely drawn from Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, with Joshua Friedman, "The Demand for
Black Market Fissile Material," in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge,
Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2005; available at
http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/threat/demand.asp as of 2 January 2007). On the lack of clear connections
to buyers in the known cases, see, for example, Rensselaer Lee, Nuclear Smuggling and International Terrorism:
Issues and Optionsfor US. Policy, RL31539 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2002);
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Nevertheless, there is significant evidence that both terrorist groups and states hostile to U.S.
interests have sought stolen nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials and have
attempted to recruit nuclear-weapons expertise. Indeed, there are disturbing indications that
demand for stolen nuclear weapons or materials may be becoming more focused and
sophisticated and may be coming closer to overcoming the gap between buyers and potential
sellers. These indications include:
" Incidents of terrorist teams carrying out reconnaissance at nuclear weapon storage
sites and on nuclear weapon transport trains in Russia, whose locations and schedules
are state secrets; 2
" Reports that the 41 heavily armed terrorists who seized hundreds of hostages at a
theater in Moscow in October 2002 considered seizing the Kurchatov Institute, a site
with enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for dozens of nuclear weapons;3 and
* The 2003 criminal case involving a Russian businessman who was offering $750,000
for stolen weapon-grade plutonium for sale to a foreign client - and succeeded in
making contact with residents of the closed city of Sarov, home of Russia's equivalent
of Los Alamos, to try to close the deal.4
Rensselaer Lee, "Nuclear Smuggling: Patterns and Responses," Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly
(Spring 2003; available at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/lee.pdf as of 5 December
2005).
2 The incidents involving warhead sites were confirmed publicly by Lt. Gen. Igor Valynkin, commander of the
12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense (often known by its Russian acronym as the 12th
GUMO), charged with guarding and managing Russia's nuclear weapons. See, for example, Pavel Koryashkin,
"Russian Nuclear Ammunition Depots Well Protected - Official," ITAR-TASS, 25 October 2001; "Russia: Terror
Groups Scoped Nuke Site," Associated Press, 25 October 2001. Valynkin has also brought up these incidents in
private discussions with U.S. officials. (Interview with U.S. defense contractor expert, February 2004.) The
incidents involving warhead transport trains were reported by the Russian state newspaper. See Vladimir
Bogdanov, "Propusk K Beogolovkam Nashli U Terrorista (a Pass to Warheads Found on a Terrorist),"
Rossiskaya Gazeta, 1 November 2002. (It is worth noting that the title of this article is unduly sensationalistic -
the pass the title refers to would have entitled the Chechen nationalist who possessed it to access to the closed
nuclear city of Lesnoy, site of a major nuclear weapon assembly and disassembly facility, but not to the facility
itself. He had the pass because he had once lived in Lesnoy, when his father worked at the facility; that the pass
was not revoked or retrieved when the father's employment came to an end clearly reflects a problem in
management of such passes.)
3 Bogdanov, "A Pass to Warheads Found on a Terrorist." Bogdanov attributes this information to sources in the
Russian security services. By this account, the terrorists' idea was to seize a reactor and threaten to blow it up,
rather than to seize HEU; the terrorists reportedly concluded that it would be easier to seize the less-well-
defended theater.
4 For summaries of Russian press reports on this case, see Matthew Bunn, "Anecdotes of Insecurity," in Nuclear
Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on
Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at
http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/threat/anecdote.asp as of 2 January 2007); "Plutonium Con Artists
Sentenced in Russian Closed City of Sarov," NIS Export Control Observer (November 2003; available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/pdfs/ob_031 le.pdf as of 23 December 2006). See in particular "Russian Court
Sentences Men for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Scam," trans. BBC Monitoring Service, RIA Novosti, 14 October
2003; "Russia: Criminals Indicted for Selling Mercury as Weapons-Grade Plutonium," trans. U.S. Department of
Commerce, Izvestiya, 11 October 2003.
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To organize the discussion of such incidents, this section focuses, as important recent
examples of demand for stolen nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials, on: (a)
al Qaeda and the global jihadist movement it has spawned; (b) Aum Shinryikyo (now known
as Aleph); (c) Chechen terrorist groups; (d) Iraq, prior to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein;
and (e) Iran. This list of cases is not intended to cover the entire universe of possible
recipients of stolen nuclear weapons and materials, but only to convince the reader that there
are both terrorist groups and states that have actively sought these items.
Al Qaeda and the Global Jihadist Network
Most terrorist groups have no interest in threatening or committing large-scale nuclear
destruction. Focused on local issues, seeking to become the governments of the areas now
controlled by their enemies (and thus not wanting to destroy those areas), needing to build
political support that might be undermined by the horror and wanton destruction of innocent
life that would result from a nuclear attack, all but a few terrorist groups probably would not
want to get and use a nuclear bomb even if they could readily do so.5
There are, however, a few dangerous exceptions that do seek to cause mass destruction
and might be able to put together the capability to do so. Al Qaeda and the global jihadist
network it has spawned are at the top of this list. On September 11, 2001, they permanently
put to rest the complacent belief that those crazy enough to want to kill large numbers of
people would be crazy enough to be unable to put together the means to do so. They are
focused, not on a local battle for which the immense power of nuclear weapons might be seen
as unnecessary, but on a global struggle, in which nuclear weapons might well be seen as
essential instruments. Bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist network have made their own
desire for nuclear weapons for use against the United States and its allies explicit, by both
word and deed. Bin Laden has called the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
s For discussions, see, for example, Amy Sands, "The Nuclear Terrorists: Who, Why, and How Capable," in
Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling, The
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling (Monterey, Cal.:
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004; available at
http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_4faces.pdf as of 2 January 2007); Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism:
The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004), pp. 19-42; Jessica
Stem, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Richard A. Falkenrath,
Robert Newman, and Bradley Thayer, America 's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism
and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism and WMD: Some
Preliminary Hypotheses," Nonproliferation Review 4, no. 3 (1997; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/
vol04/43/hoffma43.pdf as of 2 January 2007); Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessmentfor the
21st Century (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999); Brian M. Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? A
Reappraisal," in The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millenium, ed. Harvey W. Kushner (London:
Sage, 1998).
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a "religious duty."6 Al Qaeda has been seeking to buy stolen nuclear weapons or nuclear
material and to recruit nuclear expertise for more than a decade.
Al Qaeda has gone to considerable lengths to justify to its supporters and audiences the
use of mass violence, including the mass killing of innocent civilians, and they have explicitly
set inflicting the maximum possible level of damage on the United States and its allies as one
of their organizational goals. Intercepted al Qaeda communications reportedly have referred
to inflicting a "Hiroshima" on the United States.8 Al Qaeda's spokesman, Sulaiman Abu
Ghaith, has argued that the group "has the right to kill 4 million Americans - 2 million of
them children," in retaliation for the deaths the group believes the United States and Israel
have inflicted on Muslims.9 Bin Laden sought and received a religious ruling (faiwa) from an
extreme Saudi cleric in May 2003 authorizing the use of weapons of mass destruction to kill
American civilians - indeed, arguing that such use was morally obligatory if it was judged a
military necessity. Then-Attorney General John Ashcroft quoted from the ruling in June 2003
before the House Judiciary Committee: "If a bomb that killed 10 million of them and burned
as much of their land as they have burned Muslims land were dropped on them, it would be
permissible."' 0
6 6 Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Interview with Bin Laden: World's Most Wanted Terrorist" (ABC News, 1999;
available at http://www.islamistwatch.org/blogger/localstories/05-06-03/ABCInterview.html as of 5 January
2007).
7 For useful accounts of al Qaeda's nuclear efforts, see, for example, David Albright, "Al Qaeda's Nuclear
Program: Through the Window of Seized Documents," Nautilus Institute Special Forum 47 (2002; available at
http://www.nautilus.org/archives/fora/Special-Policy-Forum/47_Albright.html as of 2 January 2007); David
Albright, Kathryn Buehler, and Holly Higgins, "Bin Laden and the Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58,
no. 1 (January/February 2002; available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/
binladenandbomb.pdf as of 2 January 2007), pp. 23-24; Sara Daly, John Parachini, and William Rosenau, Aum
Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear
Terrorism (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, 2005; available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/documentedbriefings/
2005/RANDDB458.sum.pdf as of 5 January 2007). For a quick summary of open reporting on al Qaeda's
efforts, see Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Program, "Chart: Al Qa'ida's WMD Activities"
(Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 13 May
2005; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/other/sjmcht.htm as of 23 May 2006). For a useful discussion of the
early days of al Qaeda's efforts, see text and sources in Gavin Cameron, "Multitrack Microproliferation: Lessons
from Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22, no. 4 (October-December 1999).
8 See James Risen and Steven Engelberg, "Signs of Change in Terror Goals Went Unheeded," New York Times,
14 October 2001. For an interesting discussion of the frequency with which top al Qaeda operatives express their
desire for nuclear weapons, see Steve Coll, "What Bin Laden Sees in Hiroshima," Washington Post, 6 February
2005.
9 Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, in a series of articles published on an al Qaeda website under the title In the Shadow of
the Lances, in mid-2002. The series explained al Qaeda's justification for mass killing in general and the
September 11 attacks in particular. I am relying here on the translation of selected passages provided in "'Why
We Fight America': Al-Qa'ida Spokesman Explains September I 1 and Declares Intentions to Kill 4 Million
Americans with Weapons of Mass Destruction," MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) Special
Dispatch, no. 388 (2002; available at http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area-sd&ID=SP38802
as of 4 April 2006). Abu Ghaith mentioned specifically that al Qaeda had a right to use weapons of mass
destruction to kill this huge number of people.
'0 The testimony mentioning the ruling by Saudi cleric Nasser bin Hamed al-Fahd is in Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Department ofJustice, U.S. House of Representatives, 108th Congress, 1st Session, 5
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Al Qaeda's followers believe, in effect, that they brought down the Soviet Union - that the
mujahedeen's success in forcing the Soviet Union from Afghanistan was a key factor leading
to the Soviet collapse. And they appear to believe that the United States, too, is a "paper
tiger" which can be driven to collapse - that the 9/11 attacks inflicted grievous damage on
U.S. economic power (Osama bin Laden once estimated the total cost at $1 trillion) and that
still larger blows are needed to bring the United States down. As bin Laden put it in a
message to his followers in December 2001, "America is in retreat by the grace of God
Almighty and economic attrition is continuing up to today. But it needs further blows. The
young men need to seek out the nodes of the American economy and strike the enemy's
nodes."" The notion that major blows could cause the collapse of the United States is, in
essence, al Qaeda's idea of how it will achieve victory. A nuclear blast incinerating a U.S.
city would be exactly the kind of blow they want.
While most terrorist groups would not be able to make a nuclear bomb even if they had
the material, it is, unfortunately, very plausible that a well-organized and well-financed group
such as al Qaeda might be able to make at least a crude nuclear explosive if they could get the
needed material and had time and resources to devote to the task. (This fundamental point is
discussed in more detail below.) The commission appointed by President Bush to investigate
U.S. intelligence capabilities and past conclusions regarding weapons of mass destruction
revealed in March 2005 that in October 2001 the U.S. intelligence community assessed that al
Qaeda was capable of fabricating at least a "crude" nuclear device if it could obtain the
requisite nuclear material - separated plutonium or HEU. The commission also reported that
the CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center and its
Counterterrorist Center judged in November 2001 that al-Qaeda "probably had access to
nuclear expertise and facilities and that there was a real possibility of the group developing a
crude nuclear device." And the commission emphasized that the documents seized from al
Qaeda safe houses in Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban "brought to light detailed
and revealing information about the direction and progress of al-Qa'ida's radiological and
nuclear ambitions," which had not been available when those earlier judgments were made.'2
Of course, al Qaeda today is not the same group that existed before the 9/11 attacks. The
previous centrally controlled, organized structure of al Qaeda has been substantially disrupted
June 2003 (available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/108th/87536.PDF as of 4 April 2006).
Additional details on this episode were provided by Michael Scheuer, the former head of the Central Intelligence
Agency's bin Laden unit, in Steve Kroft, "Anonymous Revealed: Michael Scheuer, Former CIA Osama Bin
Laden Unit Leader, Discusses Early Intelligence and Opportunities to Kill Osama Bin Laden," "60 Minutes,"
CBS News, 14 November 2004. More on the extremist Islamic scholarship regarding the killing of civilians in
war (particularly "Christians" and "Jews") is discussed in Jonathan D. Halevi, "Al-Qaeda's Intellectual Legacy:
New Radical Islamic Thinking Justifying the Genocide of Infidels," Jerusalem Viewpoints, no. 508 (1 December
2003; available at http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp508.htm as of 4 December 2006).
" This argument is outlined, and bin Laden quoted, in Bruce Hoffman, Al Qaeda, Trends in Terrorism and
Future Potentialities: An Assessment, P-8078 (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, 2003; available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P8078/P8078.pdf as of 4 April 2006).
12 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: WMD Commission, 2005; available at http://www.wmd.gov/report/
as of 2 January 2007), pp. 267, 271, 292.
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by the worldwide campaign against the organization since the 9/11 attacks, including the
destruction of al Qaeda's Afghanistan sanctuary.13 But top officials of the U.S. government
and of other governments have continued to warn that al Qaeda retains both the intention and
the capability to inflict catastrophic attacks, particularly on the United States, and continues to
seek weapons of mass destruction. In summarizing the global threat to U.S. interests in
February 2005, the leaders of the U.S. intelligence community were unanimous in warning of
the continuing desire for weapons of mass destruction on the part of al Qaeda and the global
jihadist network it has spawned. CIA Director Porter Goss warned that "it may be only a
matter of time before al Qaeda or another group attempts to use chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapons." FBI Director Robert Mueller warned that the intelligence
community is "extremely concerned with a growing body of sensitive reporting that continues
to show al Qaeda's clear intention to obtain and to ultimately use some form of chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear material in its attacks against the United States."' 4 As
Goss and Mueller emphasized, the threat is not only from whatever remains of the old,
centralized al Qaeda, but from the global movement that has spun off from it. Some elements
of this amorphous movement have aims for mass violence on a similar scale and may have
some potential to pull together the required capabilities - which, as discussed below, would
not necessarily require advanced scientific knowledge, large numbers of people, or significant
fixed facilities.
The documents, training manuals, and other evidence recovered by coalition forces
and by Western media in Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban, along with other
information that has appeared in the public domain (including descriptions of interviews with
detainees and information put out by al Qaeda-linked organizations), present a mixed picture.
On the one hand, it is clear that the overwhelming focus of the organization and the training it
provided was on conventional weapons and explosives. On the other hand, the evidence
makes clear that al Qaeda had a strong interest in getting all types of unconventional weapons
" For useful discussions of al Qaeda as it was before the 9/11 attacks, see, for example: National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/1 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 1 st ed. (New York: Norton, 2004; available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/91 1/index.html as of 30 December 2006); Anonymous, Through Our Enemies' Eyes:
Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future ofAmerica (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2002); Rohan
Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkley Books, 2003); Peter L. Bergen,
Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden, updated edition ed. (New York: Touchstone,
2002). The 9/11 Commission Report provides perhaps the best quick summary of the growth and development
of al Qaeda, having access both to the other works cited and to the results of interrogations of key al Qaeda
personnel. Anonymous, the author of Through Our Enemies' Eyes, has since been revealed as Michael Scheuer,
a 20-year CIA veteran who was head of the agency's bin Laden unit. For a useful overview of the changed
threat posed by today's al Qaeda and related groups, see, for example, Bruce Hoffman, Does Our Counter-
Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat? CT-250-1 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005; available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/RANDCT250-I.pdf as of 28 December 2006).
14 Mueller's testimony is in 14 Mueller's testimony is in Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected
National Security Threats to the United States, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 16 February 2005 (available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005-hr/shrg1 09-61.pdf as of 4 January 2007).
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- chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear.15 Within the category of unconventional
weapons, the group and its allies appear to have devoted more effort to chemical, biological,
and radiological weapons than to actual nuclear bombs - as suggested by the videotapes
showing testing of poison gas on animals and the several poison-related plots that have been
revealed in recent years. Nevertheless, the detailed drawings, training manuals, and other
documents and physical evidence recovered by coalition forces and by Western media from
caves and safe houses in post-Taliban Afghanistan confirm that highly placed al Qaeda
operatives, including alleged chemical and biological commander Abu Khabbab, had been
very focused on obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Many of the discussions of nuclear
weapons in the seized documents are quite unsophisticated and contain substantial errors; but
some are of higher quality, including one fact about initiating a nuclear chain reaction that
remains classified and could not simply have been downloaded from the internet. 16
Al Qaeda's interest is of long standing, stretching back over a decade. Michael
Scheuer, from 1996 to 1999 the head of the CIA team focused solely on Osama bin Laden,
wrote in 2004 to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees that in mid- to late-1996,
"CIA's Bin Laden unit acquired detailed information about the careful, professional manner in
which al-Qaeda was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons." In his letter, he continued, "there
could be no doubt after this date that al-Qaeda was in deadly earnest in seeking nuclear
weapons."' 7 The U.S. federal indictment of bin Laden for his involvement in the bombings of
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania charges that "at various times from at least as early as
1992, Usama bin Laden and Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, and others known and unknown,
made efforts to obtain the components of nuclear weapons."' 8 The best documented of these
incidents was an attempt in 1993 to purchase HEU for a nuclear bomb in the Sudan, which
has been described in some detail in court testimony of Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, the al Qaeda
operative charged with several key steps in the transaction.19 While al-Fadl reports that al
Qaeda believed the material to be HEU when it was seeking to make the purchase, it appears
that the suppliers were running a scam and the material was not usable in nuclear weapons.
Similarly, it appears that al Qaeda has been scammed on several other occasions in attempts
to acquire what it thought was weapons-usable nuclear material.20 Senior bin Laden lieutenant
15 See, for example, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Report to the President, pp. pp. 267-278. For a quick summary of open sources, see Weapons
of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Program, "Chart: Al Qa'ida's WMD Activities".
16 Probably the best available unclassified summary is Albright, "Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program."
" Excerpts of the letter are reprinted in 17 Excerpts of the letter are reprinted in Anonymous [Michael Scheuer],
"How Not to Catch a Terrorist," Atlantic Monthly 294, no. 5 (2004; available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/
200412/anonymous as of 5 January 2007), p. 50.
' See "Text: US Grand Jury Indictment against Usama Bin Laden" (New York: United States District Court,
Southern District of New York, 6 November 1998; available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/11/
98110602_nlt.html as of 4 April 2006).
' For the full text and a useful discussion of al-Fadl's testimony, as well as a summary of other incidents related
to bin Laden and nuclear weapons through mid-2001, see Kimberly McCloud and Matthew Osborne, "WMD
Terrorism and Usama Bin Laden" (Monterey, Cal.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, 20 November 2001; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm as of 5 April
2006).
20 See, for example, Daly, Parachini, and Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor.
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Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, arrested in Germany in 1998 and still in prison, has been charged
with being the mastermind behind this attempted purchase and possibly others: as with bin
Laden, the indictment of Salim charges that he was involved in an attempt to purchase
uranium "for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons." 2'
In addition to this 1993 attempt, there have been repeated reports, of varying levels of
credibility, regarding al Qaeda attempts to purchase nuclear materials or nuclear weapons in
the former Soviet Union.2 2 Scheuer in particular has emphasized that the group has been
seeking to purchase stolen nuclear weapons, has "a very professional acquisition system," and
"clearly has a presence in the former Soviet Union."
Al Qaeda and its allies have also actively attempted to recruit individuals with nuclear
weapons expertise. For example, Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri met at
length with two senior Pakistani nuclear weapons experts, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and
Chaudari Abdul Majeed - both Taliban sympathizers with extreme Islamic views - and
pressed them for information on making nuclear weapons. While Mahmood and Majeed deny
having supplied any useful information, Pakistani intelligence officials told the Washington
Post that the two had provided detailed technical information, in violation of Pakistan's
secrecy laws, in response to bin Laden's questions. Similarly, in 2000, an official of
Russia's National Security Council announced that the Taliban regime had attempted to
recruit a nuclear expert from a Russian facility.2s In 1998, a scientist at one of Russia's
premier nuclear weapons laboratories was arrested for spying for both the Taliban and Iraq (in
this case on advanced conventional weapons designs, not nuclear weapons - though the
security services announced that this was by no means the first such espionage case at that
laboratory).26
In November 2001, Osama bin Laden boasted to a Pakistani journalist that al Qaeda
already had chemical or nuclear weapons. 27 The same journalist has also reported that bin
Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had claimed that the group had succeeded in buying
21 See discussion in Cameron, "Multitrack Microproliferation."
22 See discussion in Cameron, "Multitrack Microproliferation"; McCloud and Osborne, "WMD Terrorism and
Usama Bin Laden".
23 See, for example, Eric Rosenberg, "Bin Laden after Nukes from Russia, CIA Expert Says," Omaha World-
Herald, 21 November 2004.
24 Kamran Khan and Molly Moore, "2 Nuclear Experts Briefed Bin Laden, Pakistanis Say," Washington Post, 12
December 2001; Kamran Khan, "Pakistan Releases Nuclear Scientists for Ramadan's End," The Washington
Post, 16 December 2001; Peter Baker, "Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin Laden Failed Polygraphs, Renewing
Suspicions," Washington Post, 3 March 2002. The most thorough available account of the incident and related
issues is David Albright and Holly Higgins, "A Bomb for the Ummah," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no.
2 (March/April 2003; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2003/ma03/ma03albright.html as of 2
January 2007), pp. 49-55. Ummah is a term for the worldwide Islamic community.
25 "Taliban Tries to Access Nuclear Technologies - Russian Security Council Official," Interfax, 7 October 2000.
26 "Nuclear Center Worker Caught Selling Secrets," trans. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Russian NTV,
18 December 1998.
27 Hamid Mir, "Osama Claims He Has Nukes: If US Uses N-Arms It Will Get Same Response," Dawn, 10
November 2001 (available at http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/10/top1.htm as of 5 January 2007). Al Qaeda
members have also talked about unleashing a "Hiroshima" on the United States. See Albright, Buehler, and
Higgins, "Bin Laden and the Bomb."
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portable nuclear weapons from disaffected ex-Soviet nuclear scientists.28 There is no
evidence that either claim is true, but, if their remarks are accurately reported, they
demonstrate that al Qaeda at its highest levels remains actively interested in obtaining a
nuclear capability and has identified the insecure nuclear weapons, material, and expertise in
the former Soviet Union as a potential source to satisfy those ambitions.
Fragmentary evidence suggests that al Qaeda's nuclear effort continued after the
destruction of its Afghan sanctuary. Thefatwa on nuclear use, coming in 2003, makes clear
that the group's interest in nuclear weapons is by no means a thing of the past. According to
press reports, al Qaeda operative Sharif al-Masri, captured in the Afghan-Pakistani border
area in mid-2004, told interrogators that al Qaeda was looking to acquire nuclear materials in
Europe and move them to Mexico and from there across the porous border into the United
States.2 9 Two militants arrested in Germany in January 2005 - one of whom was an Iraqi
who had trained in al Qaeda's Afghanistan camps and was associated with alleged 9/11
planner Ramzi Bin al-Shibh - had tried to purchase uranium and had been recorded by
authorities discussing specific locations to obtain uranium.30 As then-CIA Director George
Tenet summarized the situation in early 2004: "this enemy remains intent on obtaining, and
using, catastrophic weapons.. .Al Qa'ida continues to pursue its strategic goal of obtaining a
nuclear capability." 3 1 There can be little doubt that if al Qaeda had the opportunity to get
stolen nuclear weapons or materials, they would jump at the chance.
At the same time, the limited evidence publicly available continues to suggest a broad
gap between the capabilities that well-organized and capable terrorist groups could put
together and the capabilities they have demonstrated to date. While a few of the documents
recovered in Afghanistan do include some disturbing sophistication on nuclear subjects, many
are extremely naYve. There is no hard evidence that al Qaeda has in fact pulled together the
level of expertise on nuclear weapons design and manufacture that a few reasonably
competent technical people who invested some months in researching the topic would in
principle be able to put together from unclassified references. Similarly, despite reports that
the group repeatedly encountered scam artists claiming they had weapons-usable nuclear
material when they did not, there are no open source reports that al Qaeda ever acquired one
of the commercially available systems for identifying isotopes, despite the relatively low cost
and ready availability of such systems.
28 Andrew Denton, "Enough Rope (Interview with Hamid Mir)," Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 22
March 2004 (available at http://www.abc.net.au/tv/enoughrope/transcripts/s1071804.htm as of 5 January 2007).29 Adam Zagorin, "Bordering on Nukes?" Time (22 November 2004), p. 19. A different report involvingrelated
to movement of nuclear or radiological materials from Mexico, involving claims that several individuals had
entered the United States from Mexico with the intent of carrying out a dirty bomb attack, possibly in Boston,
has since been discredited.
30 Faye Bowers, "Eavesdropping on Terror Talk in Germany," Christian Science Monitor, 28 January 2005;
Craig Whitlock, "Germany Arrests 2 Al Qaeda Suspects; Men Accused of Planning Attacks in Iraq,"
Washington Post, 24 January 2005.
31 Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, U.S.
Senate, 108th Congress, 2nd Session, 24 February 2004 (available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/0402hrg/
040224/witness.htm as of 28 February 2006).
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The same lack of sophistication is reflected in some other reported incidents of al
Qaeda pursuit of nuclear or radiological materials. The summaries that have been released of
the interrogations of Jose Padilla, for example, indicate that he and his accomplice presented
to top al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah the absurd idea that the two of them could make a
nuclear bomb using instructions downloaded from the Internet. 32 Zubaydah, according to this
account, expressed skepticism and suggested that a dirty bomb would be easier, but warned
that this was not as easy as Padilla seemed to think either. Strikingly, "senior al Qaeda
detainee #1" (apparently Zubaydah himself, since his statements describe Zubaydah's
thinking) reports that Zubaydah, in discussing a dirty bomb, spoke of "explosives wrapped in
uranium," again suggesting a rather low level of nuclear expertise, since uranium, which is
not very radioactive, would be among the least deadly materials to use in a radiological dirty
bomb. Nonetheless, Zubaydah gave Padilla and his accomplice money to travel to meet
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, another very senior al Qaeda operative, in order for Mohammed
to evaluate the plan. Mohammed also thought the plan was impractical and suggested that
they focus on simpler attacks (such as bombing apartment buildings by turning on the gas in
an apartment and detonating it with a bomb on a timer). Thus, both Zubaydah and
Mohammed were immediately skeptical of the feasibility of nuclear and radiological attacks,
and Zubaydah, at least, apparently knew little about nuclear matters. It may be, however, that
Zubaydah and Mohammed's skepticism was based on a low (and possibly accurate)
assessment of the personal technological capabilities of Padilla and his accomplice, rather
than on a view that nuclear and radiological attacks were impractical in general.
Similarly, in the case of the two al Qaeda operatives arrested in Germany in 2004 and
charged with seeking uranium, the sparse information that is publicly available suggests they
wanted the uranium for dispersal in a dirty bomb, rather than for use in a nuclear weapon -
and the choice of uranium for that purpose again suggests a very rudimentary level of nuclear
knowledge.3 3 In short, more than a decade after al Qaeda's pursuit of the bomb began, there
is as yet no strong, publicly available evidence that the group or its followers have put
together the capabilities that would be necessary to make a nuclear bomb. But unfortunately,
we simply cannot know what capabilities al Qaeda and its followers may have managed to
keep hidden - or may acquire in the future.
Aum Shinrikyo
Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday cult (now renamed Aleph) carried out a
comprehensive program of development for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons prior
to its famous 1995 nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway. Aum's leader, Shoko Asahara,
32 The following discussion is drawn from the extensive summary of the interrogations of Padilla and others that
was released by the U.S. Department of Defense. See U.S. Department of Defense, Summary ofJosd Padilla's
Activities with Al Qaeda (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2004; available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/
padilla/pad52804dodsum5.html as of 2 January 2007).
33 Bowers, "Eavesdropping on Terror Talk in Germany"; Whitlock, "Germany Arrests 2 Al Qaeda Suspects;
Men Accused of Planning Attacks in Iraq."
1 This account of Aum Shinrikyo's nuclear activities is drawn in substantial part from Daly, Parachini, and
Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor. Both those sources provide useful summaries of
Aum Shinrikyo's nuclear efforts. Some of the most comprehensive investigations of Aum Shinrikyo's weapons
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was obsessed with weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. The cult had
tens of thousands of members at its peak; assets in the range of hundreds of millions of
dollars, millions of which it spent on its chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs;
hundreds of members with advanced technical training, in some cases from Japan's leading
universities; and a substantial number of facilities where it could pursue its work in secret
(prior to the Tokyo subway attack, Japanese authorities gave the group remarkably free rein,
in part because of its status as a religious organization). The cult targeted Russia as a
potential source of nuclear weapons, materials, and technology; reportedly succeeded in
recruiting tens of thousands of members there; reportedly recruited staff members at the
Kurchatov Institute35 (one of Russia's leading nuclear research centers and a site where
hundreds of kilograms of HEU was poorly secured and accounted for at the time); established
extended relationships with a variety of senior Russian officials, including the chairman of
Russia's Security Council; and sent senior cult officials on numerous weapons-shopping trips
to Russia.
Nonetheless, Aum Shinrikyo failed to acquire nuclear weapons or the materials to
make them - and apparently concluded that nuclear weapons would be sufficiently difficult
and time-consuming to acquire that it should place its principal emphasis on chemical and
biological weapons, in the belief that these would be easier to produce quickly, on a schedule
consistent with Asahara's predictions of when doomsday would occur. While the chemical
and biological programs proceeded on a remarkable scale - with more than a dozen different
chemical and biological attacks, production of a wide range of agents, and construction of a
facility capable of producing hundreds of kilograms of sarin nerve gas per year - the efforts
were riddled with mistakes. Had Aum made fewer mistakes in producing and dispersing the
sarin used in the Tokyo subway attack, the number of fatalities would have been far higher.
As far as can be determined, Aum's biological attacks never killed anyone. Indeed, Aum
reportedly was dispersing a non-virulent strain of anthrax used in vaccines, unaware that the
anthrax it had acquired was not deadly.36 These extensive problems in the efforts of such a
of mass destruction efforts available in English include Both those sources provide useful summaries of Aum
Shinrikyo's nuclear efforts. Some of the most comprehensive investigations of Aum Shinrikyo's weapons of
mass destruction efforts available in English include David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End
of the World: The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear
Arsenals of Russia, 1st American ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996). For a useful chronology of Aum's
efforts related to weapons of mass destruction, with sources, see Tim Ballard et al., Chronology ofAum
Shinrikyo's Cbw Activities (Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, 2001; available at http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/aumchrn.htm as of 2 January
2007). For a useful chronology of Aum's efforts related to weapons of mass destruction, with sources, see
Ballard et al., Chronology ofAum Shinrikyo's Cbw Activities.
" See, for example, discussion in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Affairs, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Prol'feration of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study on the
Aum Shinrikyo: StaffStatement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995; available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/l 995_rpt/aum/index.html as of 5 January 2007). The staff investigators
confirmed by visiting the Kurchatov Institute and speaking with staff that at least one staff member at Kurchatov
was still an Aum member months after the Tokyo nerve gas attack.
36 For an account of Aum's chemical and biological efforts, see, for example, David E. Kaplan, "Aum
Shinrikyo," in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B.
Tucker. Bcsia Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000). For a discussion of the
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large, well-financed, and technically trained terrorist group contributed to the pre-9/1 1 view
that terrorists crazy enough to want to cause mass death would be crazy enough to interfere
with their ability to put together weapons of mass destruction.
Similarly, much of Aum's nuclear program seems to have been poorly focused. It was
pursuing efforts such as purchasing a sheep farm with uranium deposits in Australia and
stealing confidential documents on laser isotope enrichment, with the idea of producing HEU
by mining uranium, purifying it, and using laser enrichment to separate the U-235.37 This is
perhaps the most technically demanding and difficult route to acquiring fissile material yet
devised. Yet there is no public evidence that Aum pursued the apparently simpler approach
of trying to steal any of the tons of separated plutonium or hundreds of kilograms of HEU that
were present in Japan; during the peak of the cult's operations, Japan did not have regulatory
requirements that nuclear facilities where such materials were located have armed guards on-
site.
Aum did pursue the straightforward approach of seeking to acquire nuclear technology
and material from the former Soviet Union. The cult put one of its leading technical experts
in charge of its Russia operations. It sent a leading cult official, Kiyohide Hayakawa, on more
than 20 trips to Russia, apparently in significant part weapons-buying expeditions
(Hayakawa's extensive notebooks include the arresting notation "how much is a nuclear
warhead?" followed by several possible prices). 38 The group even requested a meeting with
then-Minister of Atomic Energy Victor Mikhailov in an attempt to purchase a nuclear
weapon. While Mikhailov refused to meet with Aum, then-Russian Vice President Alexander
Rutskoi and other senior officials met with an Aum delegation headed by the cult's leader,
Shoko Asahara, in early 1992, and some reports assert that Aum paid between $500,000 and
$1 million to Oleg Lobov, then Secretary of the Russian Security Council, between 1991 and
1995 - a charge Lobov denies. Lobov and Aum co-founded a Russian-Japanese university in
Moscow, with offices that Lobov had arranged across from the Bolshoi Ballet - a sign of the
extensive influence Aum enjoyed.39
After the 1995 sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway the Japanese government moved
aggressively against the group's weapons of mass destruction programs and arrested most of
its top leadership. An effort to ban the group entirely failed, however, though the group was
banned in Russia. Nevertheless, this was not the end for Aum, or, it appears, for its interest in
nuclear topics. Years later, Tokyo police were reporting that a software company founded by
the cult had gained access to information on nuclear projects in several countries;4 some
cult's use of a vaccine strain of anthrax, see Paul Keim et al., "Molecular Investigation of the Aum Shinrikyo
Anthrax Release in Kameido, Japan," Journal of Clinical Microbiology 39, no. 12 (December 2001; available at
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?tool=pubmed&pubmedid=1 1724885 as of 2 June 2005).
37 See, for example, discussion in Daly, Parachini, and Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa
Reactor.
38 See Daly, Parachini, and Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor.
39 See Kyle B. Olson, "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?" Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (July-
August 1999; available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/pdf/olson.pdf as of 2 June 2005).
40 See, for example, "Aum Cult May Possess Plans on Overseas Nuclear Plants."
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reports suggest the information included data on nuclear material transport routes.41 While
many of the group's key leaders remain in prison, the group, now known as Aleph, still has
thousands of members and continues to recruit more. As recently as late 2004, the Japanese
National Police Agency, in its annual report, warned of the "danger" that the cult would return
to "organized illegal activities," pointing out that the cult continues to emphasize the
centrality of the doctrines of founder Shoko Asahara.42 In Russia as well, there have been
concerns over continued activity of the cult, which is estimated to have some 300 active
members and several facilities there, despite its status as a banned organization. 43
In short, like the al Qaeda case, the Aum Shinrikyo case demonstrates that even large
and well-financed terrorist groups with ample technical resources can have substantial
difficulty following the nuclear path. In particular, it appears that despite being willing to
spend millions of dollars in Russia to acquire nuclear weapons or the means to make them, the
group failed to do so.
Chechen Terrorists
There is a substantial record of interest in and statements about chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons by the more extreme Chechen terrorist factions. It is
important to be careful about the evidence, however, as in the ongoing conflict, Russian
officials have been quick to charge the Chechens with virtually any horrific act or intention
imaginable. Moreover, Chechen nationalists should not all be tarred with the same brush. By
no means all Chechen nationalists support terrorist tactics, and by no means all Chechen
terrorists would be interested in the scale of violence involved in a nuclear attack. Genuine
Chechen nationalists, fighting for an independent Chechnya, might be reluctant to actually use
a nuclear bomb against Russia, fearing that the likely response might well effectively
obliterate any chance for a functional future Chechen state. (Threatening such use in order to
blackmail Russia into withdrawing its forces, however, might be of more interest to genuine
Chechen nationalists.) The best documented incident involving Chechen fighters and
radiological material - the placement of cesium-137 in a popular Moscow park in 1995 - is an
example of this kind of restraint: the Chechen fighters placed the material in the park and then
informed the Russian media where it was, as a warning, without attempting to use the material
for an actual attack.
But a range of indicators suggests that some Chechen factions may be interested in
violence on a nuclear scale. The attack by 32 heavily armed and suicidal terrorists on an
elementary school in Beslan in September 2004, which ended in the massacre of over 300
people, most of them children, demonstrates clearly that some Chechen factions are willing to
kill innocent civilians on a large scale and are capable of organizing large and well-planned
operations to do so. Some of the most prominent Chechen factions have increasingly allied
themselves with an extreme Islamic agenda that is more global than local, and there have long
4' "Cult Siphoned Nuclear Data," Asahi News Service, 29 March 2000.
42 "Japanese Police Issue Annual Report Stressing Threat of Terrorism, Cults," Kyodo News Service, 7 December
2004. See also Olson, "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?"
" See, for example, "Security Agency Inspects 39 Aum-Linked Facilities in 2004," Kyodo News Service, 22
April 2005.
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been strong ties between some Chechen factions and al Qaeda. Chechen fighters have trained
in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, foreign al Qaeda fighters have fought in Chechnya, and
Chechen fighters have fought for the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. 44 The most
extreme Islamist factions might be tempted to use a weapon of mass destruction against
Russia - or some groups might provide such weapons to al Qaeda for use elsewhere, making
the ongoing conflict in Chechnya potentially a global danger.4 5
Some statements by Chechen terrorists and documents seized from them have
suggested an interest in large-scale nuclear terrorism - either by sabotage of a major nuclear
facility or use of a nuclear bomb - and Chechen terrorists have repeatedly indicated an
interest in the use of radiological weapons. 46 As one recent example - suggesting the tension
within the Chechen camp between those who support and oppose nuclear terrorism - Akhmed
Zakayev, an envoy for then-Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov, warned that additional
terrorist attacks in Russia were likely and that: "We cannot exclude that some group takes
over some nuclear facility. The results may be catastrophic, not only for Russian society and
for Chechen society, but for the whole of Europe."4 7 Though not specifically mentioning
nuclear weapons, the late Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev - who took responsibility for the
Beslan attack - told the Globe and Mail newspaper in October 2004 that he would use any
means to force Russia to give Chechnra independence, including the use of chemical and
biological weapons against civilians.4 During 2004-2005, some Chechen elements
increasingly adopted a radical jihadist agenda; in July 2004, shortly before the Beslan attacks,
even Maskhadov, a relative moderate and long-time opponent of the tactics used by Basayev
and others, gave an interview in which he said that attacks on Russian cities would be
legitimate and praised Basayev as continuing "to battle the occupiers successfully."49
Maskhadov was killed by Russian security forces in early 2005 and replaced with a more
44 For a short and useful summary, see Andrew Higgins, Guy Chazan, and Gregory L. White, "Battlefield
Conversion: How Russia's Chechen Quagmire Became Front for Radical Islam," Wall Street Journal, 16
September 2004. The 9/Il Commission Report also discusses involvement of international Islamic terrorists in
Chechnya. See, for example, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report, pp. 58, 125, 149. A document of uncertain provenance acquired by the Defense
Intelligence Agency in 1998, which purports to be a history of al Qaeda, goes so far as to say that the late
Chechen rebel leader Khattab, leader of the foreignjihadis in Chechnya, was sent to Chechnya specifically by
Osama bin Laden. The document was released in redacted form as a result of a Freedom of Information Act suit
by Judicial Watch. See Swift Knight -- Usam Ben Laden's Current and Historical Activities (1998; available at
http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/l 02/dia.pdf as of 8 December 2006).
4' For a useful discussion, see Christina Chuen, "Chechnya Has Become a Danger to Us All: A Conduit for
Loose Nukes," International Herald Tribune, 26 June 2004.
46 See the summary in Simon Saradzhyan, Russia: Grasping Reality of Nuclear Terror (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2003; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/saradzhyan_2003_02.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
Vladimir Orlov, director of the PIR Center, Russia's leading nonproliferation research group, has compiled a list
of 25 incidents of Chechen threats or actions relating to nuclear or radiological weapons. Remarks to the 2004
Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington DC, June 21-22, 2004.
47 Gleb Bryanski, "Interview: Chechens Could Strike Nuclear Plant Next," Reuters, 27 October 2002.
48 Mark MacKinnon, "Will Use Any Tactic, Chechen Warlord Warns," Globe and Mail, 2 November 2004.
49 "Text: Excerpts of Reuters Interview with Chechen Rebel Leader," Reuters, 18 July 2004.
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radical leader from the Chechen Sharia Council, who has said the Chechens will no longer ask
50Russia for peace.
In January 2002, Russian troops found what they described as the personal archive of
the late Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev, which contained a detailed plan to hijack a
Russian nuclear submarine.5 1 The commander of Russia's troops in Chechnya, Colonel-
General Vladimir Moltenskoi, told reporters on February 2, 2002, that the plan provided for
seven Slavic-looking fighters to seize a submarine from the Russian Navy's Pacific Fleet
some time in 1995-96 and blackmail Moscow into withdrawing troops from Chechnya and
recognizing the republic as an independent state. Moltenskoi reported that former naval
officer Islam Khasukhanov developed the plan back in 1995 and that then-chief of the
Chechen General Staff Maskhadov had personally reviewed the plan and made notes on it.
Khasukhanov had served on Russian submarines before leaving the Pacific Fleet in the rank
of naval commander to become chief of the operational department of the Chechen
separatists' general staff. 53
In 2003, Yuri Vishenvsky, then-chairman of Russia's nuclear regulatory agency, said
that "information from the power agencies indicates that there have been attempted attacks"
on Russian nuclear facilities by Chechen terrorists.54 Similarly, as noted at the beginning of
this section, the Russian state newspaper has reported that the 41 heavily armed terrorists who
seized a theater in Moscow in October 2002 considered seizing the Kurchatov Institute
instead. While the Kurchatov Institute has enough HEU on-site for dozens of nuclear
weapons, the press report, based on information from Russian security services, suggested
that the plan the terrorists considered involved not stealing HEU but seizing a reactor at
Kurchatov, threatening to blow it up if their demands were not met.55
Most disturbing are the specific incidents which suggest Chechen terrorist interest in
stealing nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material. These include, most notably,
the incidents sited at the outset of this section, in which terrorist teams carried out
50 "Chechen Rebel Says Will Never Ask Russia for Peace," Reuters, 16 May 2005.
s1 "Russian TV Says Chechen Rebels Plotted to Seize Nuclear Submarine.," Interfax, 27 April 2002; "Nachalnik
Operativnogo Shtaba Maskhadova Gotovil Plan Zakhvata Rosiiskoi Atomnoi Podlodki (Chief of Maskhadov's
Operational Staff Was Preparing a Plan to Hijack Russian Atomic Submarine)," RIA-Novosti, 25 April 2002.
The second of these articles is summarized in Saradzhyan, Grasping Reality of Nuclear Terror.
52 Russian RTR Television reported on April 26, 2002, that the plan included removing a nuclear warhead from
the submarine and bringing it back to Chechnya. See "Russian TV Says Chechen Rebels Plotted to Seize
Nuclear Submarine." No other media confirmed this report, however. The Pacific Fleet presently operates no
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), but it still has some 20 nuclear powered submarines,
including those of the Oscar-li class that can carry nuclear torpedoes. Under the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear
Initiatives, however, all of these nuclear weapons should have been removed from the submarines - so if this
commitment had been fulfilled, seizing a submarine would not have allowed the group to seize a nuclear weapon
as well. When the plan was reportedly developed in 1995, however, this commitment to remove tactical nuclear
weapons from naval ships may not yet have been fully implemented - or may not have been noticed by those
planning this possible attack. Some nuclear weapons are believed to remain in a storage site for the Pacific Fleet
whose security has been upgraded with U.S. assistance.
5 "Chief of Maskhadov's Operational Staff Was Preparing a Plan."
s4 "Nuclear Security Hiked against Chechen Threat," Moscow Times, 21 February 2003.
" Bogdanov, "A Pass to Warheads Found on a Terrorist."
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reconnaissance at nuclear warhead storage facilities and, reportedly, on nuclear warhead
transport trains. Another disturbing incident occurred in March 2002, when Russian police in
the Sverdlovsk region arrested three Chechens in possession of a range of guns and
explosives. One of the men was found to have a valid pass to the high-security closed city of
Lesnoy, site of one of Russia's largest nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facilities.
(This pass would have entitled him to enter the closed city, but not the weapons facility itself,
though he could have used his access to the city to build relationships with employees and
guards at the weapons facility.) He had the pass because his father had been an employee at
the plant and the family had lived in the city.56 In January 2003, Colonel-General Igor
Valynkin, commander of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the
branch responsible for guarding Russia's nuclear weapons, summed up the situation by
warning that "Chechen terrorists plan to seize some crucial military facility or nuclear
warhead so as to threaten not just Russia, but the whole world."5 7 In late 2005, Russian
Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev, in charge of the troops that guard most key nuclear
facilities in Russia, confirmed that in recent years "international terrorists have planned
attacks against nuclear and power industry installations" intended to "seize nuclear materials
and use them to build weapons of mass destruction for their own political ends."5 8 Although
Nurgaliev referred generally to "international terrorists," rather than to "Chechen terrorists,"
he probably had groups that were primarily Chechen in mind, as Valynkin did; Russian
officials frequently assert that Chechen terrorists are being assisted by outsiders linked to al
Qaeda, and lump both together. (The renowned Chechen leader Khattab was a Jordanian,
who by some accounts had strong links to al Qaeda.)
Chechen groups might well be able to pull together the capabilities needed to acquire
nuclear weapons or materials in Russia, though there is no solid evidence that they have done
so to date. Attacks such as Beslan demonstrate Chechen terrorists' ability to pull together
attacks involving dozens of fighters striking at once, without warning; armament including
machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and large quantities of explosives; and help from
current or former members of Russia's policy and security services. Many nuclear facilities
would find it difficult to defend against a no-warning attack on that scale. Similarly, the
problem of theft by corrupt or blackmailed insiders is potentially a serious one; insider thefts
of weapons from military facilities and of equipment from nuclear facilities occur routinely in
Russia,59 and Chechen fighters have regularly made use of both corrupt insiders and tactics
such as kidnapping family members of individuals they wish to blackmail. Indeed, a number
of police and security officials have been arrested for their assistance in Chechen terrorist
attacks.60 Chechen terrorist groups are thought to have ties with Chechen organized crime
56 See, for example, Sergei Avdeyev, "Chechens Gain Access to Nuclear Warheads," Izvestia, 22 March 2002;
Bogdanov, "A Pass to Warheads Found on a Terrorist."
57 Sergei Ostanin, "Chechen Terrorists out to Lay Hands on Nuclear Arms -- Military," ITAR-TASS, 30 January
2003.
58 "Internal Troops to Make Russian State Facilities Less Vulnerable to Terrorists," RIA-Novosti, 5 October
2005.
*9 Bunn, "Anecdotes of Insecurity."
60 For a discussion of several cases and their implications, see Simon Saradzhyan and Nabi Abdullaev,
"Disrupting Escalation of Terror in Russia to Prevent Catastrophic Attacks," Connections (Spring 2005).
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groups, which in turn are thought to have ties with Russian organized crime. These and other
Chechen terrorist contacts in Russia could increase their potential to acquire nuclear weapons
or materials.
In short, in the last decade, three different terrorist groups in three different contexts
have actively sought nuclear weapons, including attempting to buy or steal nuclear weapons
or their essential ingredients, or at least carrying out surveillance in possible preparation for
such an effort. The world cannot assume that these groups will be the last. Even if al Qaeda
could somehow be destroyed completely, the threat of nuclear terrorism would be reduced,
not eliminated.
Iraq
States, in general, are likely to be very different from terrorist groups - having stable
control over large land areas and fixed facilities and far larger resources of both money and
personnel to apply to their military programs. For most states seeking nuclear weapons, the
first preference would be an indigenous ability to produce their own nuclear material and their
own nuclear weapons. But such capabilities are expensive and difficult to get. The historical
record indicates that states do indeed consider buying a bomb or the materials to make one if
(a) they believe they can avoid the expense and difficulty of putting together their own
nuclear material production facilities; (b) they see an urgent need to establish a nuclear
deterrent before their own nuclear material production succeeds; or (c) they face an
international nonproliferation effort that is making it very difficult to successfully establish
their own nuclear material production facilities. Acquiring stolen nuclear material from
abroad could offer an extraordinarily valuable shortcut, cutting a proliferator's bomb program
from years to months, or even less, if other necessary preparations had already been made.
Making a bomb from nuclear material already in hand might be done both quickly and in
facilities that might remain covert, presenting the international community with a terrifying
new threat with very little warning.
Consideration of buying a nuclear weapon or the material to make one is not unusual
in the historical record. Australia wanted to purchase a nuclear weapon, when it was
considering the nuclear weapons option; Egypt explored the possibility of a purchase when it
was pursuing a nuclear weapons program; Libya, realizing the weakness of its own
indigenous science and technology base, is reported to have repeatedly attempted to purchase
a nuclear weapon, including an unsuccessful approach to China; there are even reports that
Indonesia sought to purchase a bomb, decades ago.61 In short, the cases of Iraq and Iran,
described below, are not unique and should be considered only as particular case studies of a
broader phenomenon. The more nonproliferation efforts focused on limiting states' ability to
61 Jim Walsh, "Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001); Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and
Miriam Rajkumar, "Libya," in Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002; available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/pdf/npp/18-
Libya.pdf as of 10 December 2006); Robert M. Cornejo, "When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian Nuclear
Aspirations in the Mid-I 960s," Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000; available at http://cns.miis.edu/
pubs/npr/vol07/72/72corn.pdf as of 10 December 2006).
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build their own enrichment and reprocessing facilities succeed in the future, the more likely it
is that additional states will pursue the purchase alternative.
It was long a worry that Iraq might exploit such an opportunity, given its substantial
nuclear weapons program prior to the 1991 Gulf War and given its apparent interest in a
covert nuclear breakthrough after that war. But the available evidence suggests that despite
some attempts, Iraq was not able to acquire weapons-usable material before 1991 and may not
have tried seriously after 1991. Since the U.S.-led invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein
in 2003, intelligence assessments on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program prior to the
war have proven to be wildly wrong - and therefore considerable care has to be taken in
assessing the available evidence concerning Iraq's efforts to acquire black market nuclear
material.
There is no dispute that Iraq's former leader Saddam Hussein spent billions of dollars
before the 1991 Gulf War attempting to establish an indigenous Iraqi capability to produce
fissile material.62 This effort included the creation of a far-ranging procurement network
involving large numbers of agents, front companies, and the like, which succeeded in illicitly
acquiring a wide range of nuclear-related technologies from countries around the world.
While the network's principal focus was on the technologies that would permit the
establishment of indigenous Iraqi production of nuclear bomb material, it seems certain that
pre-1991 Iraq would have snapped up weapons-usable nuclear material eagerly, had its agents
been able to find a reliable source from which to buy it. Indeed, in its declarations to
international inspectors after the 1991 war, Iraq eventually acknowledged that it had
purchased non-weapons-usable natural uranium for its indigenous production program on
more than one occasion - demonstrating its willingness to purchase nuclear material illicitly.63
During the 1990s, Iraqi officials claimed to international inspectors that before the 1991 war,
Iraq had received many offers of stolen nuclear materials for its weapons program, but had
turned them all down - a claim that is difficult to credit.64 At least one participant in Iraq's
62 For overviews, see Charles Duelfer, "Volume II: Nuclear," in Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to
the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Langley, Vir.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2004; available at
http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/IraqsWMD_Vo12.pdf as of 10 December 2006); Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President;
International Atomic Energy Agency, Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779 (New
York: United Nations, 1997; available at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/reports/
s_1997_779.pdf as of 10 December 2006); Gary Samore, ed., Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net
Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002); David Albright, Iraq's Programs to
Make Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons Prior to the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Science and International Security, 2002; available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/
iraq/iraqs fm history.html as of 10 December 2006); Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking
Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1998; available at http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/track98b.htm as of 10 December 2006). I have not
included here the now-discredited dossiers on the subject from U.S. and British intelligence released in the
debate leading up to the 2003 war.
63 See Duelfer, "Volume II: Nuclear," p. 9.
" One senior Iraqi official told inspectors in 1996 that Iraq had received over 200 offers of everything from red
mercury to fissile material for its nuclear weapons program over the preceding decade. See discussion in David
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bomb program during the period before the 1991 war, Khidir Hamza, tells the opposite story.
Hamza reports that when arms dealers from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with whom
Iraq had an ongoing relationship made offers of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, Iraqi
authorities told them they were interested and gave them cash to acquire samples. In every
case of which Hamza was aware, however, the samples turned out to be radioactive trash, not
plutonium or HEU.6 5 As a result of these experiences, and out of fear of being caught by a
Western sting operation, Hamza reports that the part of Iraq's nuclear weapons program with
which he was associated began rejecting outside offers - though Hamza expressed his belief
before the second Gulf War that Iraqi military intelligence continued to pursue them. Hamza
acknowledged that had any of the samples proved to be genuine weapons-usable nuclear
material, Iraq would have been eager to purchase as much as was available.66
The accuracy of many of Hamza's assertions, particularly about the importance of his
own role in Iraq's pre-war nuclear weapons program, has been extensively challenged.67 His
assertions regarding attempted purchases of nuclear material nevertheless seem credible,
because (a) they were detailed and described as incidents in which he had personally taken
part; (b) they ran contrary to the overall point he was attempting to make, which was that the
principal danger was Iraq's potential to establish indigenous production capabilities, and so
cannot be explained as having been made up to support a larger argument; and (c) they fit
reasonably well with known facts concerning the extensive foreign Iraqi procurement
network. But they remain assertions from a single source of uncertain reliability. If they are
correct, they are particularly notable because of the timing of the incidents described: Hamza
left the Iraqi program in late 1990, so his account would imply that arms dealers from the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were claiming to be able to provide stolen plutonium and
HEU before the Soviet Union collapsed. (The official Iraqi statement that Iraq received
multiple offers of nuclear material which it turned down before the 1991 war carries the same
implication, since the Soviet Union did not collapse until the end of 1991.)
Albright and Khidhir Hamza, "Iraq's Reconstitution of Its Nuclear Weapons Program," Arms Control Today 28
(October 1998; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_10/daoc98.asp as of 27 February 2006).
65 Khidir Hamza, personal communication, September 2002. In an earlier interview with Frontline, Public
Broadcasting System, he reports that Iraq attempted to get nuclear weapons and materials from the former Soviet
Union, but was unable to do so and found the market full of both black marketers unable to deliver what they
promised and sting operations by governments (a problem he also mentioned in his September 2002 discussion
with me). See "Interview with Khidhir Hamza" in Frontline: Gunningfor Saddam, ed. (Washington, D.C.:
Public Broadcasting System, 2001; available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/
interviews/hamza.html as of 10 December 2006). In another interview, Hamza describes Iraqi bribery in the
Soviet Union to acquire advanced weapons technologies during the Iran-Iraq war, but does not mention attempts
to get nuclear technologies by this route. See "Saddam's Bombmaker," "60 Minutes 11," CBS News, 27 January
1999.
66 Khidir Hamza, personal communication, September 2002.
67 See, for example, quotes from an unnamed IAEA staffer and from former Hamza co-author David Albright in
Michael Massing, "Now They Tell Us," New York Review of Books 51, no. 3 (26 February 2004; available at
http://foi.missouri.edu/polinfoprop/nowtheytell.html as of 10 December 2006); Patrick Cockburn, "America
Quietly Sacks Its Prize Witness against Saddam," Independent, 17 April 2004 (available at
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0417-12.htm as of 10 December 2006).
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The potentially critical importance of getting enough nuclear material for one bomb,
while the ability to make more was still being put in place, became clear after Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait. Seeing the U.S. and coalition response to that invasion, Iraq launched a "crash"
program to rapidly produce a single bomb. For that purpose it planned on using HEU from its
French-supplied and Soviet-supplied research reactors, material that was under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. 68 As the availability of sufficient quantities of
adequately pure and enriched HEU was a key limiting factor for this effort, Iraq surely would
have been eager to receive HEU from a nuclear black market during the period of the "crash"
program. Whether Iraq's extensive foreign procurement effort was given explicit orders to
attempt to acquire such material at that time is not known. With the coalition attack in 1991,
the crash program ran out of time.
It appears that the 1991 Gulf War and the intrusive international inspections that
followed effectively put an end to the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The Iraq Survey Group
(ISG), the U.S. team set up after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 to examine the nature
and scope of Iraqi WMD programs, concluded that "Saddam [Hussein] ended the nuclear
program in 1991 following the Gulf war. ISG found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts
to restart the program."69 This conclusion is effectively identical to those of the IAEA
inspection teams, but stands in stark contrast to the claims made by the Bush administration
prior to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Despite pre-war statements to the contrary, the
ISG also found no evidence that Iraq sought uranium from abroad after 1991.70 The
commission established to review U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass destruction after the
2003 war strongly supported the ISG's conclusions.'
The ISG report does document that despite UN inspections and sanctions after the
1991 war, Iraq continued an extensive procurement effort focused on acquiring a wide range
of military technologies prohibited under the UN sanctions regime, including technologies
and materials acquired from entities in countries such as Belarus, Russia, Ukraine,
Yugoslavia, and Romania (all of which held weapons-usable nuclear material that was
72
dangerously insecure at the time), among many others. Iraq succeeded, for example, in
buying gyroscopes and other missile guidance instruments which were taken directly from
decommissioned Russian strategic nuclear missiles and which had been tested and certified by
a leading Russian institute. Desrerate Russian institutes also agreed to sell a wide variety of
other key missile technologies.7 As noted earlier, an employee of Russia's premier nuclear
weapons laboratory, arrested in December 1998, was accused of spying both for the Taliban
68 See discussion, for example, in Samore, ed., Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction.
69 Duelfer, "Volume II: Nuclear," p. 1.
70 Duelfer, "Volume II: Nuclear," p. 9.
7 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Report to the President.
72 Charles Duelfer, "Volume I: Regime Finance and Procurement," in Comprehensive Report of the Special
Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Langley, Vir.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2004; available at
http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/IraqsWMDVol 1.pdf as of 10 December 2006).
7 For a detailed account, see Vladimir Orlov and William C. Potter, "The Mystery of the Sunken Gyros,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54, no. 6 (November/December 1998; available at http://cns.miis.edu/
research/iraq/gyro/index.htm as of 10 December 2006), pp. 34-39.
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and for Iraq - in this case on advanced conventional weapons. These efforts continued right
up to beginning of the 2003 war. The ISG report, however, contains no mention of any post-
1991 Iraqi effort to acquire black-market nuclear material. The only specific such case that
has been reported in the public record is the assertion by the Department of Defense official
who led Project Sapphire, the removal of HEU from an insecure site in Kazakhstan in the
Clinton administration, that Iraq had offered $16,000 per kilogram for the HEU at that site (at
some time prior to 1994, when the material was airlifted to the United States). It is notable,
however, that this charge is not repeated in the ISG report.
The ISG report, however, makes a persuasive argument that Saddam Hussein
remained intensely interested in resuming the quest for nuclear weapons after UN sanctions
were eventually lifted and that the Iraqi regime took at least modest steps to ensure that the
knowledge of the participants in Iraq's nuclear weapons program was not dispersed. In the
words of one Saddam directive quoted in the report: "Keep nuclear scientists together at the
IAEC [Iraq Atomic Energy Commission] in order to pool their skills and have them available
when needed."7 With the HEU that was to have been used in the crash program removed
from Iraq by international inspectors, acquiring stolen weapons-usable nuclear material would
have been a critical way to maintain a secret nuclear capability. Indeed, from 1991 to 2003,
there was a broad consensus among experts on Iraq's program that the only way it could
achieve a nuclear weapons capability quickly would be by pursuing the theft option. The U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency warned in 1998 (well before the shift toward more alarming
assessments in the run-up to the 2003 war) that Iraq "would seize any opportunity to buy
nuclear weapons materials or a complete weapon."76 The U.S. Senate's report on pre-war
intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction declares that a series of U.S. intelligence
analyses from 1997 on were "consistent" in assessing that if Iraq got the needed nuclear
material from abroad "it could have a crude nuclear weapon within a year," but that it would
take "five to seven years" for it to make enough nuclear material for a bomb on its own, even
with substantial foreign assistance. 77 Similarly, both Khidir Hamza and the IAEA inspectors
in Iraq emphasized that if Iraq had acquired enough nuclear material for a bomb, the small-
scale effort needed to turn it into a bomb might have been difficult for inspectors to find. In
74 Jeffrey Starr, quoted in Chris Flores, "Project Sapphire: A Nuclear Odyssey: Defusing a Lethal Legacy," News
& Advance, 29 December 2002. Other accounts of Sapphire mention a concern about Iranian interest in the
HEU, but not a concern about Iraq.
75 Frontispiece quote, in Duelfer, "Volume II: Nuclear."
76 John Deutch, then Director of Central Intelligence, prepared testimony in 76 John Deutch, then Director of
Central Intelligence, prepared testimony in Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part //, U.S. Senate, 104th Congress, 2nd
Session, 13, 20, and 22 March 1996.
7 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the US. Intelligence Community's Prewar
Assessments on Iraq (2004; available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html as of 11
December 2006), pp. 84-85.
78 As the IAEA diplomatically put it, "it must be recognised that Iraq's direct acquisition of weapon-usable
material would present a serious technical challenge to OMV [ongoing monitoring and verification] measures,
and great reliance must continue to be placed on international controls." International Atomic Energy Agency,
Sixth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under Paragraph
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short, there was ample reason to believe before the 2003 war that, regardless of the true extent
of the Iraqi nuclear program, Saddam had a strong incentive to acquire stolen nuclear material
that might have made a small, covert bomb effort possible.
Nevertheless, the evidence now available suggests that Iraq did not make any strong
and consistent effort to get black market nuclear bomb material after 1991, or to take any
other substantial steps to reconstitute Iraq's nuclear weapons program, preferring to focus first
on getting UN sanctions lifted and return to the pursuit of WMD after that had been
accomplished.79
Iran
Because Iran retains a highly secretive government and has never been under the level
of intense international inspection that Iraq faced, information about its procurement efforts is
even more fragmentary than it is in the case of Iraq - but the available information suggests
that Iran, too, while focusing primarily on establishing the capability to produce its own fissile
material, has also sought to purchase stolen nuclear material.
Like Iraq, Iran built a substantial illicit procurement network to acquire technologies
related to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles all over the world - including in
the former Soviet Union. Like Iraq, Iran has succeeded in acquiring key missile technologies
from Russian institutes and has specifically sought technologies for producing both HEU and
plutonium.8' Indeed, U.S. concerns over leakage of Russian weapons of mass destruction
technologies to Iran have been central issues in U.S.-Russian relations for most of the period
since the Soviet collapse. While it is now clear that the most critical technologies for Iran's
indigenous efforts to produce nuclear material were coming from the black-market nuclear
network led by Pakistan's Abdul Qadeer Khan, not from Russia, Iran's nuclear connections in
the former Soviet Union are strong, and there are significant suggestions of ongoing efforts to
acquire stolen nuclear material.
In 1996, the CIA warned that Iran was pursuing an indigenous production capability
for both plutonium and HEU and that "to shorten the timeline to a weapon, Iran has launched
16 of UNSC Resolution 1051 (1996) (New York: United Nations, 1998; available at http://www.nci.org/i/iaeal 0-
8-98.htm as of 11 December 2006).
79 "Key Findings," in Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD
(Langley, Vir.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2004; available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/
iraqwmd_2004/index.html as of 10 December 2006).
80 For an overview of Iran's efforts, see Gary Samore, ed., Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net
Assessment (London: Taylor & Francis for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). For mid-1996
assessments of the centrifuge program specifically, see David Albright, "When Could Iran Get the Bomb?"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 4 (July/August 2006; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/
article.php?art ofn=ja06albright as of 5 December 2006), pp. 26-33; David Albright and Corey Hinderstein,
"Iran's Next Steps: Final Tests and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant" (Washington, D.C.:
Institute for Science and International Security, 12 January 2006; available at http://www.isis-online.org/
publications/iran/irancascade.pdf as of 6 April 2006).
81 For a discussion of Iran's attempts to acquire sensitive nuclear technologies from Russia in particular, see, for
example, Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore, "Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb," Survival
44, no. 2 (May 2002); Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 169-175.
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a parallel effort to purchase fissile material, mainly from sources in the former Soviet
Union."8 2 The next year, the Department of Defense pointed out that the "shortest route" for
Iran to get nuclear weapons would be "acquisition of a nuclear weapon from a foreign source"
or to "purchase or steal fissile material."8 3 In 2000, the CIA was still warning that "Tehran
continues to seek fissile material"8 4 and reportedly concluded that it could not rule out the
possibility that Iran had already acquired a nuclear weapon capability, if it had succeeded in
secretly procuring fissile material abroad.85 In 2001, the Department of Defense again
concluded that Iran is "is seeking fissile material and technology for weapons development
through an elaborate system of military andd civilian organizations."86 In 2004, the CIA
warned that it "suspects" that "Tehran is interested in acquiring fissile material... from
foreign suppliers" for its nuclear weapons program.87
During 2003-2006, after the revelation of Iran's secret centrifuge enrichment program
in 2002, a series of IAEA reports documented Iran's decades-long secret effort to develop
uranium enrichment and other key technologies for producing potential nuclear weapons
materials." Iran successfully procured a wide range of centrifuge- and laser enrichment-
related technologies through the black-market network led by Pakistan's A.Q. Khan and
through contacts with entities in Russia and elsewhere. Like Iraq before 1991, Iran illicitly
imported large quantities of uranium without reporting these acquisitions to the IAEA. Iran
repeatedly violated its safeguards obligations, both in failing to report imports and activities to
the IAEA and in providing information to the IAEA that Iran now acknowledges was false.
In early 2006, Iran ended a suspension of uranium enrichment activities it had agreed to with
European negotiators, and by April of 2006, Iran announced that it was successfully enriching
uranium in a 164-centrifuge cascade. The IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in
violation of its safeguards agreement and reported Iran's activities to the UN Security
Council. The Security Council issued a statement in April 2006 requesting that Iran again
suspend enrichment and reprocessing-related activities, return to compliance with the
82 Quoted in Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Prohferation, p. 169.
83 U.S. Department of Defense, Prohferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 1997; available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif97/ as of 18 December 2006).
84 See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June
1999 (Langley, Vir.: CIA, 2000; available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721 reports/janjunl999.html as of
18 December 2006).
85 See James Risen and Judith Miller, "C.I.A. Tells Clinton an Iranian a-Bomb Can't Be Ruled Out," New York
Times, 17 January 2000 (available at http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/iranbmba.htm as of 18
December 2006).
86 U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 2001; available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr2 001011.pdf as of 18 December 2006), pp. 34-3 5.
87 See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June
2003 (Langley, Vir.: CIA, 2004; available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721 reports/janjun2003.htm as of
18 December 2006).
88 The complete set of IAEA reports on implementation of safeguards in Iran, relevant Security Council
statements and resolutions, and related materials, can be found at International Atomic Energy Agency, "In
Focus: JAEA and Iran" (Vienna: IAEA, 2006; available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Iaealran/
index.shtml as of 5 May 2006).
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Additional Protocol strengthening safeguards, and take other steps to build confidence. Iran
declined to take those steps. In July 2006, the Security Council passed resolution 1696, which
legally required Iran to take those steps. Iran again refused to do so. In December 2006, after
months of debate among the permanent members, the Security Council passed resolution
1737, imposing limited sanctions on Iran for its failure to comply with its obligations under
resolution 1696.89
The IAEA reports on Iran's nuclear activity indicate that Iran's indigenous enrichment
program has been underway since 1985, yet a significant degree of enrichment was first
achieved in a small cascade in early 2006, more than twenty years later. Since Iran was for so
long unable to produce significant quantities of weapons-usable material domestically, some
in Iran might have perceived a strong incentive to acquire weapons-usable nuclear material
from abroad. The IAEA's detection of HEU contamination of equipment at some facilities in
Iran initially seemed to suggest either that Iran had succeeded in producing some HEU itself,
or that it had received HEU from foreign sources. The detection of 36% enriched HEU, a
level of enrichment used in Soviet-supplied research reactors, seemed to suggest that Iran
might have gotten such material from abroad. Iran has stated that the HEU particles came
from contaminated equipment Iran received from abroad (much of it originating in Pakistan,
but also including some non-centrifuge equipment from Russia that may have been the origin
of the 36% enrichment). In November, 2004, the IAEA reported that its "overall assessment"
is that the data "tends, on balance, to support Iran's statement on the origin of much of the
contamination," though other explanations continued to be investigated.90 As of late 2006,
there is no compelling evidence that these HEU particles came from black-market HEU.
There have been innumerable press reports (of varying levels of credibility) related to
Iranian attempts to acquire nuclear materials or even nuclear weapons. There have also been
a significant number of actual arrests of Iranian nationals apparently associated with the
89 Resolutions 1696 and 1737 can be found at International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA and Iran".
90 I nternational Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NP T Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, GOV/2004/83 (Vienna: IAEA, 2004; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2004/gov2004-83.pdf as of 18 December 2006), pp. 9-10. The November 2004 report states that
environmental samples of domestically produced components showed predominantly LEU contamination and
that it was on the imported components that LEU and HEU particles had been found. Particles at enrichment
levels up to 70% uranium-235 concentration were found in samples taken from imported components in several
different locations. Particles of approximately 54% HEU were found on imported components and centrifuge
rotors constructed using imported components, and some 54% HEU was also detected in chemical traps at the
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz (which had not begun operations at the time the samples were taken). The
November 2004 report also clarifies the February 2004 revelation that 36% HEU particles had been found in two
Iranian facilities - the Kalaye Electric Company (where much of Iran's centrifuge research and development had
taken place) and Farayand Technique (where some centrifuge components were being made). The 36% enriched
HEU particles have been found in only one room at Kalaye and on a balancing machine at Farayand (a machine
which had been relocated from Kalaye); further, the agency has said that "the level of contamination suggests the
presence of more than just trace quantities of material." The February 2004 report of 36% HEU samples sparked
particular interest, because HEU enriched to this level is not used in Pakistan (the source of most of the
centrifuge equipment), but is produced in Russia for use as fuel in certain Soviet-supplied research reactors in
states in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere in the former Communist bloc. The balancing machine now at
Farayand may well be the source of the 36% contamination.
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Iranian special services, for smuggling of various types of nuclear or radioactive materials
(though they have not been caught with substantial quantities of directly weapons-usable
materials in any of the confirmed cases). 91 At the Ulba facility in Kazakhstan, canisters were
found labeled for shipping to Teheran, in a room next to the room where hundreds of
kilograms of HEU were located. The Iranians had reportedly approached Kazakhstan to
secretly purchase beryllium and LEU from this facility, perhaps as a trust-building prelude to
an offer to purchase the HEU. (The HEU was subsequently removed from this facility under
the U.S.-Kazakh cooperative effort known as Project Sapphire.) 92
If Iran succeeds in establishing an operational enrichment capability of its own, its
potential demand for black market fissile material would presumably lessen. Nevertheless, as
long as its enrichment facilities remained under IAEA safeguards, some demand for illicit
nuclear material from abroad, which would be processed secretly without attracting
inspectors' attention, might continue.
The Demand is There
There is no evidence that either a nuclear weapon or the nuclear material needed to
make one has yet fallen into the hands of terrorist groups or hostile states. But it is clear that
both terrorist groups and states are attempting to get these items - and that if they succeed, the
international community could be faced with a terrifying new threat with very little warning.
The fact that the known cases of theft and smuggling of plutonium and HEU cannot be linked
to specific buyers should not blind one to the reality of the demand. Indeed, there is no way
to know what has not been detected: it may be that precisely those thieves and smugglers who
are well-connected to potential buyers are the ones who do not get caught.
Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?
Mother Nature has been both kind and cruel in setting the basic parameters of the
nuclear threat the world faces: kind, in that the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons -
highly enriched uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium - do not exist in more than trace
amounts in nature and are quite difficult to produce; cruel, in that once these materials are
available, making at least a crude nuclear bomb is within the technical capability of nearly
any state and potentially even some particularly capable and well-organized terrorist groups. 93
91 See, for example, "NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database" (Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2006; available at http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/ as of 12 December
2006). This database contains a large number of reported cases involving Iranian nationals. For one
particularly extensive account focusing on cases in Turkey, see Ali M. Koknar, "The Trade in Materials for
Weapons of Mass Destruction," International Police Review (March-April 1999), pp. 24-25.
92 See discussion in William C. Potter, "Project Sapphire: U.S.-Kazakhstani Cooperation for Nonproliferation,"
in John M. Shields and William C. Potter, (Cambridge, Ma: Mit Press, 1997)." in Dismantling the Cold War:
U.S. And NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, ed. John M. Shields and
William C. Potter (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).
93 This section is based on Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor Action
(Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear
Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/analysis cnwmupdate_052404.pdf as of 2
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This crucial fact is often not understood. As one leading analyst argued, "actually
building [a crude nuclear weapon] is extremely difficult. A number of countries with vast
resources and expertise, such as Iraq, have struggled unsuccessfully to produce one. It is
difficult to imagine that a small terrorist group would find bomb-building any easier." 94
Unfortunately, this argument does not withstand scrutiny. Despite the failures of Aum
Shinrikyo and al Qaeda to date, the capabilities needed to make a crude nuclear bomb once
the nuclear material is in hand are relatively limited and could potentially be acquired by a
reasonably well-organized terrorist group. The comparison to states' difficulties acquiring
nuclear weapons conflates the difficulty ofproducing the nuclear material needed for a bomb
- the key area on which Iraq spent billions of dollars - with the difficulty of making a bomb
once the material is in hand. (As already noted, a wide range of estimates suggested that
getting stolen nuclear material from abroad would have cut the time Iraq required to make a
bomb from years to months.) And it fails to make the crucial distinction between making a
safe, reliable, and efficient nuclear weapon suitable for delivery by a missile or a fighter
aircraft - that is, the kind of nuclear weapon a typical state would want for its arsenal, whose
design and construction does require substantial scientific and technical expertise - with the
far simpler task of making a crude, unsafe, unreliable terrorist nuclear explosive that might be
delivered by truck or boat.
If enough HEU is gathered in the same place at the same time, a nuclear chain reaction
will occur. Indeed, considerable care has to be taken to prevent this from happening
accidentally. To make that chain reaction explosive requires that the necessary HEU be
gathered into a critical mass quickly enough, so that the material does not turn to vapor and
expand enough to stop the reaction before a substantial amount of energy has been released.
The bomb that obliterated the Japanese city of Hiroshima at the end of World War II was a
cannon that fired a projectile of HEU into rings of HEU - a so-called "gun-type" bomb. The
basic principles that need to be understood to make a gun-type bomb are widely available in
the open literature.95 Even when nothing of the kind had ever been done before, Hans Bethe,
one of the technical leaders of the Manhattan Project, reports that the working principles of a
gun-type bomb were "well taken care of' by one scientist and two of his graduate students
during a summer study at Berkeley, before the bomb team ever arrived at Los Alamos. 96
Gun-type weapons offer a simplicity and robustness that allows the builder to have
high confidence that the weapon will perform properly without undergoing the trouble,
expense, and likelihood of discovery associated with a test nuclear explosion.97 A gun-type
Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials," in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb
(Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear
Threat Initiative, 2002; available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/overview/technical.asp as of 16
February 2006).
94 Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Nuclear Terrorism Is Not the Core Problem," Survival 40, no. 4 (Winter 1998).
9s For perhaps the best unclassified introduction, see Robert Serber, The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures
on How to Build an Atomic Bomb (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
96 Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 417.
9' Even the makers of thefirst gun-type nuclear weapon - the four-ton "Little Boy" exploded by the United
States over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 - were confident enough of its performance to agree to its use in war
without a test explosion first.
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weapon, however, is highly inefficient (meaning that only a small fraction of the nuclear-
explosive material used actually fissions) and so requires a substantial amount of nuclear
material. The Hiroshima bomb used just over 60 kilograms of HEU metal, enriched to an
average of 80% U235.98
It is impossible to get a substantial explosive yield from a gun-type bomb with
plutonium, because the rate of spontaneous fission (primarily from Pu-240) is so high that the
chain reaction will start as the two pieces in the gun get close to each other, blowing the
weapon apart before any significant yield results. Hence, if the material terrorists had
available was plutonium, or if the amount of HEU they had available was too small for a gun-
type weapon, they would have to attempt the more challenging task of designing and building
an "implosion type" weapon. An implosion type weapon uses a set of shaped explosives
arranged around a less-than-critical mass of HEU or plutonium to crush the atoms of nuclear
material closer together, increasing the chance that whenever one of those atoms splits and
releases neutrons, those neutrons will hit and split another atom - and hence setting off the
nuclear chain reaction.99
Designing and building an implosion bomb would be a significantly greater challenge
for a terrorist group. In such a bomb, precision timing in setting off the explosives is crucial:
if the explosives on one side go off much before the explosives on the other side, the nuclear
material will be flattened rather than crushed to a smaller sphere, and there will be no nuclear
explosion. In addition, an implosion device using either plutonium with a low Pu-240 content
or HEU requires a means for generating a burst of neutrons to start the chain reaction at the
right moment, before the conventional explosion destroys the configuration that will sustain a
nuclear chain reaction. 100 Solving these technical challenges of implosion weapons was a
major part of the Manhattan Project effort at Los Alamos during World War II. It had never
been done before, and the whole approach had to be invented from scratch.141 Today,
however, with the knowledge that it can be done and substantial information on the needed
explosives in the unclassified literature (explosive lenses and other shaped explosive charges
are now in wide use for conventional military and even commercial applications), the
challenge would be less, though still significant.
98 See, for example, Carey Sublette, "Section 8.0: The First Nuclear Weapons," in Nuclear Weapons Frequently
Asked Questions (2001; available at http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/Nfaq8.html as of 12 December
2006).
99 The Trinity and Nagasaki implosion bombs involved explosive "lenses" arranged around a six -kilogram
sphere of plutonium metal (itself surrounded by a reflector), with detonators arranged all around the sphere so
that the explosives were set off from every side at the same time, creating a spherical shock wave moving inward
that crushed the sphere to a much higher density.
' In this respect, terrorists might even prefer to have reactor-grade plutonium, with its high Pu-240 content,
than weapon-grade plutonium: because of the far larger number of neutrons released continuously by reactor-
grade plutonium, an implosion bomb with this material might be able to do without a neutron generator. (This
was first pointed out to the authorme by a Russian nuclear weapon designer who had been assigned to study
possibilities for terrorist design and construction of a nuclear bomb.) Personal communication, February 1997.)
The assured explosive yield of an implosion bomb with reactor-grade plutonium would typically be substantially
lower than the yield of a device made from weapon-grade plutonium, however. See discussion in Chapter 4.
'0' See the excellent discussion in Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb.
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Repeated examinations of the question: "could resourceful terrorists design and build a
crude nuclear bomb if they had the needed nuclear material?" by nuclear weapons experts in
the United States and elsewhere have concluded that the answer is "yes" - for either type of
nuclear bomb.'02 A detailed examination by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment,
drawing on all the relevant classified information, summed up the situation in a conclusory
statement intended to apply to both gun-type and implosion-type devices:
A small group of people, none of whom have ever had access to the classified literature,
could possibly design and build a crude nuclear explosive device. They would not
necessarily require a great deal of technological equipment or have to undertake any
experiments. Only modest machine-shop facilities that could be contracted for without
arousing suspicion would be required. The financial resources for the acquisition of
necessary equipment on open markets need not exceed a fraction of a million dollars. The
group would have to include, at a minimum, a person capable of researching and
understanding the literature in several fields and a jack-of-all trades technician.10 3
Setting off a nuclear explosion with HEU can be done rapidly enough that U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) internal security regulations require that security for U.S.
nuclear sites where enough material for a bomb is present be based on keeping terrorists out
entirely, rather than catching them as they leave the site, to avoid "an unauthorized
opportunity...to use available nuclear materials for onsite assembly of an improvised nuclear
device" - that is, to prevent terrorists from being able to set off a nuclear explosion while they
were still inside the facility where they stole the HEU.104
Given the importance of the question of whether terrorists could design a nuclear
explosive, the answer has not been left to analysis alone, but has been subjected to
"experiment" as well. In 1977, a Princeton undergraduate designed an implosion-type bomb
102 See J. Carson Mark et al., "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?" in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, ed.
Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1987; available at
http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm as of 4 January 2006). This remains the most authoritative unclassified
treatment of the subject - in part because it represents something of a negotiated statement by experts with a
range of views on the matter.
103 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, D.C.:
OTA, 1977; available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/disk3/1977/7705/7705.PDF as of 12 December
2006), p. 140. A million 1977 dollars would be approximately $2.8 million in 2007 dollars. This report does,
however, argue that under-appreciated difficulties of actually fabricating a gun-type device would make doing so
essentially as difficult as designing and building an implosion bomb. After consulting with a number of nuclear
weapon designers, I strongly disagree, at least with respect to a crude terrorist gun-type device that would not
require high reliability or efficiency. The relative difficulty of gun-type and implosion-type devices is discussed
in more detail in Chapter 4.
104 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Security Affairs, Office of Safeguards and Security, Manualfor
Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests, DOE-M-5632.1 c-I (Washington, D.C.: DOE,
1994; available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/doe/m5632_Ic- I/index.html as of 28 February 2006). This
order has now been superceded, and more recent orders are either less explicit or not publicly available. In fact,
however, the use of a denial strategy, because of concerns that terrorists might be able to use materials readily to
hand to make an improvised nuclear device, has been expanded at DOE since 9/11. See discussion in U.S.
Congress, Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues before
It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat (GAO, 200423 December 2006), p. 12.
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for a senior paper; Freeman Dyson, a veteran of post-war nuclear weapon design work who
was his professor, gave him an "A" on the paper, and the government then classified it.105 Of
the several official investigations of this kind that have occurred, two have been revealed
publicly in some detail. In one effort in the 1960s (before the availability of the Internet or of
a large fraction of the information that is unclassified and readily available today), two
physicists who had just received their doctorates and had no knowledge of weapons-usable
nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, or explosives were given the job of using unclassified
information to design a nuclear bomb from scratch. (There were ultimately a total of three
participants, as one of the original two dropped out and was replaced.) They quickly decided
that designing a workable gun-type bomb would be too easy to show off their technical skills
in a way that would improve their subsequent job prospects; instead, they successfully
designed a workable implosion design. Two points about this effort should be noted,
however: (a) since this experiment was intended to assess the capabilities of states, rather than
terrorist groups, the team had the opportunity to carry out "experiments" in which they wrote
up what they wanted to test (such as different explosive arrangements), and the experts
overseeing the effort told them what the result of such a test would be (an option that would
not be available for terrorist groups seeking to avoid detection); (b) they only designed the
weapon, they did not manufacture it. 106
More recently, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), when serving as chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, asked the three U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories whether
terrorists, if they had the nuclear material, could make a crude but workable nuclear bomb.
The answer given was "yes." Senator Biden reports that within a few months after he had
asked the question, the laboratories had actually built a gun-type device, using only
components that, except for the nuclear material itself, were off the shelf and commercially
available without breaking any laws. The device was actually brought into a secure Senate
hearing room to demonstrate the gravity of the threat.107
The process of actually making the bomb would require some expertise and equipment
(though all of the equipment needed is commercially available). Casting and machining the
uranium or plutonium parts for a bomb would be a significant challenge, unless the group
managed to acquire nuclear material in readily usable form, or included people with
experience in uranium or plutonium metallurgy. For a gun-type bomb, the group would need
to understand cannon ballistics. For an implosion bomb, figuring out how to detonate the
explosives at multiple points with the level of timing precision required would be a challenge.
105 John Aristotle Phillips and David Michaelis, Mushroom: The Story of the a-Bomb Kid, 1st ed. (New York:
Morrow, 1978).
106 See Dan Stober, "No Experience Necessary," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 2 (2003; available at
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?artofn=ma03stober as of 27 February 2006). Expurgated declassified
documents describing the effort are also available at the same site.
107 Joseph Biden, "Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy," in The Paul C. Warnke Conference on the Past, Present, and
Future ofArms Control, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control
Association, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, and Center for Peace and Security Studies, 2004;
available at http://www.armscontrol.org/PDF/WarnkePDFTranscript.pdf as of 12 December 2006).
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Making a nuclear bomb would not be easy for a terrorist group; but these challenges are far
from insuperable.
Having help from someone familiar with nuclear weapon design and construction
would certainly be useful to terrorists trying to build a bomb - as would having actual bomb
blueprints - though neither would be essential. As noted earlier, Al Qaeda and its allies have
actively attempted to recruit such help, from Pakistani nuclear scientists and, it appears, from
Russian scientists as well.
Over the last several years, the world has seen confirmed an extraordinary leakage of
nuclear technology from Pakistan, including designs for uranium enrichment centrifuges,
components for such centrifuges, complete centrifuges apparently taken from Pakistan's own
enrichment plant, consulting services for any problems the buyers might have, and even actual
nuclear weapon blueprints. The leakers were apparently motivated both by money and by
Islamic fervor. 108 Extreme Islamic views, including sympathy for al Qaeda and the Taliban,
appear not to be unusual in Pakistan's military and nuclear establishment, just as they are not
unusual in broader Pakistani society. A.Q. Khan, the former head of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program who confessed to leading this clandestine nuclear network, is a strident
nationalist prone to harsh Islamic rhetoric. In 1984 (three years before Iran now says it
received complete centrifuge designs), Khan spoke of his opposition to "all the Western
countries" as "enemies of Islam," and the possibility that nuclear technology might be shared
among Islamic countries, specifically mentioning Iraq, Libya, and Iran:
All the Western countries, including Israel, are not only Pakistan's enemies but also
enemies of Islam. ...All this is part of the Crusades, which the Christians and Jews had
initiated against the Moslems 1000 years ago. Islam was the only religion which uprooted
their culture and civilization and they have not forgotten it even today. ...All countries
are aware that Moslems believe in monotheism and despite political disunity, they share
each other's hardships. They are afraid that if Pakistan makes obvious progress in this
field, then the whole Islamic world will stand to benefit. There is no such danger from
India. You know that Iraq, Libya and Iran had increased ties with India in the hope that
India would assist them in nuclear technology but this was not the case and they were
108 Good summaries of the Khan network can be found in Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, "Proliferation
Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," International Security 29, no. 2 (Fall 2004;
available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20716/braun-chyba-is-fall04.pdf as of I August 2005); David
Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," Washington
Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005; available at http://www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05springalbright.pdf as of I
August 2005); Barton Gellman and Dafna Linzer, "Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls; President Faces a
Multi-Front Battle against Threats Known, Unknown," Washington Post, 26 October 2004; Bill Powell et al.,
"The Man Who Sold the Bomb," Time 165 (21 February 2005), p. 22; Douglas Frantz, "A High-Risk Nuclear
Stakeout: The U.S. Took Too Long to Act, Some Experts Say, Letting a Pakistani Scientist Sell Illicit
Technology Well after It Knew of His Operation," Los Angeles Times, 27 February 2005; William C. Rempel
and Douglas Frantz, "Global Nuclear Inquiry Stalls: Authorities Fear That the Extent of a Pakistani Scientist's
Proliferation Ring Remains Unknown and That It Will Resume Work If Pressures Ease," Los Angeles Times, 5
December 2004; John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Pakistani Scientist Apologizes; Nuclear Assistance
Unauthorized, He Says," Washington Post, 5 February 2004.
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sorely disappointed. This is the reason why Western countries ignore India's nuclear
program and its results and are after us. 109
In 1998, when the United States bombed al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in retaliation
for the bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, General Aslam Beg, who until shortly before
had been in overall charge of Pakistan's nuclear program, told reporters that "by the grace of
God" bin Laden had not been in the bombed camps and therefore had not been killed. "o Beg
is so powerful even in retirement that he openly told reporters during the ongoing
investigation of nuclear leakage in Pakistan that Pakistani official investigators "would not
dare" even question him - repeating it a second time for emphasis."' One Pakistani nuclear
physicist critical of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs has estimated that some 10 percent
of Pakistan's nuclear experts - amounting to hundreds of people - hold extremist Islamic
views that could motivate nuclear leakage." i2
Not only scientific help but actual working bomb designs now appear to be potentially
available, moreover. Libya, in its decision to roll back its weapons of mass destruction
programs, has admitted receiving an implosion design that appears to have come from
Pakistan (though it appears to have originated in China, which apparently provided it to
Pakistan long ago). The copy of the design that Libya acknowledged has been removed from
Libya - but who knows how many other copies exist, where they have gone, and where they
may go in the future? The possibility that al Qaeda has access to complete blueprints for an
implosion-type nuclear explosive - or may soon get such access - is very real. The design is
reportedly one for a relatively simple and not very efficient implosion bomb - the type of
implosion weapon that terrorists could most plausibly manufacture.' 13
Of course, even with a working design, and even if the nuclear material could be
acquired, manufacturing a weapon to the specifications called for in the design would not be a
trivial task. But the potential availability of a nuclear bomb recipe reinforces the urgency of
keeping the ingredients needed to make that recipe out of terrorist hands.
109 "Exclusive Interview with Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan (Excerpts)," trans. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Nawa-e Waqt, 10 February 1984.
"0 Elizabeth Neuffer, "A US Concern: Pakistan's Arsenal: Anti-American Mood Poses a Security Risk," Boston
Globe 2002.
"1 Quoted in David Rohde, "General Denies Letting Secrets of a-Bomb out of Pakistan," New York Times, 27
January 2004.
'12 Neuffer, "A US Concern: Pakistan's Arsenal: Anti-American Mood Poses a Security Risk." For further
discussion of the problem of extreme Islamic views in Pakistan's nuclear establishment, see Albright and
Higgins, "A Bomb for the Ummah."
"3 William J. Broad, "Libya's Crude Bomb Design Eases Western Experts' Fear," New, York Times, 9 February
2004. The design has been widely reported as being the warhead for the Chinese DF-2, the first missile-
delivered Chinese warhead. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein describe the design recovered in Libya as a
Chinese missile-warhead design weighing approximately 500 kilograms. Albright and Hinderstein, "Unraveling
the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks."
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Could Terrorists Produce Their Own Bomb Material?
Revelations that Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan and his co-
conspirators had organized a far-flung nuclear black market that had supplied complete
uranium enrichment centrifuges to Libya, Iran, and apparently North Korea have raised
questions about whether access to such technology might allow even a terrorist group to
produce highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for itself, rather than having to rely on
obtaining already produced material from a state that already possesses it. The Japanese
terror cult Aum Shinrikyo apparently planned to try, having purchased a farm in Australia for
its uranium deposits, and stolen documents relating to laser isotope enrichment.
To produce HEU first requires mining or obtaining uranium ore, converting that ore
into a chemical form suitable for enrichment, and then enriching it - concentrating the isotope
U-235, which is less than I % of the uranium that occurs naturally, to at least (and likely far
above) the 20 percent concentration defined as HEU. A variety of enrichment technologies
exist, each posing difficult obstacles. The Khan network was peddling centrifuge technology,
which uses sets of hundreds or thousands of sophisticated, ultra-high-speed, spinning
centrifuges to separate U-235 from the slightly heavier U-238. But even with complete
centrifuges provided from the black market, building and operating an enrichment facility
would be extraordinarily difficult for a terrorist group. Iran, for example, is a nation with a
strong indigenous science and technology base and substantial monetary resources, and Iran
now admits that it received complete centrifuge designs as early as 1987. Yet for years
thereafter, the Iranian enrichment program apparently made little progress. Although Iran
received an additional infusion of help from the network in the mid-I 990s, a decade after that
second infusion of help Iran appears only now to be at the cusp of mastering the technology to
build its own centrifuges and operate them in effective enrichment cascades." 4
If a terrorist group had access to a substantial quantity of low-enriched uranium
(LEU), and was willing to leave a substantial fraction of the U-235 in the LEU in the depleted
tails from the enrichment operation, the amount of enrichment work required to make bomb
material might be reduced by 80-90 percent. Getting that enrichment work done, however,
would still pose an immense challenge - though analysts from the Kurchatov Institute in
Moscow in particular have warned that for a much smaller amount of enrichment work, much
lower-quality centrifuges that might be easier to acquire and operate might be used." 5 A
good case can be made, based on the Kurchatov analysis and others, that more stringent
global controls should be imposed on LEU than now exist - especially given the danger of its
use for covert proliferation by a state. But even with LEU, actually operating an enrichment
enterprise sufficient to make a bomb's worth of HEU would be far more difficult for a
terrorist group to accomplish than making a bomb from stolen nuclear material; it is difficult
to imagine any of the terrorist groups the world has yet seen coming close to mastering the
challenge of enrichment.
114 Albright and Hinderstein, "Iran's Next Steps".
115 Alexander Rumiantsev, Vladimir Sukhoruchkin, and Vladimir Schmelev, personal communication, October
2005.
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For terrorists to produce their own plutonium would require either (a) building a
nuclear reactor to produce plutonium in spent fuel or (b) getting stolen spent fuel. In either
case, the group would then need to build at least a crude facility to extract plutonium from the
spent fuel. Building a plutonium production reactor, operating it long enough to produce a
bomb's worth of plutonium, and then separating that plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel
appear to be a set of activities well beyond the capabilities of any terrorist group known to
date; it is extremely unlikely any terrorist group will develop such capabilities in the future.
Managing to separate plutonium from stolen spent fuel is somewhat more plausible, as a
crude facility for that purpose need not be very large, and could be built with technologies that
are commercially available, relying on chemical processes that have been openly published.
But spent power reactor fuel is massive and intensely radioactive, making it very difficult to
steal. Processing the material in the presence of its intense radioactivity is much more
difficult than processing unirradiated fuel, because of the requirement to handle the various
operations remotely, and the difficulty of fixing any problems that may arise in the presence
of the intense radiation field that exists once the facility has begun to be used. The terrorists
would have to reckon with a significant probability that the vehicle carrying the intensely
radioactive material away from the theft site - which would be substantially easier to detect
with radiation sensors than a truck carrying unirradiated plutonium or HEU - would be found
and stopped, or that their facility for separation (also more detectable than it would be with
less radioactive material) would be found and destroyed before it could finish its work.
In short, even given the leakage of technology from the Khan network, it appears
extremely unlikely that terrorist groups will develop the capacity to produce their own nuclear
bomb material. If the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials held by
states can be secured reliably and kept out of terrorist hands, the probability of nuclear
terrorism can be reduced to a very low level.
Setting Off a Stolen Nuclear Weapon
A terrorist group that got hold of a stolen nuclear weapon would face somewhat
different challenges than would a group trying to make a bomb of its own from stolen nuclear
material. The difficulty of setting off a stolen weapon would depend substantially on the
specifics of the weapon's design. Many U.S. nuclear weapons are equipped with "permissive
action links" (PALs), which are effectively electronic locks, intended to make it difficult to
detonate the weapon without first inserting an authorized code. Modem versions are designed
to be integral to the weapon, making it very difficult to bypass the locking device and
"hotwire" the weapon to detonate. They are also equipped with "limited try" features that
will permanently disable the weapon if the wrong code is entered too many times, or if
attempts are made to tamper with or bypass the lock.1 6 Older versions do not have all of
116 For discussions of PALs and their role, see, for example, Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring Control of
Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links, Csia Occasional Paper, No. 2 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1987); Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians:
Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); Donald
R. Cotter, "Peacetime Operations: Safety and Security," in Managing Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter,
Charles A. Zraket, and John D. Steinbruner (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987).
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these features and therefore would provide somewhat less of an obstacle to a terrorist group
attempting to detonate a stolen weapon they had acquired.
In addition to PALs, for safety reasons many weapons are equipped with devices
which prevent the weapon from detonating until it has gone through its expected flight-to-
target sequence - for example, in the case of a nuclear artillery shell, the explosive
acceleration of being fired from a cannon, followed by the coasting through the air of
unpowered flight. These features, if designed to be very difficult to bypass, can also pose a
serious obstacle to a terrorist group detonating a stolen weapon."17
Unfortunately, what little information is publicly available suggests that older Soviet-
designed weapons, particularly older tactical weapons, may not be equipped with modern
versions of such safeguards against unauthorized use."18 In both the United States and Russia,
thousands of nuclear weapons, particularly older varieties, have been dismantled in recent
years, and it is likely that most of the most dangerous weapons lacking modern safeguards
have been destroyed. But neither country has made any commitment to destroy all of these
weapons. Nuclear powers such as Pakistan, India, and China are not believed to incorporate
equivalents to modern PALs in their weapons, but many of these weapons are believed to be
stored in partly disassessembled form.
Perhaps even more than in building a crude nuclear device of their own, terrorists
seeking to detonate a stolen weapon would benefit greatly from the help of a knowledgeable
insider, if such help could be procured. It may well be that an insider willing to help in
stealing a weapon in the first place might also be willing to help in providing important
information related to setting the weapon off. In the case of a weapon equipped with a
modern PAL, however, without the actual use codes most insiders, too, would not be able to
provide ready means to overcome the lock and use the weapon. (After all, a principal purpose
of PALs is to prevent insiders from being able to set the weapons off without authorization.)
If they could not figure out how to detonate a stolen weapon, terrorists might choose
to remove the nuclear material from it and seek to fashion it into a bomb - though if the
weapon was a modern, highly efficient design using a modest amount of nuclear material, the
material contained in it might not be enough for a crude, inefficient terrorist bomb.' 9 In any
117 For a description of such "environmental sensing devices" (ESDs), see, for example, Cotter, "Peacetime
Operations: Safety and Security."
118 See, for example, testimony of Bruce G. Blair in National Security Committee, Military Research &
Development Subcommittee, Hearing on Russian Missile Detargeting and Nuclear Doctrine and Its Relation to
National Missile Defense, U.S. House of Representatives, 105th Congress, 1st Session, 13 March 1997
(available at http://armedservices.house.gov/testimony/105thcongress/97-3-13BIair.htm as of 28 February 2006).
Blair reports that tactical nuclear weapons "built before the early 1980s lack the safety locks known as
permissive action links." See also Bruce W. Nelan, "Present Danger: Russia's Nuclear Forces Are Sliding into
Disrepair and Even Moscow Is Worried About What Might Happen," Time Europe 149, no. 14 (7 April 1997), p.
42. Nelan reports U.S. intelligence estimates that Russian tactical weapons "often" have external locks "that can
be removed, and many have none at all."
119 If the weapon were a multi-stage thermonuclear weapon, it would be more likely to have sufficient nuclear
material for a crude terrorist bomb. Such weapons include a "primary" or "pit", which uses plutonium or HEU
to create an initial nuclear blast, and the energy from that blast causes fusion to occur in the "secondary," which
typically also includes HEU, in which additional fission occurs. Combining material from the two parts of the
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case, terrorists who had a stolen nuclear weapon would be in a position to make fearsome
threats - for no one would know for sure whether they could set it off or not.
How Much Do Al Qaeda's Weaknesses Reduce the Danger?
Several weaknesses of al Qaeda have led some analysts to argue that it could not
plausibly carry out an attack with an actual nuclear explosive. First, many of the
organization's recruits have little technical sophistication and expertise. For example, a 1999
al Qaeda progress report found in Afghanistan concludes that the attempt to make nerve gas
weapons relying on the expertise the group could put together without recruiting specialists
had "resulted in a waste of effort and money." The report recommended recruiting experts as
the "fastest, cheapest, and safest" way to build the capability to make such weapons.
Unfortunately, however, a number of top al Qaeda personnel are technologically literate (bin
Laden deputy Zawahiri is a medical doctor, while reported 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh
Muhammad, now in U.S. custody, is a U.S.-trained engineer),m2' and they may well have
succeeded in recruiting other technically skilled individuals who are as yet unknown. Despite
the limited public evidence that suggests a lack of sophistication in their nuclear efforts to
date, the group has demonstrated a significant ability to carry out research on technical
subjects in the unclassified literature. 2 The most detailed unclassified analysis of al Qaeda's
nuclear program concludes that it posed a serious threat while it was underway in the
Afghanistan sanctuary and could still succeed elsewhere. 2 3
Others argue that a group with al Qaeda's structure of small cells would not be well-
suited for what they argue would be a large, long-term project like making a nuclear bomb -
particularly given the substantial disruptions al Qaeda has suffered from the international
response to the 9/11 attacks. The deaths or arrests of a substantial number of senior al Qaeda
leaders and operatives since 9/11 and the other disruptions of its operations have undoubtedly
reduced the probability of al Qaeda succeeding in pulling off a nuclear explosive attack. But
the crucial question is: by how much? Unfortunately, as already noted, the conclusion of
repeated technical studies is that the group needed to design and fabricate a crude nuclear
explosive, once the needed materials were in hand, might be quite small - as small as a single
al Qaeda cell. The ability of a cell-based organization like al Qaeda - or even one of the
many loosely affiliated regional groups that now appear to be posing an increasing threat as
weapon would make it more likely that a bomb would have enough material for a crude terrorist bomb. It is not
likely, however, that a single stolen weapon would have enough HEU for a gun-type bomb, unless it was itself a
gun-type bomb.
120 Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, "Files Found: A Computer in Kabul Yields a Chilling Array of Al Qaeda
Memos," The Wall Street Journal, 31 December 2001.
121 See, for example, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report, p. 146.
122 For an account of al Qaeda's extensive research in the unclassified literature on biological weapons gleaned
from materials recovered from al Qaeda safehouses in Afghanistan, see James B. Petro and David A. Relman,
"Understanding Threats to Scientific Openness," Science 302, no. 5652 (12 December 2003). Supplementary
on-line material includes a list of biological warfare references put together by al Qaeda experts.
23 Albright, "Al Qaeda's Nuclear Program."
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the old central structure of al Qaeda is weakened - to make a crude nuclear explosive cannot
be dismissed.
Similarly, some argue that in the absence of a stable sanctuary where a technical
development effort could be undertaken over a substantial period of time, with large fixed
facilities, it would be nearly impossible for a terrorist group to make a nuclear bomb - and
that therefore the destruction of the Afghanistan sanctuary makes any nuclear attack by al
Qaeda extremely unlikely.
The overthrow of the Taliban regime and the removal of al Qaeda's sanctuary in
Afghanistan undoubtedly disrupted al Qaeda's nuclear efforts significantly. But two crucial
points should be made. First, as noted earlier, large fixed facilities are not necessarily
required for putting together a crude nuclear explosive, and the time required may be short (as
suggested by the DOE regulation warning against the possibility of nuclear explosives being
made while a terrorist group was still inside a building where they had stolen nuclear
material). The building that South Africa used to assemble its nuclear weapons is a very
ordinary-looking warehouse, with little external sign of the deadly activities that went on
inside. The world's first nuclear bomb, for the Trinity test, was put together in a small area
at the base of a tower; the bomb was then lifted to the top of the tower with cables (with a
truckload of mattresses underneath in case the bomb fell).125 Testing of gun designs for the
Hiroshima bomb was accomplished by firing projectiles into a pile of sand.,26 Terrorist
processing of nuclear material and manufacture of a crude nuclear bomb might well be done
on the premises of an apparently legitimate front company or at an isolated location in a
developed country.127 In short, there is no reason to be confident that the facilities and
activities needed to make a bomb would be noticed before it was too late.
Second, a wide range of possible sanctuaries still exist - from the mountains on both
sides of the Afghan border, to failed states such as Somalia, to remote jungle and desert areas
around the world, where it is believed new terrorist bases are being established. Indeed, in
March 2004, CIA Director Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of his
124 See discussion of "the Circle" building where South Africa's gun-type bombs were assembled after the
program was transferred to Armscor, in David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 50, no. 4 (1994; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art-ofn=ja94albright as of
28 February 2006). The weapons were assembled on the first floor of the building, which had approximately
4,000 meters of floorspace. South Africa consciously avoided equipping the building with features that would
have made its importance obvious - such as high-technology satellite communications on the roof. The only
distinguishing feature of the building is an earth embankment on one side, intended to block the building from
view from the road within a large Armscor site.
125 For a discussion and a photograph of the small group assembling the bomb, see Lillian Hoddeson et al.,
Critical Assembly: A Technical History of Los Alamos During the Oppenheimer Years, 1943-1945 (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 367-370.
126 For a discussion of initial testing of projectiles and targets for the gun, see Hoddeson et al., Critical Assembly,
pp. 116-119. A piece of cardboard in front of the gun, which the projectiles passed through, leaving a hole
behind, was used to measure the projectiles' deviation from their intended path.
12' For a description of a scenario in which this activity might take place within the United States itself, see Peter
D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis, "The Bomb in the Backyard," Foreign Policy, no. 157
(November/December 2006), pp. 32-39.
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concern for the number of areas around the world where central governments have no
consistent reach: "We count approximately 50 countries that have such 'stateless zones.' In
half of these, terrorist groups are thriving."128
The bottom line, unfortunately, is that if a sophisticated terrorist group got a stolen
nuclear bomb or enough nuclear material to make one, there can be few grounds for
confidence that they would be unable to use it.
Size and Distribution of Global Nuclear Stockpiles
An important element of the threat of nuclear theft is the massive size and broad
distribution of the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make
them.
Today, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, there are still more than
25,000 assembled nuclear weapons in the world.129 While Russia and the United States own
some 95% of these weapons, nine countries possess such weapons (assuming that North
Korea's statements that it has manufactured nuclear weapons beyond the one tested in 2006
are accurate). The five states with the largest number of nuclear weapons are the five nuclear-
weapon state parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): Russia, the United States, China,
France, and the United Kingdom. The four other states with nuclear weapons are the only
states outside the NPT, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. (North Korea is the only
country to have joined the treaty and then withdrawn.) See Table 2.1. In addition to these
nine countries that possess nuclear weapons of their own, U.S. nuclear weapons are reportedly
located in six other countries - one other nuclear weapon state (the United Kingdom) and five
non-nuclear-weapon states (Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey). 3 0
128 Worldwide Threats.
129 This includes an estimated 16,000 remaining in Russia's stockpiles; over 10,000 remaining in the U.S.
nuclear stockpiles; and over 1,000 warheads in the combined total of other countries' stockpiles. See Robert S.
Norris and Hans S. Kristensen, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-2006," Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 4 (July/August 2006; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/articlenn.php?
art ofh==ja06norris as of 13 August 2006), pp. 64-66.
30 As a result of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, U.S. nuclear weapons have been removed from South
Korea and from surface ships, which previously regularly carried them to countries around the world. The
deployments in Europe, and on submarines, are believed to be the only remaining U.S. nuclear weapons
deployments beyond U.S. shores. For a detailed discussion of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe,
see Hans M. Kristensen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels,
and War Planning (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2005; available at
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf as of 19 July 2005).
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Table 2.1: World Stockpiles of Nuclear Weapons
Country # weapons % of world
Russia 16,000 58.91%
United States 10,100 37.19%
China 200 0.74%
France 350 1.29%
United Kingdom 200 0.74%
Israel 150 0.55%
India 85 0.31%
Pakistan 70 0.26%
North Korea 6 0.02%
Total 27,161 100.00%
Sources: For Russia, the United States, Britain, France, and China, see Robert S. Norris and Hans
M. Kristensen, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Global Nuclear Stockpiles 1945-2006," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 62 no. 4 (July/August 2006; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/
article nn.php?artofn=ja06norris as of 2 January 2007). (I have rounded their figure for the
United States to the nearest hundred.) For Israel, the figure in the table is a rounding of the
midpoint of the range given in Robert S. Norris, William Arkin, Hans M. Kristensen, and Joshua
Handler, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Israeli Nuclear Forces, 2002," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (September/October 2002; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/articlenn.php?
artofn=so02norris as of 2 January 2007); more recently, in "Global Nuclear Stockpiles 1945-
2006," Norris and Kristensen report that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimates Israel's
arsenal at 60-85 warheads. For India and Pakistan, the figures here represent an assumption that
nearly all the military plutonium and HEU on hand has been incorporated into weapons; the
estimates in the table are the mid-range of the estimates in Institute for Science and International
Security, "India" (2004; available at http://www.isis-online.org/mapproject/
countrypages/india.html as of 2 January 2007); and Institute for Science and International
Security, "Pakistan" (2004; available at http://www.isis-online.org/mapproject/countrypages/
pakistan.html as of 2 January 2007); similarly, Norris and Kristensen, in "Global Nuclar
Stockpiles 1945-2006," estimate that "India and Pakistan have about 110 nuclear warheads
between them." For North Korea, the figure in the table assumes that roughly six kilograms of
plutonium are required for one bomb, that all available separated plutonium has been fabricated
into weapons, and that the total available plutonium is roughly in the middle of the range of 20-
53 kilograms reported in David Albright and Paul Brannan, "The North Korean Plutonium Stock,
Mid-2006" (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 2006; available at
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/dprkplutonium.pdf as of 13 August 2006).
World stockpiles of separated plutonium and HEU, the essential ingredients of nuclear
weapons, amount to well over 2,300 tons - enough to manufacture over 200,000 nuclear
weapons.13 1 Neither of these materials occurs in significant quantities in nature; these
131 These figures include only plutonium separated from spent fuel, not the larger amount of plutonium in spent
fuel. They include the plutonium and HEU in intact weapons and their components, as well as additional
material stored in a wide range of other forms (the largest categories being metals and oxides); the plutonium
figure includes both separated plutonium in military stockpiles and separated "reactor-grade" plutonium in
civilian stockpiles, both of which are usable in nuclear explosives. (The weapons-usability of reactor-grade
plutonium is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.) They include also plutonium and HEU in fabricated fuel elements;
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stockpiles of weapons and materials have all been consciously produced by human beings in
the first six decades of the nuclear age.
Unlike nuclear weapons, separated plutonium and HEU have both military and
civilian uses. A number of countries reprocess plutonium from spent fuel and recycle it as
plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in civilian reactors, resulting in the processing,
transport, and use of many tons of weapons-usable separated plutonium every year. In recent
years, use of the separated plutonium as fuel has not kept pace with reprocessing, with the
result that as of the end of 2003, nearly 240 tons of separated, weapons-usable plutonium
existed in civilian stockpiles worldwide - a figure that will soon surpass the total amount of
separated plutonium in all the world's nuclear weapon stockpiles.13 2
the definition used to determine what should be included is almost the same as the International Atomic Energy
Agency's definition of "unirradiated direct use material" - that is, all materials containing plutonium and HEU
which do not emit more than 100 rem/hr at 1 meter and are not "practically irrecoverable." International Atomic
Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary (Vienna: IAEA, 2001; available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/Start.pdf as of 19 July 2005). The difference from that definition is that no attempt
has been made in these figures to exclude civil HEU emitting more than 100 rem/hr at 1 meter; as discussed in
Chapter 4, the overwhelming majority of that material is not emitting sufficient radiation to greatly reduce the
proliferation concerns it poses. These figures are from David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, eds., Global
Fissile Material Inventories (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 2004; available
at http://www.isis-online.org/globalstocks/tableofcontents.html as of 14 February 2005). These figures are
updates of the detailed review of these stockpiles provided in David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William B.
Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Solna,
Sweden; Oxford, UK; and New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Oxford
University Press, 1996). The HEU figures are for tons of 90% enriched equivalent, so if, for example, a country
had two tons of 45% enriched material, that would count as one ton in these estimates. The U.S. Department of
Energy has officially declassified the fact that it is theoretically possible to make a bomb from four kilograms of
weapon-grade plutonium, and that figure is used here for calculating the bomb equivalents for military stocks.
See U.S. Department of Energy, Restricted Data Declassification Decisions 1946 to the Present (RDD-7)
(Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2001; available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/rdd-7.html as of 14 August
2006). The higher isotopes of plutonium present in reactor-grade plutonium have larger critical masses, so five
kilograms is used for calculating bomb equivalents for civilian plutonium stockpiles. The quantity of HEU
required, at a 90% enrichment level, is often taken to be 2.5-3 times the needed quantity of plutonium; to be sure
not to overstate the case, we have used 15 kilograms of HEU for the bomb equivalent estimate here (3.75 times
the plutonium figure used). These figures are for implosion-type devices. Unclassified analyses suggest that in
principle, with good designs it is possible to make nuclear explosives with substantially less material than
envisioned in the weapons-equivalent figures used here. See Thomas Cochran and Christopher Paine, "The
Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons" (Washington,
D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 13 April 1995; available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/fissionw/
fissionweapons.pdf as of 19 July 2005). It is also important to note that modern thermonuclear weapons typically
have nuclear material both in the fissionable core of the weapon (known as the "primary" or "pit") and in the
thermonuclear portion (known as the "secondary"), and thus the average total amount of weapons-usable nuclear
material per weapon in the stockpiles of the major nuclear weapon states is substantially more than the figures
used in these weapon-equivalents figures.
132 See David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Plutonium Watch: Tracking Civil Plutonium Inventories," in
Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International
Security, 2005; available at http://www.isis-online.org/global-stocks/end2003/tableofcontents.html as of 21 July
2005).
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HEU is no longer used in civilian power reactors (with a couple of exceptions), but
remains widely used in civilian research reactors (as well as for medical isotope production, in
naval and icebreaker reactors, as spike fuel in plutonium and tritium production reactors, and
for some other purposes). Over 130 research reactors in some 40 countries continue to
operate with HEU as their fuel.'
Some of these do not have enough nuclear material on-site for a bomb, but many do -
as do many associated facilities, such as fuel fabrication plants. All told, there are an
estimated 128 research reactors or associated facilities worldwide that possess at least 20
kilograms of HEU.13 4 Of these, 41 are fuel facilities rather than research reactors
themselves. 35 There are an estimated 65 tons of HEU in civilian use worldwide. 36 As a
result, while nearly half of the estimated world stockpile of nearly 490 tons of separated
plutonium at the end of 2003 was civilian, only about 3% of the estimated world stockpile of
HEU was civilian. See Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2.
133 See, for example, the data provided in U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Office, Nuclear
Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in
Civilian Research Reactors, GAO-04-807 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d04807.pdf as of 2 February 2005). GAO notes that as of that time, there were 105 HEU-fueled
reactors on DOE's list to convert (of which 29 had already fully converted by the time of GAO's report, leaving
76 still using HEU fuel), and 56 more HEU-fueled reactors for which conversion was not planned, for a total of
132 HEU-fueled reactors as of that time. By late 2005, publicly released data from the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI) program indicated that three more reactors had completed their conversion, bringing the total
fully converted to 32, and the total number of reactors targeted for conversion had increased from 105 to 106.
See Christopher Landers, "Reactors Identified for Conversion: Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test
Reactors (RERTR) Program," in RERTR 2005: 27th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research
and Test Reactors, Boston, Mass., 6-10 November (Argonne, Ill.: Argonne National Laboratory, 2005; available
at http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR27/PDF/S9-1 Landers.pdf as of 20 June 2006). That meant that as of the end
of 2005, there were 74 reactors remaining that were targeted for conversion but were still using some HEU fuel.
But there are also other HEU-fueled reactors which were not targeted for conversion, some of which were not on
the lists provided by DOE to GAO. Data compiled by Frank von Hippel and Alexander Glaser of Princeton
University indicates that there are more than 60 operational HEU-fueled research reactors and critical assemblies
around the world not covered by the revised target list for conversion, for a total of roughly 135 HEU-fueled
research reactors worldwide. (Personal communication from Frank von Hippel, December 2005.) DOE officials
report, however, that additional HEU-fueled reactors are still being identified in ongoing visits to facilities, so
the total number of HEU-fueled facilities may turn out to be still higher. Interview with DOE officials,
December 2005.
134 U.S. Congress, DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium.
135 Interviews with Argonne National Laboratory and DOE officials, February 2005.
136 See David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Civil HEU Watch: Tracking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched
Uranium," in Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and
International Security, 2005; available at http://www.isis-online.org/globalstocks/end2003/tableofcontents.htm
as of 21 July 2005). Albright and Kramer estimate that there are 175 tons of HEU they designate as civilian,
including 50 tons in "power and research reactor programs" and 125 tons of U.S. excess HEU (these are rounded
figures). But they point out that 15 tons of the U.S. excess is research reactor fuel, and I have therefore included
this amount in the total of civilian HEU. I have not included the remainder of the U.S. excess, as Albright and
Kramer do, in order to avoid giving an exaggerated impression of the scale of civilian HEU use around the
world.
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Global Military and Civil Stockpiles of Separated Plutonium
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Source: David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, Global Stocks ofNuclear Explosive Materials
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, July 2005, available as of
2 January 2007 at http://www.isis-online.org/globalstocks/end2003/tableofcontents.html).
The JAEA does not safeguard military nuclear material, and nuclear weapon states are
not required to place their nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards (though a small amount
of material in these states, particularly in the United States, is under safeguards under
voluntary offer agreements, and French and British civilian material is under Euratom
safeguards, integrated with those of the IAEA). Hence, as of the end of 2004 less than 2% of
the world's estimated HEU stockpile was under some form of international safeguards
(representing 40 tons of HEU, of which 10 tons was excess U.S. HEU), while about and only
about 40% of the world's separated plutonium was under international safeguards
(representing 200 tons of separated plutonium outside of reactor cores, more than 90% of that
in Britain and France).137
137 The separated plutonium under safeguards included 12.4 tons under IAEA safeguards in states with
comprehensive or limited safeguards agreements (that is, INFCIRC/1 53 or INFCIRC/66 agreements); 2 tons of
U.S. excess plutonium; 4.4 tons of British excess plutonium; 102.7 tons of civilian plutonium in Britain; and
78.5 tons of civilian plutonium in France. All of the British and French civil plutonium is under Euratom
safeguards, and some of it is under IAEA safeguards as well. The HEU under safeguards included 22 tons under
IAEA safeguards in countries with comprehensive or limited safeguards agreements; 10 tons of U.S. excess
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Figure 2.1:
Figure 2.2: Global Stockpiles of Military and Civil HEU
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Source: Albright and Kramer, Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials.
material; 6.4 tons of civil HEU in France; and 1.5 tons of civil HEU in the United Kingdom. All of the British
and French civil HEU is under Euratom safeguards. For material under comprehensive or limited safeguards
agreements, see Table A 18 in International Atomic Energy Agency, Annual Report 2004 (Vienna: IAEA, 2005;
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/anrep2004_full.pdf as of 3 January 2007). For
U.S. and British material under safeguards, see Matthew Bunn, "IAEA Monitoring of Excess Nuclear Material,"
in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.:
Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003; available at
http://www.nti.org/e research/cnwm/monitoring/trilateral.asp as of 23 May 2006). For British and French civil
plutonium and HEU, see International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Receivedfrom the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of
Plutonium, INFCIRC/549/Add. 8/8 (Vienna: IAEA, 2006; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc549a8-8.pdf as of 16 May 2006); International Atomic Energy Agency,
Communication Receivedfrom the France Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium,
INFCIRC/549/Add. 5/9 (Vienna: IAEA, 2005; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Infcircs/2005/infcirc549a5-9.pdf as of 16 May 2006).For material under comprehensive or limited safeguards
agreements, see Table A 18 in International Atomic Energy Agency, Annual Report 2004. For U.S. and British
material under safeguards, see Bunn, "IAEA Monitoring of Excess Nuclear Material." For British and French
civil plutonium and HEU, see International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Receivedfrom the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of
Plutonium; International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Receivedfrom the France Concerning Its
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 2
Because they have both military and civilian uses, these materials are much more
broadly distributed than nuclear weapons are. Separated plutonium or HEU exist in hundreds
of buildings in more than 40 countries. There are ten countries with two metric tons or more
of separated plutonium or HEU, including all of the five NPT nuclear weapon states, India (a
non-NPT state), Germany, Japan, Belgium, and Kazakhstan. Thus there are at least three non-
nuclear-weapon states under the NPT with enough weapons-usable nuclear material on their
soil for hundreds of nuclear weapons. 138 See Table 2.2.
In addition to the countries with tons of weapons-usable nuclear material, there are
roughly 26 other countries with "Category I" quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material -
that is, enough material that under international standards, the highest levels of security are
required (this applies to more than 5 kilograms of U-235 contained in HEU, or more than 2
kilograms of plutonium.)
This includes the three other non-NPT states and 23 additional NPT non-nuclear-
weapon states. Of these 26, seven are developing countries and nine are transition countries
(that is, former communist countries). Thus, nuclear weapons or enough nuclear material to
pose a serious concern exist in a total of some 36 countries. See Table 2.3. Security for these
materials in all of these countries must be effective enough to ensure that plausible terrorist
and criminal threats, both from insiders and outsiders, can be reliably defeated.
Beyond these countries, quantities of separated plutonium or HEU in the range of
roughly one to a few kilograms exist in an additional 13 countries. All of these are NPT non-
nuclear weapon states; seven are developing countries, two are transition countries. See Table
2.4. Hence, quantities in the range of a kilogram or more of HEU or separated plutonium
exist in roughly 49 countries. Because official information on the stocks of HEU in these
different countries is generally not publicly available, these tables are based on partial
information and judgment; it may be that a few countries should be added, subtracted, or
moved from one table to the other.
Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium. I am grateful to John Kinney of the IAEA Safeguards
Directorate for helping me to clarify this data; personal communication, July 2006.
138 While Kazakhstan once declared over 10 tons of HEU to the IAEA, the origin of this number is somewhat of
a mystery, as Kazakhstan's stocks appear to be much smaller. Nearly three tons of medium-enriched material (in
the 20-30% range) existed at Aqtau, the site of the BN-350 fast-neutron reactor, but the fresh fuel for that facility
has since been moved to the fuel processing facility at Ust-Kamenogorsk and blended down to LEU.
"Government of Kazakhstan and NTI Mark Success of HEU Blend-Down Project: Material Could Have Been
Used to Make up to Two Dozen Nuclear Bombs" (Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 8
October 2005; available at http://www.nti.org/c_press/release__Kaz_100805.pdf as of 17 December 2005). It is
possible that the declaration included the fuel of this type that was already irradiated, which had been HEU when
fresh; depending on the burnup, it is likely that this material is now less than 20% enriched and hence no longer
HEU. The amount of material remaining at Kazakhstan's HEU-fueled research reactors has not been publicly
described, but is in the range of hundreds of kilograms, not several tons.
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Table 2.2: Countries With >2 Tons of Weapons-Usable Nuclear Material: Stocks
Physically Located in Each Country as of the end of 2003, in Metric Tons
Country Mil. Pu Civil Pu Total Pu Mil. HEUCivil HEU Total HEU Total
Russia 145 38.2 183.2 1070 22.5 1092.5 1276
United States 87 5 92 685 16a 701 793
U.K. 3.2 96.3 99.5 21.9 1.546 23.446 123
France 5 78.6 83.6 29 6.382 35.382 119
China 4 0 4 21 1 22 26
Germany 0 11.3 11.3 0 1.04 1.04 12
Japan 0 5.4 5.4 0 1.973 1.973 7
Belgium 0 3.5 3.5 0 0.505 0.505 4
India 0.4 1.25 1.65 0.5 0.0075 0.5075 2
Kazakhstan 0 0b 0 0 10.9 10.9 11
All others 0.6 0.15 0.75 1.1 5 6.1 7
Total 245 240 485 1829 67 1895 2380
Sources: Except where otherwise noted, figures are from David Albright and Kimberly Kramer,
Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and
International Security, July 2005, available as of 2 January 2007 at http://www.isis-
online.org/global_stocks/end2003/tableofcontents.html). Data for civilian plutonium in Russia,
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Japan, China, and
Switzerland and for civil HEU in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are based on annual
official declarations to the IAEA (Information Circular, or INFCIRC, 549). Where ranges were
given in the original source, the figures in the table represent the mid-point of the range. Where
the data is based on official declarations, all the significant figures in the declarations are
included; totals, however, are rounded. Departing from the convention used by Albright and
Kramer, plutonium and HEU stockpiles declared excess to military needs are listed in the military
columns (reflecting their origin), rather than the civilian columns, to avoid exaggerating the
civilian use of these materials. Data for the stocks owned by each country would differ: Japan's
plutonium figures, for example, would be much higher (as many tons of Japanese separated
plutonium are stored in Britain and France), and the figures for Britain and France would each be
substantially lower. The "bomb equivalent" estimates are based on 4 kilograms of military
plutonium per bomb, 5 kilograms of civilian plutonium per bomb, 15 kilograms of military HEU
per bomb, and 30 kilograms of civilian HEU per bomb (reflecting the substantially lower average
enrichment level of civilian HEU), except in the case of Kazakhstan; nearly all of the HEU there
is known to be of very low enrichment, and hence much larger quantities of it would be needed
for a weapon.
aAlbright and Kramer estimate that 15 tons of the HEU the United States has declared excess is
irradiated research reactor fuel and that roughly another 1 ton of HEU is in the cores of U.S.
research reactors.
bThere are three tons of very high-quality plutonium in irradiated breeder blankets from the BN-
350 reactor in Kazakhstan. These are not counted here, because they are not separated from the
uranium and fission products in the assemblies, but are counted by Albright and Kramer, because
much of this material is no longer radioactive enough to meet the IAEA definition of irradiated
material and instead counts as unirradiated direct-use material. Hence, the world total estimated
in Albright and Kramer is a few tons higher than the world total estimated here.
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Table 2.3: Other Countries With Cat. I Quantities of Weapons-Usable Material
Country NPT-NNWS Non-NPT Developing Developed Transition
Argentina Y Y
Australia Y Y
Austria Y Y
Belarus Y Y
Canada Y Y
Czech Republic Y Y
Greece Y Y
Hungary Y Y
Israel Y Y
Italy Y Y
Latvia Y
Libya Y Y
Mexico Y Y
Netherlands Y Y
North Korea Y Y
Pakistan Y Y
Poland Y Y
Romania Y Y
South Africa Y Y
Spain Y Y
Switzerland Y Y
Taiwan Y Y
Ukraine Y Y
Uzbekistan Y Y
Vietnam Y Y
Yugoslavia Y Y
Sources: Based on data presented in Albright and Kramer, Global Stocks ofNuclear Explosive
Materials.
The countries with either nuclear weapons or substantial stockpiles of nuclear
materials, shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, generally have between a dozen and hundreds of
buildings where their nuclear stockpiles reside. The countries without nuclear weapons and
with between a kilogram and two tons of weapons-usable nuclear material on their soil
(shown in Tables 2.3 and 2.4) typically have only one or two buildings with weapons-usable
nuclear material, though a small number have up to half a dozen such buildings. No complete
estimate of the number of buildings worldwide with a kilogram or more (or a Category I
quantity or more) of weapons-usable nuclear material exists; that figure is likely to be over
1,000 buildings (if buildings where nuclear weapons themselves exist are included), but is
certainly less than 3,000.
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Table 2.4: Other Countries With Kilogram-Range
Quantities of Weapons-Usable Material
Country NPT-NNWS Non-NPT Developing Developed Transition
Bulgaria Y Y
Chile Y Y
Ghana Y Y
Iran Y Y
Jamaica Y Y
Nigeria Y Y
Norway Y Y
Portugal Y Y
Slovenia Y Y
South Korea Y Y
Sweden Y Y
Syria Y Y
Turkey Y Y
Source: Based on data presented in Albright and Kramer, Global Stocks ofNuclear Explosive
Materials.
Transport
Nuclear warheads and weapons-usable materials must be adequately secured not only
while they are at fixed facilities, but also while they are being transported - between buildings
within sites, between sites, and between countries. Indeed, transport is the stage of these
items' life cycle that is most vulnerable to overt, forcible theft, as when these items are being
shipped from place to place, it is impossible to provide the multiple layers of detection and
delay that can be put in place at a fixed site. This problem is typically addressed with
measures such as armed guards accompanying the transports, vehicles with special protection
against hijack and sabotage, secrecy concerning the schedule and route of the transports, and
continuous or frequent tracking of the transport en route.
The scale and frequency of transport, particularly from site to site within countries, is
huge. Hundreds of nuclear warheads are transported from deployment sites to warhead
storage and assembly/disassembly facilities, or from such facilities back to deployment sites,
each year, in both Russia and the United States - and presumably, to a lesser extent, in other
countries with nuclear weapons. In Russia, for example, the U.S. Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program has been planning to pay for roughly 70 shipments per year of
nuclear warheads to dismantlement and storage sites, carrying 20-30 warheads each139 - in
addition to however many shipments for operational purposes (which are not paid for by the
United States) take place. In the United States, within DOE alone, the Secure Transportation
Asset program carries out nearly 100 secure transports of either nuclear warheads or weapons-
usable nuclear material a year, at an annual cost that is now in the range of $140 million per
m U.S. Department of Defense, Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress: Fiscal Year 2006
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2005).
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year. 40 That does not include Department of Defense transport of nuclear weapons and
materials, or private transport of nuclear materials.
Transport of military HEU takes place on a similarly massive scale, as nuclear
weapons are dismantled, HEU shipped from dismantlement facilities to HEU storage
facilities, and, in both Russia and the United States, excess HEU is shipped to other facilities
for blending to LEU. The 30 tons of HEU Russia blends to LEU each year for sale to the
United States is shipped from facility to facility and back again over thousands of kilometers
of rail, in scores of annual shipments, representing probably the largest annual transport of
weapons-usable nuclear material in the world (if measured in ton-kilometers traveled).' 4' The
scale of shipments of civil HEU is small by comparison, though the hundreds of kilograms of
HEU which are shipped each year for fuel for research reactors and as targets for medical
isotope production - primarily within the United States and Russia, but also internationally -
also pose proliferation risks that must be addressed.142
Transport of military plutonium currently occurs at a much smaller scale than
transport of military HEU. In the United States, and apparently to a significant degree in
Russia as well, plutonium from dismantled weapons is stored at the dismantlement sites,
rather than being transported elsewhere for storage, and disposition of excess plutonium -
which will lead to this material being transported to processing and fuel fabrication sites and
then in the form of fabricated fuel to reactor sites - has not yet gotten underway.
Large quantities of weapons-usable separated plutonium are transported every year in
the civil sector, however, as some 20 tons of plutonium is reprocessed from spent fuel and
some 10 tons of that is fabricated into fuel for use in nuclear reactors. By one estimate,
roughly 100 commercial plutonium shipments occur per year, most of which contain over 100
kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium in a single shipment.' 43 In France in particular,
which has the world's most active plutonium recycling plutonium, many tons of plutonium
separated at the La Hague reprocessing plant each year travel by scores of truck shipments, as
140 In Fiscal Year 2004, for example, the program carried out 91 secure trips carrying nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable nuclear material from one place to another - an average of almost two a week. See U.S.
Department of Energy, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration
(Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2005; available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/06budget/Content/Volumes/
Vol__NNSA.pdf as of 18 July 2005), pp. 305-309.
141 For a simplified map of these shipments, see, for example, U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Status
of Transparency Measures for U.S. Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (Washington, D.C.: GAO,
1999; available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99194.pdf as of 18 July 2005), p. 7.
142 Approximately 800 kilograms of HEU are still used each year by the U.S.-supplied and Russian-supplied
reactors currently targeted for conversion to LEU. See Catherine Mendelsohn, "Scope and Accomplishments of
the NNSA Nuclear Material Threat Reduction Program," in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the
Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005).
In many cases, however, these shipments are broken up so that individual shipments contain less than a Category
I quantity five kilograms of material,U-235 in HEU (designated in the United States and internationally as a
"Category I" quantity requiring the highest security standards) in part to avoid the expensive security
requirements for Category I material.
'43 David Albright, Shipments of Weapons-Usable Plutonium in the Commercial Nuclear Industry (Washington,
D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 2007; available at http://www.isis-online.org/
globalstocks/end2003/plutonium_shipments.pdf as of 3 January 2007).
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plutonium oxide, to the fuel fabrication facility at Marcoule; once fabricated into fuel
elements, this plutonium is then shipped to numerous reactors both in France and in other
countries. 144 Smaller amounts of plutonium oxide are shipped every year to Belgium (which
has a smaller MOX fabrication plant) and are shipped from there to other countries for use as
fuel. Plutonium separated by reprocessing in Britain is stored at the reprocessing site at
Sellafield, without transport, and under current plans much of this plutonium will be
fabricated into fuel at the MOX plant at the same site - at which point there will begin to be
major shipments of plutonium in fabricated fuel every year from Britain to other countries.
Occasionally, substantial shipments of separated plutonium are shipped across the oceans, as
when separated plutonium from reprocessing is returned to Japan from France and Britain, 14 5
or in the recent case when tens of kilograms of weapons plutonium were shipped from the
United States to France for fabrication into MOX lead test assemblies for use in a U.S.
reactor. The adequacy of security for these transports has been a subject of controversy for
many years - and controversies continue.146
Rates of Change
Both the size of the global stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear
material and their distribution are changing over time - in somewhat different directions.
The total number of nuclear weapons in the world has been declining for over a
decade, as the United States and Russia are believed to have dismantled many thousands of
nuclear weapons since the 1980s. This decline may be slowing substantially, however. While
in some years in the 1990s, the United States dismantled as many as 1800 warheads in a
single year, in recent years it appears that this figure has been in the range of 0-300
warheads.147 The United States has, however, announced a substantial reduction in the
planned stockpile of nuclear weapons, which may lead to the dismantlement of some 4,000
weapons by 2012 - though it appears to plan to maintain some 6,000 nuclear warheads
indefinitely thereafter.148 In Russia, some estimates in the 1990s similarly suggested a
dismantlement rate in the range of 2,000 a year or even more. But in recent years, Russia has
144 Albright estimates that shipments of plutonium oxide powder from La Hague to Marcoule account for nearly
half of total global plutonium shipments. Albright, Shipments of Weapons-Usable Plutonium. See also the
discussion in Ronald E. Timm, Security Assessment Report for Plutonium Transport in France (Paris:
Greenpeace International, 2005; available at http://greenpeace.datapps.com/stop-plutonium/en/
TimmReportV5.pdf as of 6 December 2005).
145 These shipments now occur only in the form of fabricated MOX fuel elements.
146 For a particularly detailed recent analysis of transport security in France, arguing that current procedures are
worse than what would be characterized as "high risk" and therefore prohibited within the DOE system,
justifying a new category of "extreme risk," see Timm, Security Assessment Reportfor Plutonium Transport in
France.
147 A table of U.S. nuclear warhead dismantlements by year, from 1990-1999, can be found in Robert S. Norris
and Hans M. Kristensen, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Dismantling U.S. Nuclear Warheads," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 60, no. 1 (January/February 2004; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/article-nn.php?
artofn=jf04norris as of 5 December 2005), pp. 72-74.
148 See, for example, discussion in Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S.
Nuclear Forces, 2005," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61, no. 1 (January/February 2005; available at
http://www.thebulletin.org/article-nn.php?art_ofn=jfO5norris as of 8 January 2007), pp. 73-75.
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closed two of its four weapons assembly and disassembly facilities, suggesting that it now
foresees a significantly lower rate of dismantlement in the future (though the two facilities
closed had modest capacities compared to the two that remain open). 14 Like the United
States, however, it appears that Russia still has some thousands of warheads that are not
currently needed either for operational stockpiles or for reserves, which may be dismantled
over the next decade.150 British warhead stockpiles are also declining, and it appears that
French stockpiles have been as well. Chinese stockpiles are expected to increase modestly
over the next decade, and India, Pakistan, and India are believed to be continuing to produce
small numbers of warheads; North Korea may be doing the same, though the fate of its
nuclear program will depend in part on the outcome of the six-party talks still underway.
The global distribution of nuclear warheads has also declined somewhat in recent
years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1991-1992 presidential nuclear
initiatives, all Soviet nuclear weapons were removed from Eastern Europe, from surface
ships, and from the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union during the the late 1980s
and 1990s. Similarly, U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from surface ships and from
South Korea in the 1990s. The number of states that possess nuclear weapons of their own
(nine) is the same in 2007 as it was 20 years before, as South Africa became the first and only
state to completely dismantle a nuclear weapon stockpile that it owned and had full control
over - but North Korea, if its declarations of a nuclear weapons capability are correct, has
added itself to the list of states with nuclear weapons. Trends over the next 20 years are
difficult to predict; it remains possible that the current number of states with nuclear weapons
will remain stable or even decline (if international efforts succeed in rolling back North
Korea's nuclear program, ensuring that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons, and
convincing other states not to follow the nuclear weapons route); but it is also possible that
the number of states with nuclear weapons could increase significantly, with both North
Korea and Iran becoming full-fledged nuclear powers and a number of other states
subsequently choosing to follow the same path.
Like warhead stockpiles, global stockpiles of military HEU have been falling for more
than a decade. All of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states have stopped production of HEU
for weapons, and the United States and Russia have each declared substantial quantities of
military HEU as excess to their military needs. Russia blends 30 tons of excess military HEU
each year to LEU for sale to the United States, a program that is expected to continue until
2013, at which point 500 tons of HEU will have been destroyed. Some 285 tons of HEU had
been destroyed in this effort by the fall of 2006.15' Some 82 tons of U.S. excess HEU had
149 See discussion, for example, in Oleg Bukharin, Russia's Nuclear Complex: Surviving the End of the Cold
War (Princeton, N.J.: Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University, 2004; available at http://www.ransac.org/PDFFrameset.asp?
PDF=bukharinminatomsurvivalmay2004.pdf as of 8 March 2005).
" Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2005,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61, no. 2 (March/April 2005; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/
articlenn.php?art-ofn=ma05norris as of 1 March 2005), pp. 70-72.
". USEC, "Chronology: U.S.-Russian Megatons to Megawatts Program: Recycling Nuclear Warheads into
Electricity (as of October 1, 2006)" (Bethesda, Md.: USEC, October 2006; available at
http://www.usec.com/v2001_02/HTML/Megatons chronology.asp as of 3 January 2007).
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been downblended or shipped for downblending by the end of FY 2005.152 Pakistan is
believed to continue to produce military HEU, though on a small scale compared to the
destruction of HEU in the United States and Russia; India is thought also to have modest
military HEU production underway, though plutonium is the primary focus of its military
nuclear material production program. North Korea is reported to be endeavoring to establish
a military HEU production capability, but U.S. intelligence assesses that it is still some years
away from acquiring such a capability. Iran is working to establish a large-scale enrichment
facility which it insists is for solely peaceful purposes; others are concerned that this facility
or others established covertly might be turned to military purposes. Civil HEU stockpiles
have been growing modestly, as the pace at which research reactors discharge irradiated HEU
and load more has been greater than the pace at which this HEU has been blended or disposed
of, but these stockpiles remain tiny by comparison to military stockpiles.
Global military plutonium stockpiles are nearly static. All of the five NPT nuclear-
weapon states have stopped producing plutonium for use in weapons weapons - though in
Russia, three plutonium production reactors continue to operate, churning out some 1.2 tons
of plutonium a year, because they also provide essential heat and power for nearby Siberian
communities. India, Israel, and North Korea are believed to continue small-scale production
of military plutonium, and such production has recently begun in Pakistan as well,
complementing Pakistan's primary focus on HEU. As noted above, disposition of excess
military plutonium has not yet gotten underway. Civil plutonium stockpiles continue to
increase dramatically. Every year, nuclear power plants around the world discharge some
8,000 tons of spent fuel, containing some 80 tons of plutonium. Roughly one-quarter of this
fuel is reprocessed each year, yielding some 20 tons of separated plutonium. Only about half
of that plutonium separated by reprocessing is fabricated into fuel each year, with the
remainder remaining in storage. Hence, the global stockpile of separated civilian plutonium
increases by roughly 10 tons each year.
The global distribution of separated plutonium and HEU is changing only slowly. All
of the countries with substantial stockpiles, shown in Table 2.2, have had stockpiles for
decades. Essentially all of the countries with smaller stockpiles, on Tables 2.3 and 2.4, have
had at least modest stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material for decades. With respect
to HEU, the trend is toward fewer and fewer countries having stockpiles, as the U.S. and
Russian efforts to convince countries to send back the HEU they exported gain momentum.
With respect to separated plutonium, the global distribution is likely to be static or nearly so
for some time to come, as few additional countries are interested in pursuing a plutonium fuel
cycle, but those who have separated plutonium on their soil are finding it hard to get rid of
(though Belgium is one example of a country that has burned all or nearly all of the separated
plutonium it owned as MOX fuel).15 3
152 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security
Administration--Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, vol. 1, DOE/CF-002 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2006;
available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/07budget/Content/Volumes/Vol-iNNSA.pdf as of 3 January
2007), p. 535.
113 See, for example, Albright, Shipments of Weapons-Usable Plutonium.
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Widely Varying Nuclear Security
Those seeking material for a nuclear bomb will go wherever it is easiest to steal, or
buy it from anyone willing to sell. Thus, security for bomb material is only as good as its
weakest link. Insecure nuclear bomb material anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere.
Yet today, there are no binding international standards for how well nuclear weapons and
materials should be secured. Nuclear security levels are left to the discretion of each of the
dozens of states that possess such stockpiles, with the result that security for stocks of
potential nuclear weapons materials varies enormously, from excellent to appalling.
It is important to understand that the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) does not
contain any provisions requiring states to secure nuclear material from theft. 54 Similarly, the
IAEA safeguards system is designed only to verify that states have not diverted nuclear
material for nuclear explosives, not to protect material from theft or even to confirm that the
state that owns the material is providing adequate protection.155 Indeed, because of the long
times between inspections at many sites, the IAEA would not typically be able to detect that a
theft had occurred until days, weeks, or months after the fact. In any case, some 90% of the
world's separated plutonium and HEU is not under either IAEA or Euratom safeguards.
There is an international Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, but
it currently applies only to material in international transport, not to the more than 99% of the
world's nuclear material that is in domestic storage, use, or transport within individual
countries. Even when the recently approved amendment to cover domestic material enters
into force (expected to take years), the convention will still exclude all military nuclear
material (nearly 90% of the total world stockpile of weapons-usable nuclear material).
Moreover, the amendment will not create any binding global nuclear security standards with
enough specifics to be effective - though it does offer a number of generally worded
principles that should help in convincing states to strengthen nuclear security. For example,
the amended convention will require parties to have a domestic rule concerning how much
security facilities with nuclear material must provide, but it will not impose any substantial
requirements concerning what that rule should say. 56
154 One of the treaty's negotiators has emphasized that if he knew then what he knows now, he would have
sought to include such provisions. See remarks by George Bunn at International Atomic Energy Agency,
Proceedings of the Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna,
29 October-2 November 2001 (Vienna: IAEA, 2001).
155 Non-nuclear-weapon states subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards are required to make comprehensive
reports on their nuclear inventories and changes in them to the IAEA, and this imposes an international
discipline that tends to improve the quality of nuclear material accounting, which is one element in an overall
nuclear security system.
156 For the text of the current convention, see International Atomic Energy Agency, The Convention on Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/274/Rev. I (Vienna: IAEA, 1980; available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274rl.shtml as of 29 July 2005). For the text of
the approved amendment, see Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2005; available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/
ccpnmdocs/cppnm_proposal.pdf as of 16 September 2005). The convention and the amendment negotiations are
described in detail in Chapter 5.
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The IAEA publishes recommendations on physical protection for nuclear materials
and facilities which are somewhat more specific, but these are purely advisory and are still
quite general - it is quite possible to comply fully with these recommendations and not have a
secure system.157 Because of disagreements among some of the states participating in the
development of the recommendations, for example, following the IAEA recommendations
does not necessarily require having any armed guards at a site with plutonium or HEU, and
the recommendations do not specify any particular threat that facilities should be able to
defeat.
A number of major nuclear suppliers, including the United States, have adopted
policies or laws that require countries they supply to meet some requirements for physical
protection for the supplied nuclear material. The United States, in particular, is required by
law to ensure that recipient countries meet adequate physical protection standards and has
nuclear supply agreements under which it has provided HEU to scores of countries around the
world. Its nuclear supply agreements with foreign countries typically require that the
recipient country provide "levels of physical protection" for the supplied nuclear material "at
least equivalent" to those in the IAEA recommendations.' 5 8 The Nuclear Suppliers' Group
(NSG), a cartel of the major nuclear suppliers, has agreed that all of its participants will
require that recipients of major nuclear exports meet at least a more general set of physical
protection criteria; these refer to the IAEA recommendations, but only as a "useful basis for
guiding" recipient states in designing their physical protection systems, not as a
requirement.159 Similarly, a number of states have entered into agreements in other contexts
that require certain levels of physical protection - in some cases to implement the IAEA
recommendations. These include the U.S.-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase
Agreement and in the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.160
Information on the specific measures taken to secure nuclear stockpiles around the
world is typically secret, to keep potential terrorists and thieves from guessing what security
measures they may be up against at a particular site. Hence it is effectively impossible, in an
unclassified publication, to put together a complete picture of security for nuclear weapons
and materials around the world. As far as is publicly known, no one - not the U.S.
157 For the text of the IAEA recommendations, see International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical
Protection ofNuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (Vienna: IAEA, 1999;
available at http://www.iaea.or.at/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/ 999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.html as of
22 December 2006). The development of these recommendations is described in Chapter 5.
158 Agreement for Co-Operation between the Government of the United States ofAmerica and the Swiss Federal
Council Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 1997;
available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/docs/SwitzerlandAgam.pdf as of 19 July 2005).
159 The NSG Guidelines are contained in International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications Receivedfrom
Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology,
INFCIRC/254/Rev. 7/Part I (Vienna: IAEA, 2005; available at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PDF/
infcirc254r7pI-050223.pdf as of 20 July 2005). The physical protection discussion is in paragraph 3 of the
guidelines and Annex C.
160 See discussion in Bonnie Jenkins, "Establishing International Standards for Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material," Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 3 (Spring-Summer 1998; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/
vol05/53/jenkin53.pdf as of 19 July 2005).
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government, not the International Atomic Energy Agency, not any other government or
organization, as far as is known - has such a complete picture today: while a great deal is
known about the risks at some particular sites, no one knows for sure which sites, judged on a
global basis, pose the highest risks and should be the highest priorities for policy steps to
reduce the risks.161
Nevertheless, from the unclassified information that is available, it is clear that
security arrangements vary widely from one country and facility to another,162 and in a
troubling number of cases would likely not be sufficient to deal with either a well-planned
insider theft or an attack by a significant number of well-armed and well-trained outsiders.
Until the 9/11 attacks, for example, several countries did not require any armed guards at
nuclear facilities - including Japan, which has tons of weapons-usable separated plutonium
and hundreds of kilograms of HEU metal on its soil, enough material for many hundreds of
nuclear weapons and was the nation where the Aum Shinrikyo terror cult was working
actively to get nuclear weapons and the materials to make them.' 63 (Since the 9/11 attacks,
Japan has posted armed units of its national police to guard nuclear facilities - but these are
apparently not fully integrated with the security plans at the sites, and many of them patrol at
the perimeters, where they look impressive but would be vulnerable to being shot in the
opening moments of an attack.164)
161 While the defense authorization for Fiscal Year 2005 required DOE to prepare a prioritized list of the highest-
risk sites worldwide and a plan for addressing them, DOE provided three separate lists corresponding to the
priorities of three different programs, none of which were based on realistic assessments combining the quality
and quantity of material at particular sites with the security at those sites and the threats those sites faced. Xxx
get ref for actual list For discussion of such an approach, see Chapter 4.
162 See, for example, discussion in George Bunn and Lyudmila Zaitseva, "Guarding Nuclear Reactors and
Materials from Terrorists and Thieves," in IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards: Verification &
Nuclear Material Security (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2001; available at
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Meetings/2001/infsm367progr_fr.shtml as of 13 June 2006).
163 These countries relied instead on detection and barrier technologies to provide warning and delay any theft
until off-site police forces could arrive. Tests in the United States suggest that such an approach would be likely
to fail in the face of well-equipped and well-trained attackers, because of the remarkable speed with which
various barriers can be breached. The reluctance to have armed units at nuclear sites reflected a Japanese culture
in which possession of firearms by private citizens has been forbidden for centuries and where even policemen
are usually not armed. (Britain, which has a similar tradition of tight constraints on the kinds of armament that
private guards may have, and of unarmed policemen, set up a separate force - the Atomic Energy Constabulary -
to guard nuclear facilities.) For a discussion of the Japanese view on this matter pre-9/1 1, confirming that "the
guards do not carry firearms on duty at any nuclear facility in Japan" (as of 1997), see Hiroyoshi Kurihara, "The
Protection of Fissile Materials in Japan," in A Comparative Analysis ofApproaches to the Protection of Fissile
Materials: Proceedings of the Workshop at Stanford University, July 28-30, 1997 (Livermore, Cal.: Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, 1997). Similarly, in Canada, which has more than a ton of HEU on its soil, the
pre-9/1 I rules only required enough guards on-site to perform tasks such as checking identification and manning
monitors; armed response to possible attack was to rely on forces arriving from off-site. See Government of
Canada, "Nuclear Safety and Control Act: Nuclear Security Regulations," Canada Gazette Part ! 134, no. 13
(21 June 2000; available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partll/2000/2000062 I/pdf/g2-13413.pdf as of 20
November 2006). Nuclear security measures in both Canada and Japan are discussed in more detail in Chapter
4. A number of other countries also do not require armed guards at nuclear facilities.
164 Interviews with Japanese experts and U.S. experts, and author's observations during a visit to a Category I
facility in Japan, November 2006. See also, Tatsujiro Suzuki, "Implications of 09/11 Terrorism for Civilian
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Many countries have not defined in regulations or other rules any particular threat that
nuclear security systems have to be able to defeat (known as the "design basis threat," or
DBT, because it is the threat that is the basis for designing the security system); they have
relied instead on setting rules regarding how high fences should be, what types of locks and
vaults should be provided, and the like. Many experts believe that having rules requiring a
particular level of performance from the security system, rather than a compliance-based
approach where rules simply require that particular technologies and procedures be in place,
is crucial to good security. As one U.S. expert put it, "if you don't have a DBT, you don't
have good security." 165 As of the end of 2006, this category of countries with no regulatory
DBT in place still included Russia, among many others, although a new rule including a DBT
is expected soon.' 66
A review of presentations about their approaches to physical protection made by 19
countries at conferences in the late 1990s noted wide variations in their nuclear security
approaches and practices. For example, 12 of the 19 reported that they perceived a threat of
insider theft and took measures to address that problem, six provided no information at all on
the insider problem, and one country insisted that it faced no threat from insiders. Only 11 of
the 19 reported that they required facilities to protect against sabotage, as well as against theft
of nuclear material. 167 In responses to a detailed survey on nuclear security practices prepared
by researchers at Stanford University, five of the six respondents said they had a DBT in
place, but two of the six said they did not take into account any risk of an attack by terrorists
in their DBT; three of the six said their DBT did not include dangers from insiders (either for
theft or for sabotage); none of the six reported having made any provision to deal with the
threat of sabotage by a large truck bomb set off beyond the protected area; two of the six did
not require armed guards to protect areas with weapons-usable nuclear material; most
required that when operations were done in an area with weapons-usable nuclear material at
least two persons had to be present ("two-man rule"), but "that requirement was administered
in quite different ways and in some cases not followed."16 8
Nuclear Industry and its Response Strategy," presentation to the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum-Harvard
University Nonproliferation Workshop, January 30-31, 2002. Security at nuclear facilities in Japan and Canada,
among several other countries, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
165 Byron Gardner, Sandia National Laboratories, personal communication, March 1995.
166 Russian officials have been projecting that a substantially modified version of the basic rules of physical
protection would be issued imminently since at least the spring of 2005; this regulation would include a
requirement for facilities to meet a particular DBTdesign-basis threat (the details of which would be specified in
a separate, classified document). Interviews with Boris Kroupchatnikov, Rostekhnadzor, May 2005 and October
2005. (Kroupchatnikov is in overall charge of regulating physical protection and material control and
accounting for all nuclear materials in Russia outside the Ministry of Defense and the portions of Rosatom
involved in manufacturing nuclear weapons and components.) As of late 2006, however, the regulation had not
yet been issued.
167 Kevin J. Harrington, Physical Protection of Nuclear Material: National Comparisons (Livermore, Cal.:
Sandia National Laboratories in cooperation with Stanford University, Center for International Security and
Cooperation, 1999).
168 The most detailed publicly available discussion of the results of this survey is in Bunn and Zaitseva,
"Guarding Nuclear Reactors and Materials from Terrorists and Thieves."
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Too little data is publicly available to provide a detailed country-by-country review of
nuclear security arrangements in each of the countries in Tables 2.1-2.4, which would in any
case be beyond the scope of this chapter. A review of the information that is publicly
available concerning security levels at different sites in different countries, quantities and
qualities of material at those sites, and the threats that security systems in different countries
must face suggests that as of 2005, the most urgent risks of nuclear theft existed in Russia; at
research reactors fueled with HEU around the world; and in Pakistan. Each of these
particularly high-priority examples are discussed in turn below.
Nuclear Security in Russia - Yesterday and Today
The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 created a danger unprecedented in human
history - the collapse of an empire armed with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and
enough nuclear material for tens of thousands more. The world has been extraordinarily
lucky that this collapse involved so little violence and that a horrifying outpouring of weapons
of mass destruction and related materials and technologies did not occur. Substantial progress
has been made in the years since the Soviet collapse, and Russia today is a very different
country than Russia in the mid-1990s. But crucial risks remain, and urgent action is needed to
address them.
The Soviet Union had a highly effective and intelligently designed security system for
its nuclear weapons and nuclear materials - but it was designed for a world that no longer
exists. A security system designed for a single state with a closed society, closed borders, and
well-paid, well-cared-for nuclear workers was splintered among multiple states with open
societies, open borders, desperate, underpaid nuclear workers, and rampant theft and
corruption - a situation the system was never designed to address.169 Given the tightly
controlled nature of Soviet society, there had been no expectation that there would be terrorist
teams operating on Soviet territory, and therefore the need to protect against armed outside
attack on nuclear facilities in peacetime had been modest.
Similarly, little investment had been made in Soviet times in technical systems to
protect against insider theft threats, as nuclear insiders were carefully screened, well
compensated, and closely watched: if they did steal something, they could not meet with a
foreigner or leave the country in an attempt to sell it without being very closely monitored by
169 For summaries of the nuclear security situation in the former Soviet Union in the years following the Soviet
collapse, see, for example, John Deutch, then Director of Central Intelligence, "The Threat of Nuclear
Diversion," in Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part II; Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave:
Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material (Washington, D.C.: Managing the Atom
Project, Harvard University, and Non-Proliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000;
available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/FullNextWave.pdf as of 2 January 2007);
Oleg Bukharin, "Security of Fissile Materials in Russia," Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 21
(1996); Frank von Hippel, "Fissile Material Security in the Post-Cold War World," Physics Today 48, no. 6
(June 1995); Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian
Nulcear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Oleg Bukharin and William Potter,
"Potatoes Were Guarded Better," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51, no. 3 (May-June 1995), pp. 46-50; "'We
Cannot Preclude the Possibility of Nuclear Materials Theft' (Edited Transcript of Duma Hearing)," Yaderny
Kontrol Digest 5 (Fall 1997).
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the KGB. For these reasons, when the Soviet Union collapsed, most nuclear facilities did not
have any detector at the door that would set off an alarm if plutonium or HEU were being
carried out (known as "portal monitors"); most did not have security cameras in the areas
where the plutonium and HEU were stored and handled; there was an accounting system
intended primarily to monitor facilities' performance in meeting their production quotas,
never intended to be able to detect nuclear material thefts; the padlocks on doors into nuclear
material areas were often of types that could be cut in seconds using a bolt-cutter from any
hardware store; and wax seals - the same technology Louis XIV used to seal his letters - were
still in wide use to indicate whether containers had been tampered with or vaults opened
(allowing any worker with an authorized stamp to break the seal, remove material, and
replace the seal with an identical one without detection).
Moreover, funding to maintain nuclear security systems plunged in the years
following the Soviet collapse, leading to gaping holes in security fences, alarm systems that
no longer worked, and the like - situations that in several cases were, in fact, exploited by
individuals who stole HEU or separated plutonium. In one case in which a naval officer
walked through a giant hole in the fence at a naval base, snapped the padlock on a shed, put
several kilograms of HEU in his backpack, and walked off without detection, the military
prosecutor concluded that "potatoes were guarded better." 70 Even then-Russian Minister of
Atomic Energy Evgeniy Adamov acknowledged in 1998 that "the weakening of our ability to
manage nuclear material has been immeasurable."' 7 1 In 1996, the U.S. Director of Central
Intelligence testified that weapons-usable nuclear materials "are more accessible now than at
any other time in history - due primarily to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and
the region's worsening economic conditions," and that none of the facilities handling
plutonium or HEU in the former Soviet states had "adequate safeguards or security measures"
in place.172
Figure 2.3 shows Building 116 at the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow in 1994, before
cooperative U.S.-Russian efforts to upgrade security there began. More than enough HEU for
a bomb was present in this building - an example of the conditions of nuclear security in the
years following the Soviet collapse. There is, in fact, a fence in the photograph, though it is
so overgrown with weeds that it is difficult to make out. (Extensive security upgrades have
since been installed for Building 116 and for the other buildings at the Kurchatov Institute
containing weapons-usable material.) Figure 2.4 shows a typical easily-cut padlock securing
a room containing nuclear material during this period, along with a typical easily-faked seal
from this period. (Seals of similar types are still in wide use.)
170 Bukharin and Potter, "Potatoes Were Guarded Better."
171 Quoted in Nick Wadhams, "Center to Track Russian Nuclear Material," Associated Press, 4 November 1998.
172 Deutch, testimony in Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part //.
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Figure 2.3: Moscow Building With Enough HEU for a Bomb, 1994
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Nuclear security in Russia (where all the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and more
than 99% of its weapons-usable nuclear materials, now resides) has improved substantially in
the years since the Soviet collapse. Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union deserve
considerable credit for preventing the massive nuclear leakage that many feared in the years
immediately following the Soviet Union's collapse - taking action in many cases under very
difficult circumstances. Some senior Russian officials have recently claimed that all
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials are now secure: in April 2004,
for example, Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov said that he could say "with full
responsibility" that "no leakage of such materials is possible."' 73 Unfortunately, Ivanov's
optimistic conclusion cannot be sustained. While security for nuclear stockpiles in Russia
continues to improve, security in many cases still falls far short of what is needed to be able to
defeat the outsider and insider threats terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose.
7 Sergei Ivanov, "Remarks to the Center for Defense Information" (Washington, D.C.: CDI, 6 April 2004).
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Figure 2.4: Ineffective Seal and Easily-Cut Padlock on Nuclear Material Door
Source: DOE
Indeed, recent anecdotal evidence, described below, suggests that the "demand side" of
nuclear smuggling is coalescing more than had been observed before.
The biggest improvements in nuclear security are the result of Russia's stabilization.
Russia in 2005 is a very different country from Russia in 1992, or even Russia in 1998. The
economy has been growing steadily for several years, the Russian government has stabilized,
the federal budget has shifted from huge deficits to noticeable surpluses, and the government
has asserted stronger control over key sectors and facilities. As a result, nuclear workers are
getting paid a reasonable wage, on time, reducing the danger that desperation might motivate
someone to steal nuclear material or sell nuclear secrets. Nuclear facility guards are no longer
leaving their posts to forage for food (though pay for nuclear guards apparently remains low).
No longer are alarm systems shutting down because the facility failed to pay its electric bill.
In addition, with funds from the United States, Russia's own budget, and limited
support from other countries, substantial improvements have been made in security and
accounting for nuclear materials and nuclear warheads at many sites. By the end of fiscal
year (FY) 2004, U.S.-funded comprehensive security and accounting upgrades had been
completed at 75% of the sites with weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia (along with all
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of the sites with such material in the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union). 174 While
such comprehensive upgrades had been completed for 75% of the sites, however, they had
been completed for only 25% of the potentially vulnerable nuclear material, as vast quantities
of material are believed to be located at a small number of large nuclear defense complex
sites, where progress has been slowed by disputes over how much access U.S. experts will
receive in the course of implementing U.S.-funded security upgrades. 7 5
Several rounds of Russian-funded security upgrades have been undertaken at the
direction of the Russian government, in response to terrorist incidents from 1999 to the
present. Russian officials report that these have included: increased protective forces at some
nuclear facilities; enlarged areas around facilities where access is restricted; an increase in the
frequency of training and exercises simulating possible terrorist attacks; and investments in
portal monitors, intrusion detectors, security cameras, and the like at individual sites. 17 6
By these means, the most egregious weaknesses of the 1990s have largely been
addressed. The systems now in place would likely protect reasonably well against casual,
poorly planned theft by a single insider or a single outsider - which appears to have been the
dominant type of theft that occurred in the known cases from the 1990s. Nevertheless, a
variety of indicators suggest that serious weaknesses remain:
* Russian government funding for nuclear security remains far below what is needed. In
May 2005, one knowledgeable Russian expert publicly estimated that funding for physical
174 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge,
Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative,
2005; available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/report cnwmupdate2005.pdf as of 2 January 2007), pp. 30-37.
m As these facilities are located in fenced-in, guarded cities, with an additional fence and guard force for the
nuclear facility itself, the danger of overt, armed outsider attack is probably less at these facilities than the danger
of insider theft. A number of incidents, however, have confirmed that at some of these sites there are well-worn
paths through holes in the fence around the city and in some cases holes in the fence around the nuclear facility
itself as well.
176 See, for example, Yuri Volodin, Boris Kroupchatnikov, and Alexander Sanin, "MPC&A Regulatory Program
in the Russian Federation: Trends and Prospective," in Proceedings of the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Institute
of Nuclear Materials Management, Orlando, Fla., 23-2 7 June 2002 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2002); Dmitry
Kovchegin, "Approaches to Design Basis Threat in Russia in the Context of Significant Increase of Terrorist
Activity," in Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management,
Phoenix, Ariz., 13-17 July 2003 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2003; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication.cfi?program=STPP&ctype=paper&item id=398 as of 22 March 2005). Russia sent additional
troops to defend nuclear sites as the Beslan crisis was unfolding. See Christina Applegarth, "Russia, U.S.
Bolster Regional Nuclear Security Following Terrorist Attacks," Arms Control Today (October 2004; available
at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_0I /GTRI.asp as of 5 April 2006). In early 2005, the Russian
government approved a new plan for safety and security, but most of the plan involved preparations to take new
measures, rather than implementing major new steps immediately. See Plan Meropriyatii, Cvyazannykh S
Vypolneniem Pervogo Etapa Pealizatsii 'Osnov Gosudarstvennoi Politiki V Oblast'i Obespecheniya Yadernoi I
Radiatsionnoi Bezopasnost'i Rossiskoi Federatsii Na Period Do 2010 Goda I Dal'neishuyu Perspektivu' (Action
Planfor Phase One of the Implementation of 'Foundations of Government Policy in the Area of Nuclear Safety
and Radiation Protection within the Russian Federationfor the Period to 2010 and Beyond), trans. U.S.
Department of Energy, Order No. II 7-r (Moscow: Government of the Russian Federation, 2005; available at
http://www.government.ru/data/newstext.html?he-id=1 03&news id=l 6586 as of 25 February 2005).
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protection covers only 30% of the need.' 77 In March 2003 testimony to the Russian
Duma, then-Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumiantsev warned that $450 million
was needed over the next six years to bolster security at Russia's nuclear facilities, that
guard forces at nuclear facilities had been cut back due to budget constraints, and that 4-5
times current spending was needed to secure Russian nuclear power plants from sabotage.
"Everything boils down to money," he said. At the same hearing, Yuri Vishnevsky, then
chairman of Russia's nuclear regulatory agency, said that the government program to
ensure nuclear and radiological safety and security received only 10-15% of the funds it
required each year. 17 In mid-2005, a representative of one major Rosatom nuclear
facility estimated that 90% or more of all funds spent for purchasing or maintaining
physical protection, material control, and material accounting equipment at that site came
from U.S. money, rather than Russian funds, and described a difficult months-long (and
often unsuccessful) process for requesting Russian funds for security upgrades.179
* Experts who visit Russia's nuclear facilities continue to report problems such as
dilapidated fences, antiquated or broken intrusion detectors, ineffective tamper-indicating
devices, undermanned guard forces without night-vision goggles or hardened fighting
positions, material accounting systems that would not be able to detect that material had
been removed in a timely manner, and the like.180 In March 2005, the commander of the
Ministry of Interior (MVD) troops for the Moscow district said that only seven of the
critical guarded facilities in the district had adequately maintained security equipment,
while 39 had "serious shortcomings" in their physical protection.181
* In general, at each new facility where Russia grants access to U.S. personnel and
cooperative work begins, U.S. and Russian experts rapidly agree that a wide range of
security and accounting upgrades are needed.
* In 2003, the chief of security at Seversk, Russia's largest plutonium and HEU processing
facility, reported that the Ministry of Interior troops guarding the facility routinely failed
to protect the facility from outside attack in tests; routinely failed to prevent insiders from
removing material in tests; often patrolled with no ammunition in their guns; and were
frequently corrupt, becoming "the most dangerous internal violators."'
* Both Russian and American experts have reported a systemic problem of inadequate
security culture at many sites - intrusion detectors turned off when the guards get annoyed
177 Nikolai N. Shemigon, director-general, Eleron (Rosatom's physical protection firm), remarks to Institute of Physics and
Power Engineering, "Third Russian International Conference on Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting,"
Obninsk, Russia, 16-20 May 2005.
178 Robert Serebrennikov, "2002 Saw Several Thefts of Nuclear Materials, Isotope Products in Russia," ITAR-
TASS, 5 March 2003.
179 Interview with expert from Russian nuclear facility, July 2005.
180 Interviews with U.S. laboratory personnel, 2002-2004.
181 See "Over 4,000 Trespassers Detained at Moscow District Restricted Access Facilities," Interfax-Agentstvo Voyennykh
Novostey, 18 March 2005.
182 Igor Goloskokov, "Refomirovanie Voisk MVD Po Okhrane Yadernikh Obektov Rossii (Reforming MVD
Troops to Guard Russian Nuclear Facilities)," trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Yaderny Kontrol 9,
no. 4 (Winter 2003; available at http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yk4-2003.pdf as of 28 February
2005).
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by their false alarms, doors left open, senior managers allowed to bypass security systems,
effective procedures for operating the new security and accounting systems either not
written or not followed, and the like. 183 The Seversk security chief's report of guards
patrolling without ammunition - and with little understanding of the importance of what
they were guarding - is one particularly troubling example.
As a CIA report summed it up in November 2004: "Russia's nuclear security has been
slowly improving over the last several years, but risks remain."' 84 Even Alexander
Rumiantsev, head of Russia's Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom, formerly
Minatom), warned after the September 2004 terrorist attacks in Russia that "today, we have to
admit that we cannot fully rule out the possibility that fissile materials, including highly-
enriched uranium and plutonium, as well as technologies suitable for manufacturing nuclear
weapons, may fall into the hands of international terrorists." 185
The outsider and insider threats that nuclear security systems in Russia face are
frighteningly high. Russia is the only country in the world where senior officials have
confirmed that terrorist teams have actually carried out reconnaissance at nuclear weapon
storage facilities. As noted above, senior Russian officials and the Russian state newspaper
have reported four incidents in 2001-2002 of terrorist teams carrying out reconnaissance on
Russian nuclear warheads - two on nuclear weapon storage facilities and two on nuclear
weapon transport trains.186 The locations of these facilities and the routes of these trains are
state secrets in Russia - but secrets the terrorists apparently managed to penetrate.
Few nuclear facilities in Russia (or elsewhere, for that matter) could defend against an
attack on the scale of the Beslan school massacre in Russia in September 2004 - 32 suicidal
terrorists, armed with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and explosives, launching a
183 Indeed, on one visit to a facility whose security had been upgraded with U.S. assistance, the U.S. General
Accounting Office found that the gate to the central storage facility for the site's nuclear material was left wide
open and unattended. At another site, guards did not respond when visitors entering the site set off the metal
detectors, and the portal monitors to detect removal of nuclear material were not working. See U.S. Congress,
General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonprohferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving;
Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-0 1-312 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2001; available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d01312.pdf as of 2 January 2007), pp. 12-13. For a useful discussion of the security culture problem
generally, see Igor Khripunov and James Holmes, eds., Nuclear Security Culture: The Case of Russia (Athens,
Georgia: Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia, 2004; available at
http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/Security%20Culture%2OReport%2020041118.pdf as of 18 February
2005). See also Irina Kupriyanova, "Assessing the Effectiveness of the U.S. Nuclear Material Accounting,
Control, and Physical Protection Program in Russia," Yaderny Kontrol 7, no. 2 (March/April 2002).
184 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear
Facilities and Military Forces (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004; available at
http://www.dni.gov/nic/special russiannuke04.html as of 5 March 2005).
185 "Top Russian Official Does Not Rule out International Terrorists May Obtain Nuclear Materials," Interfax
News Service, 18 September 2004.
186 Original reporting of the incidents of reconnaissance on warhead transport trains is in Bogdanov, "A Pass to
Warheads Found on a Terrorist." General Igor Valynkin, the commander of the force that guards Russia's
nuclear weapons, confirmed these reports in "Russia: Terror Groups Scoped Nuke Site." These incidents are
also referred to in U.S. National Intelligence Council, Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and
Military Forces.
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carefully planned attack with no warning. Nor is that size of attack the upper limit: the Beslan
attackers had acquired some of their weapons stockpile in a June 2004 raid on Russian
Interior Ministry buildings and arms depots in the neighboring province of Ingushetia that
involved at least 200 attackers and left some 80 people dead. In that raid, the attackers,
dressed in uniforms of the Russian Federal Security Service, Army intelligence, and other
special police squads, overwhelmed local forces, who did not receive reinforcements from
federal security service troops for several hours.187 (This is particularly distressing since the
usual approach to security at nuclear facilities - including nuclear weapon storage sites - is to
have a relatively modest defensive force on-site and to rely on reinforcements arriving in a
timely way.)
Such problems extend beyond Russia's southern borderlands. Attackers have shown
repeatedly that they can mass forces seemingly anywhere in Russia without warning and that
they can bribe or otherwise collude with insiders. In the week before the Beslan attack,
suicide bombers paid bribes and eluded lax airport security to get on two flights out of
Moscow, killing all 90 passengers aboard.188 In October 2004, a month after the Beslan
attack, a force of 47 men identified as Dagestanis, armed with clubs and crowbars, seized
complete control of a secret non-nuclear military research and development facility in the
town of Zelenograd, just north of Moscow, with all of its secret documents and arms
prototypes. When confronted by the facility staff, the attackers claimed to work for a firm
that had bought the company's stock and identified one member of their group as the new
deputy director of the facility. Local Interior Ministry forces had to retake the facility from
the men in an action reportedly involving hand-to-hand struggle and police firing automatic
weapons into the air.
The threat of insider theft at nuclear facilities and elsewhere in the former Soviet
Union is also severe. In October 2004, sources in the local and regional Ministry of Internal
Affairs reported that thieves had stolen three valves, valued at 700,000 rubles (over $20,000),
from the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant. The plant, like all Russian nuclear power plants, is
protected by armed guards, leading police to assume that the theft was probably an inside job.
Nor was this likely the first time such a theft has occurred: the head of the local branch of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs told a reporter, "I don't know why this crime has attracted so
much attention...such thefts happen here often." 190 Earlier in 2004, at the Rivne nuclear
power plant in Ukraine, police broke up a ring that included four authorized workers and a
187 Mark Deich, "The Ingushetia Knot," Moskovskii Komsomolets, 6 August 2004; Boris Yamshanov, "Bribes
Reeking of Explosives," Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 16 September 2004.
188 Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser, "Russian Plane Bombers Exploited Corrupt System," Washington Post, 18
September 2004.
189 Sergey Ptchikin, "Needles of Patriots: Attempts Made to Privatize Unique System for Protection Against
Terrorists," Rossiskaya Gazeta, 21 December 2004.
190 Andrey Pankov, "S Atomnoy Elektrostantsii Vynesli Tri Dorogostoyashchikh Klapana (Three High-Priced
Valves Carried Off from Nuclear Power Plant)," Novyye Izvestiya, October 2004. This article is translated and
summarized in "Three Pinch Valves Were Stolen from the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, Abstract 20040380,"
in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: NIS Trafficking Database (Monterey, Cal.: Monterey Institute for
International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004; available at
http://www.nti.org/db/nistraff/2004/20040380.htm as of 28 February 2005).
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guard they bribed with $77 in Ukrainian currency; the group had successfully stolen a large
steam evaporator worth an estimated $154,000 from inside the guarded plant.' 9' (It is
extraordinarily difficult to design a nuclear security system that will be effective in preventing
theft by conspiracies of five insiders, including a guard, working together.) Insider theft of
both money and weapons by military personnel continues to occur on epic scale; in 2003, for
example, military prosecutors in Russia opened 14,000 criminal cases, including 1,700 crimes
against federal property.192 The Russian Audit Chamber has reportedly concluded that
nuclear submarines arrive for decommissioning with half of their electronic equipment
already stolen; theft of components from ships and submarines is so extensive that a gangland
war broke out in Murmansk over the lucrative trade in stolen parts.193 For these reasons, the
2004 CIA report repeatedly highlighted the insider danger.' 94
The temptations for such insider theft are high. As noted above, in one documented
recent case, a Russian businessman was offering $750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium
for sale to a foreign client. Even though in this case the businessman linked up with scam
artists and was caught, it seems unlikely that there is no one in Russia's vast nuclear
infrastructure who could be convinced to provide plutonium in return for $750,000. The case
is especially troubling because, rather than involving obvious foreigners attempting to
purchase illicit items (such as the Aum Shinrikyo weapons-buyers), it involved a native
Russian businessman, apparently with a foreign client interested in stolen plutonium, with
enough savvy to make contact with people in one of the major closed cities where weapons-
grade material is handled. This is a troubling indicator that those seeking nuclear weapons or
materials may be making progress in closing the gap between them and people in Russia who
may be willing to sell. Another troubling indicator is the large traffic in Afghan heroin being
smuggled through Russia on its way to European markets - creating crime linkages and
transport routes from the heart of Russia to Afghanistan and Pakistan that might be exploited
for nuclear smuggling.' 95
Inadequate accounting of nuclear material in the past means that it will never be
possible to know for sure how much material may already have been stolen. In his February
2005 testimony, CIA director Goss warned that in Russia "there is sufficient material
'9 See, for example, Oleg Bukharin, Russia's Gaseous Centrifuge Technology and Uranium Enrichment
Complex (Princeton, N.J.: Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University, 2004); Bukharin, Surviving the End of the Cold War. These and other
sources are summarized in Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies,
"Thieves of Nuclear Plant Equipment Arrested in Ukraine," NIS Export Control Observer (May 2004; available
at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/nisexcon/pdfs/ob_0405e.pdf as of 5 March 2005).
192 This was reported by Russia's chief military prosecutor in two interviews in the Russian state newspaper:
"Not a Tin Soldier; Chief Military Prosecutor Comments on Investigation of Sensational Military Crimes," trans.
BBC Monitoring, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 24 December 2003; "Business Breakfast [Interview with Col.-Gen.
Alexander Savenkov]," trans. BBC Monitoring, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 27 December 2003.
193 'Enormous Damage' from Equipment Theft in Russian Navy," trans. BBC Monitoring Service, RTR-TV
(Moscow), 6 December 2003.
S94 U.S. National Intelligence Council, Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces.
'9' U.S. Department of State, "Europe and Central Asia: Russia," in International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report: 2003 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2004; available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/
nrcrpt/2003/voli /html/29838.htm as of 17 December 2006).
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unaccounted for so that it would be possible for those with know-how to construct a nuclear
weapon," and pointed out that because some material was unaccounted for, he could not
assure the American public that enough nuclear material for a bomb was not already in
terrorist hands.196 Russia is still transitioning from its Soviet-era nuclear material accounting
system, designed to monitor production, not to detect theft. In essence, each facility measured
its input and its output, and as long as the differences were small, they were written off as
normal losses to waste - making it possible for careful thieves to steal nuclear material
undetected day after day, as long as the individual thefts were small. (The chief engineer at
one of Russia's major plutonium production sites reported that until cooperation with U.S.
experts began, the accounting system at his site did not include the very concept of "material
unaccounted for" - the difference between input and output was defined as "losses to
waste."197) Over the decades of the Cold War, the few-percent uncertainties tolerated in this
accounting system amount to many hundreds of bombs' worth of material that cannot be
reliably accounted for.
To be fair, the U.S. nuclear material accounting system, though substantially better
than the Soviet one (especially after new accounting measures were developed following the
incident in which hundreds of kilograms of HEU were unaccounted for at the Nuclear
Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) in the mid-I 960s) was also not good
enough during much of the Cold War to rule out the possibility that nuclear material had been
stolen. When the United States published its plutonium inventory in the mid-1990s, some 2.8
tons of plutonium was "inventory differences" or "material unaccounted for."' 98 For HEU,
3.2 tons of material fell into this category.' 99 Probably these figures represent measurement
uncertainities, material plated out on pipes, material lost to waste beyond that estimated to
have gone to waste, and overestimates of how much was produced in the first place, but no
one can demonstrate conclusively that none of it was stolen.
Today, at a number of sites in Russia where large quantities of nuclear material are
processed every year, accounting has been much improved. But at many sites, there are still
vast numbers of containers of nuclear material built up over decades, often sealed with seals
that could be tampered with without detection, and no one has yet had the time and resources
to measure each one to make sure that it still contains the nuclear material that the paper
records say it should.
In short, the shape of the danger of nuclear theft from Russian facilities has changed in
recent years - but the danger remains very real, and the need for action to ensure that every
warhead and every kilogram of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia is secure against
both outsider and insider threats remains urgent.
196 See Goss' s testimony in Current and Projected National Security Threats.
'97 Interview, March 2001.
198 U.S. Department of Energy, Plutonium: The First 50 Years: United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition,
and Utilizationfrom 1944 Through 1994 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 1996; available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/pu50y.html as of 4 January 2007).
199 U.S. Department of Energy, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking a Balance (Revision 1) (Washington, D.C.:
DOE, 2001; available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/heu/striking.pdf as of 23 May 2006).
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The Threat From Research Reactor Fuel
As indicated in Table 2.2, some 60 metric tons of HEU - enough for over a thousand
nuclear weapons - is in civilian use or storage throughout the world. Most of this is in the
form of fuel for research reactors. As noted earlier, more than 130 operating research reactors
still use HEU as their fuel. An unknown number of shut-down or converted research reactors
still have HEU fuel on-site. While a majority of these research reactors are either in the
United States or Russia, all told, HEU-fueled reactors exist in some 40 countries. Indeed, for
most of the countries in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, the only separated plutonium or HEU on
their soil is the HEU at one or a small number of research reactors.
Many of these facilities do not have enough HEU on-site for a bomb. But as noted
above, a DOE study estimated that there are 128 nuclear research reactors or associated
facilities around the world with 20 kilograms of HEU or more. 2 0 0 Moreover, one cannot rule
out the possibility of terrorists stealing material from more than one facility, each of which
might have less than the amount required for a bomb; the possibility of simultaneous attacks
is highlighted by the simultaneous al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998. The potential use of research reactor HEU in nuclear weapons is not just a
hypothetical concern: as discussed in the earlier section on demand for black-market nuclear
material, Iraq, in its "crash program" to make one nuclear bomb as quickly as possible after
its invasion of Kuwait, planned to use both fresh and irradiated HEU from its research
reactors.201
Most civilian research reactors have very modest security - in many cases, no more
than a night watchman and a chain-link fence even when enough fresh or irradiated HEU for a
bomb is present.202 Some are located on university campuses, where providing serious
security against terrorist attack would be virtually impossible - and where the operators are
often partly students, who cycle through frequently, making it extraordinarily difficult to
provide serious checks of potential insider thieves. Many research reactors were built 30-40
years ago, in the heyday of nuclear energy; many have since fallen on hard times and have
few resources to continue safe operation or to pay for substantial security measures. The
research reactor in the Congo, attempting to operate in the midst of a civil war, at a facility so
impoverished the reactor does not have a telephone, is emblematic of the broader problem
(though its fuel is just below the 20% line that defines HEU): fuel stolen from that reactor
turned up in the hands of the Italian mafia.203
200 U.S. Congress, DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium, p. 28.
201 For a detailed discussion based on the discoveries of the IAEA Iraq Action Team after the 1991 Gulf War, see
Albright, Berkhout, and Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, 1996: World Inventories,
Capabilities, and Policies, pp. 344-349.
202 Author's visits to research reactors in several countries. For a more detailed description of typical security
arrangements at research reactors, see George Bunn et al., "Research Reactor Vulnerability to Sabotage by
Terrorists," Science and Global Security 11 (2003; available at http://www.princeton.edu/-globsec/publications/
pdf/1 1%202-3%20Bunn%20p85-107.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
203 For a discussion of this episode, see Daly, Parachini, and Rosenau, Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the
Kinshasa Reactor.
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Even in the United States, which has some of the most stringent nuclear security rules
in the world for other facilities, research reactors regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) are exempted from the requirement that facilities with more than 5
kilograms of U-235 in HEU emitting less than 100 rads per hour at one meter must have
sufficient armed guards, fences, and other security measures in place to defeat theft attempts
by either an insider or groups of armed outsider attackers. 204 (This exemption and its
implications are discussed at length in Chapter 4.) At the reactor at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), since 9/11, there have been 1-2 Cambridge police officers with
side-arms on-site to provide security. (Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the facility had no armed
guards on-site, relying on response from off-site campus police officers in the event of a
problem.) In April 2004, the facility had 29.5 kilograms of HEU on-site, which, prior to
irradiation, had been 93% enriched.20 5 To be fair, the MIT reactor is an unusually high-power
research reactor (5 MWt), making the irradiated fuel there particularly radioactive and
difficult to steal - but this is not true of many other research reactors that have similar security
approaches. In mid-2005 an investigation by ABC News documented conditions ranging from
sleeping guards to security doors propped open with books at essentially all of the 26 U.S.
university-based research reactors.
Given these security conditions, it would not be difficult for attackers to break in and
remove large quantities of HEU from a research reactor, or for insiders to remove such
material. Unlike the large and massive fuel assemblies used in nuclear power reactors, fuel
for research reactors is typically in fuel elements that are small and easy to handle - typically
less than a meter long, several centimeters across, and weighing a few kilograms. In most
cases, a thief could easily put several fuel elements at a time into a backpack, to be carried out
to a waiting vehicle.
In general, the HEU in these fuel elements would require some processing before it
could be used in a bomb - but the kind of processing required is reasonably straightforward,
and all the details of the necessary processes are published in the open literature. It is
important to understand that the threat of nuclear theft at research reactors comes not only
from the "fresh," unirradiated HEU fuel, but also from the irradiated fuel, which typically
remains quite highly enriched; is much less radioactive than power reactor spent fuel (in many
cases well below the 100 rad/hr level considered "self-protecting" against theft under
international standards - a standard that should itself be reconsidered in the face of post-9/1 I
threats of suicidal attackers); and requires the same physical and chemical processing to
recover HEU for use in a weapon as the fresh fuel elements require. (See Chapter 4 for an
extended discussion of these points.) Thus, kilogramfor kilogram, lightly irradiated
research reactor fuel poses only a modestly lower proliferation danger than fresh research
reactorfuel - and there is far more irradiated HEU fuel at poorly secured reactor sites around
204 For a discussion, see, for example, Edwin Lyman and Alan Kuperman, "A Re-Evaluation of Physical
Protection Standards for Irradiated HEU Fuel," in The 24th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichmentfor
Research and Test Reactors, Bariloche, Argentina, 5 November 2002 (Argonne, Ill.: Argonne National
Laboratory, 2002; available at http://www.rertr.anl.gov/Web2002/index.html as of 16 May 2006).
205 Visit by the author, April 2004.
206 "Radioactive Road Trip," "PrimeTime Live," ABC News, 13 October 2005.
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the world than there is fresh fuel.207 The danger posed by research reactor spent fuel stands in
stark contrast to the modest theft threat posed by nuclear power reactor spent fuel assemblies,
which are huge, heavy, and intensely radioactive, making them quite difficult to steal and
process.
Security of Pakistan's Stockpile
Pakistan has a relatively modest nuclear stockpile, which is thought to be distributed
among only a small number of locations. Pakistan has sites where nuclear weapons exist
(reportedly stored in partially disassembled form2 08) and sites with HEU or separated
plutonium (particularly the main HEU production facility at Kahuta, but also including,
among others, a research reactor with a small amount of U.S.-supplied HEU).209 Pakistan's
nuclear facilities are believed to be heavily guarded, though they probably are not equipped
with state-of-the-art physical protection and material control and accounting technologies.2 4
Clearly, either state collapse or the rise of an extremist Islamic government in Pakistan
- neither of which can by any means be ruled out - could pose severe dangers of nuclear
assets becoming available to terrorists or hostile states. Even in the current environment,
however, both insider and outsider threats to Pakistan's stockpiles appear to be dangerously
high - creating serious dangers despite the relatively modest size and relatively high levels of
security of Pakistan's nuclear stockpiles.
Insider threats. Recent events highlight the danger that insiders in Pakistan's nuclear
complex, motivated by money, sympathy to extreme Islamic causes, or both, might help
terrorists get a bomb or bomb material from Pakistan's stockpiles. First among these events
are the extraordinary revelations concerning the global black-market nuclear network led by
A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's bomb, demonstrating that at least some nuclear insiders in
Pakistan have been willing to sell practically anything to practically anyone - including
207 For a discussion of these stockpiles, see lain G. Ritchie, "Growing Dimensions: Spent Fuel Management at
Research Reactors," IAEA Bulletin 40, no. 1 (March 1998; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Magazines/Bulletin/Bull401/article7.html as of 20 September 2006). Some analysts have pointed to the modest
interest that commercial reprocessing firms have had in separating uranium from research reactor fuel to argue
that such separations would be very difficult. But there is a huge difference between separating enough uranium
to be of commercial interest and separating the much smaller amount needed for a bomb - and there is a huge
difference between separations that meet all modern safety regulations and quick and dirty separations that might
be done by terrorists.
208 See, for example, Lee Feinstein et al., A New Equation: US. Policy toward India and Pakistan after
September 11 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002; available at
http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp27.pdf as of 4 October 2006). The chapter by Albright is of special interest.
209 For a summary, see, for example, Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly
Arsenals: Nuclear Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2005), pp. 239-258.
210 The sparse information that is publicly available is summarized in Nathan Busch, No End in Sight: The
Continuing Menace of Nuclear Prohferation (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004). For a
summary of which institutions within Pakistan are responsible for each aspect of nuclear security and
accounting, see Muhammad Afzal, "Cooperation in Fissile Material Management: The View from Pakistan," in
Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-
14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005).
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designs and production manuals for uranium enrichment centrifuges, centrifuge components,
operational centrifuges, and an apparently Chinese-origin nuclear bomb design.2 11 The fact
that the network was able to remove entire centrifuges from Pakistan's premier nuclear
weapons material production facility and ship them off to other countries suggests either
government approval or a truly extraordinary breakdown in security. Second, there is the
remarkable case described earlier, in which Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-
Zawahiri met at length with two senior Pakistani nuclear weapons experts with extreme
Islamic views and pressed them both about nuclear weapons and about others in Pakistan's
program who might be willing to help. Neither of these Pakistani scientists were ever tried or
imprisoned, though it appears they remain under a loose form of house arrest. Bin Laden may
have been on the right track in asking for others who could help: by one estimate from a
Pakistani physicist, some 10% of Pakistan's nuclear insiders are inclined to extreme Islamic
views.2 12 Third, Pakistani investigations of the assassination attempts against President
Musharraf in late 2003 suggest that they were carried out by military officers in league with al
Qaeda operative Abu Faraj al-Libbi, raising the disturbing possibility that al Qaeda might also
find people willing to cooperate among the officers charged with guarding nuclear
stockpiles.m In short, the danger that insiders might pass material or weapons to al Qaeda, or
facilitate an outsider attack, appears to be very real.
Outsider threats. Similarly, the threat from a possible terrorist attack on a Pakistani
nuclear weapon depot appears dangerously high. Armed remnants of al Qaeda and of the
Taliban continue to operate in the nearly lawless tribal zones on Pakistan's border with
Afghanistan. Indeed, some combination of al Qaeda, Taliban, and Pakistani fighters was able
to hold off thousands of Pakistani regular army troops for days at a time in a pitched battle in
the tribal zones in early 2004. If 41 heavily armed terrorists can strike without warning in
the middle of Moscow, how many might appear at a Pakistani nuclear weapon storage site?
Would the guards at the site be sufficient to hold them off - and would the guards choose to
fight, or to cooperate?
A Global Threat
The identification of these three categories as the highest priority threats is by no
means intended to minimize the threats that exist elsewhere around the world. There is
probably no country where nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials are located that
does not have more to do to ensure that its nuclear stockpiles are secured and accounted for to
a level sufficient to defeat demonstrated terrorist and criminal threats. This is a global
problem, which can only be solved through a global partnership for nuclear security. Brief
summaries of some of the other major stockpiles around the world follow below, beginning
211 See, for example, the summary and references in Braun and Chyba, "Proliferation Rings."2 12 Neuffer, "A US Concern: Pakistan's Arsenal: Anti-American Mood Poses a Security Risk."
213 "Escaped Musharraf Plotter Was Pakistan Air Force Man," Agence France Presse, 12 January 2005;
"Musharraf Al-Qaeda Revelation Underlines Vulnerability: Analysts," Agence France Presse, 31 May 2004.
214 See, for example, Afzal Khan, "Pakistan's Hunt for Al Qaeda in South Waziristan," The Jamestown
Foundation, 22 April 2004 (available at http://www.jamestown.org/news-details.php?news-id=45 as of 5
December 2005).
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with the developing countries that possess nuclear weapons; continuing to the developed
countries that possess nuclear weapons; and then considering the problem of civilian
separated plutonium (civilian HEU having been discussed above).
China. While public information about China's approaches to nuclear security and
accounting is sparse, China's nuclear security system is believed to be heavily dependent on
"guards, guns, and gates," as the Soviet system was, with relatively little application of
modem safeguards technologies.2 15 China does not have a specific DBT defined in
regulations, and systematic engineering approaches to assessing and correcting vulnerabilities
are typically not applied.2 16 Chinese experts have expressed concern that improved
protections against insider theft may be needed as China shifts toward a more market-oriented
217(and more corrupt) society. Outside terrorist attack may someday also be an issue: China
does have a continuing problem with terrorist groups, including groups based in China's
Islamic minority, which the Chinese government believes are linked to al Qaeda. The United
States and China initiated a lab-to-lab cooperation program on technologies for securing and
accounting for nuclear materials in the late 1990s, which ultimately included the installation
of a demonstration facility for modern safeguards and security technology at the China
Institute of Atomic Energy in Beijing, which U.S. participants hoped would create a new
standard for securing and accounting for nuclear materials in China.218 This cooperation was
cut off after the scandal over allegations of Chinese nuclear espionage in the United States.
Recently, cooperation with respect to civilian nuclear material has resumed, and extensive
upgrades of protection, accounting, and control technologies were completed at one site in the
fall of 2005, as a demonstration. U.S.-Chinese cooperation on a broad range of physical
protection, material control, and material accounting issues in China's civil sector is now
underway, but this cooperation typically does not involve U.S. funding for installing extensive
215 For a summary of MPC&A in China, see Hui Zhang, "Evaluating China's MPC&A System," in Proceedings
of the 44th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 13-17 July 2003
(Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2003; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/
MPC&A.pdf as of 1 August 2005). See also the summaries of the sparesparse publicly available literature in
Nathan Busch, "China's Fissile Material Protection, Control, and Accounting: The Case for Renewed
Collaboration," Nonproliferation Review 9, no. 3 (Fall-Winter 2002; available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/93/93busch.pdf as of 1 August 2005); Busch, No End in Sight: The
Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation.
216 Tang Dan, "Physical Protection System and Vulnerability Analysis Program in China: Presentation to the
Managing the Atom Seminar" (23 March 2004). In an interview in October 2006, a Chinese physical protection
regulator confirmed that at most sites, a systematic vulnerability assessment has not yet been performed.
217 See Tang Dan et al., "Physical Protection System and Vulnerability Analysis Program in China," in Eu-High
Level Scientific International Conference on Physical Protection (Salzburg, Austria: Austrian Military
Periodical, 2002; available at http://www.numat.at/list%20of/o2Opapers/tangdan%20-%20unkorrigiert.pdf as of
5 April 2006). (It is notable that the authors begin with a review of recent changes in Chinese society, with the
conclusion that these changes increase the criminal threat and decrease the ability to rely solely on the loyalty of
insider personnel.)
218 See Nancy Prindle, "The U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program," Nonproliferation Review 5,
no. 3 (Summer 1998; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/53/prindl53.pdf as of I I May 2006).
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upgrades (as it has in Russia), and as of late 2006, cooperation on these issues with China's
military nuclear sector had not resumed. 219
India. In India's case, like China's, the amount of information about actual nuclear
security practices which is publicly available is small.220 Nuclear weapons and weapons-
usable nuclear material are believed to be located in a small number of facilities under heavy
guard. A special security force, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), guards both
nuclear installations and other especially dangerous or sensitive industrial facilities. Indian
experts report that India does perform systematic vulnerability assessments in designing
physical protection systems for nuclear facilities and does use some modem security
technologies, including access controls and various types of intrusion detectors.221 Resources
available for physical protection appear to be limited, however, and in some cases physical
protection systems are aging and have some important weaknesses.222 The widespread
government corruption in India, coupled with past incidents such as the assassination of a
Prime Minister by her own guards, suggests that potential insider threats should be taken
seriously. And repeated terrorist attacks, including on defended facilities such as military
bases (and the Indian Parliament) suggest that protection must also be provided against
potentially substantial outsider attacks.
North Korea. North Korea has announced that it has manufactured nuclear weapons
and tested a weapon in the fall of 2006 (though it achieved a yield assessed by U.S.
intelligence at less than a kiloton). North Korea may have sufficient separated plutonium for
2-9 bombs. 223 Almost nothing is known about this stockpile or its security arrangements,
219 For discussions of the recent upgrade, see U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration, "U.S. And China Jointly Host Technology Exposition on Nuclear Material Security and
International Safeguards: Collaborative Approaches to Enhancing Nuclear Material Security" (Washington,
D.C.: NNSA, 24 October 2005; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/docs/chinatech demo.pdf as of 24
February 2006); Stephen Wampler, "DOE Helps Chinese Agency to Secure Nuclear Material," Lavrence
Livermore National Laboratory 's Weekly Newsline, 16 December 2005 (available at http://www.llnl.gov/pao/
employee/articles/2005/12.16.05.newsline.pdf as of 24 February 2006).Supplemented by interviewsInterviews
with DOE officials, December 2004, April 2005, and July 2005, and October 2006.
220 Some additional detail was provided at International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Regional Training
Course on Security for Nuclear Installations," Mumbai, India, 11-20 May 2003. For a summary of other
publicly available information, see Busch, No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Prohferation.
221 See presentations to International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Regional Training Course on Security for
Nuclear Installations."
222 Interview with U.S. expert who toured the physical protection system at an Indian power reactor, at Indian
invitation, in 2003. Personal communication, July 2003.
223 See, for example, David Albright and Paul Brannan, "The North Korean Plutonium Stock, Mid-2006"
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 26 June 2006; available at http://www.isis-
online.org/publications/dprk/dprkplutonium.pdf as of 13 August 2006).m See, for example Albright and
Brannan, "The North Korean Plutonium Stock, Mid-2006". Albright and Brannan estimate that as of mid-2006,
North Korea had 20-53 kilograms of separated plutonium. If North Korea required the same amount of
plutonium per weapon as was used in the Nagasaki bomb, about six kilograms, and sufferssuffered 20% losses in
processing of its separated plutonium into weapons (so that 7.5 kilograms of plutonium would be needed to end
up with 6 kilograms in a bomb), this amount of separated plutonium would be sufficient for 2-7 nuclear
weapons. If North Korea has succeeded in designing its weapons to use less plutonium, and in reducing
processing losses, the number of weapons might be somewhat higher; at five kilograms per bomb and 10%
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though it is presumed that wherever these materials or weapons are, they are heavily guarded.
Given North Korea's extreme isolation, it is extremely unlikely that modem technologies for
access control, intrusion detection, barriers, and the like are currently used. North Korea's
stockpile is presumably carefully watched and is sufficiently small that it would probably be
effectively impossible for an insider to remove enough material for a bomb without detection
- though the possibility of a corrupt cabal of senior military or party officials deciding to sell
off material cannot be excluded. Given the highly controlled nature of North Korean society,
a substantial outsider attack on these facilities in peacetime also seems quite unlikely.
Concerns about this stockpile falling into the hands of terrorists usually focus on either (a) a
conscious decision by the North Korean state (or by senior nuclear officials) to sell nuclear
material or weapons;2 24 or (b) a "loose nukes" scenario in the event of a collapse of the North
Korean regime. Installing improved nuclear security and accounting equipment would not
address either of those concerns. Successful engagement with the North Korean government
that convinced it to verifiably eliminate all of its nuclear programs, however, would remove
the nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials that might otherwise be transferred or fall
out of state control.226
Israel. Israel's nuclear stockpile is believed to exist at a very small number of sites,
under heavy guard, but as Israel does not even officially acknowledge that the stockpile
exists, virtually no details of its security arrangements are publicly available. Israel has long
experience in battling terrorist threats and a reputation for taking harsh measures against those
involved in security breaches (as in the case of former nuclear weapons worker Mordechai
Vannunu). This suggests that Israel has probably put in place substantial security measures
for its nuclear stockpile.
The United Kingdom. Britain requires every facility with nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable nuclear material to have security in place sufficient to meet a specified DBT;
armed guards are employed to protect nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material
losses, for example, 53 kilograms would be enough for roughly 10 bombs. Since one weapon has been
detonated, one must be subtracted from any estimated total; hence the 2-9 figure in the text. Albright and
Brannan assume only 4-5 kilograms of plutonium per weapon, and assume that the only processing losses occur
in separating the plutonium from irradiated fuel, so that the 20-53 kilograms would be sufficient for 4-13
weapons. I believe the assumption of zero processing losses in fabrication is unrealistic, and that 10-20% is a
more realistic figure.
224 On some occasions, representatives of the North Korean regime have reportedly made vague hints threatening
to transfer nuclear weapons or materials; on other occasions, they have pledged never to allow nuclear material
or weapons to be transferred. See, for example, statements quoted in Selig Harrison, "Inside North Korea:
Leaders Open to Ending Nuclear Crisis," Financial Times, 4 May 2004 (available at http://ciponline.org/asia/
inside.htm as of 17 December 2006). North Korea would presumably understand that U.S. retaliation would be
overwhelming if the material for a terrorist nuclear strike were reliably traced back to North Korea.
Nevertheless, concern persists over the possibility of such a transfer.See Chapter 3 for a more extended
discussion of the possibility of conscious state transfer of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists, and how
large a contribution to the overall risk of nuclear terrorism this may make.
225 See, for example, Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John M. Shalikashvili, "A Scary Thought: Loose
Nukes in North Korea," Wall Street Journal, 6 February 2003.
226 For a discussion, see "Keeping North Korean Bomb Material Out of Terrorist Hands," in Bunn and Wier,
Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor Action, pp. 32-33.
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(though armed guards were only dispatched to protect nuclear power plants in 2005 227);
regular vulnerability assessments are carried out, and modern physical protection and material
control and accounting technologies are in place. Significant improvements in physical
protection have been made since the 9/11 attacks. The British view as to the level of
spending required to provide sufficient security is quite different from the U.S. view,
however. As of 2000, for example, security spending to protect and safeguard the plutonium
at the Sellafield site (a huge complex processing tons of weapons-usable separated plutonium
every year and with tens of tons of separated plutonium in storage on-site) were in the range
of £10 million per year229 (approximately $18 million 2007 dollars) - compared to over $100
million ?er year the United States was spending on securing Los Alamos during the same
period.2 0 In 1998, the plutonium and HEU reprocessing plant at Dounreay dramatically failed
a security test when a mock attack force rapidly defeated the site's defenses, and the chief of
the UK Atomic Energy Constabulary (the guard force for nuclear facilities) resigned, charging
that he had been unable to get authorization to hire enough guards to provide effective
231
security. In 2002 and 2003, Greenpeace protesters were able to get past the security fences
at the Sizewell B nuclear power reactor, climb the reactor building with ladders, and get
through an unsecured fire door into an inner secure area (though not to vital areas where
equipment whose sabotage could cause a major accident is located). While this does not
necessarily reflect what would happen in the event of a terrorist attack, as the guards
obviously take a different approach to protesters than they would to armed attackers, Britain's
nuclear security regulator acknowledged that the incident "should not have been possible,"
and expressed particular concern over the fire door not having been secured between the first
incursion and the second.232
227 Pearl Marshall, "U.K. Upgrading Nuclear Security by Posting Armed Police at Sites," Nucleonics Week (27
January 2005).
228 For a useful recent summary of publicly available information on nuclear security in the United Kingdom, see
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Assessing the Risk of Terrorist Attacks on Nuclear Facilities,
vol. Report 222 (London: POST, 2004; available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/POSTpr222.pdf
as of 2 August 2005). See also BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue, Security Working Group, Final Report
(London: The Environment Council, 2004).
229 See Appendix 3 in BNFL National Stakeholder Dialogue, Waste Working Group, Interim Report (London:
Environmental Council, 2000; available at http://www.the-environment-council.org.uk/docs/
WWG%20Combined%20Report.pdf as of 4 August 2005).
230 See U.S. Department of Energy, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request: Detailed Budget Justifications-Weapons
Safeguards and Security (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2002; available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/03budget/
content/weapons/OthrWeap.pdf as of 4 August 2005).
231 Dave King and Steve Smith, "Doomed Nuke Plant Dogged by Trouble," Scottish Daily Record, 5 June 1998;
Angela Jameson, "Elite Armed Force Stands Firm after Nuclear Shake-Up: The Saturday Interview: Bill Pryke,"
The Times, 14 August 2004; Roger Hannah, "Dounreay Security Has Been Dodgy for Years," Scottish Daily
Record, 28 April 1998.
232 See discussion in Director of Civil Nuclear Security, The State of Security in the Civil Nuclear Industry and
the Effectiveness of Security Regulation: April 2002 - March 2003 (London: Office for Civil Nuclear Security,
Department of Trade and Industry, 2003; available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23303.pdf?
pubpdfdload=03%2F418 as of 28 July 2006). See also Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology,
Assessing the Risk of Terrorist Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, p. 33.
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France. As in Britain, in France sites with nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
nuclear materials are required to be able to defend against a specified DBT, and both armed
guards and modem safeguards and security technologies are employed. Significant additional
security steps have been taken since 9/11; for some weeks after those attacks, air-defense
missiles were deployed outside the reprocessing plant at La Hague.m But as in other
countries, concerns over security weak points remain. Nuclear power plants in France, which
often have unirradiated plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel on-site, have no armed
guards on-site.234 The frequent transports of weapons-usable separated plutonium in France
are a particular concern. Greenpeace, for example, has repeatedly been able to track the
supposedly secret routes of plutonium transport trucks. In February 2003, Greenpeace
protesters succeeded in surrounding one of these trucks, which was carrying 150 kilograms of
separated plutonium at the time; had they been armed terrorists, it appears likely that they
would have succeeded in seizing the trucks and their contents (though as in other such cases,
the authorities point out that the guards' reaction to unarmed protesters is inevitably far
different from their reaction to a terrorist attack).23 5 A recent analysis of security
arrangements for transport of civilian plutonium by a former security specialist for DOE,
commissioned by Greenpeace and based on photographs of the security arrangements
provided by Greenpeace, concluded that the risks were worse than what would be considered
"high" (and therefore unacceptable) in the DOE system and dubbed them "extreme."236
United States. The United States may have the most stringent nuclear security rules in
the world and almost certainly spends more on securing its nuclear stockpiles than any other
country. Annual safeguards and security spending at DOE alone is now in the range of $1.5
billion per year;237 the private sector and the Department of Defense spend hundreds of
millions more each year. All facilities with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear
material are required to be able to defeat a specified DBT; both armed guards and modern
safeguards and security technologies are used to protect these sites (and to protect transports).
Regular performance tests probing facilities' ability to fend off mock attackers are required.
While details are classified, the DBT now in place for nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
nuclear material at DOE is reported to be comparable in magnitude to the 19 attackers in four
independent, well-coordinated groups that struck on 9/11.238 Nevertheless, even in the United
States there have been repeated controversies over whether nuclear facilities are adequately
233 See discussion, for example, in Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Assessing the Risk of
Terrorist Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, p. 38.
234 See discussion, for example, in Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, Assessing the Risk of
Terrorist Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, p. 38.
235 235 Greenpeace International, "The Action in Chalon: Greenpeace Blocks Plutonium Traffic" (19 February
2003; available at http://www.greenpeace.fr/stop-plutonium/en/20030219_en.php3 as of 5 May 2006).
236 Timm, Security Assessment Report for Plutonium Transport in France.
m U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Request: Other Defense Activities, vol. 2,
DOE/CF-003 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2006; available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/07budget/Content/
Volumes/Vol_2_ODA.pdf as of 22 December 2006), p. 161.
238 For a useful discussion of the several steps in the evolution of DOE's DBT since 9/11, see Project on
Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory at High Risk
(Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2006; available at http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ho-061001-Y12.html as of 17
November 2006).
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secured and repeated cases of security tests revealing serious vulnerabilities in physical
protection and accounting systems for nuclear material in the U.S. nuclear complex. 239 A
number of the major security initiatives DOE is now undertaking - particularly the
consolidation of nuclear materials into fewer, more secure locations - have been slowed by
opponents who question their cost and value.240
As noted earlier, HEU at NRC-regulated research reactors is exempt from most of the
security requirements that the same material would require if it was located anywhere other
than a research reactor. Lightly irradiated HEU is exempt from nearly all of the NRC's
security requirements. Tons of HEU metal - the easiest material in the world for terrorists to
use to make a nuclear bomb - exists at two NRC-licensed facilities that are required to defend
against a far smaller and less capable DBT than DOE sites handling the same material would
be required to defend against.24 The NRC has recently ruled that reactors using plutonium in
MOX fuel can be exempted from a substantial fraction of the security requirements that are
required at other sites with weapons-usable nuclear material, arguing that there is "no rational
reason" why a reactor with potential nuclear bomb material on-site should have any more
242
security than any other reactor.22 DOE's security rules exempt a wide range of types of
material that pose serious security risks from major security requirements, including most
HEU research reactor fuel. DOE's rules define any material that has less than 10% by weight
239 For a blistering critique of security in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, published shortly after the 9/11
attacks, see Project on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk (Washington,
D.C.: POGO, 2001; available at http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-0 I 1003-nuclear.html as of 4 December
2006). For a recent summary of progress made in improving security since then and problems still remaining,
including both official views and those of critics, see Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, A Review ofSecurity Initiatives at DOE Nuclear Facilities, U.S. Congress, House
of Representatives, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 18 March 2005 (available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
108/Hearings/03182005hearingl457/hearing.htm as of 15 August 2005). For a brutal earlier official review
(including a long history of past negative assessments), see President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
Science at Its Best, Security at Its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the U.S. Department of Energy
(Washington D.C.: PFIAB, 1999; available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/pfiab/ as of 13 December 2006).
240 See A Review of Security Initiatives at DOE Nuclear Facilities. For a useful discussion of the opportunities
for and obstacles to consolidation, see Project on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex:
Homeland Security Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2005; available at http://pogo.org/p/homeland/
ho-050301-consolidation.html as of 30 December 2006).
241 The two sites are Nuclear Fuel Services, in Erwin, Tennessee and the Nuclear Productions Division of BWXT
Technologies, in Lynchburg, Virginia. See, for example, the brief mention of this point in Project on
Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities.
242 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, In the Matter of Duke Energy Corporation (Catawba Nuclear Station,
Units I and 2), CLI-04-29 (Washington, D.C.: NRC, 2004; available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/commission/orders/2004/2004-29cli.pdf as of 22 September 2006); U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, NRC Authorizes Use of Mixed Oxide Fuel Assemblies at Catawba Nuclear Power Plant
(Washington, D.C.: NRC, 2005; available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2005/05-
043.html as of 30 December 2006).
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U-235 as falling outside Category I, which is the only category that requires stringent security
measures. 243 (These issues are discussed at length in Chapter 4.)
The plutonium powers. Several European states, Japan, Russia, and (to a lesser
extent) India reprocess their civilian spent fuel to separate the plutonium for use as new fuel.
(China plans to do so as well, but has not yet begun civilian reprocessing on any substantial
scale.) Despite the remarkable progress of safeguards and security technologies in recent
decades, a world in which tens of tons of separated, weapons-usable plutonium are being
processed and shipped from place to place every year - when only a few kilograms are
needed for a bomb - inevitably involves greater risks of nuclear theft and terrorism than
would a world in which this was not occurring.244 The British Royal Society, in a 1998 report,
warned that even in an advanced industrial state like the United Kingdom, the possibility that
plutonium stocks might be "accessed for illicit weapons production is of extreme concern."24 s
In Britain, France, and non-nuclear-weapon states such as Japan and Germany, this
material is under international safeguards and is therefore accounted for to international
standards - but these safeguards are designed only to detect whether the host state might be
diverting civilian material for military purposes, not to prevent theft. Standards for security
vary widely from one country to the next and are generally lower for this civilian material
than they are for military materials. In Japan, for example, as noted earlier, armed guards
were not required for plutonium facilities before 9/11, and the armed units of the national
police deployed to protect these sites since then are reportedly not well integrated into the
sites' overall security plans. Japan has just approved a new nuclear security law, but guards at
nuclear sites are still only required to be armed with billy clubs, raising obvious questions as
to how the sites can meet new requirements to be able to hold off attackers until off-site
response forces arrive.246 As noted earlier, in France, reactors where plutonium fuel is present,
243 For the specifics of categorizing different types of material, current DOE orders still refer back to U.S.
Department of Energy, Guide to Implementation of DOE 5633.3b, "Control and Accountability of Nuclear
Materials" (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 1995).
244 While this plutonium is largely "reactor-grade," all separated plutonium (except plutonium with 80% or more
of the isotope Pu-238) is weapons-usable. Terrorists or unsophisticated states could make a crude bomb from
reactor-grade plutonium, using technology no more sophisticated than that of the Nagasaki bomb, which would
have an assured, reliable yield in the kiloton range (and therefore a radius of destruction roughly one-third that of
the Hiroshima bomb) and a probable yield significantly higher than that; sophisticated states could make
weapons with reactor-grade plutonium that would have similar yield, weight, and reliability to those made from
weapon-grade plutonium. For an authoritative unclassified discussion, see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of
Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, DOE/NN-0007 (Washington, D.C.: DOE,
1997; available at http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/425259-CXr7Qn/webviewable/425259.pdf as of 2
January 2007). For further discussion and references, see Chapter 4.
245 The Royal Society, Management of Separated Plutonium (London: Royal Society, 1998; available at
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=1 8551 as of 17 December 2006).
246 See, for example, Hiroshi Masumitsu, "Revised N-Law Inadequate to Cover All Terrorism Scenarios," Daily
Yomiuri, 18 June 2005. The armed guards currently present at nuclear sites in Japan have been deployed there at
the expense of the national police, and are not required by regulation; they may be removed at any time.
Interview with Japanese physical protection regulator, November 2006.
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like other reactors, have no on-site armed guards. U.S. experts visiting the Belgian plutonium
fuel fabrication facility in the mid-I 990s found it lightly guarded.24 7
247 Personal communication from Frank von Hippel, 1996.
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3. The Risk of Nuclear Terrorism:
A Mathematical Model
No one can reliably calculate the size of the risk of nuclear terrorism, or the
effectiveness of alternative policies to reduce that risk. The factors that affect the risk are
simply too uncertain (and probably changing).
The use of a mathematical model cannot eliminate these uncertainties, but it can make
assumptions about the key factors affecting the risk explicit and thus focus debate; provide a
tool for assessing the effectiveness of alternative policies; and focus efforts to collect
additional information to reduce the uncertainties in estimating the values of the model
parameters. In Chapter 2, a qualitative description of the factors affecting the risk of nuclear
terrorism supported an argument that the risk is substantial and justifies urgent action to
reduce it. In this chapter, I propose a simple mathematical model of the risk of nuclear
terrorism (with risk defined as the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack times its
consequences); offer a numerical example; and then discuss each parameter, assessing what
information may be available to help understand what its value may be, what policy options
are available for changing it, and what additional information might be collected that would
reduce the uncertainty in estimating the value of that parameter.
This model goes well beyond previous publicly available models of nuclear terrorism,
which have generally focused on the engineering aspects and almost left the terrorists
themselves out of the equation, assuming that the risk scaled linearly with either the quantity
of material or the number of facilities where such material could be stolen.' This chapter
provides the first published model of nuclear terrorism risk that responds realistically to
variations in each of the parameters. Among the key insights that will be developed from the
model and the discussions of its input parameters in this chapter are the following:
" Plausible estimates of the values of the input parameters can support published estimates
of a 30-50% ten-year probability of a terrorist nuclear detonation. (The numerical
example of the use of the model in this chapter leads to an estimate of 29% for this 10-
year probability.) Only extremely optimistic estimates of the parameter values would
support estimates of this 10-year probability in the range of 1%, which have been made by
some authors.
" The model suggests that the most effective interventions to reduce the risk of nuclear
terrorism are likely to occur early in the pathway to nuclear terrorism. Counter-terrorism
For a simple model where the risk a material poses simply goes up linearly with the quantity of material, see
Edwin Zebroski, "Analysis of Risks of Diversion of Plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium," reproduced in
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Conversion of Research and Test Reactors to Low-Enriched
Uranium (LEU) Fuel, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 25 September
1984, pp. 60-74. For a model in which the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism increases linearly with the number
of sites where weapons-usable nuclear materials exist, see Roger E. Avedon, "On the Future of Civilian
Plutonium: An Assessment of Technological Impediments to Nuclear Terrorism and Proliferation" (Ph.D.
dissertation, Engineering Economic Systems and Operations Research, Stanford, 1997).
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efforts that were only modestly effective, resulting in only small reductions in the number
of plausible nuclear terrorist groups and in the effectiveness of the remaining groups,
could result in substantial reductions in the risk of nuclear terrorism. Improvements in
nuclear security measures that cut the probability of both outsider and insider theft by a
substantial fraction could greatly reduce the overall risk.
Despite the possibility that some of the risk comes from nuclear material that has already
been stolen, nuclear security improvements for the not-yet-stolen material would result in
large reductions in overall risk unless the fraction of the risk of black-market acquisition
resulting from already-stolen material was unrealistically high and the fraction of the time
terrorists chose to attempt to get material by instigating new thefts was very low.
A key insight developed in this chapter (not from the model itself from the
consideration of the values of the input parameters to it) is that what is important about
nuclear security is neither the average security level nor the average adversary capability
employed in a nuclear theft attempt, but the tails of these distributions. By far the highest
risks of successful nuclear theft arise when an unexpectedly capable terrorist or criminal
group attempts to steal material from one of the most vulnerable facilities. Modest
investments in improving security at those few nuclear facilities and transport legs where
security is weakest and the threats are highest may be able to reduce the probability of
successful nuclear theft substantially.
Choosing a Modeling Approach
A wide range of models have been or could be applied to modeling terrorism risks.
The choice of approach is complicated by the fundamental difference between terrorism risks
and accident risks, which is that terrorist attacks are the result of conscious decisions by
intelligent and adaptive adversaries, rather than random events.
The approach that should be chosen in building a model of the terrorism problem
depends on what aspects of the problem the model is intended to illuminate. If the purpose is
to elucidate terrorist decision-making and target selection, then modeling approaches focused
on decision-making and behavior should be used. Some analysts, for example, have used
game-theoretic models portraying the problem as a strategic game in which terrorists are
seeking to maximize the consequences of their attacks, and governments are attempting to
minimize the consequences of those attacks.2
2 See, for example, Gordon Woo, "Quantitative Terrorism Risk Assessment," Journal of Risk Finance 4, no. I
(October 2002; available at http://www.rms.com/NewsPress/QuantitativeTerrorismRiskAssessment.pdf as of
22 May 2006). Woo and his company, Risk Management Solutions, have developed a proprietary model used in
the insurance industry to estimate different types of terrorism risks to insured assets (including, among others,
the risk of nuclear terrorism). The structure of the model is game-theoretic, but the estimates of the probability
of success for particular types of terrorist attack (such as terrorists' ability to get nuclear materials and make
them into a nuclear bomb) rely heavily on solicitation of expert opinion. Woo's articles do not discuss the
specifics of the model in any detail; somewhat more information on the model can be found in an assessment of
terrorism risks that makes use of the model, in Henry H. Willis et al., Estimating Terrorism Risk (Santa Monica,
Cal.: RAND, 2005; available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RANDMG388.pdf as of 6 May
2006). Important complications that could be added to such game-theoretic approaches include the possibility
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Such models, however, often implicitly or explicitly assume that terrorists and those
protecting against them are rational actors (within the framework of their own objectives),
which may or may not be the case. To address that weakness of the game-theoretic models,
others have argued that models based on data from the history of real terrorist networks -
perhaps integrated into a social network analysis - will be more useful than abstract utility-
maximizing models in understanding terrorist behavior and assessing the probabilities of
different types of attacks in the future. 3 In some cases, either of these types of models can be
dynamic, modeling the way that terrorists and the societal efforts to respond to them or
protect against them in different countries might respond to each other and to external events
over time.
If, on the other hand, the goal is to elucidate the probability that various types of
terrorist attack would succeed, and the likely consequences, then the most appropriate and
frequently used models are based on what is known as vulnerability assessment, a static
approach very similar to probabilistic risk assessment (PRA).4 Such approaches are typically
used to assess the vulnerability of particular facilities to attacks using a particular level of
terrorist capability (often specified in regulation as a "design basis threat" or DBT - that is,
the threat that should be the basis for designing the facility security system). Just as a PRA
asks: "What can go wrong? What is the likelihood of that happening? What are the
consequences if it does happen?" a vulnerability assessment asks: "What could an adversary
cause to go wrong? What is the likelihood the adversary would attempt to take that action,
and would succeed? What are the consequences if it does happen?" Just as PRAs are based
that terrorist attackers might have very different assessments of the value of different consequences than the
defenders (for example, placing a very high value on a successful attack on a highly symbolic target, even if this
did not cause very much damage if measured in lives and economic value lost); that terrorists might have very
different beliefs about the probability of success of different approaches than the defenders do; and that the
terrorists might be either risk-prone or risk-averse (for example, putting a higher premium on certainty of success
than a simple "maximizing expected consequences" approach might indicate). For discussion, see, for example,
Mark K. Snell, "Estimation of Probability of Adversary Mission Success," in Proceedings of the 47th Annual
Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, Tenn., 16-20 July 2006 (Northbrook, Ill.:
INMM, 2006).
3 See, for example, Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Netivorks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2004). Sageman elaborated on the opportunities offered by a network analysis approach, and provided
some examples of the use of this approach to analyze particular incidents, in his presentation "Threat
Convergence: The Future of Terrorism Research," at the conference on "Threat Convergence," Fund for Peace,
Washington, D.C., 7 April 2006. (The title "threat convergence" refers to the potential convergence of terrorism,
weak or failed states, and weapons of mass destruction.)
4 For general introductions to vulnerability assessment, see, for example, Mary Lynn Garcia, The Design and
Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems (Woburn, Mass.: Butterworth-Heineman, 2001); Byron Gardner,
"Process of System Design and Analysis," paper presented at Workshop on Physical Protection, Moscow, 1 1-14
September 1995 (available at http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/I 12931-7hNczP/webviewable/ 12931 .pdf
as of 9 January 2007). For a critique, focusing on the difficulty of adequately accounting for complex system
interactions and for unexpected adversary tactics, see Matthew Bunn, "Systems Approaches to Security for
Nuclear Materials and Facilities", Presentation, "Research Seminar in Engineering Systems," Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University, 4 December
2001). For a broader discussion of the application of modifications of quantitative risk assessment techniques to
terrorism risks, see B. John Garrick, "Perspectives on the Use of Risk Assessment to Address Terrorism," Risk
Analysis 22, no. 3 (June 2002).
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on laying out a range of possible scenarios linking an initiating event or series of events to
undesirable consequences, so a vulnerability assessment is based on laying out a range of
possible scenarios that connect initiating events terrorists might cause to undesirable end
states, with the complete sequence of events linking these, and estimates of the likelihood that
terrorists would succeed in carrying out the various steps on each potential pathway.
Typically, vulnerability assessments are used to identify the most vulnerable pathways for a
terrorist attack at a particular facility, assuming that an attack does occur - that is, the
pathways offering terrorists with a given level of capability the highest chance of success in
causing the undesired end-states - and then to design measures to reduce those most-urgent
vulnerabilities. Just as PRA has contributed to major improvements in safety in the nuclear
industry and in other complex systems, the vulnerability assessment approach has contributed
to large improvements in security at nuclear facilities and in recent years has been widely
applied to assessing and reducing vulnerability of a wide range of facilities.
The model presented in this chapter takes the static approach of vulnerability
assessment, extending it from looking at particular facilities to examining the entire pathway
from a terrorist decision to attempt to get and use a nuclear bomb to the detonation of such a
bomb. It takes this approach because its principal goal is to provide a structure for thinking
through the different pathways terrorists might take to the bomb, and the factors that
determine the probabilities that those pathways would succeed, if chosen. I have not
attempted to marry this static model to any dynamic model of how terrorists would make their
choices and how the choices at each step on the pathway might be affected by the results of
previous steps, for three reasons. First, so little is known about how terrorists might make
decisions about nuclear acquisition that explicit modeling of that decision-making process -
as opposed to simply rough estimates of the likelihood that terrorists would choose different
pathways, based on what little is known about their nuclear pursuits in the past - does not
appear likely to offer significant additional understanding of the problem. Second, what little
is known about the past record suggests that terrorists do not necessarily choose the paths that
a game-theoretic approach focused on maximizing the probability of success would predict:
Aum Shinrikyo's decision to try to get a nuclear bomb by the singularly unpromising pathway
of purchasing a sheep farm in Australia to mine its own uranium for later enrichment - when
it was operating in a country where hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
and plutonium were very lightly guarded at the time - is an obvious example. Third, terrorists
in general will face even greater uncertainties than modelers do about what the best
approaches to getting nuclear material and to building a nuclear bomb would be, and it is
effectively impossible to predict what facts they will find out, or what vulnerabilities they will
observe correctly (or incorrectly come to believe in).
Hence, the model developed here treats the probabilities that terrorists will make
various possible decisions as parameters whose values are exogenous to the model (though
the history of those groups known to have pursued nuclear weapons can offer some limited
s This summary of the approach is based on Garrick, "Perspectives on the Use of Risk Assessment to Address
Terrorism."
6 Garcia, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems.
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insight as to what the values of these parameters should be, as discussed in this chapter).
Previous attempts to present mathematical models of the dangers of nuclear terrorism have
generally been even more simplistic in their treatment of terrorist decisions, assuming either
that the probability of a nuclear theft attempt simply scales linearly with either the quantity of
material7 or the number of facilities from which material could be stolen.8
I have emphasized keeping the model simple, as a tool for understanding and
discussion. Because so little is known about the values of the different parameters that affect
the risk of nuclear terrorism, increasing the sophistication of the model would make it harder
to understand and use without increasing its fidelity in reproducing the characteristics of the
problem. Similarly, because the uncertainties are so large - and even the shape of the
distributions of the individual parameters is entirely unknown - I have not attempted to model
the uncertainties formally using Monte Carlo simulation or other approaches. Formal
modeling of the uncertainty would make the model more complex, yet would require a range
of assumptions about parameter distributions that would themselves exaggerate how much is
known. (Indeed, formal attempts to model uncertainty often greatly understate the real
uncertainty, as uncertainties in parameter values that are formally modeled are often a far less
important source of uncertainty than choices concerning the basic intellectual frame and
structure of the model. 9) Instead, in what follows I discuss the uncertainties qualitatively and
provide examples of how the results would change with particular changes in key parameters.
This model, in short, is one simple first cut, designed to illuminate particular issues about the
possible terrorist pathways to the bomb and what might be done to block them; it is by no
means a final answer to the problem of modeling nuclear terrorism.
The model presented here focuses on a small number of terrorist groups which have
made the decision to attempt to get and use nuclear explosives, and have the resources to give
them some non-zero probability of success. Each such group has to decide how much of its
efforts and resources to focus on nuclear acquisition attempts versus other activities. When it
decides to undertake a nuclear acquisition attempt, it has four pathways to choose from:
carrying out or instigating an insider theft at a nuclear facility or transport leg; carrying out or
instigating an outsider theft; attempting to buy a nuclear weapon or weapons-usable material
from a nuclear black market; or attempting to convince a state to provide a nuclear weapon or
weapons-usable material. Each of these pathways offers some probability of success; if it
succeeds in getting the material it needs for a bomb, the group then has some probability of
succeeding in making a nuclear bomb that would detonate when desired; and it then has some
probability of choosing to, and being able to, deliver the bomb to a target location and then
detonating it. Each of the groups and its acquisition attempts is assumed to be independent of
the others. Figure 3.1 shows the event tree the model is based on, with the early branches
based on terrorist decisions to pursue particular pathways, and the later branches based on
their success or failure at particular steps on those pathways. In essence, the model simply
takes the probability that terrorists will decide to, and manage to, pass each step on this
7 See the simple model presented by Edwin Zebrowski, in Conversion of Research and Test Reactors, pp. 60-74.
8 Avedon, "On the Future of Civilian Plutonium".
9 Igor Linkov and Dmitriy Burmistrov, "Model Uncertainty and Choices Made by Modelers: Lessons Learned
from the International Atomic Energy Agency Model Intercomparisons," Risk Analysis 23, no. 6 (2003).
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pathway and multiplies them to find an overall estimate of passing through the entire
pathway.
This model is intended only to analyze the risk of the actual terrorist use of nuclear
explosives: it would need to be modified (in some cases substantially) to be used to analyze
other nuclear-related types of terrorism, from radiological "dirty bombs" to sabotage of major
nuclear facilities to nuclear hoaxes.
Introducing the Model
The model is driven by the decisions, and the successes and failures, of individual
terrorist groups making attempts to get nuclear weapons or the materials to make them.
Hence, the first input parameter is the number of groups making such attempts. At any given
time, there will be N, terrorist groups in the world that have decided to attempt nuclear
violence and that are capable and sophisticated enough to have some non-zero probability of
success (the subscript n denoting nuclear terrorists). 0
Each year, each particular groupj of these Nn groups will have some probability Pa) of
launching a significant attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon or the nuclear materials essential
to making one (rather than spending its organizational effort on other activities). Pa6 is quite
likely to be different for different groups.
The expected number of acquisition attempts per year, A, is the sum of the
probabilities of deciding on such an attempt for all of the groups that might do so:"
N,
J=l
These acquisition attempts will have probability PoUw of being based on carrying out or
instigating an outsider theft attempt at a facility or transportation leg; probability PiQ) of being
based on instigating a theft attempt by insiders with authorized access to the facility or
transportation leg; probability PbOw of being based on attempting to purchase such items from
others who have stolen them on some kind of nuclear black market; and probability Pn ) of
being based on deliberate provision of such items by a nation-state in possession of them.
10 In cases like the loose network of groups that post-9/1 1 al Qaeda has become, one could model these groups as
one group called al Qaeda, or, equivalently, as a large number of separate groups, each with a correspondingly
lower yearly probability of launching a significant attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon or the materials to make
one. In what follows, al Qaeda is treated as a single group.
" This assumes a maximum of one serious acquisition attempt per year per group, adequate for the purposes of
this simple model. (If there are several groups, however, there may be several acquisition attempts in one year.)
One easy way of relaxing this assumption would be to use a smaller unit of time, such as a month or a week, and
adjust estimates of Pa(,) accordingly.
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Acquisition attempts are divided into these categories in the model because the policy
prescriptions for reducing the probability of success for each of type of acquisition attempt are
different.1 2 In this model, these are the only possible paths for an acquisition attempt.
Each acquisition attempt k will have some probability of being successful - Pos;,,k),
Pis6,k), Pbsik), Pns;,k). These probabilities, too, are likely to vary from one group to the next
and from one acquisition attempt by that group to the next.
In the event that an acquisition attempt is successful, there will be some probability
Pw,;k) that the group that acquired the items will successfully be able to transform them into a
workable nuclear explosive capability that would in fact detonate (including transporting them
to the location where the group would work on this transformation, if necessary). Once the
group has a usable nuclear capability, there will be some probability Pdj,k) that they will
decide to, and be able to, deliver the bomb to its intended target and detonate it.
The probability Ps(k) that any given acquisition attempt k will be successful, and will
ultimately lead to a terrorist nuclear attack, is given by taking each of the pathways on the
event tree and multiplying out the probability of success on that path (including the
probability that the terrorists will choose that pathway, the probability that the chosen
acquisition attempt will succeed, the probability that the recipients will then be able to make a
workable bomb, and the probability that they will be able to, and decide to, detonate that
bomb), and then adding up the results for the different pathways:
vk)":::: Poj ±P(~k Pi~)jJ + Pb(1P,. P ± Pn,,k
Hence, the overall probability P, of a terrorist nuclear catastrophe somewhere in the
world in any given year can be found by multiplication of the probabilities from each of the
acquisition attempts: 13
12 In many cases, outsiders and insiders might work together - for example, an insider might tell outsiders about
the details of the site's security arrangements and possibly disable some security measures to facilitate an
outsider attack. In this simple model, such combined insider and outsider attacks are treated as one subset of
insider theft, because two of the most important differences between outsider and insider thefts - the need to
convince at least one authorized insider to participate and the possible knowledge of the confidential details of
the security system that an insider could bring - apply in such combined cases as they do in cases involving only
insiders.
13 In cases where there are not an integer number of expected acquisition attempts per year, this simplified
notation for multiplying from I to A is not appropriate; one obvious solution is to integrate the risk over a period
of time for which the expected number of acquisition attempts is an integer.
Note here that I am using a linear model of the accumulating number of acquisition attempts, but an
exponential model for the risk of an actual terrorist nuclear detonation. An exponential model is appropriate
when one occurrence of an event would transform the situation, so that the relevant question is "what is the
probability of greater than zero occurrences?" This is certainly the case for a terrorist nuclear attack, as
responses to such an event would transform the probabilities of further such attacks. But in assessing the risk
posed by events that happen regularly without changing the overall situation, a linear model is most appropriate.
For example, if a tall building with a lightning rod has a 50% chance of being struck by lightning each year, and
those lightning strikes have no major effect on the building, one would expect that over 10 years there would be
an average of 5 lightning strikes. If, on the other hand, a lightning strike would destroy the building, the relevant
question is "what is the chance of avoiding having even one lightning strike?" For that question, an exponential
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A
P, =1-H(1-P(k)
k=1
=I- (1-(P"(P,(P, + i.~i.(ik+Pbajty, ~k+P,,(,, ) Pl(ikd.j))
This probability can be converted into the risk of nuclear terrorism, Re, by multiplying
it by the consequences of the event, C:
R, = P,C,
Now the problem boils down to considering the factors that affect the various terms in
the equations for Pc and Re. The many different policy prescriptions that have been offered
for dealing with the danger of nuclear terrorism amount, in effect, to different perceptions
concerning which of the factors in these equations offer the most promise for risk reduction
resulting from government policies.
A Numerical Example
Suppose, as one plausible estimate, that the factors in the equations for Pe and Re have
the following numerical values. For simplicity, assume for the sake of this example that the
various probabilities are the same for all groups in the set No and for all acquisition attempts
of a given type by those groups:
Number of plausible nuclear terrorist groups, N,=2
Yearly probability of an acquisition attempt by a particular group, Pa6=0.3
Probability of choosing an acquisition attempt based on outsider theft, Po6)=0.2
Probability of choosing an acquisition attempt based on insider theft, Pi )=0.3
Probability of choosing to attempt to purchase black market material, Pb6;=0. 3
Probability of choosing to attempt to convince a state to provide material, Pso)=0.2
Probability that an outsider theft attempt will succeed, Pos;,k=0.2
Probability that an insider theft attempt will succeed, Pis6,k)=0.3
Probability that a black-market acquisition attempt will succeed, Pbs;k=0.2
Probability that an acquisition attempt from a state will succeed, Ps6,k=0.05
Probability of being able to convert acquired items to nuclear capability, Pw)=0. 4
Probability of delivering and detonating bomb once acquired, Pdjk)=0. 7
Consequence of terrorist nuclear attack, Ce=$4 trillion
model is appropriate, and the answer in this hypothetical case is that the building has only one chance in a
thousand of surviving for ten years. The linear model for acquisition attempts used here is probably not strictly
accurate, as acquisition attempts that were successful and were detected - especially an overt, violent assault on
a nuclear facility or transport to steal nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material - would themselves
provoke reactions that would change the picture significantly. This is discussed in the section "Dynamics of the
System," below. I am grateful to Richard de Neufville for encouraging me to be more explicit about the
circumstances under which linear and exponential risk models were appropriate.
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In this example, the number of plausible nuclear terrorist groups in the world is small
but not zero. Each of them has about a one-third chance per year of undertaking a significant
nuclear acquisition effort. The chances that the group will decide to base such an effort on
organizing an outsider attack on a facility or transportation leg, or on getting a nuclear
weapon or materials provided by a state, are each 20%, while the chance that the group will
decide instead on attempting to instigate an insider theft or to get material from a nuclear
black market are each about 30%. The chance of success is about 20% for an outsider attack
or a black-market purchase attempt (meaning that four out of five of such attempts will fail),
30% for an insider theft, and only 5% for an attempt to convince a state to provide a nuclear
weapon or the materials to make one. 4 Once the relevant materials have been acquired, the
group would have a 40% chance - substantial, though still noticeably smaller than the
probability of failure - of succeeding in turning them into a usable nuclear capability that
would detonate when commanded to do so without being interrupted (based on the notion that
a group determined and sophisticated enough to succeed in getting a nuclear weapon or
material would likely be sophisticated enough to acquire the capabilities to turn such material
into a bomb and the activities involved in doing so could be difficult to detect and stop).
Once the group had a usable bomb, it would have, in this example, a very high probability
(70%) of deciding to use it and being able to deliver it to a chosen target.
The consequences figure is intended to include both the immediate destruction caused
by a terrorist nuclear blast (estimated in one study to be in the range of $1 trillion for a 10-
kiloton blast at Grand Central Station on a typical workday),'" and at least a portion of the
knock-on economic and political effects in the target country and worldwide (which UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan has estimated would be sufficiently severe to push "tens of
millions of people into dire poverty," creating "a second death toll throughout the developing
world.")16
14 The terrorists might choose to try to get a nuclear weapon or the material needed to make one from a state 20%
of the time, even if this tactic was much less likely to be successful than other tactics, either because the level of
effort required for such an acquisition attempt was less (only inexpensive negotiations rather than expensive
logistical and recruitment efforts) or because the terrorists misjudged how promising this acquisition strategy
was. In general, ifone assumes that (a) terrorists are good at judging the relative promise of different acquisition
strategies and (b) all acquisition strategies have similar risks and costs for the terrorists, then one would expect
that the low-probability-of-success strategies would also have low probabilities that the terrorists would choose
them. In general, it would be rational for the terrorists to allocate their effort to different acquisition strategies up
to the point where the ratio of the marginal increase in the chance of success with additional effort over the
marginal cost and risk of additional effort was equal for each of the strategies.
15 Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report
Card and Action Plan (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard
University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003; available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/cnwm/cnwm.pdf as of
2 January 2007), pp. 15-19.
16 Kofi Annan, "A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism: Keynote Address to the Closing Plenary," in The
International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security (Madrid: Club de Madrid, 2005; available at
http://english.safe-democracy.org/keynotes/a-global-strategy-for-fighting-terrorism.html as of 10 March 2005).
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With these values, one would expect a significant acquisition attempt roughly once
every other year:
2
A = L0.3= 0.6
J=1
The probability that such an acquisition attempt would be successful and would lead to
the detonation of a terrorist nuclear bomb somewhere in the world would be in the range of
5%:
, k =(0.2 x 0.2 + 0.3 x 0.3 + 0.3x 0.2 + 0.2x 0.05)(0.4 x 0.7) = 0.056
Over 10 years, there would be 6 expected acquisition attempts, and the probability of
nuclear terrorism over a ten-year period, P,(eo), would be just under 30 percent:
6
P I =1fl(1 -. 056)=1I - (1 -. 056 )6 = 0.29
k=1
The yearly probability of nuclear terrorism would be just over 3 percent. Multiplying
the 10-year probability of nuclear terrorism by the $4 trillion consequences estimate, the
overall risk, or expected cost, of nuclear terrorism per decade would be $1.17 trillion (without
discounting),17 or well over $100 billion per year.
The expected losses, E(L), resulting from a successful theft of a nuclear weapon or
enough nuclear material for a bomb (which can also be thought of as the expected value of
preventing such an event) would be over a trillion dollars, in this example, given the
significant chance that such a theft would lead to actual nuclear terrorism:
E(L)= w(J4k)P d(J,k) Ce = 0.4 x 0.7 x $4 x10 1 2 = $1.12x10"
Thus, assumptions similar to these would support estimates of a 30-50% probability of
nuclear terrorism over the next decade that have been made by some analysts. (By chance,
the 29% over 10 years estimate in this numerical example is identical to the average estimate
of the probability of a nuclear attack anywhere in the world over the next ten years in a poll of
selected international security experts by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005.)'9 They would also
support arguments that if policy options are available that could significantly reduce this risk,
17 The effect of discounting over a ten-year period would be less than the uncertainty in the consequences
estimate, and discounting would require determining the appropriate approach for discounting catastrophic loss
of life in future years, which is a matter of considerable debate.
18 Because of the use of an exponential model, one cannot simply divide the 10-year expected cost by ten. The
yearly expected probability of nuclear terrorism in this example is 0.34%, for an expected yearly cost in the
range of $130-$140 billion.
19 See Richard G. Lugar, The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses (Washington, D.C.: Office
of Senator Lugar, 2005; available at http://lugar.senate.gov/reports/NPSurvey.pdf as of 2 January 2007). While
this was the estimated probability for any type of nuclear attack, whether by a terrorist or by a state, 79% of
respondents judged that a terrorist use of nuclear weapons was more likely than state use over the coming
decade.
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it would be worth spending large amounts of money and political capital to implement those
policies.2 a
Those who disagree with one or more of the parameter estimates used in this example
(which are discussed in more detail below) can plug alternative figures into the model to
examine what their impact would be; the value of the model is not dependent on accepting the
particular estimates used in this example. If, for example, the probability of success in
turning the stolen items into a usable nuclear capability and the probability of success for each
of the types of acquisition attempt were both half the figures used here - perhaps because
successful policies had managed to reduce them - then the yearly probability of nuclear
terrorism would be 0.8% and the 10-year probability would be 8%. A probability of 1% over
10 years, suggested by some analysts, would require reducing these factors even further, or
reducing the yearly probability of an acquisition attempt (because the groups judged the
prospects of success to be so poor that they focused their efforts in more promising areas).
Even with only a I % probability over ten years, the expected cost per decade would be $40
billion (without discounting), or $4 billion per year.
Assessing Each of the Factors - and Policies to Influence Them
The Number of Plausible Nuclear Terrorist Groups, Nn
The number of terrorist groups interested in getting and using nuclear weapons and
with enough capability to have some chance of success in doing so is likely to be small. A
reasonably strong case can be made that this number was zero for essentially all of the period
from the invention of nuclear weapons to the late 1980s (when both Aum Shinrikyo and al
Qaeda began to take shape). Today, as discussed in Chapter 2, it appears that N, is in the
range of one to two; that is, this category may include al Qaeda (with some of its
derivatives),21 and possibly also some subsets of Chechen terrorists). While the U.S. Director
of National Intelligence has recently estimated that "nearly 40 terrorist groups, insurgencies,
or cults have used, possessed, or expressed an interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or
20 For a discussion using similar economic-based reasoning to come to the same conclusion, see Matthew C.
Weinzierl, "The Cost of Living: The Economics of Preventing Nuclear Terrorism," The National Interest, no. 75
(Spring 2004; available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m2751/is_75/ain6076390/pg_1 as of 22
May 2006), pp. 118-122.
2 Although the central al Qaeda organization has been heavily damaged since 9/l1, in its ambitions and
remaining capabilities, it is a more plausible candidate for nuclear terrorism than the many small jihadi groups it
has inspired. Nevertheless, given the relatively modest total resources that might be required to make a crude
bomb if a terrorist group got the necessary nuclear material, no one can rule out entirely the possibility that some
currently unknown jihadi group might be able to commit an act of nuclear terrorism. In this simple model, al
Qaeda could be treated as one entity, or, perhaps more realistically, the central organization and some of the
more capable jihadi groups might be treated separately; this would increase N,, but since the chance of success
of the more minor groups would be very small, it would not drastically increase the overall estimated risk.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 3122
nuclear agents or weapons," the reality is that only a small fraction of these would have any
hope of getting and using a nuclear explosive capability.2 2
N, is presumably affected by (a) the state of the wide range of grievances and other
factors that motivate large-scale terrorism; (b) the personal and organizational characteristics
and evolution of particular terrorist leaders and groups; (c) the effectiveness of
counterterrorist efforts, particularly those targeted on identifying and disrupting those groups
with ambitions and capabilities that make nuclear terrorism a plausible possibility; and (d)
perceptions, among terrorist groups interested in causing (or threatening to cause) large-scale
destruction, of the utility for their purposes of nuclear explosives compared to other weapons,
and of the difficulty of getting and using a nuclear explosive compared to the difficulties of
getting and using other types of weapons. The more that terrorists conclude that they are
more likely to succeed in accomplishing their objectives by means other than the use of
nuclear explosives, the fewer groups are likely to be seriously pursuing nuclear terrorism.
Most policy recommendations to reduce N, focus on either addressing the root causes
of large-scale terrorism or improving the targeting and effectiveness of counterterrorist
efforts. Others focus on deterring terrorists from seeking nuclear weapons, both by
emphasizing the likelihood of the utter destruction of any group that carried out such an attack
and all of its sponsors and by emphasizing how difficult acquiring nuclear weapons would
be.2
To use the model above to assess the effectiveness of these various types of efforts to
reduce N,, one could introduce the factors Fg (the fraction of terrorist groups that would
otherwise have been in N, who do not enter that group because of successes in addressing
relevant grievances and other root causes of terrorism); F,, the fraction of terrorist groups that
would otherwise have been in N,, but have been destroyed (or had their effectiveness
sufficiently reduced that they are no longer members of N,,) by law enforcement or other
counterterrorist efforts; and Fd (the fraction of terrorist groups that are deterred from pursuing
nuclear weapons because they do not believe their utility for their purposes and chances of
success in acquiring them are high enough to justify the effort involved).
This approach, however, might understate the potential effectiveness of these policy
approaches by focusing only on their chance of removing groups from the N, set entirely,
without adding their possible effect on reducing the effectiveness of the groups that remain.
Successfully addressing many of the root causes of terrorism, for example, might still leave
men like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri seeking a nuclear capability, but with
22 John D. Negroponte, "Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence" (Washington, D.C.: 2 February 2006; available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
2006_hr/020206negroponte.pdf as of 26 December 2006).
23 Indeed, analysts of nuclear terrorism in the public debate have to constantly balance providing enough public
information about the real danger of nuclear terrorism to motivate democracies to act to reduce the danger
against providing information that might convince more terrorists that acquiring nuclear weapons was a plausible
option to pursue (thereby potentially increasing N), or giving them useful information about how to do so;
publications such as this one are written with the intention of contributing to reducing the overall risk by helping
to motivate effective government action, but have to be cognizant of the danger that going too far could instead
increase the risk.
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much less chance of success because of greater difficulty in recruiting the relevant people,
raising the necessary funds, and the like; counterterrorist efforts, similarly, might substantially
reduce the probability that such groups would be able to mount a successful effort to gain and
use a nuclear explosive capability without being interrupted in the process. This potential
effect could be taken into account by introducing factors Pg and P, (for the effect on the
terrorists' probability of success from addressing root causes and from improved
counterterrorist efforts, respectively), which Ps(k) would be multiplied by to find a new
terrorist probability of success.
If, for example, one uses the values in the numerical example above and considers a
proposed increase in counterterrorist efforts that might result in Ft=0.2 (that is, 20% of the
groups previously in N, would be removed from the category) and Pt=0.6 (that is, the
remaining groups' probability of success would be reduced by 40%), then:
N, = 2x 0.8=1.6
Pk = 0.056 x 0.6 =.034
These groups would then be expected to carry out an average of 0.48 acquisition
attempts per year, or 4.8 attempts over 10 years:24
P,0 =1I-(1 -. 034)4. =.15
In other words, although the hypothetical increased counterterrorist effort in this
example was only modestly successful, the effort would cut the ten-year probability of
nuclear terrorism in half, from 29 to 15 percent.
To reduce the uncertainty in estimating the parameter N,, it would be important to
collect information, to the extent possible, on:
" Particular terrorist groups' focus, or lack of focus, on inflicting mass destruction (and
ideologies that might lead to such a focus, such as Aum Shinrikyo's ideas related to its
role in a coming Armageddon-like crisis);
* These groups' specific statements and actions related to nuclear matters (and in particular
their perception of the utility of acquisition and use of nuclear weapons, and attempts to
acquire nuclear capabilities, if any can be identified); and
* These groups' resources and organizational and technical capabilities, as they relate to a
potential effort to get and use a nuclear bomb.
The Yearly Probability of an Acquisition Attempt, P8 ;
The probability that a group seeking nuclear weapons will launch a significant
acquisition effort in any given year is difficult to assess. While a case could be made that
such efforts may be more continuous, using various potential strategies, than discrete
decisions to make an attempt using a specific strategy, any serious effort to organize an
24 In reality, of course, an acquisition attempt either occurs or it does not; while there will always be an integer
number of real acquisition attempts over any given period, there can be a non-integer expected number of
acquisition attempts, and the mathematics works as well with non-integer numbers.
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outsider attack on a facility, or to instigate an insider theft at a facility, would require a series
of definite decisions involving choosing a target, organizing or recruiting personnel for the
attempt, planning the attempt, and so on. Hence modeling these strategies as the products of a
definite decision to make a significant acquisition attempt in a particular year makes sense.
Even in the case of purchasing "loose" material from a black market, where one could
argue that for a group interested in such material the search is always underway, a case can be
made that the decision to pursue a significant acquisition attempt arises when either (a) the
group decides to send an agent out in search of such material, or (b) the group decides to take
seriously a purchase proposed by a black market participant. In the case of acquisition from a
state, the decision may be initiated by the state rather than by the group, but the probabilities
will work in much the same way - and in any case, if a state proposes a transfer, the group
still has to make a decision as to whether to pursue discussions of the idea seriously.
The history of known acquisition attempts is discussed in more detail below, with
respect to each of the types of acquisition attempt; but it is clear that the known number of
cases is small, in the range of 3-6 over the last fifteen years. If the known cases represented
the total number of actual cases and one concluded that for most of that period Nn=2, then a
reasonable estimate of Pac6 for the nuclear terrorist groups observed in recent times would be
10-20% per year. If, on the other hand, a substantial number of acquisition attempts took
place that were never detected, then the figure might be higher, in the range of 30-40% per
year, as in the numerical example above.
Pac6 is presumably influenced substantially by the group's assessment of the
probability of success - that is, many groups are likely to behave somewhat opportunistically,
launching an acquisition attempt when they think they see a good chance of getting a nuclear
weapon or nuclear material. In general, the terrorists' decisions about whether to attempt to
get a nuclear weapon (or the material to make one) or to put their efforts into non-nuclear
types of attacks will be made in an ongoing strategic game with governments deciding how to
invest (or require the private sector to invest) in preventing and protecting against the most
devastating types of attacks. If government actions to prevent nuclear terrorism are seen by
terrorists in the N, group as sufficient to make the probability of successful terrorist
acquisition of a usable nuclear explosive capability ver low, the terrorists would presumably
turn their attention to other potential avenues of attack. Hence, policy measures to reduce
25 For a discussion of the application of game theory to modeling this terrorist decision-making, see, for
example, Woo, "Quantitative Terrorism Risk Assessment." For a useful mathematical model and discussion of
terrorist choices in allocating their resources, as they relate to choices by the potential targets to invest in varying
levels of protection, see Darius Lakdawalla and George Zanjanji, Insurance, Self-Protection, and Economics of
Terrorism (RAND Center for Terrorism and Risk Management Policy, 2004; available at http://www.rand.org/
pubs/working_papers/2005/RAND_WRI71.pdf as of 11 February 2006).
26 As one might expect, game theory analyses of this interaction suggest that it is rational to invest most in
protecting those facilities where a successful terrorist strike would have the highest consequences (a category
that certainly includes facilities where nuclear weapons or their essential ingredients could be stolen). If such
facilities are provided with high levels of protection - which is not yet universally the case, as discussed in the
previous chapter - terrorists may maximize their utility by attacking less defended, but lower-consequence,
targets. In the simple model used here, no assumption is made that governments have yet been rational enough
to put in high levels of security at every high-consequence location. Nor is any assumption made that terrorists
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the chance of a successful acquisition - and to reduce terrorists' perception of that chance -
would presumably reduce Pa6 for most groups.
To reduce the uncertainty in estimating the parameter Pa6y, it would be important to
collect information, to the extent possible, on all past nuclear acquisition attempts by terrorist
groups, as well as on the extent to which any of the past cases of nuclear theft and smuggling
appear to have involved a specific buyer attempting to get the stolen items.
The Probabilities of Outsider Theft Attempts, Pog) and Posuk)
Terrorists will presumably choose the means to get nuclear material they think is most
likely to work. Hence the probability that a particular group will choose to undertake an
acquisition attempt based on an outsider theft, PoU will presumably be closely related to their
perception of Posk), the probability that an outsider theft attempt would succeed.
Pog6 appears to be small: there are no confirmed incidents in the historical record of
outsider attacks on nuclear facilities or transports that were instigated by terrorists and were
clearly intended for the purpose of stealing nuclear weapons or materials. This is something
of a puzzle, since, as described in Chapter 2, some nuclear facilities around the world -
particularly research reactors fueled with highly enriched uranium (HEU), a potential nuclear
bomb material - have no more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence for their
security, arrangements that could readily be defeated by attack capabilities terrorists have
demonstrated in other contexts, suggesting that for some facilities, Posk) may be quite high.
Several plausible explanations of this puzzle suggest themselves. Terrorists may have limited
information about nuclear matters, including which sites have weapons-usable nuclear
material and what their security arrangements are; they may believe (perhaps correctly) that
nuclear theft by open frontal assault would lead to such an intense government response
attempting to find and recover the stolen items that their chances of successfully turning them
into a usable nuclear explosive capability would be substantially reduced; 27 or they may have
felt that they were not yet sufficiently prepared to make a bomb to pursue a theft option that
would openly announce their intentions.
Over the years, however, there have been a number of incidents, from terrorists
attacking a U.S. nuclear weapons base in Germany in 1977 to terrorist teams carrying out
reconnaissance at Russian nuclear warhead storage facilities in 2001, which collectively
suggest that Po6 is not zero. There have also been documented cases of outsider thefts of
are always rational in their choices of where to allocate their effort; as noted earlier, available evidence
concerning the nuclear programs of Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda suggests that this is not the case.
27 For one discussion of some of the difficulties thieves might face after such an overt assault, see William
Langewiesche, "How to Get a Nuclear Bomb," Atlantic Monthly 298, no. 5 (December 2006), pp. 80-98.
Unfortunately, that account grossly overstates the difficulties the assailants would face in melting away after
such an assault, and essentially rules out such assaults as realistic possibilities. In a large number of cases in
Russia, by contrast, Chechens have assaulted targets in force and then escaped without being caught.
28 A detailed publicly available account of the 1977 incident, making the case that it was an attempt to steal
nuclear weapons, can be found in Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn, One-Point Safe (New York: Anchor
Books/Doubleday, 1997). The base commander at the time, however, believes that it was merely an attack on
the base, not an attempt to steal nuclear weapons; if that had been the purpose, in his view, the terrorists would
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nuclear material not instigated by terrorists - though in the known cases these outsiders had
help from insiders, a situation that would be classified as an insider theft in the simple model
used here.29
Of course, overt frontal assaults are not the only options available for outsider theft
attempts: covert outsider thefts, such as efforts to tunnel into a vault from outside (a tactic
used successfully in a number of recent bank robberies around the world), 0 or thefts based on
deception (such as using forged identifications, uniforms, and authorization papers to
convince staff that the thieves are authorized to remove nuclear material for transport to
another site)1 are also possibilities which must be guarded against.
The Design Basis Threat and Conditional Risk
Currently, the most commonly used approach to assessing the probability of
successful outsider or insider theft from a particular nuclear facility or transport leg is the use
of vulnerability assessments based on a specific set of potential adversary capabilities against
which the facility is required to be able to defend, the (DBT). A vulnerability assessment is
intended to assess the probability that the security system could defeat an adversary with the
have brought a larger and more capable force for the job. (Interview with Maj. Gen. William Burns (U.S. Army,
Ret.), August 2002.) For the 2001 incidents, see "Russia: Terror Groups Scoped Nuke Site," Associated Press,
25 October 2001; Pavel Koryashkin, "Russian Nuclear Ammunition Depots Well Protected - Official," ITAR-
TASS, 25 October 2001. There have been a substantial number of other terrorist incidents involving nuclear
facilities over the years - including one in which a group of armed terrorists overwhelmed the guards and took
complete control of a nuclear facility under construction - but these other incidents do not appear to have been
carried out with nuclear theft in mind. For a listing of such incidents through the mid-I 980s, see Konrad Kellen,
"Appendix: Nuclear-Related Terrorist Activities by Political Terrorists," in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The
Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Paul Leventhal and
Yonah Alexander (Cambridge, Mass.: Lexington Books for the Nuclear Control Institute, 1987).
29 For a detailed account of one remarkable case of this kind, in which the Russian military prosecutor concluded
that "potatoes were guarded better" than the stolen nuclear material, see Oleg Bukharin and William Potter,
"Potatoes Were Guarded Better," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 51, no. 3 (May-June 1995), pp. 46-50.
3 For a description of one recent case involving a tunnel into a bank vault, resulting in the theft of tens of
millions of dollars, see Stan Lehman, "In Brazil: Thieves Tunnel into Bank Vault for $67.8 Million," Associated
Press, 10 August 2005. For another recent case involving outsiders with insider information stealing tens of
millions of dollars in gems and succeeding in keeping the theft covert until after it was complete despite some of
the most stringent security measures in the world, see Rachel Bell, "Sensational Heists," in Crime Library (Court
TV, 2005; available at http://www.crimelibrary.com/gangstersoutlaws/outlaws/major heists/
index.html#continue as of 22 December 2005); "The Great Diamond Heist," "PrimeTime Live," ABC News, 12
February 2005. In general, terrorists would presumably prefer to stage a covert theft, rather than an overt
attempt to shoot their way into a facility or hijack a nuclear transport - because in the case of an overt attack they
would have to cope with possible response forces, pursuit, and what would presumably be a massive government
effort to find and retrieve the stolen nuclear weapon or weapons-usable nuclear material. Appropriate
investments in security and monitoring can make it quite difficult to keep a theft covert, though, as the examples
just mentioned demonstrate, sufficiently clever and capable thieves may still be able to carry off a covert theft.
" This type of deception is a common terrorist and criminal tactic. In one recent case, for example, Chechen
terrorists truck-bombed the government headquarters in Chechnya - using military uniforms and forged passes
to pass through multiple checkpoints before reaching their target. For a brief description, see Guy Chazan,
"Chechens Turn on Each Other - after Years of Attacking Russians, Local 'Collaborators' Are New Foe," Wall
Street Journal, 30 December 2002.
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maximum capabilities included in the DBT and to identify the most vulnerable pathways the
adversary might use, where additional investments in security could most reduce the
probability of successful theft. 2 In the DOE regulatory system, for example, facilities are
required to estimate the probability that their security system would be effective in defeating
the specified threat and to take steps to ensure that this probability of successful protection
remains above a specified level (related to the types of nuclear weapons or materials available
at the site).
In this system, the risk of nuclear theft from any particular facility is given by:
R = P, (I- PE,)C
where R is the risk, Pat is the probability of a theft attempt at that site, (1 -PE) is the probability
that such an attempt would be successful (expressed as one minus the probability that the
security system would be effective in defeating the threat), and C is the consequence of theft
of the particular types of weapons or materials present at that facility.
Given the difficulty of estimating Pa,, DOE has based its regulations on limiting
"conditional risk" - the risk conditioned on assuming that an attack involving adversaries with
the capabilities specified in the DBT occurs, that is, that Pa,=. Until recently, in the DOE
system, facilities were required to calculate the conditional risk at their facility, using the
following risk equation:
Rmd = C(I - P)
where Rcond is the conditional risk posed by possible nuclear theft at a particular facility, C is
the consequence of theft of the particular types of weapons or materials present at that facility,
and PE is the probability of effectiveness of facility's security system in defeating the
specified threat. 33 (C has typically been rated on a scale of 0-1, imposed by DOE regulators,
to avoid the difficulties of estimating parameters such as the adversaries' chances of gaining a
usable and deliverable nuclear capability from the stolen items and the consequences if they
do.34) More recently, because of the uncertainties and controversies in explicitly setting
consequence rankings for different types of nuclear materials, DOE has reportedly been
moving toward a system based solely on keeping the estimated probabilities of failure to
defeat the DBT below specified levels (with the different consequences of theft of different
types of material reflected in the probabilities of successful protection the regulations require,
32 For discussions, see, for example, Garcia, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems;
Gardner, "Process of System Design and Analysis." For a summary and critique of such approaches, see Bunn,
"Systems Approaches to Security".
1 See, for example, Gardner, "Process of System Design and Analysis.". See also William C. Brundson,
"Nuclear Terrorism Risk Reduction: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Department of Energy's United
States/Russian Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 2005); Ronald E. Timm, Security Assessment
Reportfor Plutonium Transport in France (Paris: Greenpeace International, 2005; available at
http://greenpeace.datapps.com/stop-plutonium/en/TimmReportV5.pdf as of 6 December 2005).
3 The DOE system is the only one the author is aware of that involves an explicit attempt to make estimates of
risk for each facility and to base regulation on those risks.
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in the DBT to be defended against, and to some extent in the defense strategy the regulations
require). 35
While the DBT approach focuses on a particular level of adversary capability, the
reality is that adversary capabilities may cover a broad distribution, which nuclear security
planners can only roughly estimate. The DBT concept is a simplification of this complex
reality: since no one knows what the likely distribution of terrorist capabilities is, regulators
simply pick one particular point on the spectrum (based on threat intelligence and a range of
other factors) and require facilities to be able to defend against a threat with that level of
capability. For a particular identified DBT, using vulnerability assessment techniques, it is
possible to estimate the change in the probability of successful theft resulting from a
particular proposed security upgrade - but that may be a different thing from the change in
probability iven the actual (but unknown and possibly reactive) distribution of terrorist
capabilities.
The Distributions of Security Levels and Terrorist Capabilities
To assess the probability of successful outsider or insider theft, it is essential to
consider the distribution of weaker and stronger security systems for nuclear stockpiles
around the world, and the distribution of potential adversary capabilities these systems must
protect against. The risk of successful outsider or insider nuclear theft will in general be
dominated by those facilities or transport legs where nuclear weapons or weapons-usable
nuclear material exist that the weakest security and face the highest threats - because
terrorists and thieves are more likely to choose those points of attack and more likely to
succeed if they do.
Since specific nuclear security measures are kept confidential terrorists are likely to
have only limited information about them; although they may have better information for
judging their own capabilities, they are likely to have limited experience operations
comparable to stealing nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, so there are likely to be
substantial uncertainties in their judgments of what security measures they could realistically
defeat, as well. Of course, the information on terrorist capabilities available to nuclear
security planners is far more limited - no one really knows how clever a plan, with how many
attackers, what weapons, or what capabilities, terrorists might be able to bring to bear to
accomplish a nuclear theft.
Nuclear security levels in any particular country are likely to cluster around the
measures that country's rules require - but as there are no binding global rules for nuclear
security, security levels vary widely from one country to the next, making the global
distribution of nuclear security a lumpy sum of national distributions.37 Figure 3.2 shows a
3s Interview with Sandia National Laboratories expert, July 2005.
36 For a good example of an approach assessing the degree of risk reduction achieved by security upgrades on the
basis of changes in the probability that a fixed DBT could carry out a successful theft, see Brundson, "Nuclear
Terrorism Risk Reduction".
37 There are many reasons for these wide variations, based on differences in national culture, varying degrees of
concern over the danger of nuclear theft, and the like. In particular, countries that do not believe nuclear
terrorism poses a substantial threat to their security will have an incentive to invest less in nuclear security;
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Figure 3.2: Lumpy Global Distribution of Nuclear Facility Security Levels
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notional version of this lumpy global distribution of security levels for nuclear facilities and
transport legs throughout the world, with the countries labeled "A" and "B" having the
weakest security measures in place.
Here, I use "security level" to mean the level of adversary capability that these
security systems would have a good chance of defeating. Plotting this on one dimension is
itself an abstraction, since different facilities may have security systems that are more or less
able to defeat different types of adversary capability. One facility, for example, may have
skeptical, well-trained personnel better able to defeat a theft attempt based on deception,
moreover, there is an "interdependent security" problem, in which countries' incentive to invest in nuclear
security is reduced by their perception that much of the threat to their security comes from the possibility of theft
in other countries and would not be reduced by investing in nuclear security domestically. See Howard
Kunreuther and Geoffrey Heal, "Interdependent Security," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 26, no. 2-3 (2003;
available at http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/downloads/02-06-HK.pdf as of 5 February 2006). To date,
however, this effect does not appear to be strong, at least in the U.S. case: although a case can be made that DOE
facilities, for example, are already secure enough that very little of the nuclear terrorist threat to the United States
comes from theft from U.S. facilities, DOE continues to make substantial investments in upgrading them further
(with total annual safeguards and security costs at DOE now well over $1 billion per year).
Even within an individual country, there may be more than one set of rules creating more than one
distribution of facility security levels. In the United States, for example, DOE facilities are subject to internal
DOE security rules, whose requirements are currently substantially more stringent than those of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), which regulates privately owned nuclear facilities.
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Figure 3.3: Lumpy Global Distribution of Nuclear Facility Security Levels and
the Capability Distribution of One Terrorist Group
Facility Security Level -- Terrorist Capability Level (Notional)
Terrorist Capability - Facility Security
while another may be better protected against an attack using large numbers of attackers, or
unusual vehicles.
A terrorist or criminal group considering an attempt to steal nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable nuclear material would have an estimate of the capability it could bring to
bear for an outsider theft attempt, with some uncertainty. The group would presumably also
attempt to develop an estimate - which might or might not be accurate - of how strong the
security was at the various facilities where it was considering making its attempt. In the
idealized case in which the group had accurate information on security measures worldwide,
and was able to bring equal levels of capability to bear anywhere in the world, the situation
from the point of view of the group's planners might look roughly like that shown in Figure
3.3. The solid line is the distribution of nuclear security levels, as before; the dotted line
represents the terrorist or criminal group's assessment of the level of capability it could bring
to bear in a theft attempt, with the associated uncertainty. 38 Only where the distributions of
3 The group's uncertainty about the capability it would succeed in bringing to bear is portrayed here as
completely random (some days they might be lucky, other days less so), and hence following roughly a normal
curve. But of course in the real world a large part of the possible uncertainty in the group's estimation of its own
capabilities is likely to be systematic; the group may be overly self-confident and overestimate its abilities, or it
may not realize how effective whatever combination of deception, violence, stealth, and other tactics it is
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Figure 3.4: Lumpy Global Distribution of Nuclear Facility Security
With Two Distributions of Adversary Capability
Facility Security Level -- Terrorist Capability Level (Notional)
Terrorist Capability 1 ------- Terrorist Capability 2 - Facility Security'
facility security and adversary capability overlapped - that is, where there was some
significant probability that the group's capabilities would be enough to beat the security
system for a particular nuclear stock - would the chance of a successful outsider theft be
significant. For this particular group, with its capabilities, nearly all of the risk of successful
nuclear theft comes from the facilities in countries "A" and "B." The overall risk of
successful nuclear theft by this group could be reduced dramatically by upgrading security for
the facilities in these two countries.
Although al Qaeda and the movement associated with it clearly have some degree of
global reach, however, it is clearly not true that they can bring the same levels of capability to
bear in every country. The level of capability they could bring to bear in a nuclear theft
planning would actually be. The graphs of adversary capability can be interpreted as probability distribution
functions whose area sums to one, but the graph of facility security levels, representing a discrete number of
nuclear facilities and transport legs, should not be interpreted in that way and has an area much larger than one.
There are many nuclear facilities and transport legs, but only a small number of theft attempts are
expected; hence the notional area covered graph of adversary capability is intended as a probability distribution
function, and therefore summing to one; the distribution of facility security lev distribution of adversary
capability is plotted as a frequency of "attempts" at different levels of capability not because I envision a single
group making hundreds of theft attempts, but simply because this might be their assessment of the likelihood that
they could bring to bear a given level of capability in a given attempt.
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attempt in Pakistan is much higher than the level of capability they could bring to bear in
Canada, to take one example. (Means to assess how such threats vary from country to
country are discussed in Chapter 4.) Hence, rather than the situation as shown in Figure 3.3, a
terrorist or criminal group's planners might face something more like the situation in Figure
3.4. If, for example, the group could only pull together the capability represented by the
distribution "Terrorist Capability 1" in Country "A," but could pull together the higher
capability represented by the distribution "Terrorist Capability 2" in Country "B," then the
probability of a successful theft in Country "B" would be substantially higher even though the
facilities in Country "B" are more secure - because there would be far more overlap between
the capabilities the group might be able to bring to bear and the capabilities needed to defeat
the nuclear security systems in Country "B" and carry out a successful theft. Hence, as
discussed in detail in Chapter 4, to assess the risk of nuclear theft posed by different nuclear
facilities and transport legs, it is essential to consider not only the strength or weakness of
their security arrangements, but also the differing threats that these security arrangements
face. Of course, in the real world there are many countries where nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable nuclear material are located, not just two, and the terrorist group might have
many different levels of capability it could bring to bear in different countries.
If the two distributions labeled "Terrorist Capability 1" and "Terrorist Capability 2"
represented the threats faced by all countries, then the probability of successful outsider theft
could be reduced dramatically by upgrading security or removing the nuclear material from
the facilities and transport legs in the countries labeled "A" and "B" in that figure. In that
case, if one could truncate the lower end of the distribution of security levels - for example by
rigorously identifying all the facilities with weaker security and either removing the nuclear
material from them or substantially upgrading the security - one might be able to effectively
eliminate the portion of the curve which overlaps with the potential adversary capabilities and
thus poses a significant risk. See Figure 3.5. This is the rationale for proposals for a "global
cleanout" focused on removing all nuclear material from the world's most vulnerable sites as
rapidly as possible.39
Similarly, if stringent global standards for nuclear security were put in place, the
global variation in security levels might be greatly reduced and the mean shifted upward,
which could also effectively eliminate the portion of the curve posing a substantial security
39 For one of the early proposals for such a "global cleanout," see Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony
Wier, Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action (Cambridge, Mass., and
Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2002;
available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/securingnuclear weapons and materialsMay2002.pdf as of 2
January 2007). For more recent discussions, see, for example, Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the
Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the
Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2005; available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/
report cnwmupdate2005.pdf as of 2 January 2007); Philipp C. Bleek, Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach
to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University,
2004; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/bleekglobalcleanout.pdf as of 13
April 2005).
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 3 133
Figure 3.5: Truncated Global Distribution of Nuclear Facility Security Levels
With Two Distributions of Adversary Capability
Facility Security Level -- Terrorist Capability Level (Notional)
Terrorist Capability 1 - Terrorist Capability 2 - Facility Security
risk.40 See Figure 3.6. Upgrading security for only some of the vulnerable facilities may not
have much benefit in reducing risk, however. If terrorists are able to observe, at least roughly,
where facilities have weak security and where they have strong security, upgrading only a
portion of the previously vulnerable sites presumably will have the effect of displacing the
risk of outsider attack on to other vulnerable sites (just as strengthening security at all nuclear
sites might have the effect of displacing terrorist efforts onto non-nuclear options).4'
Two points should be made about this way of conceptualizing the problem, however.
First, since nuclear security measures are quite secret, terrorist or criminal groups may be able
to collect partial information on the security measures at one or a few sites, but they are
hardly likely to have an accurate assessment of security levels at all facilities and transport
legs worldwide, as envisioned in Figure 3.3. The uncertainties in their estimates of the
44 For recent proposals for creating such stringent global standards, see, for example, Bunn and Wier, Securing
the Bomb 2005; Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1st ed. (New
York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004).
41 For a discussion of the displacement effect from better-protected facilities to less-protected ones, the
importance of the observability of protection to that effect, and the effect of increases in average protection of all
facilities in increasing the chance that terrorists will turn their attention elsewhere, see the model presented in
Lakdawalla and Zanjanji, Insurance, Self-Protection, and Economics of Terrorism.
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Figure 3.6: Global Distribution of Nuclear Facility Security Levels
Meeting Stringent Standards and Two Distributions of Adversary Capability
Facility Security Level -- Terrorist Capability Level (Notional)
Terrorist Capability 1 ------- Terrorist Capability 2 - Facility Security
security measures at different facilities - and the resulting probabilities that they may fail to
identify the most vulnerable facilities, or may attempt a theft from a facility that has higher
security than they expected - clearly reduce the terrorists' probability of success, PsUj).42
Second, and fundamentally, the picture is likely to look very different from the point
of view of those planning defenses against nuclear theft, as opposed to the point of view of
the adversary planners. Nuclear security planners would not be dealing with a single terrorist
or criminal group with reasonably well-understood capabilities, but with a broad spectrum of
possible adversaries whose potential distribution of capabilities was highly uncertain and
might include some dangerous outliers with very high levels of capability.
In the case of nuclear security planners considering the entire global picture - such as
planners at the IAEA or in a donor state, thinking about where to invest additional resources
for security upgrades - the situation might look like that shown in Figure 3.7. In this figure,
42 Hence, in reality, rather than the two distributions shown in Figure 3.3 , one would have four random
variables, each with its own distribution: the real security levels at different sites; the terrorist group's perception
of those security levels; the real capability the terrorist group would be able to bring to bear at the moment of the
attack; and the terrorists' perception of their capability. Such a situation could be modeled with a Monte Carlo
approach, but given that essentially nothing is known about the shapes of any of these distributions, it does not
appear likely that such modeling would contribute much additional insight.
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Figure 3.7: Lumpy Global Distribution of Nuclear Facility Security
With Two Lumpy Distributions of Potential Adversary Capability
Facility Security Level -- Terrorist Capability Level (Notional)
Terrorist Capability 1 Terrorist Capability 2 - Facility Security
"Terrorist Capability I" represents the uncertain spectrum of potential adversary capabilities
that planners might believe a relatively low-threat country faced, while "Terrorist Capability
2" represents the equally uncertain spectrum of capabilities that planners might expect in a
higher-threat country. As in Figure 3.3, if the facilities in country "B" faced the higher threat
spectrum while facilities in country "A" only faced the lower threat spectrum, the risk of
successful nuclear theft would be higher in country "B" than in country "A," with more
overlap in the distributions of facility security and adversary capability, even though the
facilities in country "B" had somewhat stronger security measures.
It is worth noting that in this figure, the second threat spectrum has one outlier so
capable that this group might be able steal nuclear material successfully from all but a few of
the most secure nuclear facilities in the world. Estimating just how far out on the curve of
adversary capability plausible outliers might be is the fundamental problem for nuclear
security planners: they do not want to remain unprotected against threats that have a
substantial probability of materializing, but they do not want to waste money attempting to
protect against unrealistically capable threats, either. Moreover, they have very little data to
go on in estimating what the highest plausible threats in a particular country might be. At a
minimum, the types of capabilities that terrorists and thieves have already demonstrated in
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that country (or in similar nearby countries) provide a useful guide for the capabilities that
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials should be protected against.
When viewed in this light, measures to remove all the weapons-usable nuclear
material from the most vulnerable facilities, or forge stringent global nuclear security
standards, as depicted in Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, would still have substantial benefit - they
would essentially eliminate the risk of successful nuclear theft for all facilities and transport
legs facing only the spectrum of adversary capabilities labeled "Terrorist Capability I," and
for those facilities and transport legs facing a spectrum like "Terrorist Capability 2," only the
outermost outlier of the adversary capability distribution would remain a substantial concern.
But the potential existence of such outliers means that nuclear security planners could have
much less confidence in estimating how much the measures they had taken had reduced the
risk.
The situation would be somewhat less complicated for nuclear security planners
within a single country. They would not be dealing with a lumpy global distribution of
facility security levels, but the distribution within their own country, which, as noted earlier,
would probably tend to cluster in a distribution around the levels required by that country's
nuclear security rules. They would have to estimate only the potential adversary capabilities
in their own country, not those that might exist in countries around the world - but they would
still face large uncertainties in estimating how far out on spectrum of capability plausible
outliers in the distribution of adversary capabilities might be. The situation might appear to
them somewhat like that in Figure 3.8. In this figure, the nuclear security rules in this
hypothetical country are stringent enough to reduce the probability of a nuclear theft attempt
succeeding to a very low level for all of the expected threat distribution except the highest-
capability outlier. Such a circumstance might well provoke debate (like the debate that is
taken place in the United States in recent years) over how likely a theft attempt at high levels
of capability was, and whether it was worth the cost of more stringent security rules that
would shift the distribution of security levels further to the right.
The discussion to this point strongly suggests that modest investments in upgrading
security for those few facilities where the weakest nuclear security measures face the most
substantial threats might drastically reduce the overall probability of successful nuclear theft,
by outsiders or by insiders. Two points that might reduce the effectiveness of such modest
investments should be kept in mind, however. First, there may be countries where the level of
capability that terrorists or criminals can bring to bear is so great that technologies such as
stronger fences and better intrusion detectors will not provide effective protection at
reasonable cost. If the distribution of adversary capability in Figure 3.8 extended well to the
right of that shown, modest investments in additional security would not be enough to
substantially reduce the risk of nuclear theft.43
43 By the same token, of course, if the actual spectrum of threats were shifted well to the left of that shown in
Figure 3.8, Pos(jk) and Pist;.k) would be close to zero, and no additional investments would be needed; it might be
that some of the existing nuclear security investments could be cut back.
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of Nuclear Facility Security Levels in One Country
With a Lumpy Distribution of Potential Adversary Capability
Facility Security Level -- Terrorist Capability Level (Notional)
------- Terrorist Capability - Facility Security
In both Pakistan and Russia, for example, terrorist attacks have on occasion involved
scores of heavily armed terrorists attacking at once, with no warning, and insider conspiracies
have occurred that involved several insiders working together. (The threats in both Pakistan
and Russia, and what they imply for the risks of nuclear theft in those countries, are discussed
in more detail in Chapter 4.) Police and intelligence measures designed to increase the
probability that large theft conspiracies would be detected before the theft attempt began are
an essential complement to nuclear security measures for nuclear facilities and transport legs
themselves; in some cases, investments in improving these police and intelligence measures
may be as important in reducing the probability of successful nuclear theft as investments in
security measures for particular nuclear facilities or transport legs.
Second, intelligent and adaptive adversaries may react to security upgrades not by
giving up, but by increasing their capabilities - recruiting more people, buying better
weapons, and developing more sophisticated tactics. If facilities need only defend against a
handful of outsiders with limited armament, or one insider, relatively simple and low-cost
security upgrades will be sufficient; if, on the other hand, they must defend against multiple
teams of numerous, well-trained, and well-armed outsiders and programs to ensure the
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reliability of authorized staff are sufficiently weak that conspiracies of 4-5 well-placed
insiders are a real possibility, the security measures needed to reduce the risk of theft to a low
level would be expensive and complex.
The possibility of terrorists' increasing their capabilities to suit the job they want to do
is a key source of the debate over what level of threat nuclear facilities should be required to
defend against. Some analysts and regulatory agencies argue that past terrorist attacks have
overwhelmingly involved only small numbers of people (or even single individuals) with
limited capabilities and that defenses against such limited threats will be sufficient to deal
with almost all of the risk. Taking this line of thinking, before 9/11, the U.S. NRC only
required U.S. nuclear power plants to be protected against a DBT involving attack by a "small
group," reportedly three outsiders, possibly in league with one insider;44 the DBT for theft of
HEU or plutonium was reportedly only modestly higher. Others have argued that typical
terrorist assaults involve small numbers of people only because that is what the perpetrators
"perceived to be necessary to accomplish their mission," and that such small numbers do "not
represent an upper limit on their capacity to mobilize people."45 Hence, they argue, reducing
theft risks substantially is likely to require defending against larger and more sophisticated
threats. Incidents worldwide in which terrorists or criminals have demonstrated the ability to
attack in large numbers, to use sophisticated weapons and planning, and to recruit or
blackmail multiple insiders to participate in theft conspiracies suggest that the threats nuclear
weapons and the materials needed to make them should be defended against are substantial
(see discussion in Chapter 4).
Terrorists' abilities to increase their capabilities are presumably not infinite, and no
one could afford to defend against an infinite threat. But as already discussed, no one knows
for sure where the upper bound lies. This uncertainty is leading to a lively debate in several
countries concerning what DBT facilities with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear
materials should be required to defend against. By late 2003, for example, in response to the
9/11 attacks, DOE adopted rules requiring its facilities to defend against a significantly more
capable DBT than had previously been envisioned - but by late 2004, this new DBT was itself
considered inadequate, and a still larger, more capable DBT was adopted, reportedly
involving a squad-size attacking force with very capable weapons and tools and sophisticated
tactics. Since then, however, there has been mounting criticism of the cost of defending
against this new DBT, creating pressure on DOE to reduce the DBT again. Meanwhile, while
the NRC has increased the DBT since 9/11, the change has reportedly been relatively modest,
44 See, for example, Daniel Hirsch, "The NRC: What, Me Worry?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. I
(January/February 2002; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?artofn=jfD2hirsch as of 8 January
2007), pp. 38-44.
4s Brian Michael Jenkins and Joseph L. Krofcheck, "Appendix III-A: The Potential Nuclear Non-State
Adversary," in Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment,
1977). These authors provide an exceptionally thoughtful discussion of some of the issues discussed in this
section.
46 While the specifics are classified, a useful discussion of how DOE's DBT has evolved since the 9/11 attacks
can be found in Project on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Y-12 and Oak Ridge
National Laboratory at High Risk (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2006; available at http://pogo.org/p/homeland/
ho-061001-Y12.html as of 17 November 2006).
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so that the DBT that an NRC-licensed facility - even one with tons of HEU metal, the easiest
material in the world for terrorists to use to make a nuclear bomb - must defend against is
reportedly far less capable than the DBT comparable DOE facilities must defend against.47
One constraint on terrorists' ability to increase their capabilities is that the probability that law
enforcement and intelligence services, mentioned above, will detect and disrupt a conspiracy
presumably increases as the size of the conspiracy increases. But incidents from the 9/11
attacks to the Beslan school seizure, where large conspiracies to kill large numbers of people
were not detected before the terrorists struck, suggest that only modest reliance can be placed
on the assumption that law enforcement and intelligence services will always be able to stop
large attacks from occurring.
Examples of the Effect of Security Upgrades in Reducing Risk
In short, if terrorists are constrained from readily increasing their capabilities,
investments in improving security or removing nuclear material entirely from those facilities
that are most vulnerable and face the highest threats could substantially reduce the probability
of a successful outsider theft, Posqk). Such investments would therefore in all likelihood also
reduce the chance that a terrorist group would choose outsider theft as their route to acquiring
nuclear material, Po6. Counter-terrorist measures, designed to detect and stop any outsider
theft plot substantial enough to have a chance of being successful in its early stages, might
also reduce Ps 6,k), if the ability to collect intelligence on such groups were good enough to
have a reasonable probability of uncovering such plotting.
In the numerical example above, of the 29% ten-year total probability of nuclear
terrorism, 6.5% was coming from the outsider theft path. If we imagine, a program of
security upgrades for the most vulnerable facilities that succeeded in cutting Posyk) in half,
compared to its value in the numerical example, and reducing Pog6 by 30%, then the
probability of outsider theft resulting in successful nuclear terrorism over ten years would be
reduced to 2.3%, a nearly three-fold reduction. If the idealized figures in this chapter present
anything close to the real situation, it may well be possible, for modest investments, to reduce
Posg) by an even larger factor.
While the specific capabilities and procedures that are most important to defeating
outsider theft attempts differ somewhat from those that are most important to defeating insider
theft attempts, at most sites where security upgrades are underway, integrated suites of
upgrades are being pursued that are intended to reduce both insider and outsider dangers.
Removal of nuclear material from vulnerable sites would certainly reduce both dangers.
4 See, for example, discussion in Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Nuclear Security: Has the NRC Strengthened Facility Standards
since 9/11? U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 4 April 2006 (available at
http://reform.house.gov/NSETIR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventlD=41937 as of 6 May 2006); Daniel Hirsch,
David Lochbaum, and Edwin Lyman, "The NRC's Dirty Little Secret," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
(May/June 2003; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art ofn=mj03hirsch as of 5 February 2006),
pp. 44-51; Project on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security
Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2005; available at http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ho-050301-
consolidation.html as of 30 December 2006).
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Moreover, security upgrades that simultaneously reduced the probability of success for both
outsider and insider thefts would also reduce the probability that a terrorist group seeking
nuclear material from a black market would succeed, by reducing the likelihood that others,
not directly instigated by the group, would succeed in carrying out insider or outsider thefts so
as to make nuclear material available on a black market. In this case, reductions in Pos6,k)
would presumably not also reduce P,,6, since all the pathways to acquiring nuclear material
other than acquisition from a state would be getting less attractive in tandem; such reductions
in the overall chance of orchestrating a theft, however, might well lead to reductions in Pac6,
the probability that a particular terrorist group would undertake a serious nuclear acquisition
attempt in a given year. In other words, if the terrorist group concluded their chances of
getting nuclear material were slim, they might not bother to try, focusing their efforts in other
areas instead. If, in the numerical example above, security upgrades managed to cut the
probabilities of success for outsider and insider theft in half, and for black-market purchase by
40% (because there is some chance that already-stolen material would be available on a black
market), and these reductions led to only a 20% reduction in the yearly probability of a
serious acquisition attempt by each group, then the previous 29% 10-year probability of
nuclear terrorism would be reduced to 14%:
',(k) =(0.2 x 0.2 x 0.5+0.3 x 0.3 x 0.5+0.3x 0.2x 0.6+0.2x 0.05)(0.4 x 0.7)= 0.031
These groups would then be expected to carry out an average of 0.48 acquisition
attempts per year, or 4.8 attempts over 10 years:
P, = 1-(1-.031)4" =.14
Effect of Quantity of Material
Once a site has one or a few nuclear weapons, or the nuclear materials to make one or
a few nuclear weapons, the danger of outsider theft it poses does not increase much as the
stockpile at that site increases. Nuclear terrorists are likely to be focused on getting the ability
to detonate one or a few bombs; hundreds are likely to be beyond their reach and their
interest. For outsider theft, ten tons of nuclear material are not substantially more difficult to
defend than one ton of nuclear material. (Hence, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, the
common use of total quantities of nuclear material as a rough indicator of the scale of the risk
of theft worldwide is not justified.)
Even if a facility has only half or two-thirds of the amount of material required for a
bomb, the danger of nuclear theft it poses cannot be dismissed, as incidents such as the 1998
embassy bombings (or the 9/11 hijackings) make clear al Qaeda's ability to strike multiple
widely separated targets at the same time. The more thefts that must be successful to get
enough material for a bomb, however, the lower the chances will be - so thieves are likely to
focus on those locations where one or two thefts would be enough. In other words, the risk
that theft of a particular stockpile of nuclear material could lead to terrorists making and
detonating a nuclear bomb increases rapidly as the quantity reaches a substantial fraction of
the amount the terrorists would likely need for a crude bomb, but then levels off after the
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 3
quantity has reached a level sufficient for one or a few bombs (see more detailed discussion in
Chapter 4).
Effect of Number of Facilities and Transport Legs
The number of facilities and transport legs that have nuclear weapons or the materials
to make them probably does have an important impact on the chances of both outsider and
insider thefts. For outsider thefts, with a distribution of security levels at different facilities
and transport legs subject to a particular country's rules, increasing the number of facilities
and transport legs will increase the chance that a facility or transport leg will exist that is low
enough on the tail of this distribution for terrorists to be able to defeat its security system (and
that terrorists will be able to identify it as such). For insider theft, more facilities means more
groups of people with access to material or knowledge of the security system of a site with
such material - and, as with outsider theft, it means more chances that some facility will have
security poor enough to cause some one to judge that they could steal nuclear material.
If we imagine, for example, a case in which the security level of the different nuclear
facilities and transport legs in a particular country happened to be normally distributed, and
the security level at which terrorists would decide to make a theft attempt corresponded to a
level two standard deviations below the mean in that country, then if there were five facilities
with the relevant materials in the country, the chance of one of them having weak enough
security to provoke a theft attempt would be approximately 11%, whereas if there were 10
such facilities in that country the probability would be 21% and with 20 such facilities, the
probability would be 37%.4 (If, on the other hand, the distributions of security and of
terrorist capability had enough overlap that it was almost certain there would be a facility that
the terrorists could attack, there would not be this strong increase in probability with
increasing numbers of facilities. Hence, the relation between risk and number of facilities
depends sensitively on how secure those facilities are and what capabilities terrorists have.)
Reducing the number of facilities and transports also makes it possible to concentrate
resources on ensuring high security at the remainder. These are the reasons why
consolidation of nuclear weapons and materials at fewer sites, coupled with steps to minimize
the number of transports, have been significant parts of the nuclear security agenda. (For
transports, both the number of transports containing a significant fraction of a bombs' worth
of material and the total time spent during such transports may be useful measures to try to
minimize, as a road shipment of that takes half an hour clearly should not count as posing
exactly the same risk as a road shipment that takes a week.)4 9
48 The probability of any particular facility having security two standard deviations below the mean in a normal
distribution is 2.275%. Hence the probability of not having one such facility in five would be 1 -(1-
0.02275)'=0.109; the probability of not having one such facility in ten would be 1-(1-0.02275)'"=0.206; and the
probability of not having one such facility in twenty would be 1-(1 -0.02275)20=0.369.
49 Past studies have proposed minimizing the "underway inventory," measured by the average amount shipped
per year multiplied by the average duration of each shipment. See discussion in U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, Panel on Reactor-Related Options, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium:
Reactor-Related Options (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995; available at http://books.nap.edu/
html/plutonium/0309051452.pdf as of 30 December 2006), pp. 100-10 1. But a shipment carrying 1,000 bombs'
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To reduce the uncertainty in estimating the parameter Posk), it would be important to
collect information, to the extent possible, on:
* The location and characteristics of all facilities worldwide where at least one nuclear
weapon or significant fraction of the amount of nuclear material needed for a bomb are
located, as well as transportation practices worldwide for these items;
* Security levels for each such facility and transportation leg worldwide, including the kinds
of threats security measures are designed to protect against; the technical measures in
place for such protection; the number, quality, and capability of personnel, including
guards, for such protection; and the dedication, morale, and "security culture" of the
personnel important to security;
* Indicators suggesting the level of capability terrorists or criminal groups might be able to
bring to bear in each of the countries where these facilities or transportation legs exist,
including the magnitude of outsider attacks and crimes (both nuclear and non-nuclear that
have already taken place in that country (or in similar countries in its region.
The Probabilities of Insider Theft Attempts, Pi,;) and P,sk)
As with outsider theft attempts, the probability that a group will decide to undertake an
insider theft attempt, Pig; is presumably determined largely by its estimate of the probability
of success on that route - that is, its estimate of Pis,k). Pis,k) is the combination of the
probabilities of success of two separate steps: the probability that the terrorist group would be
able to get one or more insiders to participate in a nuclear theft attempt (either by infiltrating
members or affiliates into the staff of a targeted organization, or by convincing existing
insiders to take part, for example by ideological persuasion, bribery, or blackmail), Pirk), and
the probability that those insiders will then succeed in carrying out the nuclear theft, Piak):
s(j,k ) r(j,k) X t(jk)
To maximize Pjrgk), a group would presumably attempt to identify facilities with the
weapons or materials it wanted, assess their security levels as best it could, and choose one
which it judged had the best combination of good quality material and modest security to
maximize the group's overall chances of success in getting a nuclear bomb. Most of the
discussion above with respect to outsider threats - including the importance of the capability
of the security measures at the site compared to the capability the adversaries can bring to
bear - is also relevant for insider threats and essentially the same techniques of vulnerability
assessment are used to assess the adequacy of facilities' protection against each type of threat.
For an insider theft attempt, terrorists would also have to factor in an estimate of Pir6k), their
chances of getting one or more insiders to participate in a theft attempt. Until they have an
insider at a particular facility, terrorists' information about insider-focused security measures
worth of material poses little more risk than a shipment carrying 3 bombs' worth of material. As each shipment
carrying a bombs' worth or a substantial fraction of a bombs' worth of material represents another opportunity
for theft, the total number of such shipments would be a better measure; that measure could be modified
somewhat with a measure of total time on the road for such shipments (since a weeklong trip clearly creates
more opportunities than a 1-day trip, though probably not seven times as many).
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is likely to be even more imperfect than their information about security against outsider
thefts, for the key measures dealing with insiders (from vaults and security cameras to rules
ensuring that no one is ever alone with nuclear weapons or material) are more difficult to
observe from outside the facility. Insiders themselves, however, will in many cases be able to
observe the security arrangements at their facility in much greater detail than terrorist
outsiders can and will presumably be far more likely to choose to make a theft attempt
(whether instigated from without or on their own initiative) at a facility where they judge the
security is poor enough to give them a good chance of success.
As with Poy, Pi6y is presumably small; while there are quite a number of confirmed
insider thefts of nuclear material in the historical record, there are few that appear to have
been instigated by terrorists. As noted in Chapter 2, a Russian criminal trial in 2003 revealed
that a Russian businessman had been offering $750,000 for stolen plutonium for sale to a
foreign client and had attempted to instigate an insider plutonium theft by making contact
with residents of the closed nuclear city of Sarov, who claimed to have the access necessary to
steal plutonium;50 this was clearly an effort to instigate insider theft and may have been
terrorist-linked. The Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo reportedly attempted to get a
meeting with the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy to offer to buy a nuclear weapon,
while bizarre and doomed to failure, this should probably also be considered in the category
of a terrorist acquisition attempt focused on persuading an insider to provide a nuclear
weapon.
To maximize its overall chances of success, the terrorist group would also want to
maximize Pir6,k), the chance of being able to get one or more insiders to participate in a
nuclear theft. Hence, in addition to security levels and threat levels, discussed previously, the
probability of a successful insider theft is presumably also related to (a) the quality of
personnel reliability programs, designed to ensure that employees are trustworthy before they
are hired and monitor them afterward to ensure that they remain so; (b) rates of corruption and
theft among insiders at the relevant facilities; (c) low morale among those insiders; (d) low
pay for those insiders; and (e) support for extreme causes among insiders, particularly causes
similar to those of groups that are members of N. These are among the reasons why
incidents of low pay and morale in the nuclear and military establishments in Russia, along
with corruption and theft (including theft and sale of major armaments) have provoked such
international concern.52 But the 2004 case in Northern Ireland in which a gang reportedly
50 "Russian Court Sentences Men for Weapons-Grade Plutonium Scam," trans. BBC Monitoring Service, RIA
Novosti, 14 October 2003; "Russia: Criminals Indicted for Selling Mercury as Weapons-Grade Plutonium,"
trans. U.S. Department of Commerce, Izvestiya, 11 October 2003; "Plutonium Con Artists Sentenced in Russian
Closed City of Sarov," NIS Export Control Observer (November 2003; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/
nisexcon/pdfs/ob_03 11 e.pdf as of 23 December 2006).
51 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, with Joshua Friedman, "The Demand for Black Market Fissile Material,"
in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the
Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2005; available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/
cnwm/threat/demand.asp as of 2 January 2007).
1 For an extended list of such incidents, see Matthew Bunn, "Anecdotes of Insecurity," in Nuclear Threat
Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing
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linked to the Irish Republican Army stole tens of millions of dollars from a bank vault that
required two officers of the bank to open - by kidnapping the families of two officers of the
bank and blackmailing those officers to participate - is an important reminder that insider
thefts can occur even if the system is designed to prevent thefts by any lone employee and the
employees themselves are not untrustworthy.5 3
Insiders could play a wide range of roles in an attempted nuclear theft. An insider or
group of insiders could carry out the theft themselves, either covertly (which they would
presumably prefer) or overtly (an approach that would likely require violence of the threat of
violence). Alternatively, insiders could help outsiders (ranging from simply providing
information about the security system and its weaknesses at one extreme to active and violent
participation on the other, such as killing one or more of the guards to help the outsiders
overcome them). Insiders could include people with access to nuclear material, guards,
managers, or others.
The effect of improved insider security measures on reducing Pisak) - both measures to
reduce the chance of insider participation and measures to reduce their chances of success if
they do - could be assessed using this model in much the same way as described above in the
case of the outsider threat. As in the outsider case, assumptions about the initial level of
terrorist capability and their ability to increase that capability are crucial to assessing how
much difference a particular set of improved security measures would make. If it is assumed
that personnel reliability programs and other measures make it extremely unlikely that there
would be more than one insider, then limited security measures intended to defend against one
insider would be effective in defending against nearly all of the likely threat; if, on the other
hand, insider conspiracies of 3-5 individuals are a real possibility, then the required security
measures will be far more expensive and less certain of success.
Effect of the Quantity of Material and Facility Throughput
The danger of insider theft may be somewhat more closely related to the quantity of
material at a site than the danger of outsider theft. For insider theft, there is likely to be a high
premium on remaining covert (at least until the theft is completed) and the chance of
remaining covert is at least related to the quantity of material: a theft of 50 kilograms of HEU
would be more likely to be noticed at a site where that was all the HEU on hand than at a site
where there were many tons of HEU.
But even more important than the sheer quantity of material is the degree to which the
material is being handled and processed: if material is simply sitting in a secure vault
monitored with security cameras at all times, insider theft is likely to be quite difficult,
whereas if the facility is doing extensive hands-on processing of tons of material each year,
the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e research/
cnwm/threat/anecdote.asp as of 2 January 2007).
5 For a discussion of the Northern Bank case, see, for example, Chris Moore, "Anatomy of a £26.5 Million
Heist," Sunday Life, 21 May 2006. Chris Ward, one of the bank officers whose families were held hostage, has
since been arrested and charged with willing participation in the crime, which he denies. If he was a willing
participant, it appears that he was motivated by republican sympathies, again highlighting the importance of
sympathies for causes similar to those of terrorist groups among employees of a protected facility.
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removal of a few kilograms, in small bits at a time, would have a much greater chance of
going unnoticed. (Annual throughput might provide a rough metric for assessing this aspect
of a facility.)
Effect of the Number of Personnel
The probability of successful insider theft is likely to be closely related to the number
of insiders in a position to steal nuclear material (or to be of substantial assistance in doing
so). If nuclear material is stored in a vault to which almost no one has access, the probability
of insider theft is far lower than if hundreds of people have regular access to it. The more
people have access to the material, or have enough knowledge of the security system to be
able to help outsiders defeat it, the more chances there are for there to be a bad apple among
them.
To reduce the uncertainty in estimating the parameter Pis;,k), it would be important to
collect information, to the extent possible, on:
* The location and characteristics, as before, of all facilities worldwide where at least one
nuclear weapon or significant fraction of the amount of nuclear material needed for a
bomb are located, as well as transportation practices worldwide for these items;
" Security levels focused on protection against insider theft for each such facility and
transportation leg worldwide, including the kinds of insider (and combined insider-
outsider) threats security measures are designed to protect against; the technical measures
in place for such protection; the number, quality, and capability of personnel, including
guards, for such protection; the procedures taken to ensure the reliability of personnel; and
the dedication, morale, and "security culture" of the personnel important to security;
" The number of people in each such facility or transportation leg with the access required
to steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear material, or to contribute substantially to doing so,
and the circumstances of such access (e.g., is the material being processed in bulk by hand
on a daily basis, or sitting in a rarely used and closely monitored vault);
" Indicators of theft risks among insiders, including low pay and morale; corruption; insider
thefts of non-nuclear items at the same or similar facilities or institutions; and adherence
to extreme ideologies compatible with those of potential nuclear terrorist groups;
" Indicators suggesting the level of capability insiders (and insiders working with outsiders)
might be able to bring to bear in each of the countries where these facilities or
transportation legs exist, including the capability shown in insider thefts (both nuclear and
non-nuclear) that have already taken place in that country (or in similar countries in its
region).
The Probabilities of Black-Market Acquisition Attempts, PabW; and Pbsjk)
Trying to buy nuclear weapons or materials on a nuclear black market appears to be an
especially common choice for terrorist groups seeking a nuclear capability. Both Aum
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Shinrikyo and al Qaeda have pursued this route.54 Thus Po6W appears to be fairly large. In
part, this may reflect opportunities for black-market acquisition presenting themselves - in the
form of individuals who claim to be able to provide nuclear items, requiring a decision - in a
way that opportunities for instigating an outsider or insider theft do not. In part, however, it
may also reflect a judgment on the part of terrorist groups that the probability of success in
getting nuclear material on the black market is substantial, perhaps better than the probability
of success in instigating an outsider or insider theft.
Like insider theft, the probability of success in acquiring nuclear weapons or materials
on a nuclear black market, Psg6,k), can be broken into two probabilities: the probability of a
potential seller coming into possession of such goods and the probability that the seller and
the buyer will succeed in finding each other and making the transaction.
The principal source of black-market nuclear material is likely to be nuclear theft, by
outsiders or insiders not directly instigated by terrorist groups. 55 Numerous cases of theft of
weapons-usable nuclear material, apparently with the intention of selling the stolen nuclear
material on the nuclear black market, have occurred. The IAEA has documented 16 seizures
of stolen HEU or separated plutonium confirmed by the states concerned - and more cases
exist that definitely occurred, but that the relevant states have not been willing to confirm.56
While most of the known cases occurred in the mid-1990s, one significant seizure of stolen
HEU occurred as recently as 2003, suggesting that the problem of nuclear thieves stealing
material for later sale is a continuing one.
Improved nuclear security measures would reduce the probability of additional thefts
of HEU and plutonium after the security measures are implemented. The critical difference
between the nuclear black market option and the options of instigating insider or outsider
thefts, however, is the possibility of sale of nuclear weapons or materials that may already
have been stolen in the past; no security upgrades implemented now will solve that problem.
The documented cases on the IAEA's list involve material that was seized and recovered, and
therefore this material will not show up on a nuclear black market - but the key question,
* Bunn and Wier, "The Demand for Black Market Fissile Material."
" State decisions to provide nuclear weapons or the materials for them to terrorist groups are discussed
separately below; state decisions to provide such items to black market middlemen, with no control over who
they might then sell them to, seem so unlikely that they are not further considered here.
56 International Atomic Energy Agency, Illicit Trafficking and Other Unauthorized Activities Involving Nuclear
and Radioactive Materials (Vienna: IAEA, 2006; available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/
RadSources/PDF/factfigures2005.pdf as of 29 January 2007). Well-confirmed cases (where the individuals
involved were caught, tried, and convicted) that are not in the IAEA database include, for example, the 1992
theft of 1.5 kilograms of 90% enriched HEU from the Luch Production Association in Podolsk, Russia, and the
1993 thefts of 1.8 kilograms of 36% enriched HEU from the naval facility at Andreeva Guba and of 4.5 kilogram
of material enriched to roughly 20% from the naval facility at Sevmorput, both in Russia. See, for example,
"Confirmed Proliferation-Significant Incidents of Fissile Material Trafficking in the Newly Independent States
(NIS), 1991-2001" (Monterey, Cal.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies, 30 November 2001; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/traff.htm as of 3 March 2006)."7 U.S.
National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear
Facilities and Military Forces (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2004; available at
http://www.dni.gov/nic/special-russiannuke04.html as of 5 March 2005).
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unfortunately unanswerable, is how many other thefts may have occurred that were not
detected. The CIA assesses that additional undetected thefts probably have occurred, but no
one can know how many or how substantial they may have been.57
Three factors suggest that already-stolen nuclear material may not be a large part of
the black-market problem. First, there is no convincing evidence that al Qaeda succeeded in
acquiring stolen nuclear material despite attempting to do so for many years before the 9/11
attacks, suggesting that there may not have been many stocks of already-stolen material
available. Second, none of the documented seizures of stolen nuclear material to date have
been confirmed to have involved nuclear material stolen long before (though when and where
the material was stolen is not known for certain in all cases). Third, nuclear workers in the
former Soviet Union who may have stolen nuclear material a decade ago and squirreled it
away for a rainy day are now making a living wage, paid on time, suggesting that if they did
not sell this material before, they may not do so now. (On the other hand, if improved
security measures make it more difficult to steal nuclear material, already-stolen material
could become more valuable, creating more incentives to sell it.) While these factors suggest
that the fraction of the black-market problem arising from already stolen nuclear material is
small, it is probably not insignificant.
The model presented here can be used to assess the impact of different assumptions
about already-stolen nuclear material on the risk-reduction benefit that might be derived from
upgrading security for not-yet stolen material. Consider two quite different cases. If we
assume, in the first case, that only 20% of the probability of successful black-market
acquisition comes from already-stolen material; that a program of security upgrades could
reduce the probability of success in instigating either an outsider or an insider theft by 80%
(with the same effect on thefts not instigated by a particular buyer); and that the probability of
terrorists choosing each type of acquisition attempt would be unaffected by these security
upgrades (perhaps because the upgrades were not observed by the terrorists), then the overall
probability that an acquisition attempt would be successful, using the numbers from the
numerical example above, would be:
P,(k) =(0.2x 0.2 x 0.2+0.3 x 0.3 x 0.2+0.3 x 0.2x (0.8 x 0.2+0.2)+0.2x 0.5)
(0.4 x 0.7) = 0.0 16
The 10-year risk of a nuclear terrorist attack would be reduced by more than three
times by such security upgrades.58 (The risk reduction is less than the reduction in the
probability of successful theft because of the contributions to risk from already-stolen
material and from state provision of nuclear capabilities.)
As a second, contrasting possibility, if already-stolen nuclear material represented
60% of the initial probability of success for the black-market option, unaffected by such
security upgrades, and one assumed that the terrorists would observe the security upgrades
58 This is not intended as an argument for a particular program of upgrades that could ostensibly achieve this
80% reduction in the probability of successful theft, but only an example to illustrate how much changes in
assumptions about the fraction of the risk posed by already-stolen material affect the outcome.
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and put less emphasis on instigating thefts and more on black-market acquisition, then, using
the same numbers, the overall probability that an acquisition attempt would be successful
would be:
P(k) :(0.1x 0.2 x 0.2+0.15 x 0.3 x 0.2+0.55 x 0.2 x (0.4 x 0.2+0.6)+0.2x 0.5)
(0.4 x 0.7) = 0.027
In this case, the overall 10-year risk would not quite be cut in half as a result of the
security upgrades - still a substantial benefit. Only if the probability that terrorists would
choose to attempt to instigate either an outsider or an insider attack were close to zero and
nearly all of the problem of black-market acquisition was the result of already-stolen material
- neither of which seem especially plausible - would security upgrades that drastically
reduced the probability of nuclear theft not result in substantial reductions in the danger of
nuclear terrorism. Hence, the model strongly suggests that while some horses may already be
out of the barn, closing the door on the remainder would have very real risk reduction
benefits.
In the black-market case, potential sellers getting hold of a nuclear weapon or the
materials to make one is only the first step. In the next step, they would have to make contact
with, and succeed in closing a transaction with, buyers from a terrorist group - and that is not
likely to be easy. None of the known cases involving stolen HEU or plutonium appears to
have involved a real buyer, or come close to a successful transaction. This may be the
product of selection bias; it could be that the competent thieves and smugglers connected to
buyers are the ones who did not get caught and whose cases are therefore not known. If
selection bias only distorts the picture modestly, however, the known cases suggest that the
problem of making the connection between potential buyers and sellers - with the risks each
faces that the other may be a scam artist, killer, or government agent - is a major barrier on
this path and the chances of success in such a transaction are relatively low. 59
In particular, the record seems to suggest a large number of cases of scams, in which
sellers attempted to pawn off worthless material they described as "red mercury" and other
radioactive trash as weapons-usable nuclear material. A case could be made, based on this
record, that the 20% chance of successful black-market acquisition in the numerical example
is too high; on the other hand, hand-held equipment which can confirm the presence of HEU
or separated plutonium in a container is commercially available at modest cost, suggesting
that sophisticated buyers are likely to become less and less susceptible to scams over time.
How could the probability of successful black-market acquisition be further reduced?
Measures to prevent outsider and insider theft are the first priority, as already discussed. Next
59 The argument that the difficulty of making the connection between potential sellers and potential buyers in this
market is one of the major factors that has prevented nuclear terrorism to date is made in "Nuclear Terrorism:
Why Hasn't It Happened Already?" in Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor
Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and
Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/analysis cnwmupdate 052404.pdf as
of 2 January 2007), p. 27. For another recent discussion of these difficulties, see, for example, Langewiesche,
"How to Get a Nuclear Bomb."
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in priority are measures to make the barriers to successful transactions between buyer and
seller even higher than they already are. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies could run
additional stings and scams, posing as either buyers or sellers of nuclear material, to catch
participants in this market, collect intelligence on market participants, and increase the fears
of real buyers and sellers that their interlocutors may be government agents. As most of the
confirmed cases in which stolen weapons-usable nuclear material was successfully seized
involved one of the conspirators or some one they tried to involve in the effort informing on
the others, additional measures to make such informing more likely - including anonymous
tip hotlines that were well-publicized in the nuclear community, rewards, and the like - could
also have substantial benefit. All potential source states and likely transit states should have
units of their national police force trained and equipped to deal with nuclear smuggling cases,
and other law enforcement personnel should be trained to call in those units as needed.
Current efforts to put in place radiation detection at key border crossings may also reduce
60
risk, forcing smugglers to pursue more difficult and chancier routes.
To reduce the uncertainty in estimating the parameter Ps6,k), it would be important to
collect information, to the extent possible, on:
" All the factors mentioned above that help determine the probabilities of outsider and
insider thefts;
* Data that may help clarify the likelihood that significant quantities of nuclear material
may have been stolen in the past that may still be offered for sale in the future (including
interviews with individuals known to have been nuclear thieves or to have attempted to
purchase stolen nuclear materials; assessments of how much material could potentially be
missing from different sites given past and ongoing accounting uncertainties; assessments,
in recent cases of seized nuclear material, of whether the material had been stolen recently
or long before; and interviews with selected individuals at key previously vulnerable
facilities to determine if they have any knowledge of past incidents of nuclear theft that
may have gone unreported);
* Data that may help clarify the chances of illicit nuclear buyers and sellers successfully
making contact with each other (in particular, through the kinds of sting operations
mentioned above, which can document how difficult it is for a buyer or a seller who
happens to be a government agent to successfully locate a real buyer or seller to interact
with);
* Data that may help clarify the chances of smugglers being able to ship nuclear material
across borders (as might be collected, for example, through officially sponsored "red
team" tests of how easy or difficult it was to do so).
60 For a discussion of measures in this area and their strengths and weaknesses, see Anthony Wier, "Interdicting
Nuclear Smuggling," in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass., and
Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2002;
available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/interdicting/index.asp as of 1 March 2005).
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The Probabilities of Acquisition From Nation-States, P; and Pajk)
The last option for attempting to acquire a nuclear weapon or weapon-usable nuclear
materials is from a state in possession of such items. President George W. Bush is among
those who see this acquisition path as the dominant danger: "Rogue states," he has said, "are
clearly the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for
terrorists."6' This belief determines the policy prescription: if the principal danger of
terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction is that hostile states might provide them, then
the key element of the solution is to take on those hostile states and make sure that they do not
provide them. This is the idea that animates the preemptive doctrine laid out in the 2002 and
2006 editions of the administration's National Security Strategy and that was fundamental to
the argument for going to war with Iraq.
It is certainly not correct, as is sometimes argued, that only terrorists with help from a
62state could possibly put together the capability to get and use a nuclear bomb. Under all but
a few circumstances, states are extremely unlikely to consciously decide to transfer a nuclear
weapon or weapons-usable nuclear materials in their possession to a terrorist group. Such a
decision would mean transferring the most awesome military power the state had ever
acquired to a group over which it had little control - a particularly unlikely step for dictators
or oligarchs obsessed with controlling their states and maintaining power. If the terrorists
actually used the transferred capability against the United States or one of its allies, there
would be a substantial chance that the source of the weapon or material would be traced back
to the state that provided it and that the resulting retaliation would be overwhelming, almost
certainly removing the government that decided on such a transfer.
Hence, prior to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, U.S. intelligence agencies
reportedly unanimously concluded that it was unlikely Baghdad would attempt any form of
unconventional attack on the United States except if "ongoing military operations risked the
imminent demise of his regime" or if he intended to "extract revenge" for such an assault; the
only dissent was from the State Department, who thought Saddam Hussein would not attempt
such an attack even then.63 Similarly, given the importance Pyongyang appears to attach to
regime survival, it appears extremely unlikely that North Korea would take the risk of
providing nuclear materials or weapons to terrorists unless the regime concluded that U.S.
overthrow of the regime was inevitable - or became so desperate that the revenue from a
nuclear sale came to be seen as crucial to regime survival. A decision by the Iranian
government to provide nuclear weapons or materials to al Qaeda terrorists (in the future, when
the Iranian government might have such items to provide) also appears extraordinarily
unlikely, particularly as the Sunni al Qaeda has been sponsoring widespread attacks on Shiites
in Iraq, Pakistan, and elsewhere.
61 President George W. Bush, "President Speaks on War Effort to Citadel Cadets: Remarks by the President at
the Citadel" (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, II December 2001; available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html as of 5 March 2006).
62 Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor Action, pp. 25-26.
63 Murray Waas, "Intel Reports Cast Doubt on Iraq War Justifications," Global Security Newswire, 9 March
2006 (available at http://www.nti.org/d newswire/issues/2006/3/9/541 C9625-EB23-4F5F-8A47-
1663B968B897.html as of 13 March 2006).
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 3 151
These are the reasons why, in the numerical example above, the probability of success
for an attempt to get nuclear weapons or materials from a nation-state, Pga), was assumed to
be quite low (5%). As there is no historical evidence of any terrorist attempt to acquire
nuclear weapons or materials from states, it may be that the 20% probability of terrorists
choosing to pursue this route used in the numerical example above is too high - though the
absence of publicly available confirmation of such incidents does not prove that they have not
occurred.
Steps to reduce the probability of success for attempts to get nuclear weapons or
materials from nation-states would include: (a) efforts to put together a package of carrots and
sticks that would convince the governments in Pyongyang and Tehran that it was in their
national interest to give up their nuclear ambitions (along with any nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable nuclear material North Korea may already have), so that they did not have
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material available to transfer even if they wished; (b)
steps to convince states that the United States would have a good chance of tracing the origin
of nuclear material used in a terrorist nuclear attack and would be very likely to launch a
devastating retaliation against the state that provided such items; and (c) steps to ensure that
states in a position to make such transfers do not become sufficiently desperate that such
transfers might be seen either as the last chance for regime survival or the last chance to
punish those whose actions led to the regime's collapse. Efforts such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) and improved border controls, designed to increase the chance that
such a transfer could be intercepted, should also be pursued - but given that the nuclear
materials for a bomb could easily fit into a briefcase and are quite difficult to detect, such
efforts are likely to be able only to have a modest effect on the probability of successful
transfers.
To reduce the uncertainty in estimating the parameter Pns/,k), it would be important to
collect information, to the extent possible, on:
* Past decision-making in key states such as Iraq, North Korea, and Iran relating to
cooperation with terrorists (and in particular cooperation related to weapons of mass
destruction);64
" Past decision-making by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo concerning
whether to attempt to convince a state to provide weapons of mass destruction (potentially
available from interviewing arrested former operatives of these groups); and
* Data on the difficulty of organizing a sale and physical transfer of a nuclear weapon or
nuclear materials from a developing state to a terrorist group (as might be acquired in part
through simulations and exercises).
" Considerable information on the Iraqi case may now be available from interviews with former senior officials
and from documents recovered after the 2003 war. The CIA's investigator, however, does not mention any
significant policy discussions on the subject. See Charles Duelfer, Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor
to the DCI on Iraq's WMD (Langley, Vir.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2004; available at
https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html as of 10 December 2006). Information on decision-
making in North Korea and Iran would be very difficult to collect at present, but might become more available
were these governments to change in the future.
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The Probability Terrorists Could Make a Nuclear Bomb or Detonate a
Stolen Nuclear Weapon, P,k)
As discussed in Chapter 2, getting the nuclear material is the most difficult part of
making a nuclear bomb - but making a workable bomb from most types of stolen material is
not a trivial matter. Most of the world's terrorists would have little chance of being able to
make a nuclear bomb, even if they had the nuclear material to do so. But the question of
whether a terrorist group could make a nuclear bomb only becomes relevant if the group is
sufficiently well-organized, well-financed, and sophisticated to have succeeded in acquiring a
sufficient quantity of weapons-usable nuclear material. What is important, then, is not the
probability of success for all terrorist groups, including tiny cells with little capability to do
more than a truck bomb at a bar, but the probability of success for the small subset of terrorist
groups within the set N, which includes only groups at the high-capability tail of the
distribution of terrorist capabilities.
As described in Chapter 2, unfortunately, with enough weapons-usable nuclear
material in hand, it does not take the resources of a state to design and build a crude unsafe,
unreliable nuclear bomb of uncertain yield, capable of being delivered in a van or yacht -
which may be all a terrorist group requires. A sophisticated group that had devoted the level
of organizational focus and resources required to get enough weapons-usable nuclear material
for a bomb would presumably also have devoted significant organizational resources to
pulling together the capabilities needed to make use of that material. Hence, for the small
subset of high-capability terrorist groups in the set N,, the probability of success in taking
nuclear material they had acquired and making it into a bomb that would detonate when
desired is probably substantial. That probability is probably less than even, but may be in the
range of the 40% used in the numerical example above. Fortunately, there is no record of
multiple cases of terrorists getting the material to make a nuclear bomb and attempting to
make bombs from it to draw on in estimating the value of this parameter.
In most cases, a terrorist group would first transport nuclear material from wherever it
was acquired to a safe location where it planned to do the work of manufacturing it into a
bomb and then do the actual manufacturing.s The safe location might be in one of the
dozens of "stateless zones" around the world where governments have minimal control (such
as substantial areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan),66 or it might be in an apparently ordinary
machine-shop or chemical shop in any country in the world (including, potentially, the target
65 As noted in Chapter 2, such transportation may not be essential in all cases. DOE security regulations require
facilities with nuclear material that would be especially attractive to terrorists to be able to prevent terrorists from
even being able to get into the building, to avoid the possibility that they could make a crude bomb while still in
the building.
66 The CIA estimates that there are some 50 "stateless zones" in the world and that "in half of these, terrorist
groups are thriving." See George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, testimony in Committee on Armed
Services, Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, U.S. Senate,
108th Congress, 2nd Session, 9 March 2004.
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country).67 Thus the probability of making a working bomb, Pk), can be broken into two
separate probabilities - the probability of success in transporting the material to the planned
safe location and the probability of success in manufacturing a bomb.
Today, the probability of success in transporting the material to a planned safe
location is probably quite high. Effective nuclear material detectors are installed and in use at
only a limited number of border crossings around the world and are quite observable where
they are installed, allowing terrorists and smugglers to choose other routes. Efforts to install
nuclear detectors at key border crossings, to make it more difficult for terrorists to transport
such items from wherever they acquire them to a safe location where they can work on them,
should continue - but the nuclear materials for a bomb would fit in a suitcase, their radiation
is weak and difficult to detect, and nuclear terrorists and smugglers are likely to pick
unmonitored routes. It would also be desirable to put in place more effective and practiced
procedures for responding to the discovery of a nuclear theft that had just occurred - rapid
approaches to searching the area immediately around the facility and questioning facility
personnel; rapid deployment of nuclear detectors on roads and rail-lines leading away from
the area and at nearby airports; immediate steps to inspect all shipments leaving the country
for nuclear material; and more. But it would be unwise to put undue reliance on such
measures.
As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the probability of success in manufacturing a
crude bomb will depend on the quantity and quality of nuclear material the terrorist group
acquires. If the group managed to get a sufficient quantity of HEU metal (or HEU in forms it
had the capability to convert to metal), it could make a simple "gun-type" bomb, in which two
pieces of HEU (each less than a critical mass by themselves) are slammed together at high
speed. If, on the other hand, the group had acquired plutonium, or an amount of HEU too
small for a gun-type device, the group would have to attempt the more challenging task of
building an "implosion-type" bomb, in which explosives arranged around a ball of nuclear
material are detonated so as to crush the ball to a higher density, setting off the nuclear chain
reaction.
Building an implosion bomb would be a significantly greater challenge for a terrorist
group, and the probability of success in doing so would be significantly lower than the
probability of successfully building a gun-type bomb. For this reason, some analysts have
argued for a policy that would focus primarily on securing HEU stockpiles, giving plutonium,
which cannot be used to make an effective gun-type bomb, a lower priority. 8 But a strong
case can be made that, while making an implosion bomb is substantially more difficult, many
of the groups with the sophistication needed to acquire weapons-usable nuclear material and
make it into a gun-type bomb would also be able to succeed in the task of acquiring the
67 For a scenario in which this activity takes place on an isolated farm in the United States (to avoid having the
noise from non-nuclear testing of the gun raise alarms), see Peter D. Zimmerman and Jeffrey G. Lewis, "The
Bomb in the Backyard," Foreign Policy, no. 157 (November/December 2006), pp. 32-39.
68 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling, The
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling (Monterey, Cal.:
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2004; available at
http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysis_4faces.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
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additional capabilities needed to make an implosion-type bomb; that is to say, the probability
of success might be only 40-60% as high as for an implosion-type bomb, but it is not likely to
be only 0-5% as high.
Similarly, while the need to do some chemical processing if the group acquires nuclear
material in forms other than the metal form preferred for use in a bomb would be an
additional barrier (and create additional risks that the group's work might be detected before it
was finished), the reduction in the chance of success for many important forms of nuclear
material that a group might acquire would be significant but is not likely to be anything like
an order of magnitude.
Terrorists would require some 50-60 kilograms of weapons-grade HEU for a gun-type
bomb (or more, if the material was less enriched). Substantially less material would be
needed for a crude implosion-type bomb: the Nagasaki implosion bomb, for example,
involved approximately 6 kilograms of plutonium. A comparable weapon using weapon-
grade HEU would require roughly three times more.69
Policy approaches to reducing the probability of successful manufacture of a bomb
would include (a) strengthened intelligence, law-enforcement, and counter-terrorist measures
that could increase the chance of stopping an effort to pull together the needed capabilities
while it was still in progress, make it more difficult for groups to recruit the needed
technically skilled personnel, and increase the chance of detecting such efforts, as discussed
above; (b) intelligence collection focused on particular indicators of this type of activity,
ranging from purchase of some of the books that would be most useful to a crude nuclear
weapons designer, to acquisition of certain types of high-temperature crucibles for casting
metal parts from uranium or plutonium, to release of certain types of slightly radioactive
effluents (including greatly expanded cooperation with other countries to help them put in
place capabilities to detect such activities); and (c) efforts to rebuild failed states, avoid future
failed states, and help countries gain control over "stateless zones." Such measures, however,
are not likely to cut the terrorists' chances of success dramatically: while strengthened
intelligence efforts are needed, as discussed in Chapter 2, the activities in putting together a
nuclear bomb may be small and easy to hide. And while limiting terrorists' access to
sanctuaries where they could work on a bomb program will have some impact on reducing the
risk of nuclear terrorism, such a program would also have a significant chance of being
carried out undetected in a machine-shop in any country in the world.
69 The critical mass of 93% enriched HEU is approximately three times that of weapon-grade plutonium in its
most commonly used delta phase. See, for example, H.C. Paxton and N.L. Pruvost, Critical Dimensions of
Systems Containing 235U, 239Pu, and 233 U: 1986 Revision (Los Alamos, N.M.: Los Alamos National
Laboratory, 1987; available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/lanl/lib-www/la-pubs/00209019.pdf as of 9
January 2007), pp. 97, 102.
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To reduce the uncertainty in estimating the parameter Pns,k), it would be important to
collect information, to the extent possible, on:
* The chances of success in transporting nuclear material to potential safe locations (as
might be gathered through simulations and exercises involving attempts to make such
transports);
" The current level of nuclear knowledge among groups plausibly in the set N, (an
assessment that has been a high intelligence priority for a long time, but which is very
difficult to make);
" The numbers and skills of personnel, types of equipment, and types of processes likely to
be needed for various different approaches to manufacturing a crude bomb (including an
assessment of those actually used for initial bomb manufacture, and any problems
encountered, in selected cases of state nuclear programs);
" The chances of success in recruiting personnel with the skills needed to manufacture a
crude bomb (which could again be assessed through exercises in which attempts to do so
were made);
" The chances of success in acquiring the needed equipment without detection (which could
similarly be assessed through exercises, among other approaches);
* The types of mistakes that might be made, and difficulties that might arise, in terrorists'
efforts to process nuclear material and manufacture a nuclear bomb (which could
conceivably be assessed through simulations and exercises);
" The chances of success in avoiding detection during the actual manufacturing process if it
were conducted on the territory of a failed state or in a stateless zone; and
" The chances of success in avoiding detection during the actual manufacturing process if it
were conducted in a covert facility in a functioning state.
A terrorist group that got hold of a stolen nuclear weapon would face somewhat
different challenges. As discussed in Chapter 2, weapons equipped with modern, difficult-to-
bypass electronic locks, environmental sensing devices, and the like might be quite difficult
for a terrorist group to figure out how to detonate. Older weapons not equipped with such
features would pose a smaller challenge, but still a significant one. Terrorists trying to
detonate such a weapon could benefit substantially from help from a knowledgeable insider -
but even that might not be enough, as the electronic locks are specifically intended to prevent
insiders from being able to set the weapons off without authorization. If they could not figure
out how to detonate a stolen weapon, terrorists might choose to remove the nuclear material
from it and seek to fashion it into a bomb. In any case, terrorists who had a stolen nuclear
weapon would be in a position to make fearsome threats-for no one would know for sure
whether they could set it off or not.
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The Probability Terrorists Would Deliver a Nuclear Bomb, Pdjk)
Unfortunately, the chance that terrorists could successfully smuggle a nuclear bomb
into any major country is high, despite the nuclear detection measures that have been put in
place since 9/11. Attempting to protect the United States from nuclear terrorism by detecting
and stopping nuclear contraband at the U.S. borders is like a football team defending at its
own goal line - but with that goal line stretched to thousands of kilometers, much of it
unguarded wilderness, with millions of people and vehicles legitimately crossing it every
70year. Moreover, while Osama bin Laden has spoken of using nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons for "deterrence," the chance that a group that went to the effort involved
in getting a nuclear bomb would decide to use it seems likely to be high. These are the
reasons for the 70% estimate, used in the numerical example above, for the probability that
terrorists would decide to, and be able to, deliver and detonate a nuclear bomb should they
succeed in making one.
Policy options for reducing this probability would include (a) beefing up detection and
interdiction capabilities at all national borders (as well as within potential target countries);
(b) steps to attempt to deter terrorists from using such a capability; and (c) efforts to make the
case within the communities from which terrorists draw support that the use of nuclear
weapons to murder innocents on a mass scale is morally illegitimate. Each of these
approaches might reduce the risk by a few percent; only the last, however, seems to have any
significant hope of having a larger impact.
To reduce the uncertainty in estimating the parameter Pdak), it would be important to
collect information, to the extent possible, on:
" The chances of success in transporting a nuclear weapon into potential target countries by
various routes (as might be gathered through simulations and exercises involving attempts
to make such transports); and
" The thinking of terrorist groups that might be within the set N, concerning the actual use
of weapons of mass destruction, should they acquire them.
The Consequences of a Terrorist Nuclear Attack, C,
The consequences of a terrorist nuclear blast - turning the heart of any major city into
a modem Hiroshima - are almost too horrible to contemplate. Tens or hundreds of thousands
of people could be killed, with total economic costs in the trillions of dollars. As noted above,
the worldwide economic repercussions could drive a global economic depression, affecting
countries far beyond the borders of the state attacked. Terrorists might exert blackmail or
cause panic by claiming to have a second bomb. The reaction after such an attack is difficult
to predict but would almost certainly by ugly. The world as we know it would be changed
profoundly. It is difficult to monetize all of these consequences, but it is clear their magnitude
is large; the $4 trillion estimate used in the numerical example above may even be an
understatement.
70 For useful discussions, see Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe; Wier,
"Interdicting Nuclear Smuggling."
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A substantial fraction of the damage from a nuclear blast is immediate and no amount
of preparedness ahead of time would reduce it. There are, however, steps that could be taken
to reduce some of the consequences, if nations chose to make substantial investments in doing
so - ranging from resilient arrangements to ensure continuity of government and of critical
private business operations, to preparing to provide massive surge capacity for treating burn
and radiation victims, to better plans to evacuate people from the projected path of the
radioactive fallout.
To reduce the uncertainty in estimating the parameter Cc, it would be important to
collect information, to the extent possible, on:
" The likely casualties and direct economic damage resulting from nuclear blasts in
different potential target cities;
" The likely effects of such a blast on government and economic actors' ability to function
effectively;
" Capabilities in place to evacuate populations in a timely way, treat the burned, irradiated,
and wounded, and to recover and reconstruct (including what responses to other large-
scale recent disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, may have to say about such capabilities);
* Steps terrorists might take to blackmail the target country or sow panic in the wake of
such an attack; and
" Likely follow-on economic impacts of such an attack.
The Dynamics of the System
As described in Chapter 5, national systems for securing nuclear stockpiles and the
global system that is the aggregation of those national systems are strongly incident-driven.
When the attack on the Munich Olympics in 1972 demonstrated that a carefully planned
attack by a well-trained, well-armed terrorist team in the middle of a developed state like
Germany was a realistic threat, the United States and a number of other countries significantly
upgraded nuclear security. When stolen HEU and plutonium began turning up in Europe in
the mid-1990s, major international cooperative programs were launched to attempt to beef up
security and accounting for nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. After
the 9/11 attacks, the United States beefed up nuclear security at its own facilities and sought
to accelerate cooperation with Russia to do the same, and a number of other countries also
toughened their nuclear security rules. Nevertheless, as described in Chapter 2, scores of
facilities around the world remain dangerously insecure.
Were there to be a well-documented frontal assault on a nuclear facility by a terrorist
team, this would almost certainly lead to major increases in investments against protection
from such outsider attacks at facilities around the world. Similarly, an acknowledged and
well-documented insider theft perpetrated by a conspiracy of several insiders working
together would likely cause countries around the world to review their requirements for
protecting against such insider thefts. (The nuclear thefts that have taken place to date have
typically been perpetrated by individual outsider or insider thieves, with no connection to
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particular terrorist groups; most nuclear facilities around the world believe they are already
sufficiently protected against modest threats of that kind, so these thefts did not have a
comparable galvanizing effect.)
At the same time, as discussed above, terrorists will take note of increased security
measures being put in place and can either shift to target facilities where comparable upgrades
have not taken place; attempt to recruit more people, acquire stronger weaponry, and develop
better plans and training, so as to take on the enhanced security measures; or turn to any of the
wide range of terrorist options other than attempting to get and use nuclear explosives (the
latter being the best success that a nuclear security system can hope for). Over time, if major
incidents do not occur again, complacency is likely to set in, nuclear security measures are
likely to relax, and vulnerabilities will begin to increase again. Thus, the choices of states to
invest in nuclear security and terrorists to choose their strategies in response represent a long-
term strategic game with many moves - a game that is likely to last as long as nuclear
weapons and their essential ingredients coexist in the world with terrorist groups bent on
wreaking mass destruction.
Conclusions
The model presented here cannot, in itself, eliminate the huge uncertainties in
estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism. But as this chapter has attempted to show, the use of
such a model can break the problem into one of estimating a series of parameters for which
(in many cases) at least some basis for judgment exists - in technical analysis or historical
experience or both - and can help identify additional pieces of information that could reduce
the uncertainty in estimating each of those parameters. It also makes it possible to identify
policy options to modify each of the parameters to reduce the risk and to explore
quantitatively what the effect of such policy options might be.
Overall, the result is not surprising: it appears that the most promising policy options
are based on a forward defense, combining strengthened counter-terrorism policies that could
both reduce the number of groups contemplating nuclear violence and their likely
effectiveness with a rapid global campaign to beef up security or remove the nuclear stocks
from the world's most vulnerable sites. Once terrorists have gotten hold of a nuclear weapon
or the materials to make one, the policy options available to reduce the danger that they will
commit nuclear terrorism become far more limited. The great advantage of policies focused
on keeping nuclear weapons and materials locked down at their sources is that the nations in
control of these items know where they are; getting the job of putting in place improved
security in place done is a matter of diplomacy, political will, and allocation of resources, not
a matter of searching for a needle in a haystack. But once a nuclear weapon or the nuclear
material to make one has walked out the door, it could be anywhere and the problems of
finding and recovering it multiply a thousand-fold.
The uncertainties in estimating the risk are large, but even a risk dramatically smaller
than that estimated in the numerical example used here would justify a broad range of actions
to reduce the threat. And the very uncertainty of the danger highlights what we do not know -
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including the possibility that a major nuclear theft could be in the planning stages at any time.
There is, in short, no time to lose.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 3160
4. Identifying the Highest Risks of Nuclear Theft
On 22 August 2002, the United States government, working with the governments of
Yugoslavia and Russia, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the private
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), helped to airlift 48 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
(HEU) from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences in Belgrade to a secure facility in Russia,
where it was blended down to low-enriched uranium.' The operation was carried out under
intense security, with 1,200 armed Yugoslav and Serb troops guarding the material as it made
its way to the airport. Characterizing the material as sufficient for two and a half nuclear
bombs, the State Department hailed the operation as a major victory in the struggle to keep
nuclear weapons material out of terrorist hands.2
But had the identical material been physically located at a U.S. research reactor
regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), it would have required few security
measures - because nuclear materials at research reactors are exempt from all but the most
basic NRC physical protection requirements. 3 Similarly, if the Vinca material had been
located at a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility, it would have been considered only
Category II material, requiring relatively modest security measures (though more than those
required at an NRC-regulated research reactor) - because of internal DOE rules on how the
dangers of theft posed by different types of material should be ranked, which are starkly
different from the categorization systems the United States insisted on in international
standards such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations on
physical protection and the physical protection convention.4 While these DOE rules are in the
process of being reconsidered, they remained in force as of the end of 2006.
1 For an account of the Vinca operation, see Philipp C. Bleek, "Project Vinca: Lessons for Securing Civil
Nuclear Material Stockpiles," Nonproliferation Review (Fall-Winter 2003; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/NonProRev-Bleek.pdf as of 28 September 2005). For a
discussion that puts this operation in the context of several others, and makes recommendations for streamlining
the process of such removals of nuclear material in the future, see Philipp C. Bleek, Global Cleanout: An
Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom,
Harvard University, 2004; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/
bleekglobalcleanout.pdf as of 13 April 2005).
2 "Fact Sheet: Project Vinca" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 23 August 2002; available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/12962.htm as of 28 September 2005).
' The NRC physical protection regulations are in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Part 73-Physical
Protection of Plants and Materials," in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office; available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part073/full-
text.html as of 28 September 2005). Section 73.6(e) exempts special nuclear material at all "non-power reactors"
from nearly all of NRC's physical protection requirements. The very modest remaining requirements that
research reactors with 5 kilograms or more of U-235 in HEU must meet can be found at Section 73.60. Research
reactors are exempt from even these requirements if the U-235 is in irradiated fuel emitting more than 100 rem
per hour at 3 feet - a level of radiation that is not remotely sufficient to deter suicidal terrorists, as discussed later
in this chapter.
4 Both the evolving DOE rules and the international rules on categorization of nuclear material are discussed
extensively in this chapter.
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In short, the problem of how to assess which materials, at which facilities, pose the
most urgent dangers of nuclear theft remains one where there is little consensus and much
inconsistency. Remarkably, it appears that neither the U.S. government nor the IAEA yet has
a prioritized list assessing which facilities around the world pose the most serious risks of
nuclear theft - that is, a list that integrates assessments of factors such as the quantity and
quality of material at each site (and therefore the chance that adversaries could make a nuclear
bomb from it), the security at that site, and the level of capability adversaries might be able to
bring to bear for a theft attempt in the area where the site exists. But in a world of limited
resources - not only of money but of the time and attention of senior officials and the political
capital needed to convince facilities and countries to cooperate - it is crucial to develop such
an assessment of the highest priorities to be addressed. While no single government or
international organization can control nuclear security worldwide, considerable efforts are
being invested in reducing the risks of nuclear theft (by the United States, the IAEA, and
other governments), and it is clearly important to ensure that those investments are targeted on
reducing the highest risks. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/1l attacks, IAEA
Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei identified such a prioritization as the most urgent
step the world community needed to take: "the most immediate task is to achieve a more
complete picture of nuclear security worldwide, to enable a rapid response to the most urgent
needs, and to develop a coherent plan for longer term action." 5 This chapter provides a
systematic risk-based method for developing such an assessment of "the most urgent needs."
Past assessments of these issues have generally focused on qualitative descriptions of
how "easy" or "difficult" it would be, for example, to make a bomb from particular types of
materials; 6 similarly, they have typically focused on some particular level of adversary
capability as the maximum "credible," and estimated risk reduction by estimating decreases in
the ability of that specified level of capability to succeed, rather than treating adversary
capabilities as a continuous spectrum with some probability of capabilities above and below
the specified level. (The question that might be asked in these types of studies might be "how
much would the proposed upgrade reduce the probability that 3-5 well-armed attackers in
league with one well-placed insider would be able to steal material from this facility?"7) The
' L. Wedekind, "Upgrading Nuclear Security Tops Board Agenda" (Vienna: International Atomic Energy
Agency, I February 2002; available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2002/0I022002_news0l.shtml as
of 4 October 2005).
6 See, for example, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Panel on Reactor-Related Options, Management and
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1995; available at http://books.nap.edu/html/plutonium/0309051452.pdf as of 30 December 2006). This
study gives 1-5 ratings for the quality of different types of nuclear material, but makes no attempt to convert
those ratings into estimates of the risk posed by such materials.
' This is the general approach to vulnerability assessment at nuclear sites in the United States, based on a fixed
"design basis threat" (DBT) that facilities are required to defend against. For a study that is particularly explicit
in describing a reduction in the chance that one particular DBT could steal material as a reduction in the overall
risk, see William C. Brundson, "Nuclear Terrorism Risk Reduction: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the
Department of Energy's United States/Russian Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
Program" (Ph.D. dissertation, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 2005). In this
chapter, I use the notion of the level of "adversary capability" and the level of "threat" more or less
interchangeably, much as the term "threat" is used in the phrase "design basis threat."
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approach taken in this chapter, by contrast, is explicitly based on quantitative estimates of
probabilities and risks, much like probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for nuclear safety.
(Indeed, offering a method that is explicitly based on thinking about adversary capabilities as
a probability distribution, rather than a fixed maximum credible threat, is one of the major
contributions of this chapter.)
There is an obvious problem with applying this approach to security, which is the
difficulty of assessing the probability of various actions by intelligent adversaries who can
change their tactics and develop their capabilities in response to defensive measures that may
be put in place. In the case of safety, it is possible to collect historical data on matters such as
the probability of earthquakes of varying magnitudes, or the rate of occurrence of various
types of human errors, and base future predictions on this past experience, because no one is
consciously trying to increase the chance that the system will fail. Estimating the probability
of types of events that have never occurred before is an obvious problem, but there is usually
at least some historical data on which judgments can be based. In the case of security, by
contrast, adversaries are trying to make the system fail and will presumably change their
approaches in order to increase their chance of success. For the risk analyst, thinking through
all the varieties of creative malevolence adversaries might come up with is a difficult
problem, and the types of actions adversaries have taken before is a less reliable guide to the
likelihood that they will do so in the future. On September 10, 2001, very few people would
have said that an attack involving four well-trained teams of 4-5 dedicated, suicidal
individuals each, hijacking four separate airliners at approximately the same time with no
prior warning and using them to kill thousands of people was a threat with a high enough
probability to be worth worrying about very much.
Nevertheless, judgments about whether to invest more to protect a particular type of
material or not, or whether to put higher priority on upgrading security at one facility rather
than another, are inevitably based on judgments about relative risks - either implicit or
explicit. The method described in this chapter helps structure thinking - and may help
highlight important risks that have so far been ignored - by making these implicit judgments
explicit.
Estimating the absolute magnitude of the risk of nuclear theft at any given facility or
transport leg is effectively impossible, given the immense uncertainties in essentially all of the
relevant parameters.8 There is more hope of developing reasonable estimates of relative risks
8 Attempts to estimate the absolute magnitude of terrorism risks posed by individual facilities can create
dangerously misleading results - especially if they simply assume that the future will be the same as the past. In
one recent study by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), for example, commissioned by the Nuclear
Energy Institute (NEI), the authors argued that even though they estimated a 35% chance that an attack by
terrorist saboteurs on a U.S. nuclear plant would be successful in defeating the plant's defenses, the risk to the
public from possible terrorist attacks on U.S. reactors was nevertheless negligibly small. This was because (a)
terrorists would probably not attack (such attacks were estimated as having an average frequency of once every
2,500 years!), and (b) terrorists would probably be too incompetent to cause a major release even if they did
attack and did succeed in overcoming the plant's defenses (assessed as only 1% chance of a major release). As it
is impossible to calculate either of these probabilities, the study's conclusion that the risk is extremely low has
no defensible basis. Doug True et al., Risk Characterization of the Potential Consequences of an Armed
Terrorist Ground Attack on a U.S Nuclear Power Plant (Palo Alto, Cal.: Electric Power Research Institute,
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- that is, whether one facility poses more or less risk than another. Even in that case, the large
uncertainties in estimating the probability that potential adversaries will attempt, or be able, to
carry out various tasks - such as chemically processing uranium-aluminum research reactor
fuel to recover uranium metal, to take just one example - means that any estimation of
relative nuclear theft risks, even one informed by all available classified information, will
inevitably contain a large element of technical judgment. Estimates of some of the parameters
are, in effect, educated guesses. There is room for honest disagreement over the relative
difficulty of various possible routes terrorists might take to the bomb - and therefore over the
relative risks posed by different materials at different facilities. Nevertheless, current national
and international rules and recommendations calling for "graded safeguards," which call for
materials that would be easier to use to construct a nuclear explosive to receive higher levels
of security, are inevitably based on such judgments about the relative difficulty of different
paths to the bomb.
In this chapter, I will present a number of key judgments on these matters. Each of
these judgments is subject to debate, but by presenting a systematic framework for analysis, I
hope to provide a structure that will make it possible for participants in such a debate to
identify specifically where they differ, discuss the reasons for their varying perspectives, and
ultimately narrow their differences. The approach draws very directly on the risk model
presented in Chapter 3, focusing on how different aspects of the security level for facilities
and transport legs around the world, the spectrum of adversary capabilities that might be
involved in theft attempts at these facilities and transport legs, and the quantity and quality of
nuclear material affect the probability of successful theft and the probability of subsequent
successful bomb-making.
Because of the complexities and uncertainties that make it impossible to make
absolute estimates of risk - or even indisputable relative rankings of risk among different
facilities - regulations and other policies relating to nuclear security should be "risk-
informed," taking insights from attempts to explicitly estimate risks of different facilities into
account along with other means of making judgments about priorities, rather than "risk-
based," relying only on quantitative risk calculations. Such a mix of explicit probabilistic risk
analysis and technical judgment is generally also the best practice with respect to safety of
highly complex systems.9
In this chapter, I will proceed as follows. First, I describe the factors that determine
the risk of nuclear theft from particular facilities and transport legs, offering an example
involving two hypothetical countries with different risk profiles to be assessed. Second, I
examine the spectrum of plausible capabilities and characteristics that nuclear thieves might
2003; available at http://www.nei.org/documents/EPRINuclearPlantConsequencesStudy20032.pdf as of 26
September 2005). Only the Executive Summary of this report has been made publicly available, and therefore
the reasoning behind these remarkable conclusions is not provided.
9 George E. Apostolakis, "How Useful Is Quantitative Risk Assessment?" Risk Analysis 24, no. 3 (2004). For a
discussion of this problem as it relates specifically to physical protection vulnerability assessment, see Matthew
Bunn, "Systems Approaches to Security for Nuclear Materials and Facilities", Presentation, "Research Seminar
in Engineering Systems," Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: Managing the Atom
Project, Harvard University, 4 December 2001).
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bring to bear in attempting to carry out a theft. Third, I describe how different types of
information about the potential adversary capabilities in different countries might be used to
inform assessments concerning the probability that nuclear thieves would have various levels
of capability in different countries. Fourth, I describe how other categories of information
could be used to judge the effectiveness of nuclear security systems at different facilities and
transport legs in defeating these various potential levels of adversary capability. Fifth, I
examine the spectrum of plausible capabilities that the recipients of a stolen nuclear weapon
or stolen nuclear material might bring to bear for the task of turning the stolen items into a
usable nuclear explosive capability. Sixth, I provide an extended discussion of current
approaches to categorizing what types of nuclear material require what levels of security; after
examining how a wide range of barriers posed by the physical form of material that might be
stolen (including isotopic, radiological, chemical, and size and mass barriers, among others)
would affect the odds that different types of adversaries would be able to gain a usable
nuclear explosive capability from them, I propose a new approach to categorizing nuclear
materials for nuclear security purposes. A briefer discussion of the potential usability of
stolen nuclear weapons with different characteristics follows that discussion of materials. I
then summarize the risk assessment method developed in the chapter and provide an example,
applying two different approaches to the method to a set of example countries to assess the
nuclear theft risks there. Finally, I discuss how opportunity can be integrated with risk in
assigning priorities, so that reductions in nuclear risk that can be achieved easily can be
addressed quickly even if they are not the highest-risk sites.
The Factors That Determine Theft Risk
The risk of any event is the probability of that event multiplied by its consequences.
Hence even low-probability events may pose high risks if their consequences are
catastrophically high, as would be the case if terrorists were to get and use a nuclear bomb.
The risk of nuclear theft from any particular facility or transport leg, R, is the
probability that a theft attempt will occur there, Pat, multiplied by the probability that such an
attempt would be successful, Ps(a), multiplied by the consequences of theft of the particular
types of weapons or materials present at that facility, C:
R = PP C
This approach is effectivelv identical to the risk equation used in assessing physical
protection measures at DOE sites.
'0 This approach is effectively identical to the "risk equation" used in assessing physical protection measures at
DOE sites, where the probability of successful theft is expressed as one minus the probability that the security
system would be effective in defeating the attempt, or I -PE:
R = P,,(I - PE )
See, for example, Byron Gardner, "Process of System Design and Analysis," paper presented at Workshop on
Physical Protection, Moscow, 11-14 September 1995 (available at http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/
112931-7hNczP/webviewable/112931.pdf as of 9 January 2007). This approach is valid even though Pa, and
Ps(aQ) are not likely to be independent (the probablity of a theft attempt is presumably higher at facilities where
adversaries judge the probability of the attempt being successful to be higher). In essence, Psra,) is a conditional
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What factors affect the terms in this equation? As outlined in Chapter 3, the
probability that a nuclear theft attempt would be successful, Ps(a,), is, in essence, the
probability that the capability that the thieves manage to bring to bear turns out to be more
than the security system for that facility or transport leg can defeat. Hence, the security level
for a particular facility or transport leg and the level of adversary capability that thieves might
be able to bring to bear in a particular country or region are the first-order terms in estimating
the probability that a theft attempt would be successful."
The potential consequences, should nuclear theft occur, are the possibility that this
would lead to either a proliferating state or a terrorist group gaining a nuclear explosive
capability that they would not otherwise have acquired - or sooner than they otherwise would
have acquired it. The ultimate consequence might well be the detonation of a nuclear bomb in
a major city, with the loss of tens or hundreds of thousands of lives, hundreds of billions to
trillions of dollars in economic damage, and far-reaching social and political effects. In this
chapter, rather than repeating the very rough estimates of the magnitude of these
consequences from Chapter 3, 1 will use the probability that adversaries would be able to
transform the stolen items into at least one substantial-yield nuclear explosive capability, P.,
as an indicator of the consequences of theft from any given facility, so an adjusted risk factor,
Ra, would be given by:
R =t P aP,
This is a simplification of the reality. It assumes, in effect, that the consequences of
any substantial-yield terrorist nuclear bomb are so immense that one should not focus unduly
on the additional consequences if the yield were very large (as might be the case if terrorists
managed to detonate a stolen weapon from the arsenal of a major state, rather than making a
crude bomb of their own from stolen nuclear material), or if the terrorists managed to detonate
two, or five, or ten weapons. Obviously the consequences in those cases would be higher -
and in a worst case, one might imagine a breakpoint where nearly infinite consequences
probability, the probability that an attempt would be successful given the circumstance that an attempt has
occurred - and therefore its influence on the chance that a theft would occur does not affect the validity of the
approach.
It is easy to show that any or all of these factors can be normalized (so that some particular value
corresponds to a particular chosen number, such as 1.0) by multiplying both sides of the equation by a constant,
without affecting the resulting relative risk rankings between different facilities and transport legs. Later in this
chapter, for example, I will introduce a "discount factor" describing the difficulty of making a nuclear bomb
from the stolen items, where the most attractive materials (actual nuclear weapons, or large quantities of HEU
metal) will have discount factors of 1.0, and all other materials will have discount factors somewhere between 0
and 1.0.
" Certain aspects of what has been called the "environment" at the nuclear facility - such as whether large
quantities of material are being processed by hand on a regular basis, at one extreme, or all the material is always
locked in a vault to which almost no one has access, on the other extreme - also affect the probability of theft.
As discussed later in this chapter, these elements of the "environment" can usually be included in assessments
either of the security level at a facility or transport leg, or of the insider threat there. For a discussion of this
"environment" factor, see J.P. Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, SAND97-8203
(Albuquerque, N.M.: Sandia National Laboratories, 1996; available at http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/
437625-gCUCGr/webviewable/437625.pdf as of 14 August October 2006).
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would ensue, if terrorists managed to get a number of nuclear weapons sufficient to
effectively cause a major state to collapse as a functioning society.
Equally clearly, however, the difference between zero terrorist nuclear weapons and
one is a gigantic, yawning gap: any effective policy to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism
must ensure that any facility or transport leg with even one weapon, or one bomb's worth of
nuclear material, is secure enough to reduce the risk it poses to a low level. Hence, that is
what the method proposed here focuses on. This simplification has only a modest effect on
the recommended policies resulting from the analysis, as stringent security measures are
clearly needed at any site with one nuclear weapon or the material to make one, and it is
difficult to make the case that security measures should be dramatically different for a site
with enough material for two or three bombs. (This is also implicitly the approach taken in
existing U.S. and international nuclear security rules, where all sites with enough attractive
nuclear material for even one improvised nuclear device require very high levels of
protection, and sites with enough material for more devices do not require more.) If after
providing stringent security measures for sites with one nuclear weapon or the material to
make one, policy-makers choose to put in place even more stringent security measures for
sites with somewhat larger numbers of weapons or somewhat more material, there is no
reason to challenge this choice; but it should be seen as an additional measure once the urgent
task of providing effective security for all the facilities and transport legs with at least one
nuclear bomb or its essential ingredients has been addressed. (Indeed, as discussed in more
detail in a later section, because of the possibility of accumulating material from more than
one theft, even sites with only half or a quarter of the material needed for a nuclear bomb
require significant security measures.)
The factors that determine P., the probability that a nuclear theft will lead to the
recipients of the stolen items gaining a usable nuclear explosive capability vary depending on
whether it is nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials that have been stolen. As
discussed later in this chapter, in the case of a stolen nuclear weapon, this probability is
determined by the capabilities of the recipient group and by the efficacy of the safeguards
incorporated into the weapon (for those attempting to set the weapon off) or the quantity and
type of nuclear material inside the weapon (for those who might attempt to mine the weapon
for nuclear material to make a bomb). In the case of stolen nuclear material, the probability
that the recipients would be able to make a bomb from it is determined by their capabilities
and by the quantity and quality of the nuclear material they receive - issues discussed in
considerable detail in later sections.
The probability that a nuclear theft attempt will occur at a particular facility or
transport leg is affected by the same factors that affect the other two terms: that probability
will be higher for a facility or transport leg in an area with higher potential adversary
capabilities (e.g., higher in Pakistan than in Canada); it will be higher for facilities with
12 am grateful to John P. Holdren for emphasizing this point. For a critique of the simplification used here,
emphasizing that there would be large differences in the number of deaths and the quantity of economic damage
between small terrorist nuclear blasts and very large ones, see Michael Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).
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weaker security, where adversaries would likely judge they had a better chance of carrying
out a theft successfully; and it will be higher for facilities with weapons or materials that
would give the recipients a better chance of achieving their goal of a usable nuclear explosive
capability. (Non-rational factors, such as how famous a particular facility may be, or how
closely linked it may be to some controversial military activity, may also factor into thieves'
decisions concerning where to make a theft attempt, but these are difficult to predict in
advance, and are therefore difficult to include in assessments of the relative risk posed by
different facilities or transport legs.)
Hence, in assessing which facilities pose the largest risks of nuclear theft, the most
critical factors are:
1. the security level for the facility or transport leg (that is, what types of adversaries the
security in place is able to defeat);
2. the likely distribution of capabilities of insider and outsider adversaries where the facility
or transport leg in question is located;
3. the quantity of weapons-usable nuclear material available to be stolen (and in particular
whether there is enough for a crude terrorist bomb); and
4. the quality of the material or warheads that might be stolen (that is, how difficult to
overcome are the barriers to making a bomb created by the form of the material, whether
these are created by its mass and bulk, its radioactivity, its chemical form, or its isotopic
composition, or to detonating the weapon posed by the type of safeguards with which the
weapon is equipped).
An Illustration: Nuclear Theft Risks in Two Hypothetical Countries
As an illustration of how factors such as security level, adversary capability level, and
quantity and quality of material might interact to affect the overall risk of nuclear theft,
consider two hypothetical countries. (The numbers used in this example are purely
illustrative; in the real world, it would be very difficult to assess either the spectrum of
adversary capabilities or the capability of security systems to defeat them so precisely.) Each
country has only one facility with weapons-usable nuclear material. Country A has relatively
low outsider and insider threats, while Country B faces higher potential adversary capabilities
- as might be evidenced, for example, by the scale and frequency of terrorist attacks or insider
theft conspiracies that take place there. (Indicators that might be used to assess these various
factors are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.) Because of the higher threat it faces
and various other bureaucratic and political drivers, Country B has more substantial security
measures in place at its nuclear facility. But the quantity and quality of the material at
Country A's facility is better, making it easier to make a nuclear bomb from material stolen
from the facility in Country A. If one divides the various plausible levels of adversary
capability into bins, each with an estimated probability that a theft attempt would have a
capability in that range and each with an estimated probability that the security system in
place would be able to defeat a capability in that range (rather than the more conceptual
continuous distribution of threats and security levels from Chapter 3), the situation might
appear roughly as shown in Table 4.1. (In this table, probabilities in the column "Attempt
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Table 4.1: The Risk of Nuclear Theft in Two Hypothetical Countries
Country A Country B
Threat Level Attempt prob. Success prob. Attempt prob. Success prob.
at this level at this level at this level at this level
Beyond design threats 0.01 1.0 0.05 1.0
10-15 well-armed 0.09 0.95 0.15 0.7
outsiders,
and/or 1-4 insiders
4-9 well-armed outsiders, 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.4
and/or 1-2 insiders
1-3 well-armed outsiders, 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.05
and/or 1 insider
1 unarmed outsider, 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.0
or 1 poorly placed insider
Prob. theft attempt is 0.41 0.33
successful
Prob. of theft attempt 0.1 0.2
Prob. of bomb-making 0.4 0.2
Probability of theft + 0.0164 0.0132
bomb-making
prob. at this level" are the probabilities if a theft attempt actually occurs, and sum to one; the
resulting probability that a theft attempt would be successful if it occurred is then multiplied
by the probability of such an attempt occurring at all, and the probability that the items stolen
in a successful theft could successfully be made into bomb to find an overall probability of
theft and bomb-making.)
As can be seen, the facilities in Country A are only well-protected (that is, the
probability of successful theft is low) in the case of modest adversary capabilities, but large
groups of attackers or insider conspiracies of several well-placed individuals would be almost
certain to succeed in stealing nuclear material from its facility. Country B's more substantial
security systems offer almost complete protection against modest adversary capabilities, and
some significant chance of defeating even the larger capabilities. (In both cases, though,
adversaries with capabilities well beyond those envisioned in the security system's design
would be essentially certain to succeed in defeating the security systems.) Overall, Country B
faces a roughly 50% higher chance that a successful theft will occur, despite its more effective
security arrangements, because of the higher chance that a theft attempt will occur in Country
B and the higher chance that if an attempt does occur, it will include a more capable set of
adversaries. But because the material in Country A would be easier to use to make a nuclear
bomb - giving the adversaries twice as high a likelihood of succeeding in that step, compared
to the material in Country B - the facility in Country A poses a higher overall risk than the
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facility in Country B, despite the much smaller chance of a theft attempt and the less capable
likely adversaries in Country A.13
Most policy-makers, before having gone through an analysis of this kind, might
assume that facilities in countries like Country A - which might correspond, for example, to
countries like Japan or Belgium - pose little risk, compared to countries facing higher terrorist
threats and higher dangers of insider theft conspiracies. That may indeed be the case,
depending on just how different the probabilities of various types of theft attempt are; but it
would be unwise to assume that the danger of nuclear theft in countries such as Japan and
Belgium is acceptably low until analysis has supported that conclusion.
The remainder of this chapter will discuss each of these factors in turn, assessing their
effect on overall risk. The chapter will then examine U.S. and international approaches to
categorizing which quantities and qualities of material require what levels of security and
propose a modified approach.
Preference vs. Probability
The approach in this chapter focuses on risk - the probability that an item could be
stolen and the probability that such a theft would result in terrorists gaining a usable nuclear
weapons capability. Issues such as the number of person-hours of work required to process
the stolen material into a bomb, or the quantity of acid needed to dissolve the material, may
strongly affect which materials terrorists would prefer to have, but may have only modest
effects on the probability that adversaries will succeed in turning the stolen materials into a
usable bomb before they are stopped. In an extreme case, a material modification that would
impose more work on potential terrorists who received such stolen material but would not
reduce their chances of success in that work would not significantly reduce the risk of nuclear
terrorism; hence, to keep risk at an acceptable level, the modified material would require the
same level of protection as unmodified material would.
The Probabilistic Spectrum of Capabilities of Plausible Thieves
Both the probability of nuclear theft and the probability that theft would lead to a
usable nuclear capability depend crucially on the capabilities and tactics of the potential
adversaries in question. It is useful, in thinking about the kinds of capabilities that matter, to
divide the potential adversaries into thieves (those who carry out the actual theft of the nuclear
weapon or nuclear material) and recipients (those who may receive the stolen items and
ultimately attempt to get a usable nuclear explosive out of them). While both of these stages
of the operation might be carried out by the same group (or different parts of the same
adversary network), they involve quite different capabilities.' 4
13 Note that, because nuclear material is so readily transportable, the variance in adversary capabilities from one
country to another should be considered in assessing the probability of the initial theft, but should not be a major
factor in considering the consequences of that theft. Just because the terrorists in a particular country were
considered incapable of making a bomb would not mean that a theft of HEU in that country would have no
substantial consequences, as the bomb-making may be done by others, in other countries.
14 In most cases, in addition to the original theft and the processing of the material into a usable nuclear
explosive, there would also be transport of the material from the theft site to another site suitable for the
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Before discussing approaches to assessing threat levels, security levels, and the
environment at different types of nuclear facilities, it is worth briefly discussing the spectrum
of plausible capabilities that thieves might bring to bear to steal nuclear weapons or materials.
As already noted (and discussed in Chapter 3), potential thieves may have a broad range of
different levels of capability - and for many facilities and transport legs, equipped with
substantial security systems, only the highest-capability thieves are likely to have any
significant probability of successfully stealing a nuclear bomb or enough material to make
one. (Later, before discussing different quantities and qualities of nuclear material, there will
be a similar brief discussion of the spectrum of plausible capabilities of potential recipients.)
There are limits to the threat any nuclear security system can handle. No plausible
nuclear security system will protect nuclear warheads or materials from theft by a rogue
division of armed troops or by a conspiracy of all the top management of the facility where
these items reside. At the opposite end of the spectrum, security systems involving only
modest cost and inconvenience can prevent theft by a single outsider or a single poorly placed
insider. Between these extremes, nuclear security systems incorporating more or less
stringent measures would have different probabilities of successfully stopping a theft attempt.
Individuals or groups who might try to steal a nuclear weapon or nuclear material fall on a
probabilistic spectrum of capabilities, which probably includes many potential thieves with
only modest capabilities (who could be deterred or defeated by relatively modest nuclear
security measures) and fewer and fewer groups having the needed capabilities as the task
becomes more difficult.
Conceptualizing the problem of the range of different capabilities thieves might have
as a spectrum of greater or lesser capability - an essentially one-dimensional concept - is
itself a substantial simplification, as thieves' characteristics may vary across several
dimensions, and different security systems may be better designed to handle one type of
adversary strength than another. A site with highly trained access controllers with a
questioning attitude may be well-equipped to defeat thieves planning to rely on deception (for
example, wearing official uniforms and using forged official IDs to attempt to enter), while
another site whose guards are heavily armed and trained in tactical response may be better
equipped for defeating adversaries planning to rely on a frontal attack. Some of the obvious
potential variations in the characteristics of plausible thieves are discussed below.
As discussed in Chapter 3, one key distinction in describing the types of plausible theft
threats is between thefts by insiders (people with authorized access to the facility and its
material, possibly with detailed knowledge of the facility's security system and its
weaknesses), by outsiders without such authorized access, or by both insiders and outsiders
working together. Typically a conspiracy of both insiders and outsiders is the most difficult
manufacture of the bomb, and possibly transport of the bomb to the target. Additional groups may be involved
in this chain, and the stolen items may conceivably pass through several sets of hands between thieves and
recipients. But because the essential ingredients of a nuclear bomb are small and difficult to detect, and hence
relatively easy to transport and smuggle across national borders, the most important adversary capabilities in
determining the overall risk are likely to be those of the thieves and the recipients, and hence they will be the
focus in this chapter.
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threat for a physical protection system to defend against, particularly if it includes multiple
insiders.
Another important distinction is whether the theft is to be covert (done in the hope of
keeping the effort a secret, at least until after the nuclear material has been removed), or overt,
that is, done with no attempt to hide the fact that a theft was underway (typically by force). A
typical example of an overt, forcible theft would be an armed robbery at a bank. From the
thieves' point of view, there are immense advantages to a covert theft; in the case an overt
theft, even if it is successful in getting a weapon or material out of the facility, the thieves will
have to cope with nearly immediate response and pursuit. 5 Appropriate use of security
cameras and other monitoring mechanisms, however, can make it very difficult for a theft
attempt to remain covert - though not impossible (as evidenced by the Antwerp Diamond
Center heist discussed below, among other cases). Ensuring that any removal of a nuclear
weapon or material will be detected immediately, so that a theft could not remain covert, is an
important minimum objective of a nuclear security system.
Those instigating a theft, whether insiders or outsiders, might fall into several
categories, with quite different typical characteristics:
" Opportunists. These are people who steal when they see an opportunity to do so, but
may not have any sophisticated theft plan and probably have little willingness to kill or
risk their own lives in carrying out their theft. They may also have no particular plan for
selling the material when they carry out the theft. This category has accounted for
essentially all of the thefts of HEU and plutonium whose details have been confirmed to
date.
* Professional criminals. Professional criminals, particularly if linked to substantial
organized crime groups, might bring more planning, larger numbers, more willingness to
use violence, and more capable armament and equipment to the job than opportunists
would. They would presumably be stealing the material to sell it to some one else, since
there is absolutely no credible evidence that professional criminals have been seeking
nuclear weapon capabilities of their own (though a variety of blackmail scenarios can be
imagined). As professionals, in the business to make money, they presumably would not
carry out suicidal attacks. Professional criminals might be outsiders or might infiltrate a
targeted facility and become insiders. Professional criminals might also instigate the
15 The one circumstance in which this may not be a major concern to the thieves is the situation in which their
plan is to attempt to rapidly assemble and detonate an improvised nuclear device while they are still within the
facility - or detonate a weapon present within the facility. For facilities that contain assembled nuclear weapons
or nuclear materials that offer the possibility of such rapid assembly into a crude device, DOE security rules
require that the defense plan to keep attackers out of the facility entirely, rather than being based, for example,
on trapping them within the facility after they have broken in. See, for example, discussion in U.S. Congress,
Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues before It Fully
Meets the New Design Basis Threat (GAO, 200423 December 2006). Building and detonating a crude device, or
detonating a stolen weapon, within minutes or hours, using only materials and equipment the thieves brought
along or could find at the site, is plausible for certain types of nuclear material, but would clearly be more
difficult than making or detonating a bomb if the adversaries were able to transport the stolen items to a secret
location where they could work on the problem for months or years.
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theft, without being the ones to carry it out themselves - for example by bribing or
blackmailing insiders to carry out the theft. To date, there is little substantial evidence of
organized crime involvement in the known nuclear theft attempts, but this always remains
a possibility.
* Terrorists. Like professional criminals, terrorist groups presumably could bring a
substantial level of planning, armament and violence to bear on committing a theft of
nuclear material. A terrorist group might be stealing material for itself, or for transfer to
another group or state with which they were linked. (An obvious possibility of that kind is
theft by Chechen terrorists for transfer to al Qaeda; some of the more extreme Chechen
factions have had close links with al Qaeda.) Unlike professional criminals, terrorists
might well be willing to carry out attacks in which their own death is accepted as part of
the plan, as was the case in the 9/11 attacks. Like criminals, terrorists could be outsiders
or might succeed in becoming insiders, and they could carry out the theft themselves, or
instigate others to do so. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are no documented cases of
terrorists stealing nuclear weapons or materials, but there are worrisome suggestions that
they might, such as the terrorist reconnaissance at Russian nuclear warhead sites in 2001.
Russia's interior minister has confirmed that "international terrorists have planned attacks
against nuclear and power industry installations... to seize nuclear materials and use them
to build weapons of mass destruction." 6
* Agents of foreign powers. Over the years, there have been concerns in a number of
countries that teams working for a foreign state might attempt to steal a nuclear weapon or
material, or sabotage a major nuclear facility. Such teams would presumably be primarily
outsiders, but might succeed in infiltrating an insider into the targeted facility, or bribing
or blackmailing an existing insider to help them. There is no published record of
confirmed incidents involving teams of agents of foreign powers stealing nuclear weapons
or fissile materials.
. Protesters. The only actual attempts to break through nuclear security systems that most
guard forces ever see are by protesters. As a result, protesters have a significant impact on
how nuclear security systems in many countries are structured and operated, though
protesters would be highly unlikely to attempt to actually steal nuclear weapons or nuclear
materials. In a few cases, protesters have been armed and used violence (as in the case of
the rocket-propelled grenade fired at the French SuperPhenix reactor decades ago, for
example).
Whatever the category of the potential thieves, the key question is what specific
capabilities and tactics they are likely to bring to bear. Obviously, the more capable the group
of thieves envisioned, the more capable the security system must be to have a high probability
of defeating the adversaries. The United States and a number of other countries have in place
regulatory systems under which each nuclear facility that falls in a particular defined class
(such as a power reactor, or a facility with more than a specified amount of HEU) is required
16 "Internal Troops to Make Russian State Facilities Less Vulnerable to Terrorists," RIA-Novosti, 5 October
2005.
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to provide security designed to defeat a specified set of possible adversary capabilities, known
as the "design basis threat" or DBT. The IAEA has recommended that all states with
weapons-usable nuclear material or major nuclear facilities to protect have such a defined
DBT as the basis for their physical protection approaches.17 As noted in Chapter 3, the DBT
approach effectively takes one particular point on the spectrum of possible adversary
capabilities and describes that as the maximum credible threat that facilities are required to
defend against, rather than attempting to assessing the probability distribution for different
levels of adversary capability."8
What should be included in such DBTs? What adversary capabilities should facilities
with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials be required to be able to defend
against? This is inevitably a matter of balancing security and cost. On the one hand, it is
important to be defended against obviously plausible threats, but on the other hand, it is
important not to waste money defending against imagined armies of 10-foot-tall terrorists.
The nuclear industry, which in most countries has to bear much of the cost of security at its
facilities, would inevitably draw the balance at a different point than would those in the rest of
society who bear many of the risks of failure but few of the costs of action; hence, it is the job
of regulators to tug the balance to a point they judge to serve the broader interests of society.1 9
Some observers, noting that the vast majority of terrorist and criminal actions are
carried out by small groups (or even single individuals) have argued that nuclear facilities
need only be defended against small groups with limited capabilities. Taking this line of
thinking, before 9/11, the U.S. NRC only required U.S. nuclear power plants to be protected
against attack by a "small group," reportedly three outsiders, possibly in league with one
insider;20 the DBT for theft of HEU or plutonium was reportedly only modestly higher.
Others have argued that typical terrorist assaults involve small numbers of people only
17 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (Vienna: IAEA, 1999; available at http://www.iaea.or.at/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.html as of 22 December 2006).
18 In some countries, there is a clear acknowledgment that the DBT facilities are required to defend against is not
the maximum credible threat, but only the maximum threat that the security systems at individual sites are
charged with coping with. In the United States, for example, the Atomic Energy Act specifies that the federal
government, not individual licensees, is responsible for providing defense against enemies of the state. The
NRC has interpreted this to mean that licensees should only be responsible for defending against relatively
modest threats; there do not, however, appear to be specific procedures in place for the federal government to
fulfill its responsibility to defend against more substantial threats, if a theft attempt begins before intelligence has
detected the conspiracy unfolding. For discussion, see Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Nuclear Security: Has the NRC Strengthened
Facility Standards since 9/11? U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 4 April 2006
(available at http://reform.house.gov/NSETIR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventlD=41937 as of 6 May 2006).
19 Whether the government or privately owned hazardous facilities (such as nuclear facilities) should pay the
costs of increased security, and in what proportion, is a difficult question that is not addressed in this dissertation.
An argument can be made for the government paying for the societal benefit of reducing the security
externalities posed by such facilities, but an argument can also be made for a principle similar to "polluter pays."
20 See, for example, Daniel Hirsch, "The NRC: What, Me Worry?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. I
(January/February 2002; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art-ofn=jfD2hirsch as of 8 January
2007), pp. 38-44.
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because that is what the perpetrators "perceived to be necessary to accomplish their mission,"
and that such small numbers do "not represent an upper limit on their capacity to mobilize
people."2' Indeed, an examination of terrorist attacks and crimes involving high-value,
guarded non-nuclear targets over the past two decades demonstrates the remarkable range of
outsider and insider threats that terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they are able to
pose.22
Large overt attack. Terrorists have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to mount
large overt armed attacks. In September, 2004, for example, 34 heavily armed terrorists
seized a school in Beslan, starting a hostage crisis that ended in a massacre in which hundreds
were killed, most of them children. In October 2002, 41 heavily armed, well-trained, suicidal
Chechen terrorists (the 19 women in the group all had explosives attached to their bodies)
struck a Moscow theater in a carefully planned attack launched without warning, seizing
hundreds of hostages. The official Russian government newspaper reported that the group
had considered seizing facilities at Moscow's Kurchatov Institute (where hundreds of
kilograms of highly enriched uranium, enough for dozens of nuclear weapons, is located).24
Large overt attacks have occurred in a number of other countries as well. The 9/11 attacks
themselves involved 19 well-trained terrorists.
Multiple coordinated teams. The 9/11 attacks provided an especially clear example
of the use of multiple, independent, well-coordinated teams striking simultaneously. These
attacks involved four teams, each with four to five well-trained, suicidal participants, from a
larger organization with access to heavy weapons and explosives. The groups spent over a
year collecting intelligence and planning, yet succeeded in striking without warning without
the conspiracy being detected in advance. Many nuclear facilities today have security
systems designed only to handle a single team of attackers. Multiple teams of attackers can
significantly complicate the defense: one team, for example, might distract the defenders
while the real attack was carried out by another, or one team might be assigned to mine the
road to prevent response forces from arriving to defeat the team carrying out the actual theft.
Significant covert attack. Criminals often use covert outsider or insider attacks to
strike their target without the defense even being aware until after the crime has been
committed. On February 16, 2003, for example, sophisticated thieves stole an estimated $100
million in gems from 123 vaults in the Antwerp Diamond Center, one of the most secure
jewel-handling facilities in the world. The thieves, while outsiders, apparently had extensive
2! Brian Michael Jenkins and Joseph L. Krofcheck, "Appendix III-A: The Potential Nuclear Non-State
Adversary," in Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment,
1977). These authors provide an exceptionally thoughtful discussion of some of the issues discussed in this
section.
22 For earlier examples of a similar approach to assessing the threat, see Bruce Hoffman et al., Insider Crime: The Threat to
Nuclear Facilities and Programs, R-3782-DOE (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, 1990); Robert Reinstedt and Judith Westbury,
Major Crimes as Analogs to Potential Threats to Nuclear Facilities and Programs, N-1498-SL (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND,
1980).
23 For a description, see, for example, "1 18 Hostages Are Dead in Moscow Theater Raid," The Russia Journal,
27 October 2002.
24 Vladimir Bogdanov, "Propusk K Beogolovkam Nashli U Terrorista (a Pass to Warheads Found on a
Terrorist)," Rossiskaya Gazeta, 1 November 2002.
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insider knowledge of the security system and were able to overcome security cameras, an
alarm system, and more to keep their theft undetected until the following day, when they were
long gone.25 In Brazil in 2005, a sophisticated gang of thieves spent three months digging a
roughly 80-meter tunnel under the heart of the town of Fortaleza, coming up into a bank vault
without detection and making off with an estimated $67.8 million.26 In a similar nuclear-
related case in India in 2003, thieves reportedly drilled through a wall to avoid a sophisticated
alarm system at the front gates, in order to steal three canisters containing cobalt-60.
Use of deception and diversion. Criminals have frequently used deception to trick
their way through a target's defenses. In 1990, for example, thieves dressed as policemen
tricked the guard at the Gardner Museum in Boston into letting them go into the museum and
remove several priceless works of art, including a Rembrandt. In 2002, Chechen fighters
wore Russian military uniforms and used forged official passes to get a truck filled with
explosives through three successive military checkpoints, in a suicide truck-bombing that
destroyed the headquarters of Chechnya's Russian-backed government and killed at least 72
people.29
Intelligence collection, planning, and acquisition of specialized skills. Both
terrorists and criminals have demonstrated an ability to collect information about potential
targets and plan their attacks on them over extended periods of time. The 9/11 attacks
involved well over a year of detailed collection of intelligence on U.S. airline schedules,
security procedures, and other factors. The Antwerp Diamond Center heist appears to have
involved at least three years of planning and intelligence collection. In the case of the 9/11
attacks, the terrorists trained as pilots in order to carry out the attack, consciously acquiring a
specialized skill for a hostile purpose. In the case of the Antwerp Diamond Center,
investigators believe an Italian criminal group known as the "School of Turin," including
criminals with specialties in skills such as safe-cracking and defeating alarm systems carried
out the theft. In many cases the intelligence collection includes successfully gaining access to
inside information, not available to the general public. The Antwerp Diamond Center thieves
clearly had detailed knowledge of the design of the security system - including the fact that a
key to the vault was, inexplicably, stored right next to the vault and how the alarm system
could be prevented from going off.30
25 See, for example, "The Great Diamond Heist," "PrimeTime Live," ABC News, 12 February 2005; Chris
Summers, "Hopes of Finding Diamond Haul Fade," BBC News Online, 14 February 2004 (available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1l/hi/world/europe/336491 I.stm as of 22 December 2005).
26 Stan Lehman, "In Brazil: Thieves Tunnel into Bank Vault for $67.8 Million," Associated Press, 10 August
2005.
27 "Radioactive Material Stolen from Steel Plant in Eastern India," Associated Press Newswires, 17 August
2003.
28 Elizabeth Neuffer, "Gardner: Masterwork of Crime: Retracing the Steps of Robbery's Twisted Trail," Boston
Globe, 13 May 1990. For other examples of the common deception tactic, see Reinstedt and Westbury, Major
Crimes as Analogs to Potential Threats to Nuclear Facilities and Programs.
29 Guy Chazan, "Chechens Turn on Each Other -- after Years of Attacking Russians, Local 'Collaborators' Are
New Foe," Wall Street Journal, 30 December 2002.
30 "The Great Diamond Heist."
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Use of heavy weapons and sophisticated explosives. Automatic weapons such as
the ubiquitous AK-47 are widely available to terrorist and criminal groups all over the world.
Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) are also available worldwide. Such weapons have been
used frequently in Chechen terrorist attacks and in attacks in Iraq and elsewhere. Highly
accurate long-range armor-piercing weapons (such as .50-caliber armor-piercing rounds) can,
unfortunately, be purchased at gun shows and other venues in the United States. RPGs and
large-caliber armor-piercing rounds can be devastatingly effective against body armor and
armored fighting positions for guards at facilities - though relatively low-cost means are
available to counter such adversary weaponry. Similarly, from the attack on the USS Cole
to ongoing attacks in Iraq, terrorists have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to use
increasingly sophisticated explosives - and attackers who know what they are doing can use
explosives to breach both fences and concrete walls remarkably quickly. Indeed, Al Qaeda
training videos show terrorists training in the use of explosives such as platter charges to blow
through security doors.3 3
Use of unusual vehicles. Criminal groups have frequently used a variety of vehicles
to help them get through security systems. For example, helicopters have been used in many
recent prison escapes. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security's
National Planning Scenarios - the set of attacks and disasters the United States should be
prepared to cope with - assumes that attackers could easily rent helicopters for use in their
attacks.3s Similarly, the six men convicted for planning a heist of $500 million worth of
diamonds from London's Millennium Dome in November 2000 used a bulldozer to break into
the dome, then planned on using a speedboat along the Thames to escape.36 The security plans
at many nuclear facilities are not designed to cope with attackers arriving and departing in a
helicopter or speedboat.
Theft of material in transit. When valuable materials - whether diamonds or nuclear
weapons - are being moved from place to place, it is impossible to have the same layers of
security that can be provided at a fixed site with walls, fences, vaults, and other fixed barriers.
In countries around the world, thefts of hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars from
armored cars equipped with armed guards happen every year. Indeed, in France, robberies of
armored cars by "very well-organized.. .paramilitary-type" gangs, using "Kalishnikovs,
bazookas, and bombs" became so frequent that in May 2000 the armored car drivers went on
strike, demanding hazard pay and an end to night transports.37 Yet an analysis of extensive
31 "Systems under Fire," U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance, 2003.
32 "Systems under Fire."
3 "Systems under Fire."
3 See, for example, "5 Use Copter to Break out of Prison," Los Angeles Times, 31 December 2002; John
Tagliabue, "Latest in a Series of Bold Breaks Frees 3 Inmates at French Jail," New York Times, 15 April 2003.
3 National Planning Scenarios (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005; available at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/nationalsecurity/earlywarning/
NationalPlanningScenariosApril2005.pdf as of 4 October 2005), pp. 6-2.
36 Sue Leeman, "Scotland Yard Foils Huge Jewel Heist," Associated Press, 8 November 2000.
17 See, for example, Anne Swardson, "Armored Car Driver Strike Shortchanges Parisians; Atms Empty While
Merchants Are Flush," Washington Post, 16 May 2000.
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photographs taken of French transports of separated plutonium - which occur roughly weekly
- suggests that these transports would be dangerously vulnerable to similar types of attacks.3
Use of insiders. Terrorists and criminals around the world frequently use insiders and
insider information. Insiders may be motivated by sheer desperation for money, as appears to
have been the case with the 1992 theft of 1.5 kilograms of 90% enriched HEU from the Luch
facility in Russia, for example.39 Insiders may simply be greedy, as is the case with countless
crimes around the world.40 Insiders may be vengeful and disgruntled. In one case in the early
1990s, for example, a group of six employees at a Halliburton facility in India admitted to
stealing three radioactive sources and dumping them in a nearby river, simply because they
were angry over a decision to transfer one of the six to another site.41 Disgruntled ex-
employees, who are familiar with the location of valuable items and the facility's security
system and may still have good contacts among current employees, have also played a key
role in many major crimes.42 Insiders may also be ideologically motivated - as in the case of
senior Pakistani nuclear weapon scientist and Islamic extremist Sultan Bashiruddin
Mahmood, an anti-American Islamic extremist who after his retirement met with Osama bin
Laden and discussed nuclear weapons at length.4 3
Many nuclear facilities have programs to limit access to employees who have been
screened for trustworthiness, to address these kinds of insider problems. But even if all the
insiders are believed to be highly reliable, they might be coerced into joining a scheme against
their wishes. In a case in Northern Ireland in 2004, for example, thieves apparently linked to
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) made off with £26 million from the Northern
Bank. While the bank's security system was designed so that only two managers of the bank
together could open the vault, the thieves kidnapped the families of two bank managers and
blackmailed them into helping the thieves carry out the crime.44 (The thieves also used
deception in this case, appearing at the bank managers' homes dressed as policemen.) One of
these managers, however, has now been charged with participating voluntarily in the crime;
38 Ronald E. Timm, Security Assessment Report for Plutonium Transport in France (Paris: Greenpeace
International, 2005; available at http://greenpeace.datapps.com/stop-plutonium/en/TimmReportV5.pdf as of 6
December 2005). While this analysis was prepared for Greenpeace, Timm is a well-known security analyst who
spent decades doing vulnerability assessments and physical protection designs for DOE facilities. This analysis
provides a useful comparison of the conditions shown in the photographs Greenpeace collected to the security
approaches required for comparable nuclear materials transported by DOE.
39 See, for example, the interview with Yuri Smirnov, the convicted perpetrator, in "Frontline: Loose Nukes:
Interviews" (Public Broadcasting System, 1996; available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
nukes/interviews/ as of 22 December 2005).
40 Hoffman et al., Insider Crime: The Threat to Nuclear Facilities and Programs.
41 "Radioactive Device Stolen from Halliburton India Unit," Dow Jones Newswires, 11 October 1993.
42 Reinstedt and Westbury, Major Crimes as Analogs to Potential Threats to Nuclear Facilities and Programs.
4' For the Mahmood case, see, for example, David Albright and Holly Higgins, "A Bomb for the Ummah,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 2 (March/April 2003; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/
2003/ma03/ma03albright.html as of 2 January 2007), pp. 49-55; Peter Baker, "Pakistani Scientist Who Met Bin
Laden Failed Polygraphs, Renewing Suspicions," Washington Post, 3 March 2002.
44 For a good introduction to the Northern Bank case, see Chris Moore, "Anatomy of a E26.5 Million Heist,"
Sunday Life, 21 May 2006.
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he denies the charge.45 If in fact it is the case that these managers only participated because
their families were held hostage, no personnel reliability program in the world would have
turned them up as security risks, suggesting that other measures also need to be taken to guard
against insider threats. Kidnapping to blackmail family members into carrying out certain
actions has been a common Chechen terrorist tactic.46 Such tactics are frequently
successful.47
Insiders may be in any position - including senior managers and also guards. (In one
database, guards were responsible for 41% of insider thefts at guarded facilities. 48) There
may be more than one insider, as in the Northern Bank case: conspiracies of multiple insiders,
familiar with the weaknesses of the security system (and in some cases including guards or
managers) are among the most difficult threats for security systems to defeat. Yet insider
conspiracies are relatively common. In 1998, for example, an insider conspiracy at one of
Russia's largest nuclear weapons facilities attempted to steal 18.5 kilograms of HEU-
potentially enough for a bomb.49 And, of course, insiders can collude with outsiders, playing
roles ranging from simply providing information, to disabling critical security systems, to
using armed violence to help the outsiders attain their objectives.50
These are not James Bond fantasies from Hollywood. These are real events that have
occurred in the last couple of decades. These examples are deeply sobering, documenting the
broad range of capabilities that terrorists and criminals have succeeded in bringing to bear to
carry out thefts and attacks. It would be politically, though not technically, impossible to
ensure that every facility in the world where a nuclear weapon or the material to make one
existed had a security system as strong as the one at the Antwerp Diamond Center - yet that
system was defeated. This highlights the fact that improved security measures can only
reduce the risk of theft, never eliminate it; the danger that nuclear material could be stolen
from a particular building can be eliminated only by removing the material, so that there is
nothing there to steal.
A strong case can be made that nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients should
be defended at least against the kinds of capabilities that terrorists and criminals have
demonstrated in real incidents (especially incidents that occurred in the country or region
where the particular nuclear cache in question is located). Some would go further and argue
45 Moore, "Anatomy of a E26.5 Million Heist."
46 Robyn Dixon, "Chechnya's Grimmest Industry: Thousands of People Have Been Abducted by the War-Torn
Republic's Kidnapping Machine," Los Angeles Times, 18 September 2000.
47 Reinstedt and Westbury, Major Crimes as Analogs to Potential Threats to Nuclear Facilities and Programs.
48 Hoffman et al., Insider Crime: The Threat to Nuclear Facilities and Programs.
49 This attempt was first officially revealed by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), who claimed credit
for foiling it. See Yevgeniy Tkachenko, "FSB Agents Prevent Theft of Nuclear Materials," ITAR-TASS, 18
December 1998. The attempt was discussed somewhat more by Victor Erastov, chief of material accounting for
what was then Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy. See"Interview: Victor Yerastov: Minatom Has All
Conditions for Providing Safety and Security of Nuclear Material," Yaderny Kontrol Digest 5, no. 1 (Winter
2000). Neither of those accounts identified the type of material; that is from an interview by the author with a
Ministry of Atomic Energy official, 2000.
50 For a discussion of crimes of this type, see Hoffman et al., Insider Crime: The Threat to Nuclear Facilities and
Programs.
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that nuclear weapons and the materials to make them should also be defended against
capabilities that are not yet demonstrated, but easily imaginable. On the other hand: (a)
criminals with the most extensive capabilities have generally focused their efforts on theft of
items such as cash and jewels, which are relatively easily turned into untraceable money
(though jewels often pose a problem in that respect), raising the question of what the
probability is that comparable capabilities would be applied to stealing nuclear weapons or
materials; (b) none of the cases described above involve all of the capabilities just described
being brought to bear at once, raising the question of what fraction of these capabilities
nuclear facilities should be required to be able to defend against in a single attack; and (c) in
nearly all the cases just described, some or all of the criminals or terrorists involved were
eventually caught. If a nuclear weapon or the nuclear materials to make one were found to be
missing, the effort invested to catch the perpetrators and recover the stolen goods would
presumably be far greater; that factor might well deter some groups, if they concluded that
they would not have a good enough chance of both carrying out the theft and avoiding capture
for long enough to make effective use of the stolen nuclear goods.
Resources for nuclear security are inevitably limited. Providing reliable protection
against the kinds of threats just described requires, in effect, a military level of security, even
at civilian sites, which in itself raises troubling issues. Clearly, not all of these possible
adversary capabilities are equally likely. There are probably large numbers of potential
opportunistic insiders in the world who might take advantage of a gaping security weakness to
steal nuclear material, but who could be deterred from doing so by even fairly rudimentary
security systems. The chance of a large-scale military-style attack with multiple teams aided
by knowledgeable insiders is obviously far lower.
An illustrative version of the spectrum of capabilities of plausible thieves is shown in
Figure 4.1. The placement of many of the points on this graph could be debated (are multiple
insiders more or less likely than two insiders working with outsiders, for example); it is
intended primarily as a basis for thought and discussion. The placement of the insider and
outsider lines on the chart is intended only to get both on one chart, not to imply that outside
attackers are always less probable than insiders. Much of the debate over what nuclear
facilities should be required to defend against boils down to a debate over what the shape of
this chart really looks like - and in particular, how low the probability of a theft attempt by
adversaries with substantial and sophisticated capabilities really is.
Assessing the Threats Adversaries Pose at Different Facilities
While terrorists have demonstrated global reach in some cases, there is little doubt that
the level of capability adversaries could plausibly bring to bear to attempt to carry out a
nuclear theft varies from one country to the next and within particular areas of some
countries. A nuclear security system that might be perfectly adequate in Canada might not be
sufficient in Pakistan, and one that might be adequate in St. Petersburg might not be enough
in Chechnya. 51
51 All nuclear weapons had been removed from the Caucasus republics of the former Soviet Union before the
Soviet Union collapsed. There are no known facilities with separated plutonium or HEU in Chechnya or nearby
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Figure 4.1: The Probabilistic Spectrum of Plausible Thieves
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Given this combination of global threat with local variations, a prioritized risk-
minimization strategy would seek to ensure that all facilities with nuclear weapons, separated
plutonium, or HEU worldwide are effectively protected against a common minimum threat
and that those facilities facing higher threats are provided an appropriately higher level of
security.
areas of Russia, either. There were previously two sites with HEU in Georgia, but the HEU from one of these
sites was airlifted to Britain in Operation Auburn Endeavor in 1998, while the modest amount of HEU from the
other site, at Sukhumi, remains missing. For a discussion of Auburn Endeavor, see Thomas A. Shelton et al.,
"Multilateral Nonproliferation Cooperation: US - Led Effort to Remove HEU/LEU Fresh and Spent Fuel
from the Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland (Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus)," in Proceedings of
the 21st International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR), Sao Paulo,
Brazil, 18-23 October 1998 (Argonne, Ill.: Argonne National Laboratory, 1998; available at
http://www.rertr.anl.gov/Fuels98/SpentFuel/SThomas.pdf as of 2 December 2006). For the Sukhumi incident,
see "Confirmed Proliferation-Significant Incidents of Fissile Material Trafficking in the Newly Independent
States (NIS), 1991-2001" (Monterey, Cal.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, 30 November 2001; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/traff.htm as of 3 March
2006). Substantial quantities of radiological material suitable for use in a "dirty bomb" are still located in
Chechnya, however, particularly at a site of the Russian radioactive waste management organization Radon,
located near Grozny, which has repeatedly been the target of thieves. See, for example, Yuri Bagrov, "Cache of
Unprotected Radioactive Material Found in Chechnya," Associated Press, 16 April 2003; Amina Bisaeva,
"Chechnya's Ticking Radiation Bomb," Environment News Service, 27 January 2005 (available at
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2005/2005-01-27-01.asp as of 2 December 2006).
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A wide variety of sources of information are available to judge the level of different
types of threats in different countries and different areas of them. First and foremost, the
analysis should include an assessment of real incidents (both nuclear and non-nuclear) that
have occurred in recent years in the country or area in question and what they may indicate
about the capabilities adversaries can bring to bear. Have there been large overt armed
attacks? How large, with what weapons and tactics? Have there been insider theft
conspiracies? How sophisticated were they?
A variety of factors have to be taken into account in considering how much weight to
give to different types of incidents. Obviously attacking a nuclear facility in an attempt to
steal nuclear material is a very different thing from attacking an undefended school, as
terrorists did at Beslan in 2004. But the fact that terrorists were able to bring to bear 34
heavily armed attackers, willing to die, and were able to strike without warning without being
detected in advance by the police or intelligence services, is nonetheless quite relevant in
assessing what types of outsider attacks on nuclear facilities are plausible and have to be taken
into account in planning defenses of those sites. Overall, the frequency in any given country
or area of those types of crimes that are most relevant to nuclear theft should be a key factor
in assessing the threat. These include terrorist attacks (both outsider attacks and attacks
involving insiders); insider theft of high-value items; and outsider thefts of high-value items
(including both overt and covert thefts, and thefts both from fixed facilities and from
transports, such as armored cars).
Besides actual incidents, several other factors should be taken into account, including:
" levels of presence and activity of both terrorist groups and organized crime groups;
* actions or statements by these groups indicating an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons
or materials;
* levels of corruption and insider theft, in the society at large and among the staff and
guards of nuclear facilities in particular;
* levels of pay and morale among nuclear staff and guards;
* facility or transport leg location (e.g., in a major city or a remote area, how effectively is
the area nearby monitored for unusual activities, how close are major roads or other means
adversaries might use to arrive and depart, etc.);
* record of the police and intelligence services in detecting and stopping high-capability
conspiracies before they can achieve their objectives; and
* measures for screening and monitoring nuclear staff and guards for trustworthiness.
Where possible, facility-by-facility information on such factors should be collected
(and regularly updated);52 where such facility-specific information is not available, at least
52 For a brief summary of early results of a research project focusing on corruption, theft, organized crime, and
extremism in and around the Russian closed nuclear city of Ozersk (home of the Mayak Production Association,
one of Russia's largest plutonium and HEUsites), see Robert Orttung and Louise Shelley, Linkages between
Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in Nuclear Smuggling: A Case Study of Chelyabinsk Oblast, PONARS
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national-level information should be collected. French government researchers have
recommended a similar approach to assessing insider threats, emphasizing the need to "gather
on the ground information on the potential threat," including both "conditions inside the
facility" related to worker morale and human reliability programs and "conditions outside the
facility," such as the presence of organized crime or terror groups.5 3
Fortunately, nuclear security analysts do not have to start from scratch in preparing
these kinds of assessments. The insurance industry routinely makes detailed estimates of the
risks of different types of theft or terrorist attack in different countries, in order to be able to
judge the price they should charge for insurance coverage against such threats. Since large
profits or losses ride on these estimates, they are likely to be higher quality than many
government assessments. Most of this analysis is proprietary, but would be readily available
to governments willing to purchase it. Some assessments of overall threat levels made on
behalf of the insurance industry are publicly available. One consulting firm, for example,
publishes a global index ranking 186 countries on the basis of their estimate of the terrorism
risk in those countries.s4 Transparency International publishes international rankings of
perceptions of the level of corruption in different countries; 55 other organizations also publish
global corruption estimates, such as the rankings on "control of corruption" included in the
governance data published by the World Bank.s6 Where information on how much nuclear
staff and guards are paid is not available, gross domestic product per capita (adjusted for
purchasing power parity) could provide a rough indicator of whether pay levels (and the
resources available for other nuclear security investments) are likely to be high or low. This
is a very rough indicator, however, as employees at some types of nuclear facilities (such as
nuclear weapons programs in countries where those programs are considered essential to state
survival) may get pay substantially above the national average, while employees at other
types of facilities (such as civilian research reactors in countries where science receives few
resources) may get below-average pay; and research in behavioral economics suggests that
above some subsistence level of income, relative income - whether conditions are worse than
before, or worse than those of others in the country in question - may be more important in
determining attitudes than absolute income.57
Once nuclear security analysts have compiled these types of information, they then
have to analyze it to make judgments about the probability that adversaries could bring
Policy Memo No. 392 (Washington, D.C.: 2005; available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0392.pdf
as of 12 April 2006).
5 C. Brouse et al., "IRSN Activities in Physical Protection in Support of the IAEA: The Insider Threats
Approach," in Eurosafe Forum 2003: Paris, 25-26 November (Paris: Eurosafe Forum, 2003; available at
http://www.eurosafe-forum.org/products/data/5/pe_190_24__I_5_9paper.pdf as of 30 July 2006).
5 Guy Dunn, WMRC Global Terrorism Index 2003/2004 (London: World Markets Research Centre, 2003).
15 See, for example, Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 (Berlin: TI, 2004; available
at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/1532/7971/file/mediapack en.pdf as of 16 November 2006).
56 See Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators
for 1996-2004 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005; available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/
pdf/GovMatters _IV_main.pdf as of 1 August 2006).
57 Andrew E. Clark and Andrew J Oswald, "Satisfaction and Comparison Income," Journal of Public Economics
61, no. 3 (September 1996).
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different levels of outsider or insider capability to bear to steal nuclear weapons or materials
in a particular country, or from a particular facility or transport leg. Such judgments will
always be difficult and controversial. But making them is the second essential step in
estimating the probability that, in any particular nuclear theft attempt, adversaries will be able
to bring to bear a level of capability sufficient to defeat the security system and carry out a
successful theft.
The Facility Environment's Contribution to the Threat
In addition to the factors just described, certain elements of what has been termed the
"environment" at a nuclear facility are important to judging the scale of the insider and
outsider threats the facility might face.58 Many elements that could be considered as the
"environment" should be included in assessments of the levels of security at different
facilities, such as whether the material at a facility is stored in a locked and monitored vault,
whether two-person or three-person rule is enforced whenever anyone accesses the material,
how people are screened to determine their trustworthiness, and the like. But other important
elements of the facility environment that could affect the magnitude of the insider and
outsider theft threats may not be included in standard security system assessments. These
might include, among others:
* The number of people with authorized access to the material in question (if only a few
people have access, the insider threat will likely be easier to control);
" Whether the material at the facility is only being stored unused, or is being regularly
handled and processed (especially if it is being processed in bulk, offering more
opportunities for removing small amounts without detection);
" Whether the quantity of material needed for a bomb would be almost all of the material at
the facility (and hence difficult to remove without detection), a tiny fraction of the
material at the facility (possibly easier to remove without detection), or in between;
* Whether the material at the site is in large heavy forms that are easy to count and difficult
to remove covertly (such as assembled nuclear weapons or fuel assemblies) or in powders
or small pieces that can easily be carried off in secret.
Nuclear security analysts should ensure that each important element of the
environment is integrated either into the assessment of the security level at the facility or
transport leg or into the assessment of the threat adversaries may be able to pose to it.
Assessing the Threats Security Systems Can Defeat
To assess the risk of nuclear theft posed by a particular facility or transport leg,
assessing the capabilities of its security system is an essential step. This assessment should be
threat-based - that is, what levels of adversary capability, both outsider and insider, overt and
covert, could the security system in question defeat, with what probability?
58 For a report using this formulation in its assessments of the security of various types of operations, see Hinton
et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report.
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The information available for making such an assessment and the resulting level of
detail and confidence that it will be possible to have in the assessment, will vary dramatically
depending on where the particular nuclear facility or transport leg is located. For an
organization assessing security at its own facilities, detailed vulnerability assessments can be
performed, which seek to assess what pathways into the facility for theft or sabotage would be
most likely to be successful, how long the delays for the adversary would be for each of the
necessary steps the adversary would have to take along those pathways, what the probabilities
for the defender to detect and correctly assess the adversary would be at each of those steps,
how effective on-site guards would be in defeating the adversaries, how long it would take
off-site response forces to arrive, and how effective they would be in defeating the
adversaries. In the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for example, such vulnerability
assessments are routinely required for all nuclear facilities. Such vulnerability assessments
make use of expert judgment; a variety of computer software packages, from the simple (and
simplistic) Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption (EASI) to the more complex and
realistic Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS);
and "tabletop" simulations of how adversaries might attempt to steal material or sabotage
facilities and how defenders might react.59 They are typically supplemented (and input data
for such models collected) with various types of performance tests, ranging up to what are
known as "force-on-force exercises," where "red teams" portraying adversaries attempt to
break into a facility and defender teams attempt to stop them (along with similar tests
involving insider threats).
Such methods provide invaluable information and are, today, the best that can be done
to estimate the probability that a particular security system will be able to defeat a particular
set of adversaries. But they are inevitably imperfect. Security planners may not envision
every tactic that adversaries might think of to defeat a security system, possibly leaving
defenses weak against some potential tactics; they may not envision (and tests may not reveal)
all the things that may go wrong for the defense (including confused, frightened, or inebriated
guards), especially as tests inevitably have an element of lack of realism, with the guards
warned ahead of time concerning when the test will occur and using laser-tag equipment or
other fake weapons rather than real weapons (so as to avoid testers actually being shot); and
in complex tightly-coupled systems of this kind, it is inevitably difficult to foresee all the
system interactions that may take place.o
In any case, such in-depth vulnerability assessments and tests are difficult to apply
internationally, as many countries will not permit representatives from other countries to carry
out such assessments and tests for their nuclear facilities, considering such information to be
secret. Similarly, many countries are not likely to provide detailed accounts of the results of
their own nuclear security assessments and tests. Countries vary in their willingness to
provide other information that may contribute to assessing nuclear security levels. Some
developing or transition states with only civilian facilities are happy to have international
59 For an overview of vulnerability assessment and physical protection system design, see, for example, Mary
Lynn Garcia, The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems (Woburn, Mass.: Butterworth-
Heineman, 2001).
60 For a critique of such methods making these points, see Bunn, "Systems Approaches to Security".
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reviews of security at their facilities and international assistance in improving it; at the other
end of the spectrum, a state like Israel, to take one example, which does not even
acknowledge the existence of its nuclear weapons, is highly unlikely to provide any
information whatever that would contribute to judging how well they are secured. Alliance
relationships contribute to information-sharing in many cases - but critical nuclear security
information is often not exchanged even between close allies.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the few nuclear facilities and transport legs with the
weakest security systems are likely to pose a large fraction of the total risk of nuclear theft.
Hence, whether there are some particularly vulnerable facilities within a particular country is
even more important than what the average level of security for nuclear facilities and
transport legs in that country may be. As a result, information on how rigorous a particular
country's approaches to regulating and inspecting nuclear security are may be particularly
important, as weak regulatory measures could allow some facilities to remain especially
vulnerable for years or decades before regulators identified them and succeeded in getting
their operators to take corrective action.
Several key sources of information are available that can inform relative judgments
about nuclear security in different countries.
Intelligence information. Even for the United States, which may have the most
extensive and expensive intelligence system in the world, information available on nuclear
security from classified intelligence sources is quite limited. Satellite photographs of nuclear
facilities can reveal some important factors, such as whether there are substantial fences with
clear zones around a facility, whether armored personnel carriers are parked there, and
whether vegetation has been allowed to grow up to or over the fences. But these images say
nothing about whether the intrusion detectors are broken, whether the guards are patrolling
with no ammunition in their guns, or whether the personnel at the facility are financially
desperate or corrupt. Spies at these facilities, or interviews with employees who work there,
can provide much more detailed information, and analysis of a variety of open sources can
supplement such intelligence sources; but these sources require that the intelligence
community be instructed to place high priority on collecting information on this subject,
which has not yet occurred. In 1995, for example, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee (JAEIC) prepared a highly classified assessment of nuclear security in the former
Soviet Union, which concluded that not a single facility in the former Soviet Union had
adequate safeguards and security to prevent nuclear theft.61 Because at that time U.S. experts
had only physically visited a few of these facilities, however, the actual information on
security measures at these sites contained in this report was quite limited.
Technical cooperation. In some (but not all) cases, technical cooperation to improve
nuclear security can include a wide range of visits and discussions that provide quite detailed
61 This conclusion is mentioned, without specifically mentioning the JAEIC study, in the unclassified testimony
of John Deutch, then Director of Central Intelligence, in Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Part II, U.S. Senate,
104th Congress, 2nd Session, 13, 20, and 22 March 1996. At the time, I was directing a classified study of
policy on improving nuclear security in the former Soviet Union, and had full access to relevant intelligence.
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information on which to base judgments about the security of different facilities and transport
legs. In the early days of U.S.-Russian cooperation on material protection, control, and
accounting (MPC&A), Russia was unwilling to allow U.S. experts to visit any facilities that
contained actual plutonium or HEU - even civilian facilities -judging the information about
nuclear security that would be gleaned by such visits to be too sensitive. That sensitivity has
long since been overcome, however, and a great deal of information has since been
exchanged. Under current approaches, Russian experts perform vulnerability assessments of
their own at facilities subject to cooperation and propose upgrades to correct weaknesses
identified, with at least selected information from the vulnerability assessments to justify the
proposals; U.S. teams work with them to develop a list of agreed upgrades; and Russian
experts then implement the agreed upgrades, paid for with U.S. funds. U.S. experts are
typically permitted to visit the facility once before upgrades begin, to confirm the need for
them; once to assess the upgrade work while it is underway; and once to assess the completed
upgrades. In many cases, a wide range of different types of upgrades may be implemented
under several different contracts over a period of years, so the total number of visits may be
substantially larger.62 Although the United States does not get access to the detailed
vulnerability assessments themselves, showing, for example, the easiest routes by which
adversaries might be able to gain access to a particular facility, nonetheless the U.S.
understanding of nuclear security in Russia has improved dramatically as this process has
proceeded.
Such technical cooperation can lead to even higher levels of information exchange, or
can keep virtually all information about nuclear security at particular sites protected. In the
non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union, for example, in some cases facilities were
willing to let U.S. analysts perform detailed vulnerability assessments and allowed U.S.
groups to carry out "red team" tests of the security at the facility, providing even more
detailed insight as to the real performance of the security systems at these sites than the
United States has for Russian facilities. 63 By contrast, the cooperation with China has so far
involved doing upgrades at only one facility, combined with intensive discussions of
approaches China can use for finding and fixing vulnerabilities at its other facilities on its
own.64 Similarly, Pakistan has publicly acknowledged that it is cooperating with U.S. experts
to improve security at Pakistani nuclear sites, but has said that this cooperation does not
involve any U.S. access to Pakistani nuclear sites.65
In principle, the information developed as the result of such technical cooperation
might be systematized, assessing performance of nuclear security systems in several different
62 This process is described briefly in U.S. Department of Energy, 2006 Strategic Plan: Office of International
Material Protection and Cooperation, National Nuclear Security Administration (Washington, D.C.: DOE,
2006). See also Matthew Bunn, "Cooperation to Secure Nuclear Stockpiles: A Case of Constrained Innovation,"
Innovations 1, no. 1 (2006; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA__content/documents/
INNOVO 101 _CooperationtoSecureNuclearStockpiles.pdf as of 4 April 2006).
63 Interviews with U.S. participants in these assessments and tests, 1999-2000.
64 Interview with DOE official, July 2006.
65 Nirupama Subramanian, "Pakistan Accepted U.S. Help on N-Plants," The Hindu, 22 June 2006 (available at
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/06/22/stories/2006062205201400.htm as of 28 July 2006).
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categories (e.g., intrusion detection, alarm assessment, barriers and delays, protection forces,
personnel reliability, access control, and so on) and then using weighting factors to come up
with an overall assessment of performance that could be compared between sites. In the
1990s, for example, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in the United States developed
a system in which U.S. teams working with individual sites in Russia would give the site they
were working with ratings on a wide range of different areas of performance, which were then
rolled into an overall 0-100 rating (with 100 the most secure) using weighting factors
developed through polling of a group of U.S. experts. When this approach was tested on U.S.
sites, where very detailed information was available, the typical rating was in the range of 70.
66This approach was never widely implemented, however. Similarly, in the course of U.S.-
Russian cooperation on improving nuclear security regulations in Russia, U.S. and Russian
experts developed a set of roughly 350 key functional elements that regulations should
require, in a prioritized list; that list, with appropriate weightings of the individual elements,
could probably be adapted for use as a tool for assessing the state of nuclear security at
particular sites.67
Information exchanges. Some international exchanges of information about nuclear
security approaches and practices already take place, and such exchanges could be expanded
in the future. The information exchanged in the context of U.S.-Russian technical
cooperation, for example, has recently been expanded to include exchanges of "best
practices" in nuclear security and accounting, including exchanges of experience in such
68
matters as how best to draft and enforce nuclear security regulations. A group of European
nuclear security regulators meet regularly to discuss topics of mutual interest, which include
experiences in implementing particular types of nuclear security regulations. 69 The United
States already publishes information on the percentage of facilities of various types that have
received high ratings, or have failed to do so, in security inspections and security tests. 70 It is
easy to imagine that cooperating countries could work out arrangements under which they
would describe to each other in detail the kinds of assessments, inspections, and tests that
were done on their facilities and then provide summary-level information of this kind on the
66 Personal communication from Deborah Yarsike Ball, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1999.
67 Greg E. Davis et al., "Creating a Comprehensive, Efficient and Sustainable Nuclear Regulatory Structure: A
Process Report from the U.S. Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program," in
Proceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, Tenn.,
16-20 July 2006 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2006).
68 The first U.S.-Russian "best practices" workshop occurred in September 2005, with presentations on subjects
ranging from nuclear security regulation to screening insiders for trustworthiness. (Data provided by both
Russian and DOE officials.)
69 This European Civil Nuclear Security Regulators Forum is mentioned briefly in Director of Civil Nuclear
Security, The State of Security in the Civil Nuclear Industry and the Effectiveness of Security Regulation: April
2002 - March 2003 (London: Office for Civil Nuclear Security, Department of Trade and Industry, 2003;
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file23303.pdfpubpdfdload=03%2F418 as of 28 July 2006).
70 Indeed, changes in this percentage are used to track performance of the security program at the Department of
Energy. See, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Request: National
Nuclear Security Administration--Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, vol. 1, DOE/CF-002 (Washington, D.C.:
DOE, 2006; available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/07budget/Content/Volumes/Vol-iNNSA.pdf as of 3
January 2007), p. 418.
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fraction of facilities that fared well or poorly in such reviews. Similarly, in the 1990s, a group
at Stanford University, working with experts from several of the U.S. national laboratories,
developed a detailed questionnaire on all aspects of MPC&A that could be filled out by the
security managers at a facility; several facilities from different countries agreed to fill out all
or a large part of the questionnaire.7' One could easily imagine building a more widespread
practice of voluntary sharing of data such as that included in the Stanford questionnaire. This
kind of information exchange could help build confidence in nuclear security arrangements
and provide additional information on which to base judgments about relative nuclear security
levels in different countries.
International peer reviews. Both the IAEA and some individual states perform
international peer reviews or overviews of nuclear security arrangements. Since the late
1970s, U.S. law has required that the United States review the adequacy of physical protection
arrangements for U.S.-supplied nuclear material and facilities; U.S. experts have conducted
some 145 physical protection reviews in more than 40 countries since then.72 These visits
tend to be relatively brief and the teams do not perform detailed vulnerability assessments of
the facilities' ability to defend against particular design basis threats; rather, the teams review
the regulations in place in a country and the security measures that exist at selected facilities
to confirm that they are generally consistent with IAEA recommendations. While other
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) also require recipients of their nuclear
materials and technologies to provide at least a basic level of physical protection for them, it
is not clear whether any of the other NSG members actually conduct on-the-ground reviews
of recipients' compliance with these requirements. The IAEA began organizing international
peer reviews of nuclear security, known as the International Physical Protection Advisory
Service (IPPAS) in the mid-I 990s. 73 The IAEA organizes an IPPAS review when a state
requests such a review - so only states willing to have international experts see key aspects of
their nuclear security systems end up being reviewed. In most cases, the review recipients
have been developing or transition countries; in 2003, Norway became the first wealthy
developed state to host an IPPAS review, sending the message that all countries can benefit
from international review and advice.74 Like the U.S.-led reviews, IPPAS reviews do not
perform detailed vulnerability assessments or conduct tests of the actual performance of
nuclear security systems in defeating particular types of threats; instead, they are focused only
on confirming that facilities are generally following IAEA recommendations. Neither the
U.S. reviews nor the IPPAS reviews make their conclusions public - both for the obvious
reason of not revealing vulnerabilities to those who might want to exploit them, and because
confidentiality encourages states to be willing to accept the reviews. Hence, in the case of the
71 Personal communication from George Bunn, June 2005.
72 Data provided by DOE, July 2006.
73 For a brief description of IPPAS and its role, see Mark Soo Hoo, " IAEA Activities for the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material and Facilities -- the Role and Importance of IPPAS Missions," in Eurosafe 2002, Berlin, 4-5
November 2002 (Berlin: Forum for Nuclear Safety, 2002; available at http://www.eurosafe-forum.org/
products/data/5/pe_253_24__euro2_5_7_iaea_phys_pro.pdf as of 11 May 2006).
7 Government of Norway, "Statement by Norway," in 48th IAEA General Conference, Vienna, Austria, 20-21
September 2004 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004; available at http://www.iaea.org/About/
Policy/GC/GC48/Statements/norway.pdf as of 10 May 2006).
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U.S. reviews, only the U.S. government and the reviewed government receive the results
(meaning that other governments or the IAEA could not use the data from these reviews to
inform assessments of which facilities worldwide had what levels of security); in the case of
the IPPAS reviews, only the IAEA, the reviewed government, and the participants on the
review team are informed of the results of the review (similarly limiting the availability of the
data to inform international assessments).
Laws, regulations, and other open sources. Many countries publish a considerable
amount of information about their approaches to physical protection, including their laws and
regulations on the subject (though some parts of these are often kept secret);75 speeches and
other statements on the subject by senior officials; and conference papers by their leading
76experts. In countries with broad press freedoms, there is often additional information
available in press reports about both strengths and weaknesses of approaches to nuclear
security at particular sites. The United States makes more information publicly available than
any other country and has particularly aggressive non-government organizations monitoring
problems in U.S. nuclear security arrangements;77 but important information about nuclear
security in a variety of other countries can be gleaned from similar sources. In addition, in
many cases it is possible to visit facilities and interview security experts and managers,
collecting significant additional information that is not classified, but is not readily available
to the general public. A number of important questions can often be answered through
analysis of such open sources and compared across countries, such as: Does the country in
question base its nuclear security rules on the IAEA recommendations? If so, which revision
of the IAEA recommendations are the rules based on? (At this writing, the most recent
version of INFCIRC/225 is Revision 4, completed in 1999; international discussions of a fifth
revision are expected to begin in late 2006.) Does the country in question require its facilities
with potential nuclear bomb material to be able to defend against a specific DBT? If so, is
there any information at all in the public domain as to how substantial this DBT is? Does the
country in question require facilities to have armed guards on-site at facilities with potential
nuclear bomb material, or does it rely on armed response by forces that would have to come
to the site from elsewhere in response to a call? (Tests in the United States have suggested
that in some cases, if on-site defenses are defeated, either theft or sabotage might be
accomplished quickly enough that off-site response forces might not have time to arrive.) Are
nuclear material transports subject to similar requirements? What kind of screening is in
75 The UN Security Council committee overseeing implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1540 has made a compilation of national laws on subjects covered by the resolution, including physical
protection, available on their website. See United Nations, "1540 Committee" (New York: UN, 2005; available
at http://disarmament2.un.org/CommitteeI540/meeting.html as of 25 February 2005).
76 For selections of such papers, see, for example, Fritz Steinhausler, ed., Proceedings of Strengthening Global
Practices for Protecting Nuclear Material: Eu-High Level Scientific International Conference on Physical
Protection, Salzburg, Austria, 8-13 September (Salzburg, Austria: University of Salzburg, 2002; available at
http://www.numat.at/list%20of%2Opapers/gesamtproceedings.pdf as of 4 December 2006); International Atomic
Energy Agency, ed., Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials: Experience in Regulation, Implementation, and
Operations, Vienna, 10-14 November (Vienna: IAEA, 1997).
17 The work of the Project on Government Oversight is particularly notable in this respect. See, for example,
Project on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk (Washington, D.C.: POGO,
2001; available at http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-01 I 003-nuclear.html as of 4 December 2006).
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place to ensure that people granted access to nuclear material (or charged with responsibility
for guarding it) are trustworthy?
Combined all-source analysis. Ideally, a full assessment of security levels at the
many nuclear sites should be prepared which makes use of all the sources of information
available. Unfortunately, as far as the author is aware, this has not been done - either in the
United States, at the IAEA, or anywhere else in the world. After the 9/11 attacks, the United
States did finally attempt to pull together information from various databases into a list of
world facilities with HEU or plutonium. On this list, the analysts gave each facility that had
been subject to a recent U.S. visit a one, two, or three rating for security, depending on
whether it did not meet, just barely met, or clearly met the IAEA physical protection
recommendations. In cases where the rating suggested a problem a few words were included
to indicate what the problem was. But anyone wanting more detailed information - including
information that might help inform an estimate of what kinds of threats a facility was
defended against - would have to go back to the original trip reports of the visits. And
information from the myriad other potential sources available was not integrated into this
list.78 As noted above, much more sophisticated methods for systematizing and weighting
information about different elements of the overall effectiveness of nuclear security systems
are available, if analysts chose to make use of them.
Using the information available within a government like the U.S. government or the
Russian government (or at the IAEA, if adequate resources were available to undertake such
an analysis), analysts could attempt to divide the security levels at different facilities and
transport legs into bins, depending on the types of threats they were judged to be effectively
protected against, much as in the example at the start of this chapter. For example, something
like the following five-point scale might be used to rate facilities:
(1) Not well protected even against a single outsider or a single insider. (Some facilities in
the former Soviet Union fell in this category in the early 1990s, as evidenced by
successful thefts that involved only one insider or one outsider.)
(2) Probably protected against single outsiders, but likely still vulnerable to even a small
group of determined outside attackers, or one to two well-placed insiders. (Many HEU-
fueled research reactors around the world appear to be in this category; sites that followed
the IAEA recommendations but went not further would probably be in this category or
the next one.)
(3) Sites likely protected against one to three outside attackers, or one non-violent insider,
but may still be vulnerable to well-planned attacks by a modestly larger group of well-
armed, well-trained outsiders, one to three well-placed, determined, and violent insiders,
or both working together.
(4) Sites probably protected against attacks by modest groups of outside attackers, one to
three insiders, and both working together.
(5) Sites probably protected against squad-size force of well-trained and well-armed
attackers, one to four well-placed insiders, and both working together. (Facilities
78 Interview with DOE official, November 2005.
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meeting the new DBT that DOE facilities are now required to protect against would be
among the few facilities in the world protected at this level.)
As examples of such an approach, consider the nuclear facilities in the United States
and Russia. Most DOE facilities are probably in the process of transition from category four
to category five in this ranking system, as they put in place the measures needed to meet the
new DOE DBT. Privately owned HEU facilities regulated by the NRC would be in category
four, as they are not required to have defenses against the squad-size threats that DOE
facilities are now required to protect against, or perhaps in transition between category three
and category four. As already noted, however, HEU-fueled research reactors in the United
States are exempt from the most important NRC security requirements for facilities with
HEU, and most of them would likely be in category two. In Russia, it is highly unlikely that
there are any longer any facilities in category one. Large weapons complex sites (comparable
in some respects to the major DOE sites) are probably in category four for outside attackers,
but in category two or three with respect to insider threats; small civilian sites are likely in
category two or three with respect to both threats. (Ironically, after more than a decade of
U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation, most HEU-fueled research reactors in Russia are
probably better secured than their counterparts in the United States.)
Given the limits of available information on the real state of nuclear security at
facilities around the world, such threat-based rankings will inevitably involve a certain
amount ofjudgment and educated guesses - at any level of classification, in any government.
Despite the uncertainties, however, an approach based on the threats analysts believe security
systems can defeat is superior to approaches that are not threat based, because when it is
combined with estimates of the probability that adversaries will bring particular levels of
threat to bear, this approach can lead to a judgment concerning the probability of successful
theft from a particular facility and how it compares to that probability at other facilities facing
different levels of threat.
In short, making such estimates of the threats facilities can defend against is the first
step in assessing the risks these facilities pose. The next step is assessing the kinds of
capabilities adversaries might be able to bring to bear to challenge these security systems.
The Probabilistic Spectrum of Plausible Recipient Capabilities
Like potential thieves, potential recipients of stolen nuclear weapons or materials also
fall on a probabilistic spectrum of capabilities, with many groups having at least modest
capabilities and fewer and fewer groups having the needed capabilities as the task of using the
stolen goods to gain a usable nuclear explosive capability becomes more difficult. Much of
the task of assessing how much security different quantities and qualities of nuclear material
require is based on attempting to judge what that probabilistic spectrum of adversary
capabilities might look like - that is, what the probability of success would be, given different
types of weapons and materials such a group might receive. The higher the probability the
material in question could be made into a bomb, the higher the consequences would be of
stealing that material and the more effort should be made to reduce the probability of its theft,
in order to keep the conditional risk at an acceptable level.
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Table 4.2: DOE Consequence Ratings for Different Materials
Material DOE Consequence Ratings
Nuclear weapons 1.0
"Pure Products" 0.8
Plutonium or HEU metal, Category 1 quantity
"Simple Compounds" 0.7
Oxides, carbides, etc., Cat. 1 quantity
"High-Grade Material" 0.6
Solutions, fuel assemblies, alloys, Cat. 1 quantity
Category 2 quantity or material 0.4
Category 3 quantity or material 0.2
Category 4 quantity or material 0.1
Source: Byron Gardner, "Process of System Design and Analysis," presented at "Workshop on
Physical Protection," Moscow, 11-14 September 1995 (available at
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/pur/112931 -7hNczP/webviewable/l 12931 .pdf as of 9
January 2007.
In this chapter, I do not attempt to assess the consequences of potential nuclear attacks
in terms of lives lost and economic damage inflicted.79 Since the goal of the analysis here is
only to assess relative risks of nuclear theft - that is, which facilities pose larger risks than
others - such an absolute assessment of consequences is not needed. Rather, in this chapter,
the consequences assessment is based on judgments as to how the probability that recipients
would succeed in getting a bomb that would detonate and provide a substantial yield from the
stolen items varies depending on what the stolen items are. For different nuclear materials
that might be stolen, I use a zero to 1.0 scale, with 1.0 assigned to large quantities of HEU
metal (which, as discussed below, would be the easiest material in the world for terrorists to
make a nuclear bomb with substantial yield from, as it could be used to make a simple but
inefficient "gun-type" bomb, little more than slamming two masses of HEU together at
sufficient speed). (Assembled nuclear weapons are discussed in a separate section below.)
This 1.0 rating is only a relative judgment, not an absolute one: it says only that large
quantities of HEU metal pose the greatest dangers, not that the probability that recipients
would be able to make a bomb from a large quantity of HEU metal is anything like 100%.
All other types of nuclear material are then assigned ratings based on judgments of how much
lower the probability of recipients being able to make a bomb from them would be, compared
to large quantities of HEU metal.
This approach is very similar to the approach DOE used for many years to assign
consequence values in assessing the risks at different facilities. That consequence ranking
7 For an official U.S. government analysis of the consequences of a 10-kiloton terrorist nuclear blast in
Washington D.C. (remarkably leaving out entirely the effects of fire), see National Planning Scenarios. For an
earlier analysis by the present author (along with John P. Holdren and Anthony Wier) of the effects of a 10-
kiloton weapon detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical workday, see Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and
John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Cambridge,
Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative,
2003; available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/cnwm.pdf as of 2 January 2007), pp. 15-19.
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also featured a zero to 1.0 scale, with the materials that would be easiest for terrorists to use in
a nuclear bomb given the highest rankings and material that would be more difficult to
process for use in a bomb given lower rankings. Table 4.2 shows DOE's consequences
rankings for different types of materials as they existed in the mid-I 990s.
How the quantity and quality of material that the recipients acquire affects the
probability that they will be able to make a usable nuclear bomb from it depends on the
recipients' capabilities. For example, some recipients might have experienced nuclear
chemists and at least simple processing facilities available: the need to separate uranium or
plutonium from other materials would pose a smaller barrier to them than it might pose to
other adversaries.
Even if a theft of nuclear material did not result in a state or group gaining the ability
to actually detonate a nuclear explosive, it might contribute substantially to the credibility of
nuclear threats based on claims that they could do so. If enough material for a bomb was
known to have been stolen from a particular site, for example, and a group sent in a threat to
detonate a nuclear bomb if certain demands were not met, accompanied by a small sample of
the stolen material, it would be difficult to dismiss the credibility of the threat. Such
possibilities, while real, are not included in the consequence rankings in this chapter (or in the
categorizations in U.S. or international regulations); if they were, they would have the effect
of somewhat increasing the estimated consequences of small quantities of material (which
still might be enough for a hoax, even if not for a bomb). If, on the other hand, stolen
material never found a recipient who could make use of it (as appears to have been the case in
the known cases of theft of HEU and plutonium to date), then the consequences of the theft
could be quite minor.
Terrorist vs. State Recipients
The most important division among potential recipients is that between states and sub-
state groups. As discussed in Chapter 2, states that had not yet succeeded in producing
nuclear weapons or sufficient quantities of the materials needed to make them might be
extremely interested in purchasing stolen weapons or materials. It is not hard to imagine
thieves stealing nuclear material and selling it to a state, or a state-sponsored terrorist group
stealing nuclear material and providing it to its state sponsor. A state would have far more
financial, technical, human, and other resources than would a terrorist group and, with control
of its own territory, would have a much easier time establishing a site where the work could
be done without detection and disruption. Hence, a variety of barriers that might be
significant for a terrorist group, such as the possible need to make an implosion-type rather
than a gun-type bomb (and to carry out explosives tests with that objective), or the need to
chemically process stolen material to recover the potential bomb material from it, would be
much less significant for a state.80 On the other hand, a state might be seeking not just a
80 For a useful discussion of which barriers are more or less important in the case of "theft for a proliferation
state" and "theft for a subnational group," see U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Panel to Review the Spent
Fuel Standard for Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, The Spent Fuel Standardfor Disposition of Excess
Weapons Plutonium: Application to Current DOE Options (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2000;
available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9999.html as of 15 August 2006), pp. 22-30.
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crude, unreliable, unsafe bomb deliverable by a truck, but a usable military weapon with good
safety and reliability, deliverable by missile or aircraft, which is a far more technically
challenging goal to achieve.
Perhaps most important, the consequences if a terrorist group succeeded in getting a
usable nuclear explosive capability from the stolen items would include a high probability of
a nuclear detonation in a major city. By contrast, no state has actually used a nuclear bomb
that it acquired since more than one state in the system possessed such weapons; even very
hostile states are likely to be deterred from using a weapon in their possession against a city
(particularly in a state with overwhelming military power, such as the United States) by the
prospect of the overwhelming retaliation that would likely result if and when the source of the
attack was identified.
Nevertheless, in the case of a state recipient, if the stolen material or nuclear weapon
allowed that state to acquire a usable nuclear weapons capability that it otherwise could not
have acquired (or could not have acquired as rapidly), this would be a substantial blow to U.S.
and international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons, posing a wide range of
problems for U.S. foreign policy. It would increase the risk of nuclear use (by increasing the
number of states that could make a decision to use nuclear weapons), and it would increase
the risk of further nuclear proliferation, including to terrorist groups (by increasing the
number of states that could serve as a source of a nuclear weapon or material, either by design
or by inadvertence). It is extremely difficult to quantify these potential consequences, but two
things are clear: (a) the consequences of additional states gaining nuclear weapon capabilities
are substantial enough that the United States and many other countries have devoted
enormous efforts to preventing this from occurring; but (b) these consequences are
nevertheless dramatically smaller than those of the actual use of a nuclear weapon by a
terrorist group.
Hence, despite the smaller probability of a terrorist recipient being able to get a usable
ability to detonate a nuclear explosive from the stolen items, the overall consequences
attributable to a terrorist recipient are likely to be substantially higher than those for a state
recipient, except in those few cases where the stolen material would be so difficult to process
into a bomb that the probability of success for a terrorist group seems very small. Even in
those cases, however, security for the material in question cannot be entirely neglected,
because of the possibility that the ultimate recipient will be a state, with a state's resources.8 1
To take a specific example of this difference between terrorist groups and states,
consider the consequences of a theft of 1000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium (LEU), at a
typical power reactor enrichment of 4.5% U-235. In this case, the probability that a terrorist
g1 In internal U.S. government discussions in the mid-1990s of what the criteria should be for terminating all
domestic safeguards for certain nuclear materials, for example, advocates of criteria that would allow safeguards
to be terminated on material that was up to 10% plutonium by weight, with no additional radiation barrier,
argued that this was acceptable because terrorist groups would probably not be able to process such materials to
make a bomb from them; even if that argument was correct (which in many of the cases in dispute I believe it
was not), it neglected the possibility that the ultimate recipient would be a state. (Author's experience in
interagency discussions of termination criteria, 1995-1997.)
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group would be able to use it to make a nuclear bomb would likely be close to zero (because
further enrichment would be required, which is almost certainly beyond the capabilities of
terrorist groups).82 A state recipient would only be able to use it to make a bomb if the state
had an enrichment capability. But if that were the case, the state would have the capability to
produce HEU for a weapon from natural uranium, even if it did not acquire stolen LEU.
Having LEU available would reduce the enrichment work required to produce HEU
dramatically, saving time and money, possibly making it possible to use lower-quality
centrifuges (or other enrichment devices) and potentially making it easier to produce HEU
covertly - but it would not be very likely to make acquisition of a nuclear weapon possible
where it would otherwise be impossible.8 3 Hence, the consequence in the case of a terrorist
recipient would be very low, and the consequence in the case of a state recipient, while
higher, would still be modest.
Categorizing Nuclear Materials: What Materials Should Get What
Levels of Protection?
To efficiently allocate nuclear security resources to reduce the greatest risks, nuclear
materials that recipients would have a larger chance of being able to make into a bomb should
receive higher levels of protection, while nuclear materials that recipients would have only a
low probability of making into a bomb should receive lower levels of protection. Both U.S.
and international physical protection approaches are based on this principle of "graded
safeguards." As the IAEA puts it, physical protection of nuclear material should be based on
"the possibility that the unauthorized removal of plutonium, highly enriched uranium or
uranium-233 could lead to the construction of a nuclear explosive device by a technically
competent group," and protection levels should be based on a categorization of nuclear
material into different classes "based on the potential risk of the material being used for a
nuclear explosive device, which itself depends on: the type of material, e.g. plutonium,
uranium; isotopic composition, i.e. content of fissile isotopes; physical and chemical form;
82 For a discussion, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor Action
(Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear
Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/analysis cnwmupdate_052404.pdf as of 2
January 2007), p. 18.
83 One circumstance in which a state would find it very useful to have a secret source of LEU would be if the
state were under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, but nonetheless attempting
to operate a covert uranium enrichment plant to produce nuclear bomb material. In this case, starting from LEU
rather than from natural uranium would mean that the needed enrichment plant to produce HEU for a bomb
could be far smaller, and therefore somewhat easier to keep hidden. Starting with natural uranium (0.72% U-
235), and leaving 0.3% U-235 in the depleted uranium or "tails," for example, an ideal enrichment cascade
would require some 200 kilogram-separative work units (kg-SWU, often referred to simply as SWU) per
kilogram of 90% HEU produced; if 4.4% enriched LEU was available, by contrast, and as much as 2% U-235
were left in the depleted uranium, only one-sixth as many SWU would be required per kilogram of HEU
produced (and only 36 kilograms of LEU feed material would be needed per kilogram of HEU produced,
compared to 220 kilograms of natural uranium feed for each kilogram of HEU). The author is grateful to John P.
Holdren for providing an Excel file that implements the standard equations for making such calculations, which
can be found, for example, in Allan S. Krass et al., Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation
(London: Taylor & Francis for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1983).
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degree of dilution; radiation level; and quantity."8 4 The ease or difficulty of making a nuclear
bomb from a particular type of material is often described as its "attractiveness" to potential
adversaries seeking a bomb, or its "utility" to them. The next sections of this chapter will
focus on assessing the effect of each of these factors on the probability that recipients would
be able to make a bomb from particular types of stolen material.
As nuclear security rules and procedures are set, the goal should be a balanced system
of protection, in which, to the extent practicable, no particular type or quantity of nuclear
material has such weak security measures that it poses a substantially greater overall risk of
nuclear terrorism than any other. If one particular stockpile poses a particularly high risk,
then resources should be applied to improve security for that stockpile until the risk there is
no higher than elsewhere; but by the same token, if a particular stock already poses a low risk
(because, for example, the amount of material there is too small to make a bomb), then
resources should not be wasted on further improving security there when they could be spent
improving security for other, higher-risk stockpiles. This implies, as will be discussed below,
an approach that is more graded than current approaches are, so that the level of security
required does not "fall off a cliff' when the material's characteristics pass some arbitrary
regulatory threshold, beyond which it might still be quite useful in nuclear bombs.
In such a balanced approach to defining the levels of security required for different
types and quantities of nuclear materials, policy-makers would:
(1) Define the level of risk of successful theft of the most attractive material (such as large
quantities of HEU metal, or assembled weapons) that they are willing to accept, given the
risks to society that might result from such a theft and the costs and difficulties of
reducing the risk further;
(2) Set rules requiring sites with that type of material to provide security measures judged
sufficient to reduce the probability of successful theft, given the expected spectrum of
adversary capabilities, to the desired level;
(3) Estimate how much properties of nuclear material different from those of the most
attractive material would reduce the probability that adversaries would be able to
successfully make a nuclear bomb; and
(4) Set rules for these other types and quantities of nuclear material so that the combined risk
of successful theft and successful bomb-making was no higher than the level of risk
determined to be acceptable for the most attractive material. 8
84 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.
85 To fully optimize and ensure that all the most promising investments in improved security had been identified,
one would also have to include the cost of achieving any given level of risk reduction. It may be, for one reason
or another, that at particular sites large reductions in theft risks can be made for modest costs; in those cases,
those investments should probably be made, even if those facilities are not among the highest-risk facilities
overall. An analysis of the relative cost of all the reductions in theft risk that might be made at different nuclear
facilities is far beyond the scope of this dissertation, however - and probably beyond the scope of the analysis
governments can reasonably perform to support regulation and other nuclear security policies. At any one
facility with weapons-usable nuclear material, however, procedures and software are available to assess the cost
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More formally, the security system in such a balanced approach would be designed so
that the overall risk of successful theft followed by successful bomb-making by potential
adversaries was roughly constant over the different types of facilities and materials. For
example, if policy-makers determined that sites with large quantities of HEU metal would
have to demonstrate that their security measures would have a 95% chance of defeating theft
attempts by the kinds of adversaries expected in that country - meaning only a 5% chance that
such an attempt would be successful - and if they concluded that adversaries' chance of
making a nuclear bomb from a particular different type of material would be only half as large
(compared to their chance of making one from a large quantity of HEU metal), then if the
security rules were set so that the security measures for the second type of material would not
allow more than 10% of the theft attempts to be successful, the overall risk would be the same
(assuming the probability of any type of theft attempt was constant among facilities with these
different materials), with the probability of successful theft doubled but the probability of
successful bomb-making cut in half.
In the discussion that follows, the reduction in the probability of successful bomb-
making resulting from materials being less attractive than the best material is referred to as the
"discount factor." This is normalized to 1.0 for nuclear weapons themselves and large
quantities of HEU metal and is then somewhat lower for all other types of material. In the
sections below, I provide very rough, preliminary estimates of such discount factors for a
wide range of different types of nuclear material; I will then use these to propose a new
approach to placing nuclear material into different categories requiring different levels of
security measures, which would significantly modify current U.S. and international
approaches.
Current Approaches to Categorizing Nuclear Materials
The approach to graded safeguards laid out in the IAEA's recommendations on
physical protection and codified in the physical protection convention is based on three
categories of nuclear material, with Category I material receiving the highest level of
protection and Category III material the least. (Implicitly, there is a fourth category, the
material not even included in the categorization scheme, which requires only "prudent
management practices.") Table 4.3 shows how materials are categorized in this approach.
of a range of different approaches to achieving some required level of improvement in security (whether it be a
larger design basis threat or a higher required probability of defeating that threat), and at some types of facilities
(such as DOE facilities), such analyses of optimum upgrade approaches have become fairly routine. Such
analyses of the relative costs and benefits of different improvements that could reduce risk are routinely made in
the area of nuclear safety (usually by the companies operating the facilities); eventually, such analyses should
become routine for nuclear security as well.
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Table 4.3: IAEA Recommended Categorization of Nuclear Material
Material Form Category I Category 11 Category 111"
1.Plutoniuma Unirradiatedb >2 kg <2 kg 5500 g
>500 g > 15g
2.Uranium-235 Unirradiated"
Uranium enriched 5 kg or more Less than 5 1 kg or less but
to 2 20% 235U o kg but more more than 15g
than 1 kg
Uranium enriched 10 kg or Less than 10kg
to 10% 235U but more but more than 1
less than 20% kg
10 kg or more
Uranium enriched 10 kg or more
above natural, but
less than 10%235u
3. Uranium-233 Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 500 g or less but
kg but more more than 15 g
than 500 g
4. Irradiated Depleted or
Fuel natural
uranium,
thorium or
low-enriched
fuel(less than
10% fissile
content)d"e
a All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.
bMaterial not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal
to or less than 100 rad/hr at one meter unshielded.
'Quantities not falling in Category Ill and natural uranium should be protected at least in
accordance with prudent management practice.
d Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of
the specific circumstances, to assign a different category of physical protection. (INFCIRC/225
specifies that this level of protection is recommended for international transport considerations.)
e Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I or Il
before irradiation may be reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds
100 rad/hr at one meter unshielded.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Facilities, INFCIRC/225 Rev. 4 (Corrected) (Vienna: IAEA, 1999, available as of 9 January 2007
at http://www.iaea.or.at/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1 999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.html).
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As can be seen, 2 kilograms or more of plutonium or U-233, or more than 5 kilograms
of U-235 contained in HEU, are considered a Category I quantity of material. If the material
is emitting 100 rad/hr at one meter or more, it can be reduced one category.86 Plutonium
isotopics do not affect the categorization, except that plutonium that is at least 80% by weight
Pu-238 is excluded. Uranium isotopics above 20% do not affect the categorization. Spent
fuel is included primarily because of international transport considerations - that is, fears of
sabotage during the course of international transport. The chemical dilution and physical
form of the material do not affect the categorization; plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX)
fuel, for example, would, in this approach, be protected in the same way that pure plutonium
metal would be. In short, the approach is based primarily on the quantity of the material, with
the quality of the material entering only in the 100 rad/hr threshold for "self-protecting"
material, the 20% and 10% thresholds for different grades of enriched uranium, and the 80%
Pu-238 threshold for excluding plutonium. 87
The U.S. NRC regulations on categorizing material are similar in most respects (which
is not surprising, since the IAEA recommendations were originally based in part on U.S.
practices).88 The limits on how much plutonium, U-235 in HEU, or U-233 constitute
Category I, II, and III quantities in the NRC regulations are identical to those in the IAEA
recommendations. The radiation level at which material is exempted from Category I security
requirements is set at 100 rem/hr at three feet, essentially identical to the IAEA level.89 The
enrichment thresholds are the same, as is the lack of any distinction among materials with
different chemical or physical forms. In recent rulings, however, the NRC has granted
exemptions from many of its specific requirements for handling Category I material in the
case of reactors that were planning to use fabricated MOX fuel, as discussed in more detail
below.90
Since the late 1980s, DOE has taken a different approach, in which categorization is
affected to a larger degree by the quality of the material under consideration. In addition to
Categories I, II, III, and IV, the DOE system also includes attractiveness levels A, B, C, D,
86 Because many of the physical protection rules in the United States and internationally were first established in
the 1970s, before the SI units Grays and Sieverts came into common use, the regulations and discussions of them
are still often framed in older units, and I will use these older units in this chapter. 1 Gray=100 rad; I
Sievert=100 rem.
87 The threshold of "less than 10% fissile content by weight" in reference to irradiated fuel is somewhat odd, as it
does not specify how material that has 10% or more fissile content should be treated; from the rest of the table, a
Category I quantity of such material, if it was emitting more than 100 rad/hr at one meter, would be treated as
Category II, which is the same as the recommendation for spent fuel with lower fissile content. The purpose of
this restriction to less than 10% fissile content by weight is therefore not clear.
88 The NRC categorizations can be found in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Part 73-Physical Protection
of Plants and Materials."
89 The U.S. rules are based on the roentgen-equivalent-man (rem) unit of absorbed dose. (1 Sievert--100 rem.)
To convert from the radiation field to the absorbed dose requires multiplying by a "quality factor" that differs for
different types of radiation; since, in the case of gamma rays, the quality factor is 1, in this case the 100 rem/hr at
3 feet standard and the IAEA-recommended 100 rad/hr at 1 meter standard are essentially equivalent.
90 See, for example, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, In the Matter ofDuke Energy Corporation (Catawba
Nuclear Station, Units I and 2), CLI-04-29 (Washington, D.C.: NRC, 2004; available at http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders/2004/2004-29cIi.pdf as of 22 September 2006).
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and E, and if material is a chemical, physical, or isotopic form judged to be more difficult to
make bombs from, it falls into a lower physical protection category. Table 4.4 outlines this
DOE categorization approach.
As the table shows, the Category I quantities of "pure products" are the same in the
DOE system as in the IAEA and NRC systems - although the DOE system includes separated
americium and neptunium as well (discussed later in this chapter). But in the case of "high-
grade materials," a larger quantity -just below the IAEA "significant quantity" figures for
safeguards - is needed before the material qualifies as Category I. Materials classified as
"low-grade" can never be Category I, even if tons of plutonium or HEU are present in them.
Several crucial particulars of the DOE system are not specified in Table 4.4, but are
laid out in an old manual for implementing DOE's material control and accounting rules,
which, at this writing, is in the process of being revised.9' In particular, materials with any of
the following characteristics are all considered "low-grade," and hence can never be Category
1:
" Materials emitting at least 15 rem/hr at 1 meter (less than one-sixth of the IAEA self-
protecting standard);
" Materials containing less than 10% by weight special nuclear material (that is, plutonium,
U-235, U-233, americium, or neptunium), such as mixed oxide fuels containing 3-7% by
weight plutonium and the rest U-238, for example;
* Uranium at enrichments below 50%.
In sufficient quantity, materials with any of these characteristics - and indeed, with all
of them put together - would be treated as Category I in the IAEA system or the NRC system.
This chapter will make the case that all three of these judgments on DOE's part are
indefensible and should be revised. (As discussed below, however, the contrast may be less
stark than it seems, as Category II material receives protection in the DOE system in many
ways comparable to that recommended for Category I material by the IAEA.) Moreover, in
the DOE system, material emitting 100 rem/hr or more at one meter is not just downgraded
one category, it is considered "highly irradiated," and therefore downgraded all the way to
Attractiveness Level E, which can never be more than Category IV material, requiring
virtually no security measures to prevent theft (though DOE rules may specify important
security measures related to sabotage, in some cases). Figure 4.2 provides a decision tree for
DOE's categorization approach.
9' U.S. Department of Energy, Guide to Implementation of DOE 5633.3b, "Control and Accountability of
Nuclear Materials" (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 1995).
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Table 4.4: DOE Table for Categorizing Nuclear Materials
Pu/T-233 Category Contained U-235/Separated Np-
(kg) 237/Separated Am-241 and -243 All E
Attractiveness Ctegory Materials
Level i I In I, I H In IV Ca I
WEAPONS A All NA N/A N/A All N/A NA N'A N/A
Assembled weapons and test
devices
PURE PRODUCTS B >2 >0.42 >0 2<0.4 <0.2 >5 >1<5 >04<1 <.4 N/A
Pits, major components, button
ingots, recastable metal, directly
convertible materials
HIGH-GRADE MATERIALS C >6 >12-6 >0.4<2 <0.4 >20 >6420 >2<6 <2 N/A
Carbides, oxides, nitrates, solutions
(,25 g/L) etc.; fuel elements and
assemblies; alloys and mixtures:
UF4 or UF6 (> 50% enniched)
LOW-GRADE MATERIALS D N/A :16 >3<16 <3 N/A >50 >8<50 <S N/A
Solutiona (1 to 25 5iL), process
residues requiring extensive
reprocessing; moderately irradiated
material; Pu-238 (except waste);
UF4 or UF6(. 20% < 50%
enriched)
ALL OTHER MATERIALS E NA N/ A N/A Reportable NA N/A N/A Reportable Reportable
Highly irradiated forms, solutions Quantities Quantities Quatities
(<I g/L), uramum containing <20%
U-235 or <10% U-233' (any form,
any quantity)
U rm nmit fme caoy V vseq.W nmetiqt iu bimat.
Ie ta quottyof U-33 [ContaindV-U33 - ContainedU-2351. Thnngayi ataed by PitPU33 side ottha ae.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, DOE M 470.4-6 (Washington, D.C.: DOE,
2005).
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Figure 4.2: Decision-Tree for DOE Categorization System
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Graded Safeguards, or Cliffed Safeguards?
The differences between the security measures recommended for Category I material
and those recommended for all other material in the IAEA system are quite stark. This is
important because, the way the rules are set today, some materials that might be quite useful
in making a nuclear bomb are considered Category II or even less and are subject to very few
security measures: these materials, under current circumstances, may pose substantial risks of
nuclear theft and terrorism.
For Category I nuclear material, the IAEA recommends that it only be used in an
"inner area" within a "protected area," with the ceiling, walls, and floor of the inner area
designed to delay any attempt to penetrate them to remove material. The protected area
should have a physical barrier around it with intrusion detection equipment and should have a
24-hour guard force in regular communication with offsite response forces; if the on-site
guards are not armed, measures should be taken to compensate for that. Only people who
have been cleared as trustworthy should be granted unescorted access to the protected area or
the inner area. Everyone entering or leaving the inner area where the nuclear material is
located should be searched. People in the inner area should be kept under "constant
surveillance." When the material is being stored with no one present, it should be in a locked
and alarmed "strong room" within the inner area.92
In the case of Category II material, by contrast, there is no need for an inner area; there
is no need for a 24-hour guard force (though there should still be a central alarm station that is
continuously manned); there is no need to keep the people in the material area under constant
surveillance; and there is no need to store the material in a locked and alarmed strong room.
On the other hand, the material should still be in a protected area with a physical barrier and
intrusion detection around it, only cleared personnel should be given unescorted access to it,
and all people, vehicles, and packages should be subject to search.93 For Category III
material, even these recommendations are eliminated.94 While the IAEA recommendations
call for all states to base their physical protection approaches on some specific DBT,95 there is
no requirement that this be applied to Category II and III material along with Category I
material (even with less capable threats) - and as described below, the U.S. NRC, among
others, only applies the DBT approach to Category I material. There are similarly stark
differences in the recommendations for security for transport of these materials.
In general, the IAEA recommendations tend to be rule-based and say very little about
how well the recommended security systems should perform. The recommendations call for
each state to establish a design basis threat that nuclear security systems should be designed to
defeat, but they do not make even general remarks about what levels of adversary capability
92 See Section 6.2 in International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities.
93 See Section 6.3 in International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities.
94 See Section 6.4 in International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities.
95 See Section 6.1 in International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities.
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should be included. They call for a locked and alarmed strong room for storing Category I
material, but there is no discussion of how strong the lock should be, how difficult to defeat
the alarm should be, or how strong the strong room should be. They call for a 24-hour guard
force for Category I material, but there is no discussion of how numerous or capable they
should be (and as already noted, the guards do not necessarily have to have weapons to meet
the recommendations, even if hundreds of kilograms of HEU metal are present). They call for
an intrusion detection and assessment system, but there is no discussion of how effective and
difficult to defeat this system should be - and so on.
The gap between the security required for Category I and Category II material is even
greater in the NRC regulations. 96 Facilities with Category I material must have security
arrangements capable of defeating a violent assault by a well-armed and well-trained group
capable of operating in two or more teams or a conspiracy of well-placed insiders and they
must have a substantial armed guard force.97 The material must be in a material access area
whose roof, walls, and floor each constitute a physical barrier (similar to the IAEA's inner
areas) within a protected area. There are very detailed requirements for guard forces
(including a Tactical Response Team of at least five armed guards to respond to any assault);
physical barriers; intrusion detection, surveillance, and alarm systems; access controls; system
testing; communications; and more.98
But facilities with only Category II material do not need to be protected against any
particular DBT; they do not require an armed guard force; they do not have to be within a
protected area with any kind of fence, or a material access area with any significant delay
barriers.99 In essence, Category II material has to be handled in an area to which access is
controlled (in some unspecified way); when in storage, it has to be in some type of "vault-type
room" or "security cabinet" (which may be a file cabinet with a padlock); there has to be
some type of alarm in the case of unauthorized intrusion; and there has to be at least one
watchman (who need not be armed and can have a variety of other duties as well). Material
emitting 100 rem/hr at three feet is exempted even from these Category II requirements. All
material that happens to be located at research reactors - even if it were large quantities of
90% enriched HEU - is exempt from all the Category I requirements, though there are very
limited security requirements that are specific to research reactors with HEU emitting less
than 100 rem/hr at three feet. In other words, HEU that would require a substantial armed
guard force, fences, intrusion detectors, and a security plan able to defeat a specified DBT if it
96 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Part 73-Physical Protection of Plants and Materials."
9 These requirements are in Sections 73.1, 73.46, and 73.50 in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Part 73-
Physical Protection of Plants and Materials."
9' See Sections 73.46 and 73.50 in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Part 73-Physical Protection of Plants
and Materials."
99 See Section 73.67 in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Part 73-Physical Protection of Plants and
Materials." It appears that the NRC regulations do not follow the IAEA recommendations, as the IAEA
recommends that even Category II material be in a protected area with intrusion detection at the perimeter, but
the NRC regulations do not require this. It is somewhat ironic that the United States has been inspecting other
countries it supplies for thirty years to ensure that their physical protection arrangements are consistent with
IAEA recommendations, when U.S. physical protection arrangements in some cases are not.
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were located anywhere else does not require any of those things if it is located at a research
reactor. 100
In short, under NRC rules, a broad range of materials from HEU or plutonium metal to
mixed compounds all require the same stringent level of protection; but if the quantity is small
enough to put the material in the Category II category, or it is emitting 100 rem/hr at 1 meter
or more, or it is at a research reactor, then the facility where the material exists is exempted
from all of the most substantial security requirements. (Even the NRC requirements for
Category I materials fall far below those at DOE: although the two major Category I facilities
licensed by NRC (HEU processors Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS), in Erwin, Tennessee and
BWXT Technology, in Lynchburg, Virginia) handle tons of HEU metal, the threats they are
required to defend against are much less than those comparable DOE facilities must defend
against.10' That security levels should be determined by administrative status rather than risk
assessment clearly does not make sense: from a societal risk perspective, either DOE is
spending too much defending its HEU, or too little is being spent to protect the similar HEU
at NFS and BWXT - whose work is largely paid for by DOE as well.)
At DOE, while a variety of materials are classed as Category II that probably should
not be, the gap between Category I and Category II security appears not to be as large. (The
most specific aspects of DOE security rules - and in particular its policy on what threats
different types of facilities should be required to defend against - are not publicly available,
so it is more difficult to base judgments on detailed reading of texts.) DOE's post-9/1 I DBT
for Category I material is very substantial - reportedly a highly trained, very well-armed force
comparable in size to the 19 attackers who attacked on 9/11, along with potentially multiple
insiders - and protecting DOE sites against this threat is proving to be very costly.10 2
100 This exemption was intended to be temporary, as the research reactors phased over to LEU. For a discussion
of some of the issues this poses, see Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Conversion of Research and
Test Reactors to Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) Fuel, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 98th Congress,
2nd Session, 25 September 1984. More than two decades later, a substantial number of the NRC-regulated
research reactors are still using HEU, and still have very little security in place. See, for example, "Radioactive
Road Trip," "PrimeTime Live," ABC News, 13 October 2005.
10' See, for exampleProject on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security
Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2005; available at http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ho-050301-
consolidation.html as of 30 December 2006).
102 For discussions of the evolution of DOE's DBT over time since 9/11, see Project on Government Oversight,
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Y- 12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory at High Risk (Washington, D.C.:
POGO, 2006; available at http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ho-06 1001 -YI 2.html as of 17 November 2006). For an
earlier discussion, with an explicit comparison to the less substantial DBT at NRC, see Project on Government
Oversight, "Energy Ups Their DBT, NRC Still Making Excuses" (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 28 September
2004; available at http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2004/09/energy-ups,_thei.html as of 5 December 2005).
For a discussion of DOE's ongoing difficulties in meeting these new requirements, see Committee on Energy
and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, A Review of Security Initiatives at DOE Nuclear
Facilities, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 1 st Session, 18 March 2005 (available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/03182005hearingI 457/hearing.htm as of 15 August 2005).
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(Spending on all safeguards and security at DOE is now in the range of $1.5 billion per
year.103)
At DOE facilities, Category I material must be located in a material access area with
specific types of physical barriers, entry and exit inspections, and access controls, to which
armed guards can respond more rapidly than adversaries could complete their task - either
setting off a bomb on-site or stealing material - after setting off an alarm. 104 Such material
access areas have to be located within protected areas, each of which must have a perimeter
intrusion detection and assessment system (PIDAS) which has been tested to assure that it
will detect intruders at least 90% of the time.l"5 Category 11 material must also be within a
protected area with such a PIDAS, but it need not be in a material access area.1 06 Category II
material must be protected against a DBT that is "significantly less" than the Category I
threat'0 7 - but Category II material still has to be protected against some specified threat,
unlike the NRC approach. In the DOE system, material emitting more than 100 rem/hr at one
meter, classified as Category IV, requires very little security against theft (though in some
cases some security measures may be employed to protect against sabotage).
Overall, in these systems, except perhaps for the DOE system, "graded safeguards"
might be more accurately described as "cliffed safeguards." While the risks particular types
of material pose do not change substantially as the amount of plutonium increases from 1.9
kilograms to 2.1 kilograms, or the radiation level it emits decreases from 101 rem/hr at one
meter to 99 rem/hr at one meter, the difference in the required levels of security is dramatic.
If the objective is to allocate protection resources efficiently to reduce the overall level of risk
from all materials that could be used in nuclear weapons, then a more graded approach is
needed that does not have such dramatic security "cliffs".
These categorization systems have had major consequences, leaving some high-risk
nuclear material around the world almost unprotected. U.S. teams cooperating with Russia to
improve security for nuclear materials, for example, have been instructed to focus almost
exclusively on material that would be considered "high-grade material" or "pure products" in
DOE's categorizations, leaving large quantities of only lightly irradiated HEU, or fuel
elements with less than 10% by weight plutonium or HEU, without improved security. 0 The
Material Conversion and Consolidation (MCC) program that has worked with Russia to
remove HEU from vulnerable civilian sites and blend it down to LEU, operating under similar
guidelines, has in most cases focused on "high-grade material" or "pure products" -
103 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Request: Other Defense Activities, vol. 2,
DOE/CF-003 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2006; available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/07budget/Content/
Volumes/Vol_2_ODA.pdf as of 22 December 2006), p. 161.
104 See Section IV.8 in U.S. Department of Energy, Physical Protection, DOE M 470.4-2 Chg. I (Washington,
D.C.: DOE, 2006).
105 See Section VII.3 in U.S. Department of Energy, Physical Protection.
106 See Section 11.8 in U.S. Department of Energy, Physical Protection.
107 Personal communication from Amy Whitworth, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Field
Security, June 2006.
"0 This instruction is incorporated in the official guidelines for the program; these are not publicly available,
however.
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categories that do not include a large fraction of the HEU research reactor fuel in Russia.'09
The U.S. effort to ensure that U.S.-supplied HEU at research reactors around the world was
adequately secured did not review or improve security for irradiated HEU fuel at all until
recently - assuming, incorrectly, that this material met the "self-protecting" standard and
therefore that it required little security.1 0 Research reactors in a number of countries attempt
to manage their fuel loading and unloading to keep their irradiated HEU fuel above the 100
rad/hr at 1 meter limit, so as not to have to implement more substantial security measures.,11
The next sections of this chapter are focused on assessing how changes in the quantity
and quality of material affect the probability of successful bomb-making - information that
can then be used in assessing how much protection these different materials should be
afforded. This will make it possible to make judgments about the validity of existing rules
and to offer an alternative approach to categorizing what nuclear materials require what levels
of protection.
Different Materials and the Spectrum of Recipient Capabilities
Whether considering terrorist groups or states as potential recipients, the key question
is how much lower is the probability that a potential recipient using materials other than the
reference large quantities of HEU metal would succeed in making a nuclear bomb from them?
For the question to even come up in the case of a terrorist group recipient, a terrorist
group would have to be (a) sophisticated enough to be able to organize a successful effort to
acquire some form of weapons-usable nuclear material (either by stealing it itself, getting it
from others who had done so (possibly through intermediaries on some sort of black market),
or acquiring it from a state); and (b) technically capable enough to be able to make at least a
crude nuclear explosive if it got a large quantity of HEU metal. Hence, we are, in effect,
zooming in on one part of the spectrum of possible adversary capabilities and asking: among
the small subset of groups with the sophistication likely to be needed to acquire nuclear
material and capable of making at least a crude bomb if they got the most attractive nuclear
material, what portion would also have the sophistication to overcome whatever additional
barriers are created by the less attractive nuclear material under discussion - and how might
the odds of them making a project-ending mistake be changed by these additional barriers?
To make this approach concrete, consider what discount factor should be applied to a
potential theft of 20 kilograms of 80% enriched HEU in the form of lightly irradiated
109 This is apparently not an absolute constraint, however; on some occasions, the program has accepted limited
amounts of material in lower DOE attractiveness categories, if some particular goal (such as clearing all the
HEU out of an entire building) would be achieved by doing so. Personal communication from DOE official,
October 2006.
"0 See Philip Robinson, "Global Research Reactor Security Program," in RERTR 2005: 27th International
Meeting on Reduced Enrichmentfor Research and Test Reactors, Boston, Mass., 6-10 November (Argonne, Ill.:
Argonne National Laboratory, 2005).
"' For a discussion of the difficulties of operating reactors to maintain more than 100 rad/hr at 1 meter at all
times, see J.J. Koelling and E.W. Barts, Special Nuclear Material Self-Protection Criteria Investigation: Phases
I and II, vol. LA-9213-MS, NUREG/CR-2492 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982;
available at http://www.sciencemadness.org/lanl 1 a/lib-www/la-pubs/00307470.pdf as of 28 September 2005).
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uranium-aluminum oxide research reactor fuel (a very common type of material managed
with very modest security in facilities all over the world). As discussed below, this amount of
material would probably not be sufficient for a simple gun-type bomb; a more complex
implosion bomb would likely be required. Moreover, the research reactor fuel would have to
be chemically processed to separate the uranium from the aluminum - in the presence of at
least a modest level of radiation - and then the recovered uranium would have to be processed
to metal. For theft of this material to result in a usable nuclear explosive in the hands of a
terrorist group, the adversary recipient would have to (a) be sophisticated enough to organize
the needed effort to acquire the material; (b) in addition, be technically capable enough to take
a large quantity of HEU metal and make a gun-type bomb from it; (c) in addition to that, be
capable of making a more difficult implosion-type bomb; (d) in addition to that, be capable of
chemically processing the research reactor fuel to get HEU metal from the uranium-aluminum
oxide; and (e) in addition to that, be capable of doing the chemical processing in the presence
of at least a modest level of radiation. If it lacked any of these capabilities, no bomb would
result. See Figure 4.3.
Ifthe probability of a terrorist group having each of these capabilities were entirely
independent, then the total probability of succeeding through such a long chain would in most
cases be quite small, even if the probabilities at each step were substantial. Unfortunately,
however, these probabilities are likely to be closely linked. A terrorist group with the size,
sophistication, and nuclear ambitions that would be required to acquire nuclear material and
be able to make a bomb from a large amount of HEU metal would very likely be sophisticated
enough to determine what additional technical capabilities it needed for other weapons-usable
material, which of these capabilities it could get and then proceed to acquire them. 12 On the
other hand, the probabilities of making a project-ending mistake at any particular step are
likely to be more nearly independent, and the probability of the conspiracy being detected and
stopped is likely to grow as the needed effort becomes more complex and time-consuming.
Hence, the chance that a terrorist group that could get and make a bomb from enough HEU
metal for a gun-type bomb would also succeed in making a bomb from enough irradiated
research-reactor HEU for an implosion-type bomb is substantially less than 100% - perhaps
in the range of 20-50% - but it is not likely to be in the range of 0-5%.
m Hence, the argument that the probability of nuclear terrorism is low because there are only a small proportion
of terrorist groups willing to attack the United States; a small proportion willing to kill people indiscriminately; a
small proportion willing to use nuclear weapons; and a small proportion capable of doing so, so that the
proportion that is simultaneously in all of these categories is vanishingly small, is not correct. These
characteristics of terrorist groups are almost certainly very strongly correlated, rather than independent; one
would guess, for example, that there is almost 100% overlap between groups willing to kill indiscriminately and
groups willing to use nuclear weapons. (This argument, with an accompanying Venn diagram, is attributed to
David Tucker, in Corine Hegland and Gregg Webb, "The Threat," National Journal 37, no. 16 (15 April 2005;
available at http://nationaljournal.com/about/njweekly/stories/2005/0415njl.htm as of 30 December 2006).
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Figure 4.3: Capabilities Needed to Make a Bomb from 20 kg of HEU in Irradiated
Research Reactor Fuel
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Different terrorist groups will vary in their ability to overcome the various barriers
posed by different types of material without being detected or making fatal mistakes. Figure
4.4 provides a notional representation of the probabilistic spectrum of plausible recipient
capabilities. As with Figure 4.1, it is intended only to be illustrative, not definitive - in some
cases, a plausible case could be made for moving a particular capability one step up or down
on this graph, or for arguing that a particular capability is so difficult that there should be a
large probability gap between one capability and the next. A large gap is shown, for example,
between the ability to process nuclear material that is not radioactive enough to require
remote handling and the ability to do complex chemical processing remotely, or to enrich
uranium. (Most analysts believe that the likelihood of a terrorist group being able to enrich
uranium on its own is extremely small.) Later in this chapter, each of these types of barriers
posed by the quantity and quality of the materials that might be stolen will be discussed in
much more detail. This chart refers to recipients that are sub-national groups; a similar chart
for state recipients would likely have most of the early points in Figure 4.4 clustered in the
high probability region, as these are tasks that most states would likely be able to carry out,
with sufficient determination.
In assessing the probability that thieves might bring to bear various capabilities,
numerous somewhat analogous cases are available to draw on, provided by past thefts of
valuable guarded items and past terrorist attacks. A similar record of analogous cases of
terrorist or criminal capabilities in chemical processing of nuclear materials, plutonium and
uranium metallurgy, and nuclear physics is not available (fortunately). On the one hand, as
discussed in Chapter 2, the nuclear weapons effort of even the Japanese terror cult Aum
Shinrikyo - an unusually large and well-financed terrorist group with many technically
trained members - was almost comically inept and did not proceed very far. And from what
little is known about al Qaeda's nuclear efforts, it too seems to have made only modest
progress - though the possibility that cells linked to al Qaeda have secretly made much more
progress than is known cannot be ruled out.
On the other hand, terrorists and criminals have repeatedly demonstrated considerable
sophistication in the use of explosives of various types and, in some cases, in chemical
processing - particularly in the manufacture of illegal drugs. In the case of manufacturing
heroin, for example, some steps involve handling material that is quite toxic if inhaled, and
glove-boxes not dissimilar from those used in the nuclear industry are often used." 3 The
widespread manufacture of drugs from methamphetamine to LSD demonstrates the crude but
effective chemical processing that even relatively small subnational groups have been capable
of when the incentive was right. Overall, however, judgments related to what kinds of
capabilities in machining, chemical processing, and the like adversaries might have, with what
probability, have to be based primarily on technical judgment, given the modest past
experience with such adversary operations.
113 As far as I am aware, this analogy was first raised by Theodore B. Taylor in Robert B. Leachman and Phillip
Althoff, Preventing Nuclear Theft: Guidelinesfor Industry and Government (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 283.
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Figure 4.4: The Probabilistic Spectrum of Capabilities of Plausible Recipients
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The Difference Between Gun-Type and Implosion-Type Bombs
One of the most important distinctions among different types of nuclear material is
whether the material can be used to make a simple "gun-type" nuclear bomb, or whether it
can only be used for a much more challenging "implosion-type" bomb.
The basic problem in making a fission bomb is getting enough nuclear material
together fast enough so that the reaction does not start going and blow the material apart
before it can generate an appreciable explosive yield. More specifically, to get a significant
nuclear explosive yield requires getting a mass of nuclear material together that is
supercritical on prompt fast neutrons, 4 and keeping it that way for enough fission
114 A mass arranged in such a way that the neutrons from one fission, on average, lead to the fission of more than
one other atom (in the next "generation" of fission), so that the rate of the reaction grows exponentially, is
referred to as "supercritical." Nearly all of the neutrons released when atoms fission are released immediately -
the "prompt" neutrons - but a few are delayed. A nuclear power plant is designed to be just critical, so that the
pace of the nuclear reaction is neither increasing nor decreasing, with both the prompt and the delayed neutrons;
by contrast, a nuclear bomb must be supercritical, with the pace of the reaction growing exponentially, on
prompt neutrons alone. Moreover, most nuclear reactors slow the neutrons released in fission down (using what
is known as a neutron "moderator," typically water or graphite), taking advantage of the fact that slow (or
"thermal") neutrons have a far better chance of splitting an atom of U-235 or Pu-239 than fast neutrons do;
nuclear bombs cannot take the same approach because the neutrons would then be traveling too slowly to fission
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1: Able to organize acquisition of HEU
metal and make a gun-type bomb
2: 1+ able to process HEU oxide or simple compound
(e.g., fresh research reactor fuel) to metal
3: 2+ able to operate while controlling emissions,
other observables, to reduce detection risk
4: 3+ able to process lightly radioactive
fuel not requiring remote handling
5: 4+ able to make crude implosion bomb
6: 5+ able to accomplish difficult
processing without published processes
e.g., plutonium from ceramic)
7: 6+ able to process
highly radioactive fuel
requiring remote
handling
8: 7+ able to
enrich uranium
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generations to split some noticeable fraction of the atoms in the nuclear material. The
fundamental problem is that the nuclear chain reaction is likely to begin as soon as the
material is critical and a neutron splits an atom, releasing more neutrons; as the chain reaction
occurs, the energy it releases will quickly heat up the nuclear material, turn it to vapor, and
cause it to expand to a point where the material is no longer critical, thus stopping the chain
reaction. The trick is to get a substantial amount of material fissioned before this occurs,
given the presence of background neutrons."15
As described in Chapter 2, two principal means of accomplishing this have been
developed, though there are many variations: a gun-type bomb, in which two (or more) sub-
critical pieces of nuclear material are slammed together at high speed, or an implosion-type
bomb, in which explosives surrounding a subcritical mass of nuclear material compress it
until it becomes supercritical and an explosive chain reaction begins.
In dealing with the problem of background neutrons and pre-initiation, the key
difference between the two types of designs is the characteristic assembly time. In a typical
gun-type bomb slamming two pieces of HEU together, the assembly might become critical
when the two pieces are still some 20 centimeters apart; if they are traveling at a relative
velocity of 300 m/sec, it will take them just under a millisecond to travel this distance and
reach maximum supercriticality; if the reaction begins before they have finished traveling this
distance, the yield will be dramatically reduced.' 6 In an implosion-type bomb, by contrast,
the material is moving a few centimeters at a velocity just over half the shock velocity of the
explosives, which might be in the range of 7-8,000 m/sec, so the assembly time is more of the
order of tens of microseconds. Hence, a high-yield gun-type bomb can readily be made using
90% enriched HEU, with its low neutron background - but any attempt to make a gun-type
bomb from plutonium would produce only a tiny nuclear yield.' 7 Weapon-grade plutonium,
much of the material before it expanded and the reaction stopped. See, for example, discussion in Robert Serber,
The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992), pp. 9-20.
115 For the best available unclassified discussion of the basic physics problem to be solved in making a nuclear
bomb, see Serber, The Los Alamos Primer.
116 Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, pp. 45-61. For a discussion using the same typical numbers of a 20 cm
distance and a 300 m/sec speed, see Alexander Glaser, "On the Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel for
Research Reactors at Various Enrichment Levels," Science and Global Security 14 (2006).
117 A kilogram of U-235 undergoes 5.60 x 10- spontaneous fissions per second, generating .010 neutrons/sec,
while a kilogram of U-238 undergoes 6.78 spontaneous fissions per second (over 1200 times the rate for U-235),
generating 13.6 neutrons per second. (For a useful discussion of these rates and their implications, see Glaser,
"Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel." Glaser's figures on spontaneous fissions are consistent with those
that can be derived from the data provided in "Chart of Nuclides" (Upton, N.Y.: Brookhaven National
Laboratory, 2006; available at http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/chart/ as of 9 January 2007).) Hence a bare-sphere
critical mass of 50 kilograms of 93% enriched uranium, suitable for making a gun-type bomb, would generate
just under 50 neutrons per second if it contained no other impurities. As will be discussed later in the text, a-n
reactions with light-element impurities might contribute roughly another 25 neutrons per second in such a 50
kilogram sphere. With the material emitting some 75 neutrons per second, on average, it is reasonably
straightforward to get the pieces of a gun-type bomb together rapidly enough to achieve a low probability of
predetonation. By comparison, a kilogram of Pu-239 undergoes 7.11 spontaneous fissions per second, and a
kilogram of Pu-240 undergoes 478,000 spontaneous fissions per second. Hence, a kilogram of typical weapon-
grade plutonium containing some 94% Pu-239 and roughly 6% Pu-240 would undergo some 29,000
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however, can be used in an implosion-type design with only a modest risk of pre-initiation
leading to a much reduced yield." 8
A gun-type bomb is also very inefficient, however, requiring far more nuclear material
than needed for an implosion-type bomb. The Hiroshima bomb, for example, which was a
gun-type weapon, used approximately 60 kilograms of HEU metal, with an average
enrichment of 80%.119 If the nuclear material the recipients got was plutonium, or a quantity
of HEU too small for a gun-type bomb, they would have to build a more complex implosion-
type bomb to get a substantial nuclear explosive yield.
Published sources report a broad range of views as to how much more difficult it is to
design and build an implosion bomb, compared to a gun-type bomb. At one end of the
spectrum, Luis W. Alvarez, a Nobel laureate in physics and a participant in the Manhattan
Project, argued that getting a substantial nuclear yield from enough weapon-grade HEU for a
gun-type bomb was a "trivial job" which "a high school kid" could do "in short order,"
whereas making an implosion-type bomb "is the most difficult technical job I know." 20 At
the other end of the spectrum, a 1977 report from the Office of Technology Assessment
argued that the difficulties of designing and building a gun-type device or an implosion-type
device are "roughly equivalent."
After consulting with a number of nuclear weapon designers, I conclude that the truth
lies in between these extremes. A crude terrorist gun-type device that would not require high
reliability, safety, or efficiency would be substantially simpler to construct than an implosion-
type device - but is not likely to be something a single high-school kid could accomplish. In
most cases, even making a gun-type bomb from HEU metal will require a team that includes
someone who understands at least the basics of the nuclear physics involved in a nuclear
spontaneous fissions per second, and a roughly 10-kilogram bare-sphere critical mass of such material would
undergo some 290,000 spontaneous fissions/second, generating roughly twice that number of neutrons/second.
(This ignores the contributions from other minor isotopes, but these are small in weapon-grade plutonium; the
result given here is quite similar to that for more complete calculations based on the composition of typical
weapon-grade plutonium, ranging from 52,000 to 66,000 neutrons/kg-sec (see U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options, p. 45; J.
Carson Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium," Science and Global Security 4 (1993;
available at http://www.princeton.edu/%7Eglobsec/publications/pdf/4_1 Mark.pdf as of 9 January 2007). The
distance the assembly has to travel from first criticality to the moment of optimum criticality decreases with the
cube root of the mass (see Glaser, "Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel," p. 22.) With weapon-grade
plutonium having one-fifth the critical mass of 90% enriched HEU, the distance to be traveled while critical
would be cut almost in half, but with the huge neutron rate, one would still expect over 200 neutrons during the
period before optimum criticality. In the case of reactor-grade plutonium, with its higher content of Pu-240, the
neutron generation is roughly six times worse. See U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options, p. 45; Mark, "Explosive Properties of
Reactor-Grade Plutonium."
118 For discussion, see Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium."
"19 Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, pp. xv, 22.
120 Luis Alvarez, Adventures of a Physicist (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 125.
121 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, D.C.:
OTA, 1977; available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/disk3/1977/7705/7705.PDF as of 12 December
2006), p. 142.
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explosive; some one able to melt uranium metal and cast it into appropriate shapes for the two
HEU pieces the gun should slam together; some one able to machine the cast pieces of
uranium metal (a metal with somewhat unusual properties) to at least reasonably precise
specifications; some one familiar enough with explosives and gun ballistics to be able to
arrange a gun to fire the HEU pieces together appropriately; and some care to ensure that
neither noises nor effluents from the group's work could be easily detected. 22 A crude
implosion-type device would pose a substantially greater challenge for a subnational group,
but would not require as extreme a level of sophistication as is sometimes imagined. In
particular, as long as a substantial degree of compression is achieved, the imploding shock
wave does not have to be perfectly shaped. (A flat platter charge placed against a flat plate of
steel will result in substantial compression of the steel.) There is a very real possibility that a
technically sophisticated terrorist group, given sufficient effort, could make a crude
implosion-type bomb - particularly if they succeeded in recruiting knowledgeable help, as al
Qaeda in particular has been actively attempting to do.
There would, however, be a number of difficulties that would be greater on the
implosion path. The group would have to not only design but manufacture a set of explosives
that could be detonated with reasonably precise timing and that would be able to crush a ball
of material into a denser configuration. For a group without previous experience, estimating
how much compression was likely to be achieved in their design would be a very difficult
problem, almost certainly requiring a number of explosive tests to clarify; depending on the
location where this testing was conducted, this might increase the danger of detection.
Moreover, instrumenting such tests to assess how well the explosives are working in
compressing the ball of metal is itself a tricky problem; flash X-rays were used for this
purpose in the early days of the Manhattan Project, and flash X-ray technology is controlled
by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 23
A variety of official U.S. government studies, from the 1970s through to the present,
have similarly concluded that terrorist groups might well be able to make crude nuclear
bombs of either the gun-type or the implosion-type. 2 4 The U.S. Department of Defense has
offered a view very similar to that taken in this chapter: 2 5
122 For a discussion of these requirements, see, for example, J. Carson Mark et al., "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear
Weapons?" in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (Lexington, Mass:
Lexington Books, 1987; available at http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm as of 4 January 2006).
123 I am grateful to Michael Levi for making this point. Personal communication, June 2006.
124 For a discussion from the 1970s, see U.S. Congress, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards. For official U.S.
government discussions from the late 1990s, see, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Arms
Control and Nonproliferation, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, DOE/NN-0007 (Washington, D.C.: DOE,
1997; available at http://www.osti.gov/bridge/servlets/purl/425259-CXr7Qn/webviewable/425259.pdf as of 2
January 2007); U.S. Department of Defense, "Section V: Nuclear Weapons Technology," in Militarily Critical
Technologies List (Washington, D.C.: DOD, 1998; available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-
2/p2secO5.pdf as of 12 December 2005). In the discussion of the barriers posed by different types of materials
that follows, I will be referring frequently to this DOE report and to other reports from committees of the
National Academy of Sciences, from a DOE-sponsored group known as the Proliferation Vulnerability Red
Team, and from another laboratory group led by experts at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In the
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If fissile material is available, subnational or terrorist groups can likely produce an
"improvised nuclear explosive device" which will detonate with a significant nuclear
yield.. .A terrorist with access to >50 kg of HEU would almost certainly opt for a gun-
assembled weapon despite the inherent inefficiencies of such a device, both because of its
simplicity and the perceived lack of a need to test a gun assembly... If the subnational
group had only 239Pu or needed to be economical with a limited supply of HEU, then it
would likely turn to an implosion assembly.
Similarly, a 1987 article on the plausibility of terrorists making nuclear weapons by
several key nuclear weapons scientists from Los Alamos, including experts in physics,
metallurgy, and explosives - probably the most detailed authoritative statement on the subject
in the unclassified literature - makes only modest distinctions between the difficulties of gun-
type and implosion-type weapons.126
How much lower is the probability that a terrorist group could make an implosion-type
bomb than the probability that they could make a gun-type bomb? There are probably a
substantial number of terrorist groups that could plausibly get some significant nuclear yield if
presented with a large quantity of weapon-grade HEU metal, but that would not be likely to
be able to get a noticeable nuclear yield from plutonium. But if one focuses in, as one should,
on the small subset of groups with the sophistication needed both to organize a successful
acquisition of nuclear bomb material and to make a gun-type bomb, it seems very likely that
the majority of them would also have the capability - or be able to acquire the capability - to
make a crude implosion-type bomb. At the same time, the probability of being detected and
stopped, or of making a mistake that would lead to an unworkable bomb, would certainly be
higher for an implosion bomb. (Most states would likely be able to make either a gun-type or
interest of full disclosure, I should note that I was the principal drafter of this DOE report, and was the study
director for the 1994 and 1995 Academy studies. U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on
International Security and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1994; available at http://books.nap.edu/html/plutonium/
0309050421 .pdf as of 30 December 2006); U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of
Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options. Hence, while these studies represent official U.S.
government or Academy publications, they are not entirely independent of my own thinking. By contrast, I had
no substantial role in the 2000 Academy study of the spent fuel standard, in the Proliferation Vulnerability Red
Team, or in the Livermore-led laboratory group (though the latter reported to an advisory committee of which I
was a member). See U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standardfor Disposition of Excess
Weapons Plutonium: Application to Current DOE Options; Hinton et al., Prol'feration Vulnerability Red Team
Report; "Annex: Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power Systems," in Technological
Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS) (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee, 2000; available at
http://www.nuclear.gov/nerac/FinalTOPSRptAnnex.pdf as of 9 January 2007).
m U.S. Department of Defense, "Nuclear Weapons Technology." The first sentence quoted is a summary
conclusion from p. II-V-5 8 ; the others are from the section "Types of Nuclear Design Useful for a Terrorist" on
pp. II-V-60-61. On p. II-V-60, the document also remarks that "90 percent of the overall difficulty in making a
nuclear weapon lies in the production of special nuclear material," noting that more than 90 percent of the
Manhattan Project budget went to material production, with only 4 percent to the scientific laboratory at Los
Alamos.
126 Mark et al., "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?"
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an implosion-type bomb, given enough time, if they were the recipients.) Overall, I estimate
that the probability that the high-capability terrorist groups under consideration here would
succeed in making an implosion-type bomb is in the range of 40-60% of the probability that
they would succeed in making a gun-type bomb. For the purposes of this chapter, if a large
quantity of HEU metal has a discount factor of 1.0, I will assign a discount factor of 0.6 to
plutonium metal or a quantity of HEU metal insufficient for a gun-type bomb.127
In short, the argument here is that while large quantities of HEU metal pose the
highest risks, the risks posed by plutonium are substantial and cannot be ignored. This
represents, in a sense, a balance between authors who would assign a much lower probability
to terrorists being able to make an implosion-type bomb and official practices that make no
distinction between plutonium and HEU. In the DOE system, for example, while
considerable effort has gone into analyzing the consequences of theft of different types of
material, theft of HEU or of plutonium are considered to have equal consequences. Similarly,
in international recommendations for securing nuclear material, substantial quantities of either
HEU or plutonium are considered to require equal levels of security.
Material Quantity and Theft Risk
The frequent question "how much HEU or plutonium does it take to make a bomb?"
has no one technical answer - it depends on the sophistication of the bomb-maker. To get a
substantial yield from a gun-type device typically requires something of the order of one bare-
sphere critical mass of HEU (some 50 kilograms, in the case of 93% enriched weapon-grade
uranium). Criticality can be achieved with half of a bare-sphere critical mass or less with the
use of an appropriate neutron reflector, but since reasonable efficiency in a gun-type device
requires the presence of something like two critical masses,12 8 a single bare-sphere critical
mass is a reasonable figure for a gun-type bomb. For example, as noted above, the Hiroshima
bomb used some 60 kilograms of material with an average enrichment of 80%. A gun-type
weapon can be made using smaller quantities of material than one bare-sphere critical mass,
but the yield declines very sharply as the quantity of material is reduced. 29
Implosion-type weapons, which compress the nuclear material to a higher density, are
more efficient and require less nuclear material. In the case in which the implosion crushes
127 Another aspect of the consequences of nuclear theft, in the case of plutonium, is that even if a group failed to
manufacture a bomb that produced a substantial nuclear yield from plutonium, the result could be a radiological
dirty bomb contaminating a substantial urban area. (Uranium is not very radioactive and would not be especially
useful for use in a dirty bomb.) For a useful discussion of the consequences of dispersal of a bomb's worth of
plutonium, see, for example, Steve Fetter and Frank Von Hippel, "The Hazard from Plutonium Dispersal by
Nuclear-Warhead Accidents," Science and Global Security 2, no. 1 (1990; available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-globsec/publications/pdf/2_I Fetter.pdf as of 3 January 2006).
"2 See, for example, discussion in Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, pp. 38-46.
129 As Serber points out, the yield is roughly proportional to A3, where A is the difference between the critical
radius and the actual radius of the supercritical system. Since the mass is proportional to the cube of the radius,
this means that the yield is roughly proportional to (M 3 /M113-1)3, where M is the mass of material in the bomb
and Me is the minimum critical mass of that material in that state. Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, p. 42. As the
amount of material declined from two critical masses to 1.5, the yield would decrease by a factor of 6. 1 am
grateful to Marvin Miller for elucidating this point to me. Personal communication, January 2007.
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both the nuclear material and the reflector equally (or there is no reflector), critical mass
declines as the square of the material density. Hence, if the bare-sphere critical mass of
weapon-grade plutonium metal in the medium-density delta phase is of the order of 16
kilograms,130 implosion that successfully doubled the density would decrease the critical mass
to 4 kilograms; implosion that tripled the density would decrease the critical mass to 1.8
kilograms. The degree of compression that can be achieved depends on the speed and
sophistication of the explosive design used. With the use of a reflector, the critical mass at
any given density could be significantly less. (Of course, a significant nuclear yield requires
that the mass be substantially supercritical, not just critical.) One unclassified estimate
suggests that with high-speed explosives in a sophisticated design, a 1-kiloton yield could be
obtained from 1 kilogram of plutonium, or 2.5 kilograms of HEU.131
Terrorists making their first bomb, however, would be highly unlikely to be able to
use such small amounts of material. For that purpose, the six kilograms of plutonium used in
the Nagasaki bomb132 is probably a reasonable estimate of the required quantity; allowing for
process losses of perhaps 25% in manufacturing a bomb, a reasonable total is roughly 7.5
kilograms, just below the IAEA "significant quantity" figure of eight kilograms of
plutonium. 133 The bare-sphere critical mass for 93% enriched HEU is roughly three times that
for delta-phase weapon-grade plutonium, 3 4 suggesting a figure three times as high for an
HEU implosion bomb - 18 kilograms of weapon-grade HEU, or some 22.5 kilograms when
process losses are included (again, just below the IAEA significant quantity figure, which is
25 kilograms of U-235 contained in HEU). 3 5
The risk of nuclear terrorism resulting from a successful theft do not decline to zero
for facilities with less material than these figures, both because bombs can be made from
somewhat less material (at the price of reduced yield or a requirement for more
sophistication), and because there is the possibility of theft from more than one facility.
Clearly, however, organizing multiple thefts would be more difficult than organizing a single
theft, and it seems likely that the difficulty and risk of failure would increase sharply with the
number of thefts required to achieve the objective: two thefts would be more than twice as
130 H.C. Paxton and N.L. Pruvost, Critical Dimensions of Systems Containing 235U, 239Pu, and 233U: 1986
Revision (Los Alamos, N.M.: Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1987; available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
othergov/doe/lanl/lib-www/la-pubs/00209019.pdf as of 9 January 2007), p. 102.
"31 See Thomas Cochran and Christopher Paine, "The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium
Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons" (Washington, D.C.: Natural Resources Defense Council, 13 April
1995; available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/fissionw/fissionweapons.pdf as of 19 July 2005).
132 Frank von Hippel and Edwin Lyman, "Appendix: Probabilities of Different Yields," Science and Global
Security 4 (1993; available at http://www.princeton.edu/%7Eglobsec/publications/pdf/4_1 Mark.pdf as of 5
December 2006).
"13 International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary (Vienna: IAEA, 2001; available at
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/Start.pdf as of 19 July 2005).
134 The measured bare-sphere critical masses provided by Los Alamos are 49.1 kilograms for 93.7% enriched
HEU metal, and 16.8 kilograms for delta-phase weapon-grade plutonium. See Paxton and Pruvost, Critical
Dimensions of Systems Containing 235 U, 239Pu, and 233U: 1986 Revision, pp. 97, 102.
m3 International Atomic Energy Agency, /AEA Safeguards Glossary.
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difficult to carry off successfully than one theft (though probably less than four times as
difficult).
For facilities with more than enough material for a single bomb, the risks do not
simply scale linearly with the quantity of material. Clearly there is an immense difference
between zero and one terrorist nuclear bombs; going from one to two terrorist nuclear bombs
would make matters worse, but the difference in is substantially smaller than the leap between
zero and one. Between two and three, the increase in consequences is smaller again.
Moreover, terrorist ambitions are not infinite - they are likely to be looking for enough
material for one or several bombs, not hundreds of bombs (and national and international
responses are likely to be sufficient to prevent them from being able to get and use tens or
hundreds of bombs). Hence, as DOE has pointed out, "a building with I ton of nuclear
material in storage is as great a threat as a building with 10 tons."'136
In the case of plutonium, the risks resulting from a successful theft would increase
sharply as the quantity stolen increased from zero to 6-8 kilograms; after that, the risks would
increase only modestly' 37 until they took another (smaller) ramp upward when the quantity
stolen reached 12-16 kilograms, enough for two bombs; and they would then proceed upward
in successfully smaller steps as the quantity reached the amount needed for three, four, and
more bombs. In the case of HEU, the risks resulting from a successful theft would increase
sharply as the quantity stolen increased from zero to 20-25 kilograms, enough for a crude
implosion bomb; they would then level out, increasing only modestly until the quantity stolen
neared the amount required for a gun-type bomb, at which point they would increase again
(because of the higher probability of terrorists being able to make a gun-type bomb, discussed
above); and would then proceed upward in successively smaller steps as in the plutonium
case. Whether the consequences of theft of enough plutonium for several implosion bombs
should be considered more or less than the consequences of theft of enough HEU for one gun-
type bomb is a matter ofjudgment - trading off the danger of terrorists gaining multiple
nuclear weapons against the decreased probability they would be able to get any at all.
Clearly, reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism resulting from nuclear theft will require
stringent security measures at all facilities with enough separated plutonium or HEU for a
nuclear bomb. In a system for regulating security that had a large number of different security
levels, facilities with enough nuclear material for several nuclear bombs would deserve still
higher levels of security to keep the net risk they pose comparable to that from facilities with
only enough for one nuclear bomb. But in systems with only a few gradations of security
levels, such as those in use for nuclear materials in the United States and internationally,
facilities or transport legs with enough nuclear material for a single nuclear bomb all deserve
the highest level of security. Current thresholds for a "Category I" quantity requiring the
highest levels of protection, set at 2 kilograms of plutonium or 5 kilograms of U-235
136 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request, p. 514.
137 They would be increasing slowly rather than remaining flat until enough for a second bomb was available,
because of the greater ease of making one bomb if more material was available.
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contained in HEU, are appropriately conservative, and there seems little reason to advocate
changing them.138
Implications. A fundamental point is that the risk of nuclear theft or diversion from a
stockpile of plutonium or HEU is not closely related to the size of that stockpile. From
disposition of excess plutonium to the HEU Purchase Agreement to Japan's policy of not
accumulating plutonium stockpiles, a great deal of money and effort has been devoted, over
the years, to policies which were targeted on reducing stockpiles that would still have tons of
material remaining when the policies were fully implemented. While these policies were
described as intended to reduce the risk of nuclear theft and proliferation, they would have
little chance of appreciably affecting nuclear theft risks unless they eliminated the weapons-
usable material entirely from particularly vulnerable buildings, which none of them are
focused on doing.139 Policies intended to reduce the risk of nuclear theft should focus on
improving the security of particular vulnerable stocks (whether by improving their security
where they are, or removing them to more secure locations), not on reducing the size of
stockpiles that will still include many tons of material.
Material Quality and Theft Risk
Different types of nuclear material that might be stolen pose a variety of barriers to
using them to make nuclear bombs; recipients with different capabilities will face varying
degrees of difficulty in overcoming these barriers. In the sections below, I review a number
of the key barriers posed by different types of materials. Several important previous analyses
have addressed these issues;'4 0 the discussion below integrates (and in some cases extends, or
modifies) this previous work. I begin by discussing how much more difficult the use of
plutonium would be for terrorists, compared to the use of HEU.
138 See, for example, International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities. These standards are not conservative by as wide a margin when one considers states as
potential recipients, since states might be able to design weapons using smaller amounts of material than terrorist
groups could. Even for states, however, the first bomb designs - which are the only ones for which stolen
nuclear material is likely to be of much interest - are likely to require substantial quantities of nuclear material.
As noted in the text, the first U.S. implosion bomb design involved 6 kilograms of plutonium; more recently, the
Iraqi implosion design reportedly required some 15 kilograms of HEU. David Albright, "When Could Iran Get
the Bomb?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 4 (July/August 2006; available at
http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art-ofn=ja06albright as of 5 December 2006), pp. 26-33.
139 For an extended discussion of this point in the case of plutonium disposition, see testimony of Matthew Bunn,
in Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, Plutonium Disposition and the U.S. Mixed
Oxide Fuel Facility, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 July 2006 (available at
http://www.house.gov/hasc/schedules/ as of 10 August 2006).
140 The most useful previous studies summarizing different barriers to the use of materials in weapons are those
from panels of the National Academy of Sciences: U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standard
for Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Application to Current DOE Options; U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options, pp. 61-73.
Other important previous analyses include "Annex: Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear
Power Systems"; Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report; U.S. Department of Energy,
Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess
Plutonium Disposition Alternatives.
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Plutonium vs. HEU as a Terrorist Nuclear Bomb Material
As discussed earlier, plutonium generates such a large neutron background that a gun-
type device made from plutonium would be essentially guaranteed to pre-detonate, giving
only a few tons to perhaps 10-20 tons of nuclear yield (depending on the specific
configuration and the speed of the gun);' 4' to get a yield in the kiloton range from plutonium
would require an implosion device.
Working with plutonium would pose other barriers for terrorists as well. If inhaled or
ingested, plutonium is far more toxic than uranium; while some members of the terrorist
group may be suicidal, if the group's technical and mechanical experts are interested in their
own safety, they would need to rig up at least crude glove box arrangements that would not be
necessary working with uranium. 42 Plutonium is also more radioactive, modestly increasing
the chance that searchers after the theft took place might be able to find the stolen items, or
find a bomb as it was being smuggled into a target country. As a metal, plutonium has
unusual properties that make it difficult to work with, and there are no metals with similar
properties to practice on. Plutonium metal comes in several crystal phases, or allotropes: the
easiest of these to work with (which is the type used in both U.S. and Russian nuclear
weapons) is the delta phase, but the phase that is stable at room temperature and pressure is
the alpha phase. To stabilize plutonium in the delta phase, states typically alloy it with a
small percentage of gallium.' If terrorists got plutonium stolen from a weapons program, it
might well already be alloyed with gallium; if they got civilian plutonium, however, and
wanted to avoid the difficulties of working with other phases of plutonium metal, they would
have to figure out how to alloy it.
These additional barriers make plutonium a somewhat less desirable material for
terrorists than HEU, even if the amount of HEU available is only sufficient for an implosion-
type bomb. But the vast majority of adversaries with the sophistication required to organize
the acquisition of potential nuclear bomb material and make an implosion-type bomb would
also be able to address the additional difficulties of working with plutonium rather than HEU.
Hence, the difference in resulting probability of successful bomb-making caused by these
141 For a discussion of the impacts terrorists might be able to achieve with such a plutonium gun-type weapon,
see Stanislav Rodionov, "Could Terrorists Produce Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons?" in High-Impact Terrorism:
Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002).
142 A reasonable glove box for handling plutonium could be made from plywood, clear plastic, and rubber
gloves. See Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 4.4.
"4' The fact that gallium is used to stabilize plutonium in the delta phase was declassified in 1995. See item
l1.L.48 in U.S. Department of Energy, Restricted Data Declassification Decisions 1946 to the Present (RDD-7)
(Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2001; available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/doe/rdd-7.html as of 14 August
2006). There are suggestions that even North Korea, perhaps the least developed state ever to have attempted to
manufacture plutonium-based weapons, has alloyed its plutonium with gallium. When North Korean experts
showed Siegfried Hecker a sample of their plutonium, they said it was alloyed, and that while they were not
authorized to say what with, they used the same approach as the United States. See Hecker's testimony in
Committee on Foreign Relations, An Update on North Korean Nuclear Developments, U.S. Senate, 108th
Congress, 2nd Session, 21 January 2004 (available at http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/hearings/2004/
hrg040121a.html as of 9 August 2006). As Hecker notes, gallium is not the only possibility for alloying
plutonium to stabilize it in the delta phase; aluminum is another.
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additional differences between plutonium and HEU are probably small, and I do not include a
further discount for the risks of plutonium theft based on these factors.
Isotopic Barriers: Uranium
Typical "weapon-grade" uranium is enriched to 93% or more U-235. Uranium at
much lower enrichments, however, can be used in nuclear weapons, and all uranium with
enrichments of 20% or more U-235 is internationally defined as HEU and subject to stringent
controls.144 Making a bomb from material with enrichments below 93% poses three main
problems: increased critical mass, increased risk of pre-initiation (making it more difficult to
make a gun-type bomb) and decreased yield.
Increased Critical Mass
The more the U-235 is diluted with U-238, the more material is required to make a
nuclear bomb. With larger amounts of material needed, the problems of getting sufficient
material and making it into a gun-type bomb increase. Figure 4.5 shows the critical mass of a
uranium metal sphere with a 10-cm beryllium reflector as a function of enrichment. As can
be seen, the curve is fairly flat from roughly 40% enrichment to 93% enrichment. The critical
mass at 93% is 14.9 kilograms, at 70% 23.7 kilograms, and at 40% 60.0 kilograms, still only
four times the amount required at 93%. 45 Below 40% enrichment, however, the curve
becomes quite steep. At 20%, the official dividing line for HEU, 220.7 kilograms of material
would be required for a single critical mass. As can be seen, the 20% dividing line between
HEU and LEU is to some extent arbitrary: in principle, it is possible to make nuclear
explosives with material at less than 20% enrichment, though as far as is known it has never
been done, and a very large amount of material would be required.
Systems for categorizing nuclear materials should take into account that at lower
enrichments, a larger amount of material is required to have the same strategic significance.
Currently, however, both U.S. domestic and international systems for categorizing nuclear
material do not take enrichment levels into account, but simply consider any HEU containing
at least 5 kilograms of U-235 to be a Category I quantity, requiring the highest level of
protection, regardless of its enrichment.14 6 By contrast, the IAEA safeguards system already
includes the concept of an "effective kilogram," defined, in the case of enriched uranium, as
its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment. 47 If this method were used
144 International Atomic Energy Agency, /AEA Safeguards Glossary, p. 26.
145 Alexander Glaser, then of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, personal communication, September
2002. Similarly, measurements at Los Alamos indicate that a 93.6% enriched uranium metal sphere at 18.6
g/cm 3 density with a slightly thicker beryllium reflector (11.8 cm) would have a modestly lower critical mass,
13.1 kilograms. See Paxton and Pruvost, Critical Dimensions ofSystems Containing 235U, 239Pu, and 233 U:
1986 Revision, p. 97. Similar ratios for different enrichments apply for bare spheres.
146 See, for example, International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and
Nuclear Facilities.
4 See the definition in paragraph 104 of The Structure and Content ofAgreements between the Agency and
States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/1 53
(Corrected) (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1972; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/Others/infl 53.shtml as of 22 August 2005).
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Figure 4.5: Enrichment and Critical Mass for a Reflected Uranium Sphere
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Source: Alexander Glaser, "On the Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel for Research Reactors at
Various Enrichment Levels," Science and Global Security 14, 2006, pp. 1-24.
to define the 5-kilogram physical protection threshold, then, for example, 5.8 kilograms of
93% enriched HEU would be a Category I quantity, but it would take 31.2 kilograms of 40%
enriched material to be a Category I quantity - a 5-1 ratio, similar to the 4-1 ratio of the
critical masses at these enrichment levels. Alternatively, a more precise relation between
enrichment level and the quantity of material required for a bomb could be used.148
Increased Risk of Pre-Initiation
The much larger total quantity of material required for a gun-type bomb made with
lower-enrichment HEU means that there is far more material that might release a neutron that
would start the chain reaction prematurely. Each kilogram of U-235 undergoes 0.0056
spontaneous fissions per second, while each kilogram of U-238 undergoes 6.78 fissions per
second, a rate over 1200 times higher.' 49 In material with such high concentrations of U-235,
the neutron background is so low that neutrons from a-n reactions may be significant, if light-
element impurities are present in the metal, as is often the case. In particular, as the alpha-
emitter U-234 is also concentrated in the process of uranium enrichment, weapon-grade
uranium might contain something like 1% U-234, and if the metal contained 0.2% oxygen
atoms, the U-234 in one kilogram of such HEU would cause the release of 0.56 additional
148 Glaser has found, for example, that the data from his simulations of critical mass for spheres with 10-cm
reflectors can be well approximated with an equation based on enrichment ("x") expressed as the weight percent
of U-235 (e.g., 20, 50, 90): critical mass=1.0535E6 (x-3) - 8309 (X-2) + 2453 (x-1) - 12.3265. Personal
communication, September 2002.
149 See, for example, Glaser, "Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel."
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neutrons/second.150 Hence, 50 kilograms of 93% enriched HEU, as might be used for a gun-
type bomb, would emit approximately 75 neutrons per second, on average. At 70%
enrichment, with a bare sphere critical mass in the range of 85 kilograms, that mass would
emit some 350 neutrons per second, while at 45% enrichment, with a bare sphere critical mass
in the range of 185 kilograms, that mass would emit nearly 1400 neutrons per second. In each
of these cases, essentially all of the neutrons are coming from the U-238, so the neutron
generation is directly proportional to the total quantity of U-238 present.' 5'
With this larger neutron background, the probability of successfully assembling a gun-
type device to optimum criticality without pre-initiation declines. If one assumes an assembly
time of 1 millisecond, the probability that no spontaneous fissions will occur during that time
is over 97% for 93% enriched weapon-grade HEU; over 80% for 70% enriched material; but
only 50% for 45% enriched material. 52 While not every neutron will succeed in initiating a
chain reaction, 5 3 the chance of a chain reaction beginning prematurely increases significantly
with decreasing enrichment. The increase in the risk of pre-detonation in a gun-type device
with reduced enrichment is likely to be even more substantial than these figures suggest, as
with larger critical masses, the distance to be traveled while the system is in a critical state -
and therefore the assembly time for a given speed - will increase. Moreover, high speeds will
require larger guns as the quantity of material increases. 5 4
Decreased Explosive Yield
Lower enrichments will also result in lower explosive yields, other things being equal.
The explosive yield of a fission bomb is determined by how many fissions take place between
the time the chain reaction begins and the time the assembly expands enough that it is no
longer critical, shutting off the chain reaction. Hence, the yield is very sensitive to the
neutron multiplication rate, often denoted as a.155
150 See Steve Fetter et al., "Detecting Nuclear Warheads," Science and Global Security 1 (1990; available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-globsec/publications/pdf/1_3-4FetterB.pdf as of 13 August 2006), p. 229. Cosmic
rays also create some neutron background, but this is at a much lower rate and does not substantially affect the
overall probability of pre-initiation even in weapon-grade uranium; in less enriched uranium, both the cosmic ray
neutrons and the a-n neutrons are dominated by the neutrons from spontaneous fission in U-238.
's' Critical masses in this paragraph are rounded from Glaser, "Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel."
152 Glaser, "Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel."
153 For a discussion of the odds of a neutron starting a chain reaction - which depend on how critical the system
is - see Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, pp. 46-49.
154 Serber argues that the required gun mass is roughly proportional to the shell mass and "very roughly" to the
cube of the of required shell velocity, but this was based on rather preliminary reviews of gun ballistics. See
Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, p. 56.
155 Serber uses the notation (v'-1 )/r for a (the latter notation not yet having been invented), where v' is the
effective neutron number - the net number of neutrons resulting from each fission, taking into account losses and
absorption, and r is the mean neutron lifetime in the system. Thus a reflects both how much the number of
neutrons increases with each generation of fission, and how rapidly these generations occur.
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Serber derives an approximate expression which indicates that the efficiency of a
device is proportional to the following factors:156
2
f oc-R ,CA3
In this formulation,f is the efficiency (the fraction of the total fissionable material that
is fissioned, which itself is proportional to the yield), a describes the effective neutron
multiplication rate in the system's initial state, , is the fission energy released per unit mass of
fissionable material, Reo is the radius at which the system in its initial state was critical, and A
is the "excess radius," that is, the difference in radius between a just-critical mass in the
system's initial state and the actual radius in the initial state, a measure of the initial
supercriticality of the system. (As this expression is a very approximate one worked out in
1943, it has not been measured precisely over the full range of possible enrichments that
might be used in a bomb, but it is sufficient for providing a general idea of the effect of
declining enrichment.)
Reduced enrichments reduce a, because collisions with U-238 atoms reduce the
energy of many of the neutrons below the point where they can cause fissions.157 Indeed, the
initial value of alpha for a supercritical system of two bare-sphere critical masses declines
linearly with decreasing enrichment.' 58 Since the yield is proportional to a2, and a declines
linearly with enrichment, one might expect that yield would decline with the square of
enrichment. But the relationship is more complex than this, because at lower enrichments, Re0
and A are both somewhat larger, because of the increased masses required. Overall, however,
yield is sharply reduced with decreasing enrichment. By one estimate, the yield of a gun-type
bomb assembling two critical masses of 36% enriched HEU would be roughly an order of
magnitude less than that a system assembling two critical masses of 93% enriched HEU, even
assuming no predetonation. 159 Similarly, in an implosion bomb, it is unlikely to be possible to
achieve as large a criticality insertion with the large amount of material that would be used at
36% as it would be possible to achieve with 93% material, significantly reducing yield.
Uranium Isotopic Barriers: Summary
Clearly, less enriched material poses a variety of difficulties for potential terrorist
bomb-makers. As already discussed, approaches to specifying the minimum amount of
material requiring high levels of security should take into account the larger quantities of
material needed for a bomb at lower enrichments, which they do not currently do. The
increased neutron background at lower enrichments could make it difficult to make a gun-type
bomb, but is not enough to significantly complicate use of these materials in an implosion-
type bomb. As a result, for enrichments in the 20-40% range, estimates of the probability that
adversaries could make a bomb from the stolen material should be based on use of it in an
156 See Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, p. 42.
157 Serber, The Los Alamos Primer, pp. 21-22.
158 See Glaser, "Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel."
159 This result is based on simplified simulations. Calculations provided by Michael Levi, personal
communication, June 2006.
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implosion-type bomb, not in a gun-type bomb; even at enrichments in the 40-60% range,
terrorists may choose to attempt an implosion bomb. The reduced yield resulting from using
lower enrichments would reduce casualties and direct economic damage from a terrorist
nuclear blast, but would not prevent the terrorists from achieving kiloton-range yields, which
would still have immense consequences. Overall, the probability that terrorists could get a
significant nuclear yield out of enough HEU for a gun-type bomb would not be greatly
reduced as the enrichment fell from 93% to 50% or so; for enrichments in the 20-40% range,
the 0.6 discount factor for implosion-type bombs should be used, along with some additional
discount factor for the reduced yield and other complications associated with such low
enrichments.
An analysis by experts from the national laboratories provides a useful summary of the
barriers to making weapons from different types of HEU. They characterized the barriers to
making a bomb from HEU with enrichment of 80% or above as "insignificant"; the barriers
for enrichments between 50% and 80% as "insignificant (+)"; the barriers for enrichments of
35% to 50% as "low (+)"; and the barriers for 20-35% enriched material as "medium." 160
Isotopic Barriers: Plutonium
Unlike uranium, all isotopes of plutonium can sustain an explosive fast-neutron chain
reaction. Different isotopes of plutonium, however, generate quite different levels of
neutrons, heat, and other radiation, posing a variety of difficulties for potential bomb-makers.
The most desirable isotope for weapons use is Pu-239, formed when U-238 absorbs a
neutron; it generates less heat than most other plutonium isotopes and fewer neutrons than any
of them. As nuclear fuel continues to be irradiated, some of the Pu-239 absorbs additional
neutrons and forms Pu-240, which is problematic because of the large number of background
neutrons resulting from its high rate of spontaneous fission. Over time, small amounts of Pu-
241, Pu-242, and Pu-238 also begin to accumulate. Table 4.5 outlines the relevant properties
of the key plutonium isotopes; Am-24 1, the decay product of Pu-24 1, is also included, as the
heat and gamma rays it generates can be important in some cases.
Plutonium produced specifically for weapons purposes is typically irradiated in
reactors to relatively low burn-ups and hence typically contains in the range of 93% Pu-239
and 7% Pu-240. As far as is known, all the nuclear weapons that any state has actually
incorporated into its arsenal have been made from such "weapon-grade" plutonium.
Plutonium that is even better than this - such as the first plutonium produced in the Manhattan
Project, used in the Nagasaki bomb - is sometimes referred to as "super-grade." Plutonium
with Pu-240 contents in the range of 7-18 percent is often referred to as "fuel-grade," while
plutonium with Pu-240 content in the range of 18-30 percent, typical of commercial operation
of light-water reactors is often referred to as "reactor-grade." When plutonium is reprocessed
and recycled as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel, so that the plutonium is irradiated a second time,
further undesirable isotopes build up; plutonium from MOX spent fuel is sometimes referred
160 "Annex: Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power Systems," p. 11.
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Table 4.5: Key Properties of Plutonium Isotopes
Critical Half Life Decay Heat Neutron Generation
Isotope Mass (kg) (years) (watts/kg) (neutrons/g-sec)
Pu-238 10 88 560 2600
Pu-239 10 24,000 1.9 0.02
Pu-240 40 6,600 6.8 900
Pu-241 13 14 4.2 0.05
Pu-242 89 380,000 0.1 1700
Am-241 57 430 110 1.2
Source: "Annex: Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power Systems"
in Technological Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global Nuclear
Power Systems (TOPS) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Energy
Research Advisory Committee, 2000, available at http://www.nuclear.gov/nerac/
FinalTOPSRptAnnex.pdf as of 9 January 2007), p. 4.
to as "MOX grade."161 The plutonium produced in the breeding blankets of a fast-breeder
reactor (FBR) is typically better than weapon-grade. Table 4.6 shows the isotopic content of
different grades of plutonium. The table shows two burnup levels for reactor-grade
plutonium, 33 gigawatt-days/ton (GWd/t) and 50 GWd/t. The MOX grade plutonium referred
to in the table comes from MOX made from reactor-grade plutonium at 33 GWd/t, which is
then irradiated again to 33 GWd/t.
Despite the terms "weapon-grade" and "reactor-grade," all of these grades are usable
in nuclear weapons. The barriers of increased neutron generation, heat, and radiation can all
be overcome to varying degrees, with varying degrees of sophistication. Table 4.7 shows the
critical masses, neutron generation, and heat generation for the different grades of plutonium.
Increased Risk of Pre-Initiation
A key difficulty in using reactor-grade or MOX-grade plutonium rather than weapon-
grade plutonium in a bomb is the increased neutron background, which increases the chance
that the chain reaction will begin sooner than intended, reducing the explosive yield. If
reactor-grade plutonium was used in a simple design like the Nagasaki bomb, featuring a solid
ball of plutonium surrounded by tamper and explosives, there would be more than a 90%
chance of some degree of pre-initiation.162
But it is important to understand that in a system similar to the Nagasaki bomb (that is,
with roughly the same design and amount of plutonium), the "fizzle yield" - the yield if a
neutron starts the chain reaction at the worst possible moment, when the system first becomes
critical - is still in the range of a kiloton.' 63 No matter how many neutrons are present, it is
161 For discussions of these different grades of plutonium, see, for example, Bruno Pellaud, "Proliferation
Aspects of Plutonium Recycling," Journal of Nuclear Materials Management 31, no. I (Fall 2002; available at
http://www.inmm.org/topics/contents/fall02issue/pellaud.pdf as of 4 August 2006).
162 Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium."
163 For discussions, see U.S. Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons-
Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, pp. 37-39; U.S. National
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Table 4.6: Isotopic Contents of Different Plutonium Grades
Grade Pu-238 Pu-239 Pu-240 Pu-241 Pu-242 Am-241
Super-grade 0 0.98 0.02 0 0 0
Weapon-grade 0.0001 0.938 0.058 0.0013 0.0002 0.0022
Fuel-grade 0.012 0.709 0.154 0.0636 0.019 0.0424
Reactor-grade (33 GWd/t) 0.013 0.603 0.243 0.056 0.05 0.035
Reactor-grade (50 GWd/t) 0.027 0.47 0.26 0.09 0.09 0.06
MOX-grade 0.019 0.404 0.321 0.107 0.078 0.0712
FBR blanket 0 0.96 0.04 0 0 0
Source: Figures for weapon-grade and reactor-grade plutonium at an exposure of 33 gigawatt-
days/ton (GWd/t) are from U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of
Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
1995, available at http://books.nap.edu/html/plutonium/0309051452.pdf as of 9 January 2007), p. 45.
That panel was adapting figures from J. Carson Mark, by including the decay of Pu-241 to Am-241,
assuming that the weapon-grade plutonium in question was 20 years old and the reactor-grade
plutonium was 10 years old. Figures for super-grade plutonium and blankets from fast-breeder
reactors ("FBR blankets" in the table) are from the same source the Academy panel was drawing
from, J. Carson Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium," Science and Global
Security 4, 1993, pp. 111-128 (available at http://www.princeton.edu/-globsec/publications/pdf/
4_1 Mark.pdf as of 9 January 2007 Figures for fuel-grade plutonium are from Alexander Glaser, "On
the Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel for Research Reactors at Various Enrichment Levels,"
Science and Global Security 14, 2006, pp. 1-24.
impossible to do worse than this. The destructive radius from a one-kiloton blast would be
about one-third that of the Hiroshima bomb, making such a bomb "a potentially fearsome
explosive." 164
At the other end of the spectrum of sophistication, it is an unclassified fact that some
weapon designs are "pre-initiation proof' - that is their yield is not sensitive to initiation
earlier than the planned time.165 The presence of large neutron backgrounds would not make
these weapons less reliable or reduce their yield.
Increased Heat
Another problem posed by using reactor-grade plutonium rather than weapon-grade
plutonium is the increased radioactive decay heat generated by the reactor-grade plutonium.
Six kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium (the amount discussed above as being suitable for a
crude implosion bomb) would generate 15 watts of heat, while a comparable amount of
reactor-grade plutonium (7.6 kilograms, taking into account the increased critical mass of this
material) would generate almost 110 watts of heat, more than seven times as much. This
increased heat can affect the stability and performance of the bomb's components. With this
Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, pp. 32-33; Mark, "Explosive
Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium."
164 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, p. 33.
165 See item B.2.k in U.S. Department of Energy, RDD-7.
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Table 4.7: Key Properties of Different Grades of Plutonium
Grade Critical Mass (kg) Neutrons /g-sec Heat (W/kg)
Super-grade n.a. 18 2.0
Weapon-grade 11.5 53 2.5
Fuel-grade 13.2 202 14.1
Reactor-grade (33 GWd/t) 14.6 338 14.4
Reactor-grade (50 GWd/t) n.a. 457 25.1
MOX-grade n.a. 471 22.2
FBR blanket n.a. 36 2.1
Source: Neutron and heat generation are calculated from the isotopic properties and the
contents of the different grades presented in the previous tables. Critical masses are for
bare spheres of alpha-phase plutonium with a density of 19 g/cc, presented in Alexander
Glaser, "On the Proliferation Potential of Uranium Fuel for Research Reactors at Various
Enrichment Levels," Science and Global Security 14, 2006, pp. 1-24. Since critical mass
declines with the square of density, delta-phase plutonium, with a density in the range of
15.8 g/cc, would have critical masses some 45% higher.
much heat being generated in a Nagasaki-type design, with the insulating tamper and
explosives wrapped around the pit, the temperature would rise to an equilibrium temperature
in the range of 1900 C. 166
There are a variety of more and less sophisticated ways to manage the heat generated
in the core of a nuclear bomb, however. As one example, it is an unclassified fact that even
some of the earliest and simplest U.S. weapon designs used "insertable nuclear components"
- that is, the nuclear material core was not put into the bomb until the bomb was being readied
for use. A bomb core made from reactor-grade plutonium could simply be kept in a small
refrigerator until the bomb was ready to be used.167 A variety of other approaches to heat
management are possible, including providing heat-transfer channels through the insulating
explosives.16 8
Some analysts have argued that there is a threshold at around 2% by weight Pu-238,
beyond which the plutonium is "practically unusable" in nuclear explosives.169 This is clearly
incorrect. As shown in Table 4.7, reactor-grade plutonium with an exposure of 50 GWd/t,
which has a Pu-238 content of 2.7%, does generate 75% more heat than the reactor-grade
plutonium with an exposure of 33 GWd/t, which has roughly half as much Pu-238. But the
166 See Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium."
167 The specific heat of plutonium is 0.13 J/g*C. Therefore heating a 7.6 kilogram mass of plutonium by, say, 50
*C would require 4.9 x 104 J. If the mass were generating 110 watts of heat, it would take over seven minutes to
heat up by this amount even if it were perfectly insulated after being inserted into the bomb. Adversaries
attempting to use this approach would presumably detonate their bomb immediately (probably in far less than
seven minutes) once insertion of the plutonium component was completed, to avoid phase changes in the
plutonium. If inserting the component was expected to take a substantial time, it might be desirable to have a fan
blowing cool air on the component until its insertion was completed.
168 For brief mentions of such heat channels, see Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium"; U.S.
National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, pp. 32-33. Further
details on heat management are classified.
169 See, for example, Pellaud, "Proliferation Aspects of Plutonium Recycling."
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heat generation, at 25 watts per kilogram, is still at a level that could readily be managed by
storing the plutonium component in a refrigerator until needed, and possibly by other methods
such as heat channels. There is clearly no threshold at 2% Pu-238, though it does seem clear
that the difficulties of heat management will increase as the proportion of Pu-238 increases.
Increased Radiation
Reactor-grade plutonium also generates more radiation than weapon-grade plutonium
does, meaning that "more shielding and greater precautions to protect personnel" - or
acceptance of greater radiation doses by the personnel - "might be necessary when building
and handling nuclear explosives made from reactor-grade plutonium."' 7 0 The surface dose
rate from a several-kilogram sphere of reactor-grade plutonium could be roughly 15-20 times
the dose rate from a comparable sphere of weapon-grade plutonium.' 7 The increased
precautions required, however, are comparatively modest and easily within the capabilities of
any terrorist group able to make an implosion bomb in the first place, or of any state; terrorist
groups, in any case, might be willing to simply accept higher radiation doses to their
personnel.
Increased Critical Mass
Unlike uranium, the increase in the critical mass as the isotopic mixture changes is
comparatively modest, as shown in Table 4.5. The critical mass of reactor-grade plutonium is
about one-quarter larger than that of weapon-grade plutonium and still only a fraction of the
critical mass of weapon-grade uranium.' 72
Reduced Yield
Even without preinitiation, a weapon made from reactor-grade plutonium would have
somewhat reduced yield compared to a similar design using weapon-grade plutonium,
because the Pu-240 has a lower fission cross section (and higher absorption cross section) in a
fast spectrum, reducing the effective neutron multiplication rate in the system. Unlike the
uranium case, however, the effect is not large, as Pu-240, unlike U-238, is a nuclear explosive
material itself, capable of sustaining a fast-neutron chain reaction.173
170 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, p. 33.
1" U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, p. 45. The panel's estimates of surface dose rates are 0.94 rem/hr for weapon-grade plutonium
and 15 rem/hr for reactor-grade plutonium (aged for 10 years after separation), but it does not appear from their
discussion that they have included an increased quantity of material for the reactor-grade plutonium; the factor of
20 in the text includes increasing the amount of plutonium present by the ratio of the critical masses.
172 Similarly, the Los Alamos measured data indicate a bare-sphere critical mass for delta-phase metal containing
only 4.5% Pu-240 (weapon-grade) of 16.8 kilograms, and a comparable critical mass for plutonium containing
20.1% Pu-240 (low-burnup reactor-grade) of 19.3 kilograms, only 15% higher. See Paxton and Pruvost, Critical
Dimensions of Systems Containing 235U, 239Pu, and 233 U: 1986 Revision, p. 102.
1m3 This is why the graph of yield vs. fissile content presented by Pellaud is completely incorrect. See Pellaud,
"Proliferation Aspects of Plutonium Recycling."
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Increased Detectability
Plutonium is much easier to detect than HEU; both its gamma emissions and its
neutron emissions are orders of magnitude higher, significantly easing detector design,
making shielding more difficult, and making detection possible at somewhat longer ranges.
Reactor-grade plutonium is much more radioactive than weapon-grade plutonium (with a
typical gamma dose at the surface about 15 times higher and a neutron background some
seven times higher). 174 Hence, the probability that a terrorist bomb would be detected and
stopped as it was heading toward its target, or that the plutonium itself would be detected and
stopped as it was being moved from where it was stolen to where the bomb was to be built, or
that the bomb-making operation itself would be detected, would be somewhat higher for
reactor-grade plutonium. In general, however, even reactor-grade plutonium could only be
detected if it was quite close to the detector - that is, if the adversaries chose to transport the
material through a border crossing equipped with nuclear material detectors (which seems
unlikely, since the adversaries would in general be able to observe which crossings had such
detectors in place), or if those searching for the plutonium had quite precise intelligence
information on where to look (which also seems unlikely).
Summary of Plutonium Isotopic Barriers
Weapon-grade plutonium is generally the preferred material for making nuclear
explosives. But any state or group capable of making a nuclear bomb from weapon-grade
plutonium would also be capable of making a nuclear bomb from reactor-grade plutonium.
And sophisticated nuclear weapon states could, if they chose, make reliable, high-yield
weapons from reactor-grade plutonium (using pre-initiation-proof designs). Virtually any
isotopic composition of plutonium is potentially weapons-usable.' 75
A 1997 DOE report provides the clearest official unclassified summary of the issue of
using reactor-grade explosives in weapons:176
114 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, p. 45.
175 The exception is plutonium containing substantial quantities of Pu-238, which generates such intense heat that
it is not practical to make nuclear explosives from it; plutonium containing 80 percent or more Pu-238 is
therefore exempted from international safeguards. See International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards
Glossary.
176 U.S. Department of Energy, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Assessment of Weapons- Usable Fissile
Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, pp. 37-39. This statement was reviewed by all
three U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories before publication. Similarly, Mark (who led the weapons-design team
at Los Alamos for many years) concludes that "Reactor-grade plutonium with any level of irradiation is a
potentially explosive material. The difficulties of developing an effective design of the most straightforward type
are not appreciably greater with reactor-grade plutonium than those that have to be met for the use of weapons-
grade plutonium." Mark, "Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium." A committee of the National
Academy of Sciences reached essentially the same conclusion, after detailed classified briefings from the
weapons labs. The committee included, among others, a former director of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory; a participant in the Manhattan Project; a Nobel Prize-winning physicist; and a physicist who did the
engineering design for the first hydrogen bomb. See U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, pp. 32-33.
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The degree to which these obstacles [to using reactor-grade plutonium in weapons]
can be overcome depends on the sophistication of the state or group attempting to
produce a nuclear weapon. At the lowest level of sophistication, a potential
proliferating state or subnational group using designs and technologies no more
sophisticated than those used in first-generation nuclear weapons could build a nuclear
weapon from reactor-grade plutonium that would have an assured, reliable yield of
one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly higher than that). At the other
end of the spectrum, advanced nuclear weapon states such as the United States and
Russia, using modem designs, could produce weapons from reactor-grade plutonium
having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other characteristics generally
comparable to those of weapons made from weapons-grade plutonium. ...
Proliferating states using designs of intermediate sophistication could produce
weapons with assured yields substantially higher than the kiloton range possible with a
simple, first-generation nuclear device.
As a committee of the National Academy of Sciences put it: "Theft of separated
plutonium, whether weapons-grade or reactor-grade, would pose a grave security risk."' 77
The committee members have since had the opportunity to discuss these conclusions with
weapons designers from all five of the Nonproliferation Treaty nuclear weapons states, none
of whom have disagreed with the broad outlines of these conclusions.'7 8 Indeed, one Russian
weapon-designer who had been assigned to examine what kind of nuclear explosives terrorists
might be able to build pointed out to me that terrorists might actually prefer reactor-grade
plutonium, as an implosion bomb with reactor-grade material would not require a neutron
generator, avoiding one of the modestly difficult steps in making an implosion bomb.17 9
A group from the national laboratories made almost no distinction between the
different grades of plutonium, summarizing the isotopic barriers to the use of weapon-grade
plutonium in weapons as "low (-)," the barriers to the use of typical reactor-grade plutonium
with roughly 60% Pu-239 as "low," and the barriers to use of very high bum-up reactor-grade
plutonium with 40% or less Pu-239 as "low (-)" - on a scale that included "insignificant,"
"low," "medium," "high," and "very high."180
Hence, for the purposes of this dissertation, all grades of plutonium are referred to as
"weapons-usable" material. The probability that a subnational group would be able to make a
kiloton-range bomb from reactor-grade plutonium is only modestly lower than the probability
that they could make a kiloton-range bomb from weapon-grade plutonium; considering all the
177 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, p. 33.
178 Personal communications from John P. Holdren and Richard L. Garwin.
179 Personal communication, October 1996.
180 "Annex: Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power Systems," p. i1. Similarly, the
National Academy study of the spent fuel standard concluded that the isotopic barrier to a terrorist group making
a bomb from reactor-grade plutonium rather than weapon-grade plutonium was "low," but that this barrier would
be "moderate" for a proliferant state recipient, which might have higher standards for the type of bomb it wanted
to make. U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standardfor Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium: Application to Current DOE Options, p. 23.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 4232
various aspects (including detectability), a reduction factor in the risks resulting from
successful theft of 0.8 for reactor-grade plutonium compared to weapon-grade plutonium is
probably reasonable. Nevertheless, any facility with enough plutonium for a bomb, whether
weapon-grade or reactor-grade, should be considered as potentially posing high consequences
of nuclear theft.18 '
Isotopic Barriers: U-233 and Other Nuclear Explosive Isotopes
As far as is known, every nuclear weapon that has ever been manufactured has been
made from HEU, plutonium, or some combination of the two. However, other materials can
in principle be used to make nuclear explosives.
U-233 has long been recognized as a suitable material for either nuclear weapons or
nuclear fuel and is covered by IAEA safeguards and both U.S. and international physical
protection guidelines.i8 2 In addition, some isotopes of neptunium, americium, and a few other
elements are potentially usable in nuclear explosives. The relevant properties of these
isotopes are shown in Table 4.8; U-235, Pu-239, and Pu-240 are also included for
comparison.
Just as Pu-239 is produced by neutron absorption in U-238, U-233 is produced by
neutron absorption in the main naturally occurring thorium isotope, Th-232. World resources
of thorium are believed to be several times those of uranium; India, in particular, has limited
uranium resources (and has been cut off from most international fuel supplies since its 1974
nuclear test, though that may now be changing), but has large thorium resources. As a result,
India has long been interested in fuel cycles based on breeding U-233 from thorium. (Th-232
itself, like U-238, is not itself useful as a fuel, but only as a fertile material for producing
fuel.)
Because of this production process, the world's U-233 exists primarily in forms not
diluted with U-238. Pure U-233 has a bare sphere critical mass in the range of 15 kilograms,
somewhat more than that of Pu-239, but far less than that of U-235. Its neutron generation is
low enough that it can be used in a gun-type bomb, and its decay heat, while higher than U-
235, is much lower than Pu-239. In short, it is a very attractive weapons material. On the
other hand, the alpha activity of U-233, like that of all grades of plutonium, is high enough it
has to be handled in a glove-box (at least for those bomb-makers who care about their long-
term cancer risks), which is not required for U-235.183 Moreover, U-233 is typically
contaminated with small quantities (hundreds of parts per million) of U-232, and the thalium
daughter product of U-232 decay (Tl-208) emits very penetrating gamma rays (2.6 MeV).
181 This stands in stark contrast to the recommendations in Pellaud, "Proliferation Aspects of Plutonium
Recycling." Pellaud is entirely wrong on several major technical points related to the usability of reactor-grade
plutonium in nuclear explosives, particularly in the assertion that MOX-grade material is "practically unusable"
in nuclear weapons, and should be treated for safeguards purposes like natural or depleted uranium.
182 See, for example, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary; International Atomic
Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.
183 C. W. Forsberg et al., Definition of Weapons-Usable U-233, ORNL/TM- 13517 (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, 1998; available at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/criticalityshielding/HopperPubs/
DefWeaponsUsableU-233ORNLTM 1 3517.pdf as of 12 August 2006), p. 15.
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Workers handling typical U-233 without shielding for several hours will begin to suffer
radiation sickness.' In a thorium-U-233 fuel cycle, however, it is possible to produce U-233
with very little U-232 by separating protactinium from the spent fuel, and allowing the
dominant Pa-233 isotope to decay to U-233.' 85
Like U-235, U-233 can be diluted with U-238 to an isotopic mix that is no longer
practical to use in nuclear explosives. Material with 12% U-233 has approximately the same
critical mass as material with 20% U-235. 86 In 2000, DOE accepted, for its internal
accounting and physical security rules, that material with less than 12% U-233 was the
equivalent of LEU.18 7
Only a few countries have stockpiles of separated U-233, and in most cases these
stockpiles exist at facilities that also contain larger stockpiles of HEU or separated plutonium,
with the associated security. Overall, while stocks of U-233 should be heavily guarded, the
small number of secure locations where kilogram quantities of this material exist make it a
very small part of the global risk of nuclear theft. In the future, however, if a significant
number of countries begin to pursue fuel cycles based on breeding and recycling of pure U-
233, the risk from U-233 theft could increase substantially. Options are available for breeding
and consuming U-233 in place without reprocessing, to a limited degree, and for recycling U-
233 in an LEU form mixed with U-238; the proliferation-resistance of different proposed
approaches to thorium-U-233 fuel cycles requires further examination.18 8
The other isotopes in the table are produced by successive neutron capture from either
U-235 or plutonium, or, in the case of protactinium, by radioactive decay of U-235. Pa-231 is
the only one of these that occurs in nature to any significant degree, at 1-3 parts per million in
uranium ores.189 It is typically produced only in gram quantities, and as far as is known, no
one has ever seriously contemplated attempting to make a nuclear bomb from this very high
critical-mass material. (Even with 100% efficient separations, assuming a concentration of 2
parts per million, producing a critical mass of Pa-231 would require processing over 80,000
metric tons of uranium ore, several times the amount mined worldwide in a typical year.)
184 Forsberg et al., Definition of Weapons-Usable U-233, p. 15.
185 Personal communication from Marvin Miller, January 2007.
186 Forsberg et al., Definition of Weapons-Usable U-233.
187 Joseph Rivers and D.L. Whaley, "Review of the Department of Energy Graded Safeguards Table," in
Proceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, Tenn.,
16-20 July 2006 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2006).
188 See, for example, International Atomic Energy Agency, Thorium Fuel Cycle -- Potential Benefits and
Challenges, TECDOC-1460 (Vienna: IAEA, 2005; available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/
PDF/TE_1450 web.pdf as of 12 August 2006); Jungmin Kang and Frank N. von Hippel, "U-232 and the
Proliferation-Resistance of U-233 in Spent Fuel," Science and Global Security 9 (2001; available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-globsec/publications/pdf/9_1 kang.pdf as of 12 August 2006).
189 For a discussion of the properties of Pa-23 1, the only long-lived isotope of protactinium, see Manson
Benedict, Thomas H. Pigford, and Hans Wolfgang Levi, Nuclear Chemical Engineering, 2nd ed. (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1981), pp. 220, 420-424.
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Table 4.8: Key Properties of U-233 and Alternative Nuclear Materials
Critical Half Life Decay Heat Neutron Generation
Isotope Mass (kg) (years) (watts/kg) (neutronslg-sec)
U-233 15 160,000 0.3 0.0009
U-235 50 700,000,000 0.0001 0.00001
Pu-239 10 24,000 1.9 0.02
Pu-240 40 6,600 6.8 900
Pa-231 162 32,800 1.3 0
Np-237 59 2.1x10' 0.021 0.00014
Am-241 57 430 110 1.2
Am-242m 9-18 kg 141 n.a. 5.8x10 7
Am-243 155 7,380 6.4 .9
Cm-245 13 8,500 5.7 147
Cm-246 84 4,700 10 9 x106
Bk-247 10 1,400 36 0
Cf-251 9 898 56 0
Source: "Annex: Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power
Systems" in Technological Opportunities to Increase the Proliferation Resistance of
Global Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Energy, Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee, 2000, available at
http://www.nuclear.gov/nerac/FinalTOPSRptAnnex.pdf as of 9 January 2007), p. 4.
There is an error in the original table with respect to the neutron generation rate of U-
235; that is calculated here from the data provided in "Chart of Nuclides" (Upton,
N.Y.: Brookhaven National Laboratory, available at http://www.nndc.bnl.gov/chart/
as of 9 January 2007). Critical mass of Am-242m, a material left out of the original
table, is from David Albright and Lauren Barbour, "Troubles Tomorrow? Separated
Neptunium-237 and Americium," in The Challegenges of Fissile Material Control,
David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, eds. (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and
International Security, 1999, available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/
fmct/book/New%20chapter%205.pdf as of 9 January 2007), pp. 86-96. Half-life
and neutron generation of Am-242m are from "Chart of Nuclides."
The other isotopes on the table occur in small concentrations in spent fuel. The only
ones on the list that exist in substantial quantities are neptunium and americium; estimates
suggest that a total of over 100 tons of neptunium and americium exist in spent fuel around
the world.190 Np-237, of these isotopes, holds the most potential for weapons applications -
though DOE has declassified its judgment that the americium isotopes should also be of
concern for potential weapons use.191 The neutron generation rate of Np-237 is low enough
that it could potentially be used in a gun-type bomb. Only a few countries, typically weapon
states, have separated kilogram quantities of neptunium, americium, or curium, and these
190 David Albright and Lauren Barbour, "Troubles Tomorrow? Separated Neptunium-237 and Americium," in
The Challenges of Fissile Material Control, ed. David AIbright and Kevin O'Neill (Washington, D.C.: Institute
for Science and International Security, 1999; available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/fmct/book/
New%20chapter%205.pdf as of 11 January 2007).
191 Albright and Barbour, "Separated Neptunium-237 and Americium."
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stocks are typically stored at sites that also have much larger quantities of HEU or plutonium.
They contribute only a tiny portion of the global risk of nuclear theft. 92 In the future,
however, advanced transmutation fuel cycles might call for separation of these materials, and
the risk they pose could become more important.' 93 These materials are not formally included
in either IAEA safeguards or international physical protection recommendations. In 1999, the
IAEA Board of Governors agreed on a monitoring approach for neptunium and americium,
but as of 2005, the IAEA reported that states were not providing the information on separated
stocks of these materials that had been agreed, making it difficult for the agency to have
enough information to sustain its previous conclusion that current stocks posed a low
proliferation risk.194 It is worth noting that the latest DOE categorizations of nuclear material,
shown in Table 4.4, treat separated forms of Np-237, Am-24 1, and Am-243 exactly the same
way that U-235 is treated - but do not include any other materials beyond the traditional
plutonium, U-235, and U-233.
Mass and Size Barriers
Other things being equal, a larger and heavier object is more difficult to steal. The
mass and size of the objects to be stolen can affect both the kind of equipment needed to steal
them and how difficult a theft is to conceal. A small disk of HEU or plutonium metal (of
which there are some 80,000 at the Institute for Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk,
Russia, for example) might easily be slipped into a pocket without anyone noticing, if
adequate security and material control procedures were not in place. By contrast, an
adversary would need some kind of lifting and transport equipment to carry off plutonium in a
fabricated light-water-reactor fuel assembly, and the defenders would be very likely to notice
such a removal while it was still in progress. In short, the size and mass of the forms of
nuclear material at a facility are key elements of the "facility environment" described above,
which must be considered in considering the probability of nuclear theft.
It is useful to distinguish several ranges of size and mass. Nuclear material that can be
partitioned into small units that could readily be concealed as a person was going in or out of
a facility pose the smallest barrier; nuclear material in forms that could readily be carried by
one person but would be more difficult to conceal (objects up to a couple of tens of
kilograms) pose a somewhat larger barrier; nuclear material in forms that could only be
moved by several people or one person with some kind of equipment (such as a dolly or
forklift) would pose the next level of difficulty (this would be true of objects weighing up to
hundreds of kilograms, such as fuel assemblies); nuclear material in forms that would require
some kind of crane or other lifting machinery and would require a heavier truck to drive away
(1,000 kilograms or more) would pose a further level of difficulty; and, finally, nuclear
192 For this reason, I believe Michael Hynes and his co-authors are wrong to highlight controls on these materials
as a key first step in reducing nuclear theft risks. See Michael V. Hynes, John E. Peters, and Joel Kvitky,
"Denying Armageddon," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 607 (September
2006).
193 Albright and Barbour, "Separated Neptunium-237 and Americium."
194 International Atomic Energy Agency, Safeguards Statementfor 2005 (Vienna: IAEA, 2006; available at
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es2005.pdf as of 12 August 2006).
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material in forms that would require multiple vehicles or vehicles so large as to be difficult to
acquire and highly noticeable would be the highest level of mass and size barrier.' 95
Nuclear material in forms with large mass and size can in many cases make it very
difficult or impossible to keep a theft concealed, making overt theft the only realistic option.
Since overt theft raises the possibility of immediate response and pursuit, this in itself reduces
the risk of theft to an important degree.
In the broad range between "large enough to be hard to conceal its removal" and "so
large it would take a crane and multiple or hard-to-acquire vehicles to lift it up and carry it
away," however, increasing size and bulk may have only a modest effect on the probability of
a successful nuclear theft. Any group attempting an outsider theft of nuclear weapons or
materials is virtually certain to have researched what items it is that they are hoping to steal
and to bring equipment suitable for lifting them and a vehicle appropriate for carrying them
away.
Under current DOE rules, nuclear material containing less than 10% by weight Pu-239
or U-235 is no longer considered Category I material, no matter how much of it there may be,
and a large part of the reason for this is the judgment - which is not expected to change in the
ongoing review of DOE's nuclear material categorization system - that the large mass of
dilute material that would have to be carried off to get enough plutonium or HEU for a bomb
greatly reduces the risk of theft.1 96 But no one would argue that nuclear weapons themselves
do not deserve the highest levels of protection - yet the size and weight of many nuclear
weapons are larger than the size and weight of the roughly 90 kilograms of material that
would have to stolen to get 8 kilograms of plutonium from material containing 9% plutonium
by weight. Even ignoring the massive multi-megaton weapons of the past, the U.S. W80
warhead, for example, is reported to weigh over 120 kilograms,197 and the B61 bomb over
300 kilograms.198 Virtually any modern warhead could easily be put on a dolly and wheeled
to a truck to be driven off (as could also be done with containers of dilute nuclear material);
the number of people and the level of sophistication required would be far less than those
needed to attack a nuclear warhead facility or well-guarded nuclear material facility in the
first place.199 Similarly, while it is often argued that tactical nuclear weapons pose a greater
195 This typology is based on that presented in U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition
of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options, p. 68.
196 Joseph Rivers, U.S. Department of Energy, responses to questions at "47th Annual Meeting of the Institute
for Nuclear Materials Management," Nashville, Tenn, 16-20 July 2006.
197 Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume I: US.
Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984), p. 79.
198 Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume /, p. 65.
199 Here, my analysis differs sharply from that in U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standard
for Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Application to Current DOE Options, p. 24. The Academy panel
argues that the concentration of weapons-usable material in the items to be stolen "is of high importance in
relation to theft for a proliferant state or a subnational group, because concentration even more than individual
item size determines the scale of the entire theft operation (personnel and equipment), directly affecting both the
resources the thieves would need to mobilize, the time required for the acquisition operation, and the chances of
their being detected and thwarted in the course of it." I argue that this conclusion does not hold over the broad
range described in the text, where the resources required for the theft do not change very much with the
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nuclear theft risk than strategic weapons do, in part because on average they are smaller and
lighter,2 00 the difference this makes in the probability of successful theft is likely to be very
small; anyone planning a theft of nuclear weapons would surely bring a vehicle big enough to
carry away whatever nuclear weapons they were planning to steal.
If nuclear material in dilute form were stolen, some kind of processing would be
needed to produce a form of material that could be used in a bomb. The difficulties of such
processing are discussed under chemical barriers, below. If the material stolen was more
dilute and therefore had greater mass and size, a larger volume of material would have to be
processed, possibly requiring somewhat more time and more chemicals. There would not be
any very large difference in difficulty, however, between processing material that contained
11-30% by weight Pu-239 or U-235 and material that contained 9% by weight of these
materials. 20' In short, DOE's 10%-weight standard for recategorizing material as Category II
is unjustified and should be revised.
A key question in considering mass and size barriers - and radiological barriers,
discussed below - is how easy it would be to separate the desired material from the rest. Is
the nuclear material the thieves might want "readily separable" from the other material, in the
words of U.S. regulations? Clearly putting plutonium in a lead can, so that the plutonium was
less than 10% by weight of the total can, should not be enough to make the plutonium
Category II material if the can could be easily opened and the plutonium removed. There are
often debates, however, as to how "readily separable" different types of materials are. Should
a mix of plutonium oxides and other oxides, in which the plutonium oxide particles were
notably larger than the others, so that they might be separated with a sieve without chemical
processing, be considered "readily separable"? How likely is that adversaries would know or
be able to figure out that this was possible for a given package of oxides? What about
materials that might be separated with a clever use of shaped-charge explosives? 202
concentration of material in the items to be stolen. This range includes most of the nuclear material forms in
most common use in the world.
200 See, for example, William Potter and Nikolai Sokov, "Practical Measures to Reduce the Risks Presented by
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons," paper presented at The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission,
Stockholm2005 (available at http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No8.pdf as of 18 April 2005), p. 6.
201 Here, too, my analysis differs from that in U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standardfor
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Application to Current DOE Options. The Academy panel puts
greater emphasis on concentration levels as a barrier to recovery of sufficient material for a bomb. The analysis
here is closer to that of the Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team, which states flatly that "plutonium dilution is
not a significant utility barrier" (meaning "utility" as the utility of the material to potential recipients for making
a bomb), seeing the penalties in increased resources and time required as quite modest. See Hinton et al.,
Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, pp. 4.5, 4.8.
202 As one example, for a discussion of how readily cans of immobilized plutonium might be separated from
canisters of radioactive glass in which they were embedded, by explosives or other means - and the extended
technical dispute on that subject - see U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standardfor
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Application to Current DOE Options.
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Chemical Barriers
Plutonium and HEU exist in a wide range of chemical forms around the world,
ranging from oxide powders to nitrate solutions, from alloys and mixed oxides to
contaminated ash and slag from processing. Each of these chemical forms would pose
somewhat different obstacles to recovery of the material for use in nuclear weapons.
Plutonium or HEU oxide - one of the most common forms of these materials other
than metal - could be used directly in nuclear weapons without converting them to metal.
Because of the lower density of materials in oxide form, however (particularly if not packed
to full crystal density, which requires special equipment), larger quantities of material would
be needed, and explosive yields would be reduced. Moreover, a-n reactions with the oxygen
atoms would greatly increase the neutron background; the quantity of material needed and the
higher neutron background would likely make a gun-type bomb impractical. Even for an
implosion bomb with weapon-grade plutonium, the probability of preinitiation would be
increased significantly. Similar conclusions can be reached about other solid compounds of
plutonium or HEU, such as carbides and nitrides, though the details will differ in each case.
Alternatively, the terrorists might choose to reduce oxides to metal, using one of a
number of reasonably simple, openly published processes using commercially available
equipment. At Los Alamos during the Manhattan Project, for example, oxides were
fluorinated in furnaces smaller than 55-gallon drums and the fluorides reduced to metal in a
matter of hours in desktop-sized crucibles (known as "bombs" at the time).204 Although not
unduly difficult, any such conversion from one form to another would:
" require the group to acquire an additional set of skills, this time in chemical processing;
* require the purchase of some additional equipment (particularly a specialized crucible)
and materials;
* add additional time between acquisition of the material and availability of a usable bomb;
e add opportunities for mistakes to occur and problems to arise; and
* create additional opportunities for the plot to be detected and stopped.
One reasonably detailed unclassified discussion of the obstacles terrorists would face
in making nuclear weapons, by several individuals with experience in nuclear weapon design,
machining, and nuclear material processing, concludes that converting oxide to metal would
take "a number of days" and that while the relevant chemical steps have been "described in a
straightforward manner," their "conduct is most unlikely to proceed smoothly unless in the
hands of someone with experience in the particular techniques involved, and even then
substantial problems could arise." 205 Others have provided assessments that are similar in
203 For an authoritatively declassified statement on this point, see U.S. Congress, Nuclear Proliferation and
Safeguards, p. 32. See also discussion in Mark et al., "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?"
204 Richard S. Baker, Siegried S. Hecker, and Delbert R. Harbur, "Plutonium: A Wartime Nightmare but a
Metallurgist's Dream," Los Alamos Science (Winter/Spring 1983; available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/
doe/lanl/pubs/00416629.pdf as of 19 September 2006).
205 Mark et al., "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?"
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specifics, but less skeptical in tone. The Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team, for example, a
group of experts from the national laboratories formed to assess various approaches to
disposition of excess plutonium, concluded that the process of converting plutonium oxide to
metal would require only two process steps of low complexity, would have 90 percent or
more process efficiency, would require only two people, and, with a month or so of
preparation, could be accomplished in less than a week.206 A National Academy panel, using
a reference point of 0 for the chemical barrier posed by plutonium metal, rated plutonium
oxide as 1 on a scale from 0-4 (suggesting that this barrier was not very substantial), while a
group from the national laboratories similarly described the chemical barrier for metal as
"insignificant" and that for oxides as "low." 7 Overall, it appears that a discount factor in the
range of 0.8 would be appropriate when comparing the probability that sub-national recipients
will be able to make a usable bomb from nuclear material in oxide rather than metal form.
In the case of mixed compounds (including uranium-plutonium mixed oxides, or
MOX, a common form of these materials in industrial use, or the uranium-aluminum mixtures
common in research reactor fuel), if the concentration of weapons-usable nuclear material is
high, it may still be possible to make a bomb directly from the mixture (especially if the
mixture is first converted to metal). The quantities of material required if such mixtures are
used directly will be high, however, because of the low resulting density of the nuclear
material. One U.S. government study, for example, concluded that mixed oxides containing
30% plutonium in U-238 could in principle be used directly in a bomb without separation,
though the amount of material required would be roughly ten times greater than the amount
required with pure plutonium (and, though the study did not estimate this effect, the resulting
yield would likely be quite small, because of the low neutron multiplication rate that could be
208
achieved in a system with such a low density of plutonium).
In general, however, recipients who acquired such mixtures would probably choose to,
or have to, chemically separate the plutonium or HEU before attempting to make a nuclear
bomb. This would typically require chopping or cutting the material into smaller pieces,
dissolving it, and then using any of a variety of separations processes (solvent extraction, ion
exchange, etc.) to separate the desired material from the other materials in the solution. These
kinds of separations would require more complex processes, requiring more skill and more
process steps, than simple conversion from metal to oxide; the time and resources required,
the potentially detectable effluents that might be created, and the opportunities for making
mistakes would all be substantially higher. 09 If the group included no one with actual
206 Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 4.6.
207 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, p. 67; "Annex: Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power Systems," p.
12.
208 Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Safeguarding a
Domestic Mixed Oxide Industry against a Hypothetical Subnational Threat, NUREG-0414 (Washington, D.C.:
NRC, 1978), p. 6.9.
209 The Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team concluded that separating plutonium (or, by analogy, uranium)
from various compounds and chemical matrices, as compared to converting metal to oxide, would require
substantially more process steps of greater complexity; a larger number of personnel; three months rather than
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experience in such separations, there would be a substantial probability of mistakes and
problems arising that could end the project, or at least take a substantial time to fix.
On the other hand, for nearly all of the forms that are in common use which thieves
might steal, all the process steps required to separate the nuclear material have been openly
published. Moreover, as the Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team put it, "the equipment and
materials required for the processing are not unique or unusual, and could be acquired from
conventional industrial supply sources."210 The students at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology provide a demonstration that separation from a wide range of matrices does not
require years of training and experience. At the end of a one-semester course in nuclear
chemical engineering (for students who were otherwise studying nuclear engineering, not
chemistry), the typical final exam involved presenting the students with plutonium in an
unknown chemical matrix, from which they each had to design and implement a chemical
separation in the laboratory. Most of the students passed this examination without undue
difficulty. 21 1 While this involved tiny laboratory quantities of plutonium, it nevertheless
suggests that the difficulty of chemically separating plutonium from a wide variety of
chemical matrices should not be exaggerated.
Processing would be somewhat more difficult in the case of chemical matrices where
published processes and extensive industrial experience were not available, such as separating
plutonium or uranium from ceramic materials such as those proposed for immobilization of
excess weapons plutonium.m
Such chemical processing would also raise the danger of creating a variety of effluents
that might be detected, revealing the plot in progress. Dissolution in hot nitric acid, for
example, would typically release nitrogen oxides into the air, though routine monitoring of
environmental releases now in place would not detect these. Liquid leaks contaminated with
nuclear material might occur and might be noticed. Careful planning could greatly reduce the
potentially detectable signatures, however: rigging up fume hoods and fans that would
discharge the air to drums filled with sand and limestone, for example, could eliminate most
detectable airborne releases.2 13
Lower concentrations of nuclear material would mean that more total nuclear material
would have to be processed for a bomb. While this could affect the processing time required
and the quantity of materials such as acids for dissolution that would be needed, over fairly
broad ranges (for example, from 30% nuclear material down to 3-5% nuclear material, which
covers nearly all the kinds of mixed compounds that most commonly exist around the world),
one month of preparation time; and six weeks rather than less than one week of implementation time. Hinton et
al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 4.6.
210 Hinton et al., Prohferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 4.4.
211 Personal communication with Ken Czerwinski, the professor who gave this exam, 2000.
212 See, for example, discussion in U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standardfor Disposition
of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Application to Current DOE Options, pp. 23-27.
213 Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 4.4.
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it does not appear that reduced concentration of nuclear material would significantly reduce
the operation's probability of succeeding, or greatly increase its cost.214
Summarizing the chemical separation issue, a National Academy of Sciences panel
rated the chemical barriers posed by mixed oxides and other compounds requiring dissolution
and separation as a two, on a scale from zero to four.215 That panel also argued explicitly that
"most potential proliferators with the technical expertise, personnel, and the organization
required to produce an operable weapon from separated plutonium-a substantial task in
itself-would also be able to extract plutonium chemically from a glass log not spiked with
radioactivity. Having to do so would not substantially increase the overall time and cost of
building a weapon."2 6 The panel clearly had a similar view of the difficulty of separating
plutonium from unirradiated plutonium-uranium mixed oxides, as it recommended that not
only plutonium metal but even fabricated MOX fuel, until it was inserted into a reactor, be
given security comparable to the security provided for nuclear weapons themselves.217 The
national laboratories team described the barriers to chemical separation of nuclear material
from forms such as MOX fuel as "medium," on a range from insignificant to high - but then
added that "the range of difficulty implied by this classification [from insignificant to high]
may be rather narrow. Most chemical processes involved in the separation, extraction, and
refining of fissile materials are well known and available." 218 Overall, a discount factor in the
range of 0.4-0.6 for the probability that sub-national recipients would be able to make a bomb
from compounds requiring chemical separation, compared to the probability that they could
make a bomb from HEU or plutonium metal, seems appropriate.
DOE, in its categorization system, sets a threshold for the quantity of material that
must be present before the material is considered Category I that is three times as high for
plutonium that is in the form of oxides or other compounds, alloys, and mixtures considered
"high-grade" materials and four times as high for HEU. This approach is technically
unjustified and should be modified. There will inevitably be some process losses in
separating plutonium or HEU from some compound in which it might be found, but these are
most unlikely to be in the range of 60-75% of the material at hand. The Proliferation
Vulnerability Red Team estimated that the process efficiency of converting oxides to metal by
214 As noted earlier, the Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team reached an even more sweeping conclusion on this
point, arguing that even for the most dilute concentrations of plutonium they examined (0.4% by weight
plutonium), "recovery of plutonium.. .would not be seriously complicated by the lower concentrations." See
Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 4.5. This conclusion is in contrast, however, with
that of the National Academy panel on the spent fuel standard, which argued that lower concentrations of
plutonium, meaning larger quantities of material to be processed, would be a "high" barrier to sub-national
groups recovering plutonium from stolen material (and a "high" barrier to the initial theft and removal of the
plutonium as well). See U.S. National Academy of Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standardfor Disposition of Excess
Weapons Plutonium: Application to Current DOE Options, pp. 23-27.
215 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, p. 67.
216 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, pp. 225-226.
217 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, p. 72.
218 "Annex: Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power Systems," p. 12.
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a sub-national group would likely be in the range of 90% (meaning that only 10% of the
plutonium or HEU would be lost to waste), while the efficiency for separating nuclear
material from a mixed oxide might be in the range of 80%.219 Hence, it would be appropriate
to multiply the quantities required for material to count as Category I material by 1.1 or 1.2,
but not by three or four.
If the nuclear material to be processed were radioactive enough that the chemical
processing had to be done not just in a glove box but with remotely-operated equipment, this
would create a substantial additional barrier - probably a very difficult one for subnational
groups to overcome. While the chemical steps required for separation would be similar,
carrying these steps out remotely requires still more equipment, preparation, and time, and the
presence of radioactive fission products creates more potentially detectable effluents from the
processing. Most important, with remote operations, the chance of making serious mistakes
increases substantially, and the difficulties of fixing those mistakes increase enormously.22 0
Radiological Barriers
The radioactivity of nuclear material to be stolen affects the ease or difficulty of the
initial theft; the detectability of the material as it is being transported away and at the site
where the recipients hope to process it for use in a bomb; and the difficulty of processing it.
The importance of these barriers varies, depending on the level of radiation and the kinds of
doses the thieves and recipients are willing to accept.
Radiological Barriers to the Initial Theft
The radiological dose that thieves would receive in the course of a theft depends on
the radiological dose rate from the material to be stolen; the amount of time the theft requires;
and the means of protecting themselves from these doses that the thieves choose to use.
To derive detailed estimates of the doses that thieves or processors might receive from
material emitting different dose rates requires specific time-and-motion analyses of the steps
they would have to take to steal and process these materials, and few of these are available in
the open literature. One unclassified Los Alamos study of this kind examined scenarios for
theft of irradiated HEU fuel from a research reactor. For a typical concentration of uranium in
research reactor fuel, they concluded that it might take the thieves half an hour to pull the
assemblies they needed for one bomb's worth of HEU from the pool at the research reactor
and carry them out to a waiting truck; that if they simply carried the radioactive assemblies by
hand, they might accumulate radiation doses in their bodies at roughly twice the rate of the
radiation dose at one meter; and that therefore the thieves would receive a dose roughly
equivalent to the dose rate at one meter being emitted by the irradiated fuel (divided by the
number of thieves among whom the work of carrying out the fuel assemblies was divided).
219 Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 4.6.
220 Similarly, the National Academy panel on reactor-related options for plutonium disposition concluded that
remote operation would "greatly increase the difficulty" of chemical processing, increasing the chemical barrier
from two to four on its 0-4 scale U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess
Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-Related Options, p. 67.
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Hence, if five thieves split up the job, and the material was emitting 100 rem/hr at one meter,
they would each receive a dose of roughly 20 rem. 2  Such doses would typically not cause
any outward symptoms.
What dose rate is enough to protect material from theft - to make it "self-protecting"
in the parlance of physical protection rules - varies by many orders of magnitude depending
on the attitude of the thieves. People who want to avoid getting doses beyond current safety
limits would be deterred from handling material emitting even a few rem/hr at one meter. At
the other end of the spectrum, to disable a truly suicidal thief would require a huge radiation
dose. While a radiation dose of 400-500 rem will kill 50% of those who receive it over the
next several weeks, to be acutely disabling requires a dose in the range of 2,500-10,000
rem. To deliver such a dose before the theft could be completed would require dose rates
of thousands of rem/hr at one meter. The Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team summed up
the situation as follows: 223
Dose rates of up to a few hundred rem per hour will not pose an accessibility barrier
for any thief willing to expose himself to some element of danger. Dose rates in the
range of a few hundred to several thousand rem per hour may not pose an accessibility
barrier to those willing to take a dose of several rem to accomplish the theft. Dose
rates of many thousands of rem per hour and above deliver lethal doses that will
incapacitate during a theft and pose a significant accessibility barrier to all, thereby
forcing shielding and remote handling during the theft and requiring the use of heavy,
cumbersome equipment.
As the 9/11 attacks highlighted the dangers posed by attackers for whom their own
death is part of the plan, Oak Ridge National Laboratory recently recommended that DOE's
standard for "self-protecting" nuclear material be increased 100-fold, from 100 rem/hr at one
meter to 10,000 rem/hr at one meter.224 As far as current officials can determine, the 100
rem/hr standard - now enshrined not only in U.S. regulations but in physical protection
convention and IAEA recommendations - was set in the 1950s, on the basis of safety, not
225
security. A strong case can be made that against terrorists unconcerned for their own
safety, material emitting 100-300 rem/hr at one meter would pose little more barrier to the
initial theft than would unirradiated material. Such radiation levels, however, would require
221 Koelling and Barts, Special Nuclear Material Self-Protection Criteria Investigation: Phases I and II.
222 For a very detailed recent discussion of this point, with an estimated model of the degree of incapacitation as
a function of dose (beginning with a roughly 60 percent acute reduction in personnel effectiveness after a dose
of 2,500 rem), see C.W. Coates et al., "Radiation Effects on Personnel Performance Capability and a Summary
of Dose Levels for Spent Research Reactor Fuels," in Proceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Institutefor
Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, Tenn., 16-20 July (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2006). For earlier
discussions suggesting disabling doses in the range of thousands of rem, see, for example, Hinton et al.,
Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, pp. 4.10-14.11; Koelling and Barts, Special Nuclear Material Self-
Protection Criteria Investigation: Phases I and II.
223 Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 4.12.
24 Rivers and Whaley, "Review of the Department of Energy Graded Safeguards Table." For a discussion of the
Oak Ridge analysis that led to this recommendation, see Coates et al., "Radiation Effects on Personnel
Performance."
22s Rivers and Whaley, "Review of the Department of Energy Graded Safeguards Table."
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those orchestrating a theft to recruit people who were unconcerned about their own safety,
which might limit the pool of available individuals with appropriate skills somewhat. Thieves
participating for money rather than because ofjihadi fervor, for example, may not be willing
to steal such material.
Radiological Contributions to Post-Theft Detectability
Even if a theft were detected quickly and responders were able to get a combination of
road-based and airborne radiation detection equipment to the area to search within an hour or
two, there would be little chance of detecting a truck carrying unirradiated HEU: at any
distance much beyond the boundaries of the truck, there would simply be no signal above
background to detect. But if, instead, the truck was carrying irradiated material, there would
be a much stronger potentially detectable signal. This would increase the probability that the
terrorists would be found and caught; how much that probability would change would depend
on the particular scenario (and in most cases a realistic assessment of the probability of
detection would remain quite small). 226 Similarly, if the recipients have to process somewhat
radioactive material, the probability that searchers might detect the building where they were
doing so by its radiation signature would increase somewhat. That probability would increase
still further if some volatile fission products were released in the course of processing the
material, and the recipients had not taken appropriate care to limit such releases (such as with
the system of fans discharging into sand and limestone described above). If the responders
had good intelligence and knew where to look, these factors might have a substantial effect on
the probability of the conspiracy being found and stopped; if, however, the responders did not
know where to look, or were unaware that a theft had occurred and a bomb plot was
underway, the probability of detecting such radiation signatures would be very low.
226 Despite the strength of a radioactive source emitting 100 rem/hr at 1 meter, it might be difficult to detect a
vehicle carrying such material at long distances, because of the background gamma radiation at similar energies,
and the attenuation of gamma rays by air. One estimate indicates that the likely detection range for a sodium-
iodide detector, given these factors, would not be likely to be more than 0.5-1.0 km. (Steve Fetter, personal
communication, November 2006, using methods described in Fetter et al., "Detecting Nuclear Warheads.") An
aircraft flying at 200 km/hr (so as to have reasonably long integration times, to achieve such a detector range), at
an altitude of 500 m, would be able to search 0-350 km2/hr. If we assume that the plane takes only one hour to
arrive after the theft, and that the thieves spend much of their time off easily-searched major highways and hence
are able to disperse into a search area whose radius grows only at 20 km/hr, then by the time the aircraft arrived
the search area would already be over 1200 km2 and expanding rapidly, giving the aircraft very little chance of
finding the thieves without some intelligence on where to look. Under current circumstances in the United
States, arrival of the search aircraft within one hour is a very generous assumption, as the only suitable search
aircraft are located at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada and Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. General
Accounting Office U.S. Congress, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and
Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-1015
(Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2006; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061015.pdf as of 20 November
2006). The United States is almost certainly better prepared for carrying out such rapid searches than most other
countries are. In short, it is not a good idea to rely on the ability to detect the fleeing vehicle carrying irradiated
fuel from the air as a key contribution to prevention of theft of such fuel.
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Radiological Barriers to Processing
Estimating what dose rates would pose which barriers to processing is difficult, as it
depends on a complex interaction between the types of processing needed and the time they
would take; the types of simple shielding the recipients might use; and the doses the recipients
are willing to put up with. For example, even if a subnational group has little difficulty
recruiting suicidal armed attackers to steal nuclear material, it may be far more difficult to
recruit people with the expertise needed for processing nuclear material who are also willing
to absorb potentially fatal radiation doses. Moreover, in most cases the chemical processing
will take much longer than the initial theft will, meaning that there will be more time for large
radiation doses to accumulate. Hence, in some cases a radiation level that posed only a
modest barrier to the initial theft could lead the recipients to conclude that they had to shift
toward remote operations for the processing, with all the complications and difficulties that
remote operations would raise. Careful assessments of the radiation levels that would force
adversaries with various levels of radiation tolerance to use remotely operated processing are
not available in the open literature.
Debate over whether subnational groups could plausibly recover plutonium by
reprocessing spent fuel from power reactors (which is far more intensely radioactive than
typical spent fuel from research reactors) has been ongoing for decades.227 There appears to
227 An early contribution to this debate was an Oak Ridge memorandum that offered a design for a "simple,
quick" reprocessing plant that the authors argued could be built and operated covertly in a short time for low
cost. See D.E. Ferguson, "Simple, Quick Reprocessing Plant" (Oak Ridge, Tenn.: Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, 30 August 1977). The implications of this assertion were sufficiently far-reaching that Congress
requested the General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the subject. GAO concluded that Oak Ridge had
likely understated the difficulty of building and operating such a plant. See U.S. Congress, General Accounting
Office, Quick and Secret Construction of Plutonium Reprocessing Plants: A Way to Nuclear Weapons
Proliferation? EMD-78-104 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1978). Much, though not all, of that debate was focused
on what states could do covertly, rather than on what subnational groups could do. More recently, the
Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team, while arguing that a radiation barrier requiring remote operations is a
major barrier to recovery, requiring more time, more people, more complexity, and the like, nevertheless took
the view that reprocessing of spent power reactor fuel by a subnational group is quite plausible. Hinton et al.,
Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, pp. 4.4-4.6. The team did not, however, explicitly examine the
increased risk, with remote operation, of mistakes and problems that could end or greatly delay the effort.
Moreover, the team's conclusion should be considered in the light of their assertions regarding the scale of the
subnational groups they envision: "access to billions of dollars to fund the acquisition of weapons material using
increasingly sophisticated sources and methods" was considered "within the purview of many credible threats."
Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 2.1. This debate over the feasibility of small,
simple reprocessing plants is reviewed in detail, primarily in the context of covert reprocessing by states (rather
than terrorist reprocessing), in Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, and Harmon Hubbard, A Fresh Examination of
the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors (Washington, D.C.: Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center, 2004). The NAS panel on the spent fuel standard did not dwell at length on this topic, remarking only
that "the need for shielding against this [radiation] field complicates the technical work [of chemical
separation]... and it poses a risk of health-damaging or even fatal doses of radiation to the operators in the event
of mistakes or in the event of a need for "hands on" repairs during processing." U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, The Spent Fuel Standardfor Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Application to Current DOE
Options, p. 52. Since all the disposition forms they examined had substantial radiation fields requiring remote
processing, they did not consider what level of radiation field might be required to force the adversaries to shift
toward remote processing of the material.
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be general agreement that radiation levels sufficient to require remote processing - probably
in the range of several hundred to several thousand rem/hr, depending on the doses the
processors were willing to sustain - would pose a very substantial barrier to subnational
groups, though possibly not an insuperable one to particularly high-capability groups,
especially if they had managed to recruit experts with reprocessing experience.22 8
Summary of Radiological Barriers
Against determined, potentially suicidal terrorists, radiation levels would have to be
thousands of rem per hour to offer substantial protection against theft. Lower radiation levels,
however, would noticeably increase post-theft detectability and could complicate processing.
Overall, radiation levels of a few tens to a few hundred rem/hr would probably only reduce
the probability of successful theft and bomb-making by about 20%, compared to unirradiated
HEU metal (hence a discount factor of 0.8); radiation levels sufficient to force the use of
remotely operated chemical equipment, in the case of materials also requiring complex
chemical separations, probably rate a discount factor of 0.1-0.2 (that is, a probability of
successful theft and bomb-making some 80-90% less than that of unirradiated HEU metal);
and material with radiation levels of 10,000 rem/hr or more at one meter should be considered
self-protecting against theft.
DOE's current rules, under which any material emitting 15 rem/hr or more at 1 meter
is automatically excluded from the Category I category requiring high levels of protection, are
totally unjustified and should be changed. Similarly, the DOE, NRC, and international
guidelines that treat nuclear material emitting 100 rem/hr at 1 meter or more as self-protecting
against theft are indefensible in an age of suicidal terrorists and should be revised.
228 For one official discussion, see U.S. Department of Energy, Nonprolferation and Arms Control Assessment
of Weapons-Usable Fissile Material Storage and Excess Plutonium Disposition Alternatives, pp. 53-57.
229 DOE's graded safeguards table appears in its order on material accounting; at this writing, the most recent
version is U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Material Control and Accountability, DOE M 470.4-6
(Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2005). That table refers to "moderately irradiated" material without defining the term;
while the new directive no longer refers explicitly to the 1995 implementation manual, the rules in that manual,
which specify that moderately irradiated means 15 rem/hr, are still in use at the sites until the ongoing
development of new categorization approaches is completed. (Interviews with DOE officials, July 2006.) See
U.S. Department of Energy, Guide to Implementation of DOE 5633.3b.
230 The physical protection convention and IAEA recommendations indicate that if material meets the 100 rem/hr
at 1 meter standard, material that would otherwise be considered Category I can be treated as Category II, and
Category Il material can be reduced to Category III. See International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities; International Atomic Energy Agency, The Convention on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/274/Rev. I (Vienna: IAEA, 1980; available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf274rl.shtml as of 29 July 2005). DOE and NRC
go further, however. In DOE's system, material that meets the 100 rem/hr at I meter standard is automatically
Category IV, requiring virtually no physical protection at all, even if it is otherwise pure weapon-grade HEU or
plutonium. See U.S. Department of Energy, Guide to Implementation of DOE 5633.3b. In the NRC system,
material emitting more than 100 rem/hr at 1 meter is exempt from the requirement that it be protected against the
design-basis threat for theft; is exempt from most security requirements during transport; and does not require
on-site armed guards, or guarded perimeters, or any of the other specific elements of physical protection systems
for fixed sites. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Part 73-Physical Protection of Plants and Materials."
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The Case of Fresh or Irradiated Research Reactor Fuel
In considering what types of security measures should be required at HEU-fueled
research reactors, it is useful to envision the series of steps that adversaries would have to take
to steal such fuel and make a bomb from it and how the properties of both the research reactor
itself and the HEU fuel from it interact to affect the probability that the adversaries would be
successful at each step on that path.
To accomplish this mission, outsider adversaries would first have to gain access to the
research reactor area (which might require breaking a lock, overcoming a guard, having one
or more insider accomplices, or other measures). Then they would have to get access to either
fresh fuel that existed on-site, fuel in the reactor core itself (which might take some time to
get to, as discussed below), or irradiated fuel that might be stored in a pool. The next step
would be to remove fuel elements containing the desired amount of HEU and carry them out
to a vehicle; research reactor fuel elements are typically small and light enough to carry
relatively easily (or a dolly or similar piece of equipment could be used), but in many cases
these fuel elements might only have 50-300 grams of HEU per element, so a large number of
elements would have to be stolen.23 1 Because this might take some time, they would probably
have to either defeat the alarm system at the site or be prepared to fight off the response at
least from local or university police, who might arrive relatively quickly. (More substantial
response forces would typically take longer to arrive.) Then they would have to drive the
material away and elude whatever pursuit and search might follow the theft. After that, they
would be faced with the task of chemically processing the material to recover the HEU and
then fashioning that HEU into a workable bomb. Finally, they would have to deliver and
detonate their bomb. Insider thieves would have to take much the same set of steps, but
would have an easier time doing so, as they would already have authorized access to the
facility and possibly to the material, would have knowledge and training in matters such as
how to remove and handle the fuel, and might have knowledge of the specifics of the security
system and its weaknesses as well. The difficulties at each of these steps are real, though not
overwhelming - and vary substantially depending on the specifics of the individual research
reactor and the type of material it uses.
First, one has to consider how the arrangement of the reactor itself - the facility
"environment" - would affect the difficulty of carrying off a successful theft of HEU. This
varies depending on whether the fuel in question has not yet been loaded into the reactor; is
physically in the reactor; or is in the storage area for irradiated fuel (typically a pool). It also
varies depending on the reactor design.
Many research reactors around the world arrange their fuel management to minimize
the amount of fresh HEU present: in these cases, fresh fuel is loaded into the reactor shortly
231 As one typical example, a 19-plate Materials Test Reactor (MTR) fuel element has a total weight ofjust over
6 kilograms; while the uranium content varies, a "generic" figure in the literature is 236 grams of 93% enriched
HEU. See Trent Andes, "Sample Appendix a for Generic MTR Assembly," in IAEA/USA Interregional
Training Course: Technical and Administrative Preparations Requiredfor Shipment of Research Reactor Spent
Fuel to Its Country of Origin, 13-24 January 1997, Argonne, Ill. (Argonne, Ill.: Argonne National Laboratory,
1997; available at http://www.rertr.anl.gov/IAEA197/sampl31a.html as of 20 September 2006).
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after it is delivered (unless some unexpected delay arises), and each fuel loading is a small
enough amount that they rarely, if ever, have a Category I quantity of unirradiated HEU on-
site. In the core of the reactor itself, some reactors might have less than a kilogram of HEU,
others might have as much as 10-20 kilograms; in general, only critical assemblies, pulse
reactors, and perhaps a few other special cases would be likely to have enough in-core
material for a gun-type bomb. Some research reactors have one set of fuel for their entire
lifetime and hence have little or no irradiated fuel on-site outside of the reactor core. But
research reactors that generate substantial thermal power generally have to discharge
irradiated fuel regularly and, unless they have a very good arrangement for transporting
irradiated fuel elsewhere for processing, storage, or disposal, often build up substantial
quantities of irradiated fuel in a pool or other storage arrangement on-site. Indeed, tons of
HEU have built up in irradiated research reactor fuel all over the world, and some research
reactor spent fuel is posing significant management problems.23 2 Thus, at many research
reactors, the bulk of the HEU on-site is in irradiated fuel.
These three categories of material - fresh fuel, in-core fuel, and irradiated fuel -
should be considered separately:
" Fresh fuel. Fresh HEU fuel might be stored in some type of cask and would typically be
in a locked room, cabinet, or vault. Once adversaries got to it, however, it would be
relatively straightforward to remove it and carry it to a waiting vehicle.
* In-core fuel. For in-core fuel, the difficulty of getting at it and removing it would be
significantly greater in many cases. Some research reactors (such as tank-type reactors)
have enclosed cores. Heavy blocks of shielding might have to be removed to get access to
the core; a top plug might also have to be removed, which might be difficult for
adversaries with modest experience and would often require a crane.233 In such cases, the
time required to get access to the core might be substantial, increasing the time available
for appropriate response forces to arrive and stop the theft - if the adversaries had not
succeeded in defeating the alarm system at the site so that they were not detected. Even
once the core had been accessed, some type of tool would be needed to pull the individual
fuel elements out; pulling out enough fuel elements to get the HEU for a bomb could take
an hour or more. In the case of pool-type reactors, by contrast, the top of the pool can
usually be accessed easily, but a tool to pull fuel elements out would still be needed and
there would still be the time required to pull the fuel elements out. One Los Alamos
analysis prepared for the NRC estimated that removing the fuel elements from the core
might take 2 minutes or more per element - meaning an hour or more if 30 fuel elements
232 lain G. Ritchie, "Growing Dimensions: Spent Fuel Management at Research Reactors," IAEA Bulletin 40, no.
1 (March 1998; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull401/article7.html as of 20
September 2006). While this paper is now almost a decade old, the situation has improved very little since it was
written; far more spent fuel has been generated than has been dealt with in the intervening time.
233 Moreover, the equipment used for this purpose in normal operation could potentially be locked in a way that
would make it very difficult for adversaries to use it. See, for example, discussion in Koelling and Barts, Special
Nuclear Material Self-Protection Criteria Investigation: Phases I and II.
234 Koelling and Barts, Special Nuclear Material Self-Protection Criteria Investigation: Phases I and I.
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were needed to get the desired amount of nuclear material.2 35 Moreover, for high-power
research reactors, fuel pulled right out of the core would be quite radioactive (though this
would be less true for lower-power facilities where the short-lived fission products would
tend to decay away as fast as they built up); indeed, for many lower-power reactors, it is
difficult to keep even the in-core material above 100 rad/hr at 1 meter.236 To put these
difficulties in context, however, it should be remembered that these reactors are designed
to allow refueling and other tasks requiring access to the core to be done regularly; these
tasks are typically done by students at the universities where many research reactors exist;
and all the equipment necessary to gain access to the core and to remove material from the
core is available on-site, because it is needed on-site.237
0 Irradiated fuel. As already noted, delays in shipping irradiated fuel away for processing
or disposal have led to many sites having large quantities of HEU in irradiated fuel on-
site. This material is often stored in pools, where again some type of tool could be used to
raise the fuel elements out of the pool one at a time, after which they could be carried to a
waiting vehicle, such as a truck.
Critical assemblies and pulse reactors pose important exceptions to the discussion
above. Critical assemblies generate virtually no fission products; their fuel, even the in-core
fuel, can be considered essentially identical to fresh fuel. In many cases, for convenience of
experimenting, the fuel is designed so that it can readily be added to or taken out of the
assembly core. (In some cases the researchers do this with their bare hands, the fuel is so
non-radioactive.) In the case of pulse reactors, very high power may be generated, but only
for a fraction of a second, so again, the buildup of fission products and the resulting
radioactivity from the fuel are minimal. Both types of reactors often have far larger quantities
of material on-hand than typical research reactors do, in some cases hundreds of kilograms or
even tons of material. Moreover, some of these facilities use very highly enriched material, in
some cases in metal form. For most critical assemblies and pulse reactors, there would be
virtually no facility-related barrier to thieves removing large quantities of HEU - and hence
the requirements for security measures at these sites should be higher than for other types of
research reactors where more facility-specific barriers are in place.
Research reactor fuel might be stolen from a transport, not just from a research reactor
itself. In the United States and a number of other countries, fresh HEU fuel is usually
transported in small batches, so more than one transport would have to be seized to get a
Category I quantity of nuclear material. Irradiated fuel may be moved in larger quantities,
particularly if it is judged to meet the 100 rad/hr at one meter standard for self-protection.
During transports, fuel would typically be in large casks, which thieves would have to open in
order to gain access to the fuel itself, but for well-prepared thieves with either explosives or
235 Koelling and Barts, Special Nuclear Material Self-Protection Criteria Investigation: Phases I and II, pp. 7-8.
236 See, for example, discussions in Koelling and Barts, Special Nuclear Material Self-Protection Criteria
Investigation: Phases I and II, pp. 7-8; Conversion of Research and Test Reactors, pp. 450-452.
237 For a discussion emphasizing the potential ease of removal of material from reactor cores, see, for example,
Daniel Hirsch, "Weapon-Grade Uranium on Campus," reproduced in Conversion of Research and Test Reactors,
pp. 425-454.
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appropriate cutting tools, this should not be unduly difficult; the casks, after all, are designed
to be opened after the transport is completed.
In addition to the ease or difficulty of removing the HEU from a research reactor,
there is the question of the quality of the material that might be removed. Only a few of the
world's research reactors (again, typically critical assemblies or pulse reactors) use large
quantities of weapon-grade HEU metal as their fuel. Instead, most HEU-fueled research
reactors use fuel that consists of a mix of uranium and aluminum oxides, with aluminum
cladding, or a uranium-zirconium-erbium mix (the fuel used by the common "TRIGA"
reactors - an acronym for Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics). These materials
could not be used directly in nuclear explosives; rather, the recipients of such research reactor
fuels would have to chemically process them to separate the uranium. (Indeed, many of these
fuels contain less than 10% by weight U-235 and hence in DOE's system would always be
considered no more than Category II, no matter how many kilograms of HEU was present at a
site.) 238
Aluminum and uranium are chemically quite dissimilar, and the aluminum-uranium
separation is one of the easier separations in nuclear chemistry. Typical TRIGA fuel or
material test reactor (MTR) plates might be modestly more difficult to cut into pieces than
pins from a typical light-water reactor assembly, but this cutting would not be especially
difficult. Once in pieces, the fuel can readily be dissolved in hot nitric acid available in
quantity from any chemical supply company, and once in solution a wide variety of options
are available to separate the uranium, ranging from standard (but somewhat complex)
approaches such as solvent extraction to simple approaches such as adding particular
chemicals that will cause the uranium to precipitate as a sludge, which can then be recovered
and converted to metal with a further round of processing. The facilities for doing this do not
have to be complex: for the dissolution and separation, a series of 55-gallon drums will do.
James C. Warf, one of the leaders of the chemical processing programs in the Manhattan
Project, has argued that "[t]hese are not difficult procedures, particularly for someone intent
on acquiring an atomic explosive; one might say, in fact, that they are not beyond the ability
of most students in introductory chemistry classes at the college level." 239 Nevertheless, as
discussed above, the need for such chemical processing means another set of capabilities that
the terrorist group must acquire, more time and equipment needed to get the material for a
bomb, and more chances for serious mistakes or for detection of the conspiracy underway.
HEU research reactor fuel also comes in a range of enrichments. Some HEU-fueled
reactors, particularly U.S.-supplied facilities or facilities within Russia, continue to use HEU
enriched to 90% or more. The HEU-fueled reactors the Soviet Union exported typically used
80% enriched fuel, little different from 90% enriched material in the probability that
recipients would be able to make it into a bomb. But during the 1980s, most of these reactors
were converted to use 36% enriched fuel, which is much less attractive for weapons use, as
238 See, for example, the fuel element weights and the weights of contained uranium for generic MTR (materials
test reactor) fuel elements, provided in Andes, "Sample Appendix a for Generic MTR Assembly."
239 James C. Warf, statement in Conversion of Research and Test Reactors, pp. 514-516.
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discussed above. (Efforts are now underway to convert both the U.S.-supplied and Soviet-
supplied HEU-fueled reactors to use LEU fuel.)
The HEU fuel that might be stolen could be fresh fuel, in-core fuel, or irradiated fuel.
Fresh fuel would not have any significant radiation barrier to theft or processing, but in-core
or irradiated fuel would. The characteristics of irradiated HEU fuel vary, of course,
depending on the specifics of the reactor and the irradiation history of the fuel. The two most
important differences between fresh HEU fuel and irradiated HEU fuel are the enrichment of
the material and the radiation level of the material.
HEU research reactor fuel is often irradiated to burnups of 40-60% of the fissile
atoms. A burnup of 50% does not, however, cut the enrichment in half. Fuel that was 90%
enriched initially and is irradiated to a burnup of 50% will still be over 80% enriched when
discharged.240 Hence, with respect to enrichment level, HEU fuel that initially had very high
enrichments ends up only modestly less attractive for weapons use after irradiation.
The other major difference between fresh and irradiated fuel is the radiation level of
the irradiated fuel. But irradiated research reactor fuel is very different from spent fuel from
power reactors. Unlike the massive, intensely radioactive fuel assemblies from a light-water
reactor (LWR) operated to a typical burnup, typical research reactor fuel assemblies are
physically small and light enough for one person to carry, or even to put in a backpack, and
the radiation fields they emit are far lower. Typical Materials Test Reactor (MTR) fuel
elements with 300 grams of 93% enriched uranium per element, burned to 50% of fissile
atoms, will no longer meet the 100 rem/hr at one meter standard 10-12 years after discharge
(depending on the power generated per kilogram of U-235 during irradiation).24' IRT fuel
elements used in many Soviet-designed reactors behave in a roughly similar way, but fuel
elements from the common TRIGA reactors will typically cool to below 100 rem/hr at one
meter in a couple of years after discharge.242 The IAEA experts who manage a database on
irradiated research reactor fuel around the world believe that most of the world's irradiated
research reactor fuel does not meet the 100 rem/hr standard.
As noted earlier, fuel delivering a radiation dose in the range of 100 rem/hr at one
meter would not pose any substantial obstacle to theft by individuals who did not care about
their own health or safety. The vehicle carrying the stolen fuel away from the theft site would
be easier to detect than would be the case for fresh fuel, if responders were able to get
240 As a simplification, if 9 out of every 10 of the original uranium atoms were U-235, and half of those 9 atoms
have been destroyed, then 4.5 of the remaining 5.5 uranium atoms (8 1%) are U-235. To get a more precise
accounting taking into account the fact that a small portion of the U-238 is also destroyed requires more detailed
modeling.
241 See R.B. Pond and J.E. Matos, Nuclear Mass Inventory, Photon Dose Rate, and Thermal Decay Heat ofSpent
Research Reactor Fuel Assemblies (Rev. I), ANL/RERTR/TM-26 (Argonne, Ill.: Argonne National Laboratory,
1996).
242 Calculations by Bryan Broadhead, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Personal communication, October 2006.
Broadhead's calculation related to IRT fuel was specifically for the 36% enriched type still in wide use. Few, if
any, reactors outside Russia still use the previous 80%-enriched fuel, and for the reactors outside Russia, that
fuel will in general have been cooling long enough that it no longer emits 100 rem/hr at 1 meter.
243 Interview with lain Ritchie, IAEA, September 2002.
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helicopters or airplanes with effective radiation detectors searching very soon after the theft -
but as discussed above, the increase in the probability of catching the perpetrators from this
additional radiation is likely to be quite modest. The chemical processes that would have to be
used to separate the uranium from the rest of the material would be identical to those required
for fresh fuel, and if those conducting these processes also did not care about their health and
safety, remote operations would not be required.
Overall, then, the HEU in fresh research reactor fuel would pose a substantial risk if
stolen; a discount factor in the range of 0.6, compared to the risk posed by HEU metal of
equivalent enrichment, seems appropriate - toward the high end of the range for materials
requiring chemical processing, discussed above. For irradiated research reactor fuel with
radiation levels in the range of 100 rem/hr at one meter or lower, a discount factor in the range
of 0.4, compared to HEU metal of equivalent enrichment, seems appropriate (that is, this
radiation level might reduce the chance that recipients could make a bomb from the stolen
material by a further one-third compared to unirradiated research reactor fuel at the same
enrichment).
The Case of Unirradiated Plutonium-Uranium Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel
Another type of material that is in common civilian use and whose security risks are
often debated is unirradiated MOX power reactor fuel. Currently, because fast-neutron
reactors have not yet been commercialized, MOX fuels are predominantly used in light-water
reactors. MOX fuel assemblies for such reactors are large and heavy. The total weight of a
pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel assembly (the most common type of reactor using
MOX) is 658 kilograms; they are about 4 meters long.244 461 kilograms of this total weight is
heavy metal (uranium or plutonium) in the fuel, of which approximately 7% by weight, or
roughly 32 kilograms, might be plutonium in a typical MOX assembly. Hence adversaries
considering a theft from a facility where such assemblies were located would have to choose
whether to carry off an entire MOX assembly or whether to try to separate a part of the
assembly (possibly with explosives). In most cases, the measures needed to carry off only,
say, one-third of the assembly would be likely to be more trouble than carrying off the entire
assembly. At a typical reactor site, MOX assemblies before loading might be stored in a
locked area near the reactor, or they might be stored in the spent fuel pool pending insertion in
the reactor. In either case, the thieves would have to overcome whatever security was
provided for the facility; in the case of MOX assemblies stored in the spent fuel pool, they
would also have to (a) determine which assemblies were the unirradiated ones (possibly on
the basis of the Cerenkov glow, which is routinely used by IAEA inspectors to confirm that
the assemblies in a pool are irradiated fuel) and (b) lift the assembly out of the pool, a task
which would require special equipment. While fuel-lifting equipment would be available on-
site, it might be locked in a way that would make it difficult for adversaries to use. Once they
had gotten an assembly, the adversaries would have to get it out to a vehicle and drive it
away, coping with whatever response, pursuit, or search ensued. Given the size and weight of
244 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, p. 270. Boiling-water reactor (BWR) assemblies are about one-half as heavy, with a similar
length.
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the assembly, even a very minimal security system should make it possible to ensure that such
a removal would be detected, so that the theft would have to be overt; on the other hand, any
thieves remotely capable of taking on the security at a typical reactor site should have little
difficulty carrying the assembly to a vehicle and providing a vehicle large enough to transport
it. Of course, as with research reactor fuel, the thieves might steal the material from a
transport or a fuel fabrication site, rather than a reactor site.
Once adversaries had a MOX assembly, they would have to chemically process it to
recover the plutonium. This would require cutting the fuel rods into pieces, dissolving them
in hot acid, and then separating the plutonium from the solution, for example by solvent
extraction or by ion exchange. The uranium-plutonium separation is somewhat more difficult
than the uranium-aluminum separation, but it has been performed in many facilities in many
countries, and the procedures for the separation have been published in detail. The recovered
plutonium would then have to be reduced to metal (unless the adversaries were planning to
use the recovered form directly in a bomb, which might be possible in some cases). As
discussed above, all of the required equipment and chemicals are commercially available and
could be purchased without raising undue attention. On the other hand, having a MOX
assembly rather than plutonium or HEU metal would mean that the recipients would have to:
recruit people with knowledge of chemical processing; prepare facilities, equipment and
materials for that purpose; allow more time to prepare for bomb manufacture; face a larger
number of chances to make serious mistakes or for the operation to be detected. The
Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team, for example, estimated that to get plutonium metal
from MOX, some nine chemical processing steps would be needed; three months would likely
be required to prepare the necessary facilities and equipment; and six weeks would then be
245
needed to do the processing.
There has been a long-standing debate over the years over how much protection was
afforded by plutonium being in the form of unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies. Many in the
plutonium recycling industry have argued that fabricated MOX fuel elements pose little threat
of theft, because of the difficulties of stealing such large, heavy objects and the difficulties of
processing them to recover plutonium. Japan, for example, has adopted a policy of having
plutonium recovered from reprocessing in Europe shipped to Japan in the form of fabricated
MOX fuel elements, in part to limit controversies over the risks of theft during these long and
readily tracked sea shipments. Others - especially those opposed to plutonium recycling and
to the use of MOX for disposition of excess weapons plutonium - have long argued that the
theft risk posed by plutonium in MOX fuel is only modestly less than the risk posed by other
plutonium. The U.S. government has insisted, in international discussions, that MOX must be
considered Category I material like other plutonium. A detailed review of proliferation risks
by a committee of the National Academy of Sciences recommended that MOX fuel be subject
to security standards comparable to those applied to intact nuclear weapons (which the panel
called the "stored weapon standard"). Such standards should be applied: 24 6
245 Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, p. 4.4.
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up to the point in the [plutonium] disposition process where the spent fuel standard has
been attained. The argument for the stored weapons standard is that the pathway
leading from any separated plutonium form (a pit, an ingot, plutonium oxide, or even
plutonium and uranium mixed oxide) is sufficiently direct and easily traversed by at
least some potential proliferators that applying less than the stored weapons standard
to the protection of such material could lead to the highly undesirable result that
dismantlement of surplus nuclear weapons and disposition of their nuclear-explosive
materials could produce an increase in proliferation risk.
Overall, this panel, assigning numerical ratings from 0-4 for the overall barriers to
recovery of plutonium from different forms for use in weapons (where 0 is insignificant and 4
is a very large barrier), rated MOX powder at "2-", MOX fuel rods at "2" and MOX
assemblies as "2+". In other words, the additional benefit of the large size and mass of the
assemblies was considered to be real but quite modest, while the barrier posed by the need to
chemically process the MOX to recover the plutonium was considered to be quite significant,
though not insuperable.247 Similarly, the laboratory team referred to earlier rated the
difficulty of recovering plutonium for weapons from MOX fuel as "medium" (with the
difficulty of reducing pure oxide to metal "low," and the difficulty of recovering plutonium
from spent fuel "high"). 24 8 The Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team argued that the large
size and mass of MOX assemblies would make covert theft "non-credible," but would not be
a major barrier to overt theft and that while the chemical processing required was significantly
more complex than for pure plutonium oxides, it would not be unduly difficult for adversaries
to accomplish.249 In a detailed government study on MOX security from the 1970s, the NRC
staff categorized unirradiated MOX fuel as requiring "relatively modest facilities and effort"
to recover the plutonium for use in a bomb.25 0 That study concluded that since separating
plutonium from MOX "could be within the capabilities of some malefactors... lowering the
concentration of plutonium through blending should not be used as a basis for reducing the
level of safeguards protection," though it would increase the mass of material adversaries
would have to steal to get enough for a bomb and increase the time required between the theft
and having a usable nuclear explosive.2s'
More recently, the NRC has taken a starkly different view in an extended (though
largely classified) debate concerning how attractive MOX fuel might be to potential thieves in
the context of licensing U.S. reactors to use MOX fuel for the U.S. weapons plutonium
disposition program. Duke Power asked for an exemption from many of the specific physical
protection requirements for Category I facilities, based on the specific characteristics of the
material in MOX fuel assemblies and the level of security that power reactors have been
required to have since 9/11 to protect against sabotage. Critics tried to block these
exemptions, arguing that potential adversaries might well be able to steal and process
247 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, p. 275.
248 "Annex: Attributes of Proliferation Resistance for Civilian Nuclear Power Systems," p. 12.
249 Hinton et al., Proliferation Vulnerability Red Team Report, pp. 4.6, 4.8, 4.13-14.14.
250 Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Safeguarding a Domestic MOX Industry, p. 3.16.
251 Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Safeguarding a Domestic MOX Industry, pp. 6.8-6.9.
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plutonium in MOX fuel, while Duke and the NRC staff argued that MOX fuel assemblies
would be highly unattractive targets for theft. The Atomic Energy Licensing Board
concluded that theft of fresh MOX fuel represented a real risk; the NRC disagreed, arguing
that MOX fuel would not be an attractive target for potential thieves.m Unfortunately, all of
the specifics of these arguments are considered confidential safeguards information and have
not been released.2 s3 It does not appear, however, that NRC had any new information
available to it that demonstrated that recovering plutonium from MOX was more difficult than
the NRC staff concluded it was three decades ago; rather, the current Commissioners appear
to have drawn different judgments from a similar underlying set of facts.
Remarkably, at one point in the proceedings, the NRC argued that there was "no
rational reason" why a reactor with unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies should have any
greater security than other reactors.25 4 Not surprisingly, given that view, the NRC ultimately
granted the exemptions Duke requested. Though Duke did not ask for and was not granted an
exemption from the fundamental requirement to be able to defend against the NRC's DBT for
theft, it was permitted to defend only against the pre-9/1 I DBT; NRC explicitly ruled that
while it had ordered the two large HEU-processing facilities it regulates to put in place
measures to defend against a larger design basis threat after the 9/11 attacks, those orders
applied only to those facilities, and reactors with MOX fuel would not be required to meet
those post-9/1 1 requirements.2 ss
In thinking through what position to take in this debate, it is important to remember
that making an implosion-type bomb from pure plutonium would already require a highly
sophisticated terrorist group with substantial capabilities; while stealing and processing MOX
assemblies would clearly require more capabilities and involve more opportunities for
mistakes or detection, it seems likely that the point the National Academy panel made about
extracting plutonium from a glass log with no fission products in it would also apply to a
MOX fuel assembly with no fission products in it: "most potential proliferators with the
technical expertise, personnel, and the organization required to produce an operable weapon
from separated plutonium - a substantial task in itself- would also be able to extract
plutonium chemically" from such an assembly.256
Ultimately, as plutonium metal already has a discount factor of 0.6 compared to HEU
metal, a further discount factor of an additional 0.6 for MOX fuel assemblies (compared to
plutonium metal) appears appropriate.
252 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in the Matter of Duke Energy Corporation (Catawba Nuclear Station,
Units I and 2), CLI-05-14 (Washington, D.C.: NRC, 2005; available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/commission/orders/2005/2005-14cli.html as of 22 Sepember 2006).
253 References to relevant page numbers from the confidential proceedings are cited in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, CLI-05-14.
254 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, CLI-04-29.
255 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, CLI-04-29. Remarkably, the NRC also overruled the Atomic Energy
Licensing Board's decision to require Duke to prove, in a realistic test, that it could defend against the pre-9/l I
DBT - even though Duke had not objected to that requirement. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, CLI-
05-14.
256 U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium: Reactor-
Related Options, pp. 225-226.
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Risks Posed by Different Types of Nuclear Weapons
Clearly, theft of any type of assembled nuclear weapon would pose an immense threat.
Every assembled nuclear weapon deserves the highest practicable levels of protection. But it
is worth briefly considering how the risks posed by successful nuclear theft vary with the
particular type of weapon stolen, and how the risks posed by theft of an assembled weapon
might compare with the risks posed by theft of weapons-usable nuclear material. Several
factors affect the probability that terrorist recipients would be able to make use of a stolen
nuclear weapon.
Weapon Technical Safeguards
Ifterrorists could figure out how to detonate it, an assembled nuclear weapon would
have the immense advantage of being already assembled and ready to go. Moreover, in most
cases, assembled weapons would have much larger explosive yields than terrorists are likely
to achieve with a crude bomb of their own: most public estimates of plausible yields for a
terrorist nuclear bomb are in the 1-20 kiloton range, while most nuclear weapons in the
arsenals of states have yield in the range of 100-500 kilotons.
But detonating a stolen nuclear weapon may be a substantial challenge for a terrorist
group that receives it. Even a weapon with no built-in technical safeguards may pose a
difficult puzzle as to how it should be set off, if the recipients do not also get any insider
information about the weapon. But as discussed in Chapter 2, many modem weapons are
equipped with features that make them quite difficult to detonate, some designed for security
and some for safety.
Overcoming an electronic or electromechanical lock designed to prevent the weapon
from being armed and detonated unless the correct code is inserted (known in the United
States as a Permissive Action Link, or PAL) would be a substantial challenge, particularly if
the PAL were a modern design, made to be very difficult to bypass and "hotwire" the warhead
and equipped with "limited try" features designed to permanently disable the weapon if too
many wrong codes are inserted.2 s7 Unfortunately, older Russian tactical nuclear weapons
reportedly are not equipped with PALs, or are equipped with older designs that may be easier
to bypass.258 How many of these weapons still exist is not publicly known. Similarly, since
U.S. PALs were introduced to address perceived risks posed by forward-deployed tactical
257 For discussions of PALs, see Donald R. Cotter, "Peacetime Operations: Safety and Security," in Managing
Nuclear Operations, ed. Ashton B. Carter, Charles A. Zraket, and John D. Steinbruner (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1987); Peter Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control ofNuclear Weapons in
the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992); Peter Stein and Peter Feaver, Assuring Control
of Nuclear Weapons: The Evolution of Permissive Action Links, Csia Occasional Paper, No. 2 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1987).
25' For a press report ostensibly describing U.S. intelligence estimates on this subject, see Bruce W. Nelan,
"Present Danger: Russia's Nuclear Forces Are Sliding into Disrepair and Even Moscow Is Worried About What
Might Happen," Time Europe 149, no. 14 (7 April 1997), p. 42. See also the testimony of Bruce G. Blair in
National Security Committee, Military Research & Development Subcommittee, Hearing on Russian Missile
Detargeting and Nuclear Doctrine and Its Relation to National Missile Defense, U.S. House of Representatives,
105th Congress, 1st Session, 13 March 1997 (available at http://armedservices.house.gov/testimony/
105thcongress/97-3-13Blair.htm as of 28 February 2006).
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nuclear weapons, in the U.S. stockpile PALs were not applied to strategic ballistic missile
warheads.
Environmental sensing devices (ESDs), designed to prevent a weapon from arming
and detonating until it has gone through the expected flight-to-target sequence (such as
several minutes of boost phase acceleration followed by free flight, in the case of a ballistic
missile) were designed for safety, not security, but are also likely to complicate the recipients'
efforts to set off a stolen bomb significantly. Weapons incorporating modem PALs and
ESDs pose a significantly lower probability that terrorists would succeed in detonating them
than weapons without these features.
Some less developed nuclear states, such as Pakistan, are not believed to incorporate
advanced technical safeguards into their weapon designs. But in Pakistan, weapons are
believed to be stored in disassembled form, perhaps with key nuclear components needed for
the weapon to detonate in two separate locations;261 such an approach may be as effective as
PALs in reducing the dangers posed by nuclear theft.
Quantities of Nuclear Material Contained in a Weapon
Even if the recipients of a stolen nuclear weapon could not find a way to set it off, they
could cut it open and try to use the nuclear material inside to make a crude bomb of their own.
This nuclear material would typically be plutonium or HEU metal, or both. The terrorists
might try to put their own explosives around the metal ball of weapons-usable nuclear
material known as the primary, or "pit," without changing its configuration at all. For some
weapons, this might work (and thereby reduce the number of tasks the terrorists would have
to accomplish significantly, compared to manufacturing a pit of their own); in the case of a
highly efficient modern pit design, however, the weapon might contain so little nuclear
material in the primary that it could be difficult to get a substantial yield from it with a crude
terrorist arrangement of explosives.
But modern thermonuclear weapons will also have a "secondary" component, which
contains HEU. The HEU in the secondary alone might be sufficient, when cast and machined
to appropriate shapes, for a crude implosion bomb. If not, the combination of the primary
material and the secondary material should be more than enough to make a crude implosion
bomb - though if the primary was made from plutonium (as most are) and the secondary from
HEU, this would require the recipients to master working with both metals. Few assembled
weapons that are not themselves gun-type bombs are likely to contain enough HEU for a gun-
259 For a discussion of which U.S. warheads have which types of PALs, see Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig,
Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume I.
260 For a discussion of ESDs, see Cotter, "Peacetime Operations: Safety and Security."
261 See, for example, Lee Feinstein et al., A New Equation: US. Policy toward India and Pakistan after
September 11 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002; available at
http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp27.pdf as of 4 October 2006), p. 39.
262 One unclassified estimate suggests that a typical modern thermonuclear warhead contains 15-30 kilograms of
HEU. See David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William B. Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium,
1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Solna, Sweden; Oxford, UK; and New York: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 90.
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type bomb. In general, weapons with large amounts of material in their primary (so that
terrorists might be able to get a substantial yield from the primary with their own explosives,
without modifying the primary) should be considered to pose a somewhat greater risk than
other weapons.
Weapon Size and Mass
While stories of "suitcase bombs" capture the public imagination, a good case can be
made that over a broad range that covers most modern nuclear weapons, smaller, lighter
weapons would be only slightly easier for thieves to steal. Thieves sophisticated enough to
have any chance at all of success in stealing a nuclear weapon will surely bring a vehicle
suitable for transporting the stolen weapon or weapons from the site and will surely have
several people involved in the theft. So as long as a weapon is small enough that it can be
lifted to a nearby vehicle by several people - perhaps using a dolly or similar simple
equipment - and can be carried by a common-place vehicle, it is likely to be almost as easy to
steal as a smaller weapon would be. The most massive bombs ever built in the United States
and the Soviet Union, weighing many tons each, would indeed pose a significant size and
mass barrier to theft; but as discussed above in the section on size and mass of material that
has to be stolen, typical modem weapons, many of which are designed to be carried by long-
range missiles (putting a premium on weight) have weights in the range of a few hundred
kilograms or less. Anyone who could accomplish the very difficult job of arranging a theft of
a nuclear weapon would have a very high probability of succeeding in the far simpler job of
arranging for transport of such a weapon.
Tactical vs. Strategic Weapons
Many analysts argue that tactical nuclear weapons pose a higher risk of nuclear theft
than do strategic nuclear weapons, because (a) tactical weapons are less likely to be equipped
with effective technical safeguards against unauthorized use; (b) tactical weapons are smaller
and easier to steal; and (c) tactical weapons are more likely to be located at forward-deployed
and less secure storage facilities. 263
As noted above, published reports suggest that it is correct that Russian tactical
weapons are less likely to have effective PALs, but the opposite is true for U.S. nuclear
weapons. The argument that tactical weapons are smaller and lighter is certainly true for
some tactical weapons (such as nuclear artillery shells or atomic demolition munitions, for
example), but in other cases the sizes are similar; indeed, some weapons in both the United
States and Russia (such as the B61 bomb) are slated for both tactical and strategic missions.
Many of the smallest tactical weapons (including, apparently, all nuclear artillery shells and
all U.S. atomic demolition munitions) have been dismantled, in part as a result of the 1991-
1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). In any case, as just argued, few remaining
strategic weapons are massive enough that their sheer size and mass would pose much of an
obstacle to theft. It was overwhelmingly true in the past that tactical weapons were spread at
263 See, for example, Potter and Sokov, "Practical Measures to Reduce the Risks Presented by Non-Strategic
Nuclear Weapons."
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forward-deployed and potentially less secure sites: U.S. tactical weapons were deployed all
over the world, and Soviet tactical weapons were deployed in most republics of the Soviet
Union and in Eastern Europe as well.264 But the pull-backs before and after the 1991-1992
PNIs have dramatically changed that situation. Today, most U.S. and Russian tactical
weapons have been dismantled, and most of the remainder are in central storage facilities.
Russian tactical weapons exist only in Russia, largely in centralized national-level storage
facilities (though some service-level tactical storage sites still exist);265 a modest number of
U.S. tactical air-delivered bombs are still deployed in Europe, and the remaining U.S. tactical
weapons are in centralized storage in the United States. In short, tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons both pose risks of nuclear theft; there is no reason to focus greatly more attention on
one type of weapon than on the other.
Stolen Weapons vs. Stolen Materials
Theft of either an assembled nuclear weapon or enough plutonium or HEU for a crude
nuclear bomb would pose an immense danger. But what can be said about the relative risks
posed by each?
I would argue that the various types of items that might be stolen rank roughly as
follows (in order of descending probability of the recipients being able to achieve a
substantial-yield nuclear explosion from them):
1. Enough high-grade HEU metal for a gun-type bomb
2. An assembled nuclear weapon without technical safeguards
3. An assembled nuclear weapon with effective technical safeguards
4. Enough HEU or plutonium metal for an implosion-type bomb
5. Enough HEU or plutonium for an implosion-type bomb in direct-use or easily convertible
compounds and mixes (e.g., oxides, nitrates)
6. Enough HEU or plutonium for an implosion-type bomb in compounds and mixes
requiring complicated chemical separations
In this listing, a large quantity of HEU metal comes first because the information
needed to achieve a nuclear explosion is in the unclassified literature and the equipment
needed is readily commercially available. By contrast, none of the information needed to
figure out how to detonate an assembled weapon would be publicly available. An assembled
weapon, even with effective technical safeguards, ranks modestly higher than enough HEU or
plutonium metal for an implosion-type bomb, as there would be some non-zero chance that
264 William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985).
265 The best available current accounts of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and the issues they raise are Gunnar
Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part I: Background and Policy Issues, vol.
FOI-R-- 1057--SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2003); Gunnar Arbman and Charles
Thornton, Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations, vol.
FOI-R-1588-SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2005; available at http://www.foi.se/
upload/pdf/FOI-RussiasTacticalNuclearWeapons.pdf as of 12 April 2005).
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the terrorists could figure out how to detonate the weapon, or to use its primary for their bomb
without modification, and even if neither of those could be done, in most cases the weapon
would still contain enough plutonium or HEU (or both) for an implosion-type bomb.
But several factors suggest that assembled weapons deserve at least as much security
as large stocks of HEU metal, even if the weapons are equipped with effective technical
safeguards. First, terrorists who had a stolen nuclear weapon would be in a position to make
fearsome threats-for no one would know for sure whether they could set it off or not.
Second, as noted earlier, if they did succeed in setting off a stolen weapon, the explosive yield
of most weapons would be much higher than the likely yield of a crude terrorist bomb. Third,
an assembled nuclear weapon, by its nature, contains nuclear weapon design information,
which itself should be protected from transfer either to terrorist groups or to states. Hence,
like large quantities of HEU metal, I assign assembled nuclear weapons a discount factor of
1.0, meaning that they require the highest levels of protection.
Implications: A New Approach to Categorizing Nuclear Materials
These considerations suggest that significant modifications should be made in DOE's
approach to categorizing nuclear materials, the approaches in NRC regulations, and the
international approaches included in the IAEA's recommendations.
A completely graded approach might have almost continuous variations in the
intensity of security measures with increasing quantity and quality of the nuclear material at a
facility or transport leg. It would not be very practical, however, to have regulations that
required frequent changes in security arrangements resulting from even modest changes in the
nuclear material on-site. Moreover, with the basic Category I, II, and III structure having
been in place for decades and enshrined in difficult-to-alter international legal agreements
such as the Convention on Physical Protection, it is useful to attempt to stick with that
structure as much as possible.
A more graded approach that sticks with that structure is possible, however. In the
approach proposed here, regulators would assign discount factors, as discussed above, for
material that posed various barriers to successful bomb-making - and would then set security
rules that would allow correspondingly higher probabilities of successful theft for material
that would offer adversaries less chance of successfully manufacturing a nuclear bomb.
Regulators might adjust the probability of successful theft by requiring facilities to be
defended against a smaller DBT (which might therefore have a higher probability that
adversaries would exceed it and overwhelm the security system at a facility); by requiring
facilities to achieve only a lower probability of defeating a fixed DBT; or, in a rule-based
approach, by modifying particular security requirements.
The threat spectrum faced by Country A in Table 4.1 at the beginning of this chapter
can serve as an example. If regulators in Country A set a DBT corresponding to the middle of
that threat spectrum (4-9 well-armed, well-trained outsiders, 1-2 insiders, or both) and
required facilities with large quantities of HEU metal to put in place security measures that
were judged to have a 95% chance of defeating that threat, these measures' probability of
defeating the lesser threats in the table would probably be close to 100%. Even if these
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Table 4.9: Proposed Categorization of Nuclear Materials: Quantity
Pua or U-233 HEU Disc. Factor
Category 1 2 2 kg 2 5 eff. kgb 1.0
Category II > 500 g < 2 kg >1 eff. kg < 5 eff. kg 0.3
Category III > 15 g s 500 g > 15 eff. g S 1 eff. kg 0.1
a All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.
b Effective kilograms=kilograms of uranium times the square of the fractional enrichment.
measures had only a 50% chance of defeating the next higher level of threat and no chance at
all of defeating the highest level of threat, their overall probability of effectiveness would be
93% (given the probabilities assigned to the different levels of threat in the table). If
regulators considered that sufficient for a large quantity of HEU metal, they might conclude
that for fabricated MOX fuel, for example, with a discount factor in the range of 0.4, facilities
could be required to have security measures offering lower confidence in defeating the DBT,
so that the overall probability of a theft attempt being successful, rather than 7%, would be in
the range of 17%. This would leave the overall estimated risk the same as that for the HEU
metal, if the probability of any type of theft attempt occurring did not change.
Table 4.9 outlines the first step in this revised approach, focused on the quantity of
different types of materials. The thresholds are the same as those in the current IAEA, NRC,
and DOE rules - except that for HEU, the quantity is measured in "effective kilograms" of
HEU (kilograms of total uranium multiplied by the square of the fractional enrichment), to
better reflect the increasing quantity of material required as enrichment is reduced. (As noted
earlier, the term effective kilograms, measured in this way, is already used in IAEA
safeguards.) In this approach, as noted earlier, 5.8 kilograms of 93% enriched HEU would be
a Category I quantity, but it would take 31.2 kilograms of 40% enriched HEU to be a
Category I quantity. The specific discount factors proposed here are somewhat arbitrary. I
suggest 0.3 for Category II because, while it would take only two thefts of Category II
quantities to get to a Category I quantity, it would require roughly four of the largest Category
II quantities to reach the rough 7.5-kilogram threshold of enough plutonium for a crude bomb
(counting likely process losses) discussed above, or the roughly 22.5-kilogram threshold for
HEU. As discussed above, arranging two thefts would be more than twice as difficult and
risky as arranging one, and arranging four thefts would be more than four times as difficult as
arranging one. The comparison to the Category I threshold suggests that the correct figure
should be below 0.5, while the comparison to the amount required for a bomb suggests that
the correct figure should be one-quarter or less; 0.3 is this a compromise, with an element of
conservatism (similar to the conservatism also reflected in the size of the thresholds for
Category I materials). The 1990s DOE consequence ratings cited above assign a 0.4 rating to
Category II material, reflecting a modestly greater degree of conservatism. For Category III
material, I suggest a 0.1 figure, again roughly one-third that of the next highest level, for
similar reasons. The 1990s DOE consequence ratings are again more conservative, giving
Category 3 material a rating of 0.2.
In both cases, however, the actual rules for Category II and (especially) Category III
material at DOE are considerably weaker than those for Category I; it seems likely that the
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probability of successful theft at a DOE facility with only Category III protections would be
of order ten times as high as that for a DOE facility with Category I protections in place.
Hence, in practice, the system advocated here would probably not result in lower levels of
protection for Category III material than are in place at DOE. For NRC-regulated facilities or
those following current IAEA recommendations, the system advocated here would result in at
least somewhat higher levels of protection for Category II and Category III material and
therefore a more truly graded, rather than cliffed, system.
The second step in this approach is based primarily on material quality. Some
difference in security levels depending on the difficulty of making a bomb from different
types of materials, similar to DOE's "attractiveness levels," is justified. Table 4.10 shows
proposed discount factors for different types of nuclear material. Nuclear weapons or HEU
metal in quantities and enrichment levels suitable for a gun-type bomb would count as the
most attractive material, with a discount factor of 1.0. (This differs from DOE's consequence
ratings, which assign only assembled weapons a 1.0 consequence rating.) Plutonium or HEU
metals suitable for implosion-type bombs would have a discount factor of 0.6. (DOE's
consequence ratings make no distinction for the greater difficulty of making implosion-type
bombs.) Simple compounds such as oxides that require no elaborate chemical separation to
prepare the material for use in a bomb would have a discount factor of 0.8. (The DOE ratings,
since they assign only a 0.8 consequence for pure plutonium or HEU metal, to distinguish
those from nuclear weapons themselves, use a 0.7 rating for such compounds.) Compounds
and mixtures such as MOX, requiring complex chemical separations, would have a discount
factor of 0.5 in this approach; the additional difficulty of these separations appears sufficiently
large to justify a bigger difference between pure plutonium oxide and MOX, for example,
than the small shift from 0.7 to 0.6 in the DOE ratings.
There would be no arbitrary cutoff of 10 weight percent weapons-usable material that
would suddenly make such a mixture or compound Category II, as there now is in the DOE
system.266 There would also be no cutoff at 50% enrichment downgrading Category I to
Category II material, as there is in the DOE system - though at 40% enrichment and below,
material would be considered only suitable for an implosion-type bomb, and the increasing
quantity of material needed for a bomb as enrichment declines would be fully reflected, as it
is not in current categorization systems.
266 There may be lower concentrations where a lower discount factor would be justified, if the quantity of
material that had to be stolen to get enough for a bomb was so large as to make the theft substantially more
difficult to carry out (for example, requiring a vehicle so large as to be difficult to acquire, or a very long period
of time to carry the material, or multiple vehicles); alternatively, if a case could be made that the low
concentration would lead to a substantially larger processing facility being needed, which would be more likely
to be detected, that could also justify a somewhat lower discount factor.
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Table 4.10: Proposed Categorization of Nuclear Materials: Quality
Attractiveness Level
A: Weapons and Gun-
Type Bomb Materials
B: Implosion-Type
Bomb Materials
C: Compounds and
Mixes Not Requiring
Chemical Separation
D: Compounds and
Mixes Requiring
Chemical Separation
Material Type
Weapons, >50 eff. kg HEU metal
(>40% enrichment)
Pu metal, < 50 eff. kg HEU metal
(>40% enrichment), HEU metal s
40% enrichment
Oxides, carbides, nitrates, other
direct-use compounds, alloys and
mixtures
Alloys and mixes requiring
chemical separation; fuel
elements and assemblies;
solutions
Discount Factor
1.0
0.6
0.8
0.5
E: Lightly Irradiated Emitting -20-400 rad/hr at 1 m 0.8
Material
F: Irradiated Material Emitting -400-10,000 rad/hr at 1 0.2
Requiring Remote m
Handling
G: Highly Irradiated Emitting >10,000 rad/hr at 1 m. 0.001
Material Imposing
Disabling Doses
During Theft
Material that was irradiated, but at levels below those needed to impose acutely
disabling doses on thieves, or to require recipients to use remote handling, would have a
discount factor of 0.8 in this approach. (This contrasts sharply with the DOE approach, in
which Category I material emitting even the minimal level of 15 rem/hr at one meter is
automatically downgraded to Category II, and material emitting 100 rem/hr at one meter or
more is automatically downgraded all the way to Category IV, requiring virtually no physical
protection measures.) Material radioactive enough to require remote processing if the
recipients are not receive lethal or disabling doses would have a much lower discount factor
of 0.2, reflecting the substantial difficulties of processing such material for use in a bomb.
Material radioactive enough to disable thieves before they could complete their theft would be
considered self-protecting and would have a very small discount factor. Most spent fuel from
power reactors would fall into this latter category, with a very small discount factor; but as the
radiation field from the spent fuel decayed, decades after discharge, its discount factor would
increase, and additional physical protection measures (or passive measures such as
emplacement in a difficult-to-access repository) would be needed.
The judgments in the table as to where these thresholds may lie are highly preliminary,
intended for illustration, not recommendation: additional research is needed (possibly at the
classified level) to make more informed judgments of, for example, the level of radiation that
would likely require recipients who wished to avoid lethal or disabling doses to go to remote
operations to chemically process the material they had received.
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Somewhat difficult issues arise in combining different aspects of material quantity and
quality. As discussed above, the chance that an adversary group could successfully make an
implosion bomb and the chance that they could successfully separate plutonium from uranium
in MOX (to take one example) are not likely to be statistically independent, so it would not be
reasonable to simply multiply the 0.6 discount factor for plutonium and the 0.5 discount factor
for compounds requiring separation and reach a discount factor of 0.3. In the discussions
above, for example, I suggest a discount factor in the range of 0.4 for lightly irradiated
uranium-aluminum HEU research reactor fuel, and in the range of 0.36 (0.6 times 0.6) for
fresh fabricated MOX fuel assemblies for light-water reactors.
Implementation Issues
What would implementing such an approach mean for the levels of protection
afforded to different types of nuclear material, compared to the levels of protection they now
receive? In a few cases, security requirements might be reduced; in a larger number of cases,
they would be increased.
" Research reactors using 30-70% HEU that are now considered to have a Category I
quantity of nuclear material might be downgraded to Category II (if the quantity of
material on site was not very large), because of the use of "effective kilograms." This
would mean significantly lower security requirements for facilities in this category.
" A substantial number of research reactors that now have modest security arrangements
because their fuel is considered to be "self-protecting" at 100 rad/hr at one meter would no
longer be able to consider their fuel self-protecting and would have to provide increased
protection for it.
" DOE facilities with substantial quantities of HEU that is less than 50% enriched, or
materials containing less than 10% by weight weapons-usable material, would have to
upgrade from Category II to Category I protections. Similarly, guidance for DOE
programs to improve security for nuclear stockpiles in other countries would have to be
modified to ensure that such stocks were adequately secured.
" Special consideration would have to be given to the discount factor (and resulting security
rules) to be applied to decades-old power reactor spent fuel, as the radioactive barriers to
theft and processing decay. In some cases, it may be appropriate to upgrade current
protections for such fuel - though in many cases, existing protections against sabotage are
likely to be sufficient to protect against plausible theft threats for this difficult-to-steal
material.
Summarizing the Proposed Method
The approach to identifying the highest-risk facilities and transport legs outlined in
this chapter is conceptually quite straightforward, involving four basic steps:
1. Effectiveness of security. First, analysts using this approach would estimate what types
of adversary capabilities the security system for a facility or transport leg could defeat,
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with what probability (taking into account not only the active security measures but the
characteristics of the facility and of the material, as described above).
2. Level of threat. Second, analysts would estimate would estimate what types of
capabilities outsider and insider adversaries might be able to bring to bear to carry out a
theft on a particular facility or transport leg, with what probability, given the country and
area where it was located. Combining these assessments of threat and security level
makes it possible to make an estimate of the probability that a theft attempt would be
successful - that the adversary capabilities would be sufficient to overcome the security
measures and steal the guarded material or weapon. Assessments of the level of threat
would also be the basis for estimating how the probability of a theft attempt occurring at
all varied from one country or area to another.
3. Utility of material or weapon. Third, analysts would assess the probability that
adversaries who received the material or weapon that could be stolen from that facility or
transport leg could gain the ability to detonate a nuclear explosive from them.
4. Probability of theft attempt. Fourth, using the answers to the previous three questions,
analysts would assess the probability that any type of significant theft attempt would occur
at the facility or transport leg in question.
Combined, the probability of a theft attempt, the probability that attempt would be
successful, and the probability of successful bomb-making represent the overall risk of
nuclear theft for a particular facility or transport leg. With such assessments, it would then be
possible to rank the relative risks of nuclear theft and terrorism posed by different facilities
and transport legs all over the world and focus policy interventions on those posing the
highest present risks.
In essence, in this approach analysts would be attempting, for each facility and
transport leg with a nuclear weapon or a kilogram quantity of separated plutonium or HEU, to
recreate Table 4.1 (describing the probability of various types of theft attempts, the
probability that these various types of attempts would be successful, and the probability of
successful bomb-making, for facilities in two hypothetical countries).
While this approach is conceptually simple, it is anything but simple to implement,
because complete information that would support highly accurate estimates of these
probabilities is rarely available. Nevertheless, informed estimates based on all available
sources of information will provide a far better basis for policy decisions than simpler
approaches such as those that are currently guiding policy (at least in the United States).
These tend to be based only on the stovepipe of a particular program ("we're only doing
upgrades in Russia"); or only on the quantity of particular types of material ("we're equally
interested in any material that's Category I according to the IAEA definition"); or only on
yes/no determinations about compliance with a particular rule ("we're only interested in
upgrading facilities that don't meet the IAEA recommendations, we assume security for those
that do is good enough").
The practical effect of shifting to this proposed approach from these simpler
approaches would be to:
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" Highlight the importance of working with particularly high-threat states (such as Russia
and Pakistan) to ensure that nuclear stockpiles are protected against larger and more
capable threats than is necessary in other countries (and to try to address the terrorism,
crime, and corruption problems in those states, so as to reduce the probability of high-
capability theft attempts).
" Emphasize the need for high levels of security for particularly attractive materials (such as
large quantities of HEU metal) even if they exist in relatively low-threat states.
" Make clear that some materials currently dismissed as posing only minor threats (such as
irradiated HEU emitting 100 rad/hr at 1 meter or more) also require significant levels of
protection.
" Identify particular areas for collection of additional information to improve the
assessments (such as data on indicators of the scale of insider and outsider threats in
different countries and the specifics of protections against such threats at different
facilities and transport legs).
A First Cut at Applying the Method
Even less of the information needed to make judgments on all of these matters is
available in the open literature than is available to the U.S. government or other leading
governments. Nevertheless, for the purposes of illustration, it is worth attempting to apply the
method proposed in this chapter, at least for a few cases. While the method ultimately has to
be applied at the level of individual facilities, it would not be sensible in an unclassified
publication to highlight particular named facilities as posing particularly high risks, as that
might help adversaries identify good places to attempt to steal from. Instead, in the section
below, I will apply the proposed method aggregated at the level of entire countries. I will use
Russia, Pakistan, the United States, Japan, Canada, Uzbekistan, and an unnamed developing
non-nuclear-weapon state as examples.
Russia and Pakistan are included since a variety of indicators suggest that their nuclear
stockpiles face larger outsider and insider threats than any other countries in the world, as will
be discussed below. The United States is included because it has some of the most rigorous
requirements for nuclear security in the world and because more information is publicly
available about the quantity and quality of material at different sites, the security measures at
those sites, and the levels of insider and outsider threat than is the case for any other country
in the world. The U.S. assessment is broken down into HEU-fueled research reactors and all
other facilities with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, because, as discussed
above, the NRC's security rules for research reactors are very much weaker than those for any
other type of facility with such materials on-site. Japan and Canada are included as examples
of countries which have significant stocks of highly attractive weapons-usable material, but
where the threats are relatively low (though a strong case can be made that in these days of
terrorists with global reach, material of this type in any country must be protected at least
against certain minimum levels of threat). Uzbekistan is included as an example of a country
with very high threats but poor quality nuclear material. The developing non-nuclear-weapon
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state is included because the stockpile in question poses one of the higher risks in the
developing world; the country is unnamed because it has only one nuclear facility with a
noticeable quantity of HEU, and hence a risk assessment for the country overall would, in
effect, identify the risks at a particular facility.267
Assessing Threat Levels
As described earlier, a full assessment of the threats in a particular country would
include an examination of a wide range of information, ranging from the salaries, morale,
ideology, and corruption levels among the staff at the particular facilities or transport legs in
question to the record of terrorist attacks and major thefts from guarded facilities or transports
that have occurred in that country. Such an examination is beyond the scope of this paper.
But as also noted earlier, a number of published assessments of terrorism risks, corruption,
and related factors in different countries can provide useful, if rough, indicators of the level of
threat. 268 Table 4.11 shows, for each of the countries considered here, a rating of terrorism
risk;269 a rating of overall security risk facing firms operating there (a rating that focuses
primarily on crime);270 a rating on corruption level in each country;2 7 1 and an estimate of GDP
per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).272
267 The particulars of the country and facility are available to qualified researchers on request.
268 1 am grateful to Anthony Wier for his work in compiling a variety of indicators from many sources.
269 These particular terrorism risk ratings were prepared by the World Markets Research Centre (WMRC), a firm
which provides risk analyses to a range of industries, including the insurance industry, in 2003. See Dunn,
WMRC Global Terrorism Index 2003/2004. This rating of terrorism risk, prepared for use by companies whose
profits are riding on the accuracy of their assessments of such risks, appears to be the most complete (in its
coverage of countries) and detailed such index that is publicly available. WMRC rated each country on a 1-10
scale on several aspects of the terrorism risk there, including: the motivation of terrorists to attack that country;
the presence of active terrorist groups in the country; the scale of terrorist actions that had taken place in the
country; the effectiveness of the terrorist groups in that country (that is, how well-organized, well-trained, and
well-armed they were); and the quality of the country's efforts at terrorism prevention. After weighting each of
these factors, WMRC gave each country an overall rating for terrorism risk; because no country could have a
rating of 0 in any category, the possible range of the final scale was 10-100. For the present purposes, terrorists
might steal nuclear material in one country in order to attack a different country, so I have modified WMRC's
overall ratings by removing the factor of motivation to attack the particular country in question, and then giving
equal weighting to each of the four remaining factors. For the countries considered here, this significantly
reduces the risk rating for the United States, and reduces the rating more modestly for Canada, Japan, and
Uzbekistan, but leaves the ratings for the other countries nearly unchanged. After the preparation of this
terrorism index, WMRC was acquired by Global Insight, which provides its analyses only to major corporate
clients; there is no public indication that Global Insight has continued the preparation of an annual terrorism risk
index.
270 For this category, the ideal would be to have data on the actual rate of major thefts from guarded facilities in
the country, as these are the types of crimes most analogous to nuclear theft. No reliable international data
focused on these types of crimes is publicly available, but it is likely that companies working for the insurance
industry could compile such data - or make reasonably accurate estimates - and provide this information to
governments or international organizations, should governments or international organizations choose to contract
for that service. I have not used data on rates of reported crime, as the country-to-country variation in these
reported rates seems to be driven as much by differences in the proportion of crimes reported in different
countries as by differences in the actual rates of crime. (The most comprehensive publicly available data on
reported crime rates is in Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations, Eighth United Nations Survey of Crime
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None of these are by any means perfect indicators; they are intended to illustrate the
approach, not to be definitive judgments of the threats in different countries. The terrorism
risk index represents the judgment of one company at one moment in time and was not
focused specifically on the risks of the kind of sophisticated assaults that would probably be
necessary for an outsider nuclear theft attempt to succeed. The security risk indicator,
similarly, is a general estimate, from one company at one point in time, and does not focus
specifically on the risk of insider or outsider theft of high-value guarded items. The
corruption indicator is one of many developed by different organizations and does not focus
specifically on the kinds of corruption most relevant to the threats of concern here - such as
corrupt officials granting authorized access to facilities without conducting background
checks, or providing security plans to adversaries, or leaving doors unlocked or alarms turned
off at pre-agreed times. As noted above, the GDP per capita indicator is only very roughly
related to pay at nuclear facilities, as, in countries that devote high priority to nuclear projects,
pay at nuclear sites may be far higher than the average; while in other countries, pay at
nuclear sites may be lower than per-capita GDP (as was true in Russia in the mid-1990s).
Governments or commercial firms supporting the insurance industry would be in a better
position to develop indices that specifically assessed the most important risks for each
Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, Covering the Period 2001-2002 (New York: UN, 2005;
available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crimecicpsurvey eighth.html as of 16 November 2006). While
that source tracks the rate of "major thefts" per 100,000 population, data on that variable is unavailable for a
number of the key countries of interest, and where it is available, it appears to be incorrect in some cases,
reporting, for example, a rate of major thefts in Norway five orders of magnitude higher than the rate in
Pakistan.) Some international surveys of crime victims exist, which might provide better data, but they have
only been done consistently in a modest number of countries to date. Instead, I have used a rating of the
"security risk" facing companies operating in different countries, also compiled by WMRC. Before its
acquisition by Global Insight, WMRC published regularly updated estimates of the overall risk companies faced
operating in different countries, including ratings for political, economic, legislative, tax, operational, and
security risks. The estimate of security risk included both risks from terrorism and risks from crime (and hence
there is an overlap with the WMRC terrorism risk rating), but in most countries the risk to companies' operations
from major crime far outweighs the risks from terrorism. Since these estimates, as with the terrorism risk
estimates, were prepared for companies whose profits depended in part on the accuracy of the assessment
(including insurance companies insuring against these risks), this estimate appeared to me the most likely to be
reliable of the various rankings of crime risks available. The ratings used here were drawn from an on-line
database of Country Risk Ratings as of late 2004 (which is no longer available); I can provide the full set of risk
ratings for all countries on request.
21 These ratings are from the international anti-corruption organization Transparency International (TI) and are
based on surveys of the perceptions of corruption held by citizens and companies in each country. Because TI
uses a rating system in which a high rating means low corruption, I have inverted their 10-point scale by taking
10 minus the TI rating, so that a high rating represents high corruption. See Transparency International,
Corruption Perceptions Index 2004. There are a variety of different organizations that estimate the scale of
corruption in different countries, or the effectiveness of governments in combating corruption; the Transparency
International estimates are based on a globally consistent approach, integrate information from a wide variety of
other sources, and cover all the countries of most interest, but other ratings could also be used.
272 World Bank, World Development Indicators: 2006 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006). The PPP
adjustment - which reflects what a given amount of money can actually buy in different countries - is important
because real incomes in many less developed countries are higher than currency exchange rate conversions to
dollars would suggest.
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Table 4.11: Threat Indicators for Selected Countries
Country Terror Index Security Risk Corruption GDP/capita
(10-100). (1 -5 )b (1-10) PPP (2 0 0 4 )a
Russia 77.5 3.75 7.6 $ 9,097.83
Pakistan 77.5 4.25 7.9 $ 2,044.99
United States 66.25 3 2.4 $ 36,465.05
Japan 45 1.5 2.7 $ 26,883.71
Canada 33.75 1 1.6 $ 28,732.64
Uzbekistan 51.25 3.75 7.7 $ 1,718.30
Unnamed Country 43.75 3.25 5.5 $ 10,471.59
aWorld Markets Research Centre, WMRC Global Terrorism Index 2003-2004 (London: WMRC,
2003), modified as described in the notes.bWorld Markets Research Centre, on-line Country Risk Reports (London: WMRC, 2003-2004).
cTransparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 (Berlin: TI, 2004), inverted as
described in the notes.
dWorld Bank, World Development Indicators: 2006 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006),
2004 incomes in constant 2000 dollars.
country. Nevertheless, these indicators provide a reasonable first cut at highlighting the
relative risks in different countries.
The estimated terrorism risk for Russia and Pakistan is higher than for any other states
with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials; only Indonesia, with a much
smaller quantity of less attractive nuclear material, comes close. This assessment was
prepared before the Beslan massacre and the other terrorist attacks of 2004-2006; both Russia
and Pakistan would probably rate even higher today. (In my own judgment, the difference in
terrorism risk between Russia and Pakistan, on the one hand, and the United States, on the
other, is far higher than this particular risk index suggests; both Russia and Pakistan have
armed Islamic terrorist movements operating on their territories with a demonstrated
capability to launch sophisticated attacks with large numbers of well-armed and well-trained
attackers, which is not the case for the United States. Similarly, Uzbekistan's terrorism risk
rating, below that of the United States, seems far too low, given the existence of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, a large armed group with close ties to al Qaeda. 27) Russia,
Pakistan, and Uzbekistan also rate very high on security risk, given the scale of crime in those
countries, though here Pakistan clearly outpaces the other two. Russia, Pakistan, and
Uzbekistan also have more deep-rooted corruption than other countries with nuclear weapons
or weapons-usable material, highlighting the possible insider threat. Pakistan and Uzbekistan
have far lower levels GDPs per capita than the other countries considered here; even Russia's
is one-fourth that of the United States and lower than the developing non-nuclear-weapon
state included in this sample.
Japan and Canada, by contrast, both have very low security risk and very low
corruption. Japan's somewhat higher rating for terrorism risk may reflect the mid-1990s
attacks of the death-terror cult Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. (The cult leaders who organized
273 This index was prepared well before the unrest in Andijon in 2005; a reassessment today would presumably
indicate higher terrorism and security risks.
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those attacks have been imprisoned, but the cult, now renamed Aleph, still exists.) The
United States rates substantially higher than either Japan or Canada on terrorism risk (given
the demonstrated and oft-expressed desire ofjihadi terrorists to strike the United States) and
on security risk (given the higher rates for major crime in the United States). The U.S.
ranking on corruption, like those for Japan and Canada, is quite low. All three countries have
high per-capita GDP, offering high salaries for nuclear workers and guards and plentiful
resources to provide for nuclear security.
The unnamed developing country has a low rating for terrorism risk, reflecting the
lack of organized terrorist activity there in recent years (and its lack of participation in the
Iraq war and other U.S.-led initiatives that might make it a target). On the other hand, its
ratings for security risk and corruption are fairly high (though not as high as those for Russia,
Pakistan, and Uzbekistan), reflecting the high crime rate in the country and the endemic
corruption there. Its per-capita GDP is much lower than those of the developed countries in
the table, but substantially higher than Uzbekistan's or Pakistan's and even somewhat higher
than Russia's, on a purchasing-power-parity basis.
Assessing Overall Nuclear Theft Risks: Two Approaches
Of course, threat levels are only one of the factors to consider in assessing the overall
risk of nuclear theft. In what follows below, I will present two approaches to integrating all of
the necessary factors into relative risk assessments for different facilities and transport legs in
different countries.
The first is based on explicitly attempting to estimate the probabilities of theft attempts
with different levels of capability in different countries (and the probability that attempts at
those different levels of capability will succeed in overcoming the security systems at
particular facilities or transport legs). Both of these estimates involve, in essence, educated
guesses - though those guesses are likely to be more reliable in making relative assessments
between different countries than in making absolute assessments of these probabilities. The
second, somewhat simpler, approach is based on rating the threats and the security levels in
different countries on a 1-5 scale, based on criteria that are as objective as practicable; in that
case, the educated guesses come in attempting to relate these ratings to probabilities of
successful nuclear theft.
The first approach is, in effect, based on reproducing Table 4.1 (which describes the
risks in hypothetical Country A and Country B) for each facility or transport leg. (Here, as
just mentioned, I will be implementing the approach only at the more general national level.)
This is a very data-intensive and judgment-intensive approach; only very limited data is
available (especially in the public domain) for judging either how likely theft attempts with
different levels of capability may be in different countries, or how effective the security
systems in different countries would be in defeating those different types of threats.
Nevertheless, Table 4.12 presents a first cut at such an assessment, for the sample set of
countries listed above. The estimates in Table 4.12 are rounded to one or at most two
significant figures; where they refer to a probability of success of 1.0, I do not literally mean
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that success is absolutely certain, but only that the chance of failure is small enough to make
no noticeable contribution to the overall risk estimate.
Table 4.12 begins with a listing of several ranges of possible adversary capability -
identical to that used in Table 4.1. ("Beyond design threats" refers to threat capabilities larger
than any of those explicitly described.) For each country, there is then a column containing
estimates of the probability that a theft attempt, if it occurred, would be in the specified range
of capability; for each country, these estimates sum to 1.0. This is followed by a column
containing estimates of the probability that a theft attempt at this level of capability would
succeed, given the security arrangements at nuclear facilities with weapons-usable nuclear
material in that country. Multiplying these probabilities at each level of capability and
summing the result across all the levels of capability gives the overall probability that a theft
attempt, should it occur in that country, would be successful, a figure provided in the row
below the list of potential levels of capability. The row just below that provides estimates of
the probability that a theft attempt will occur at all in each country. (These are intended only
as estimates of relative probabilities between different countries; the absolute annual
probability of a significant theft attempt in these countries would is almost certainly smaller
than the probabilities assigned here.) The next to last row provides the discount factor for the
best material in the country in question. Multiplying the probability that a theft attempt would
occur in a particular country by the probability that the attempt would be successful and the
discount factor gives the overall risk rating, provided in the last row of the table.
Note that in making rough estimates of the likelihood of theft attempts using different
levels of capability, I assume that in most cases thieves would try to bring to bear a level of
capability they thought would succeed and might often be deterred from attempting a theft if
it seemed hopeless. Hence, rather than the highest-probability parts of the distribution being
at the most minimal levels of capability, I assume that minimal-capability thieves are often
deterred from even launching any significant attempt at nuclear theft, so that the highest
probabilities are for bins with some significant chance of success in carrying out a nuclear
theft. Since (a) only those attempts involving enough capability to have a significant chance
of success contribute to the overall risk, and (b) the purpose here is only to make relative
rankings of risk between different countries, not absolute estimates of how big the risk of
nuclear theft is in each country, the low probability assessments for theft attempts with very
little capability do not matter much. Only the variance between countries in the estimates of
the likelihood of theft attempts with substantial levels of capability affect the estimates of
relative risks.
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Table 4.12: Estimated Risk of Nuclear Theft in Selected Countries
U.S. research
Russia United States reactors
Threat Level Att. % Succ. % Aft. % Succ. % Aft. % Succ. %
Beyond design threats 0.1 0.9 0.05 0.8 0.0 1.0
10-15 well-armed 0.3 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.1 1.0
outsiders,
and/or 1-4 insiders
4-9 well-armed 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.7
outsiders,
and/or 1-2 insiders
1-3 well-armed 0.15 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.5
outsiders,
and/or 1 insider
1 unarmed outsider, 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.0 0.1 0.1
or 1 poorly placed
insider
Prob. theft attempt is 0.5 0.24 0.61
successful
Prob. of theft attempt 0.5 0.25 0.25
Discount factor 1.0 1.0 0.4
Relative risk rating 0.25 0.060 0.061
Pakistan Canada Japan
Threat Level: Att. % Succ. % Aft. % Succ. % Aft. % Succ. %
Beyond design threats 0.15 0.9 0.03 0.9 0.01 1.0
10-15 well-armed 0.4 0.7 0.07 0.7 0.05 0.9
outsiders,
and/or 1-4 insiders
4-9 well-armed 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.7
outsiders,
and/or 1-2 insiders
1-3 well-armed 0.1 0.1 0.45 0.2 0.45 0.3
outsiders,
and/or 1 insider
1 unarmed outsider, 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.05 0.19 0.15
or 1 poorly placed
insider
Prob. theft attempt is 0.55 0.32 0.43
successful
Prob. of theft attempt 0.5 0.15 0.1
Discount factor 1.0 1.0 1.0
Relative risk rating 0.27 0.048 0.043
Source: Author's estimates, explained in the text. "Att. %" refers to the estimated
probability of a theft attempt occurring, while "Succ. %" refers to the estimated probability
that such an attempt would succeed.
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Table 4.12: Estimated Risk of Nuclear Theft
In Selected Countries (continued)a
Uzbekistan Unnamed Country
Threat Level: Att. % Succ. % Att. % Succ. %
Beyond design threats 0.1 1.0 0.07 1.0
10-15 well-armed 0.3 0.8 0.13 0.9
outsiders,
and/or 1-4 insiders
4-9 well-armed 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8
outsiders,
and/or 1-2 insiders
1-3 well-armed 0.15 0.25 0.3 0.5
outsiders,
and/or 1 insider
1 unarmed outsider, 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.15
or 1 poorly placed
insider
Prob. theft attempt is 0.62 0.67
successful
Prob. of theft attempt 0.5 0.3
Discount factor 0.2 1.0
Relative risk rating 0.062 0.20
Source: Author's estimates, explained in the text. "Att. %" refers to the
estimated probability of a theft attempt occurring, while "Succ. %" refers
to the estimated probability that such an attempt would succeed.
As noted in Chapter 3, most of the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism comes from the
most vulnerable facilities, not only because terrorists and thieves are more likely to succeed if
they attempt to steal from these sites, but because they are more likely to pick these
vulnerable locations. In Table 4.12, the estimated probability that a theft attempt would be
successful follows directly from the estimated chances of attempts at various levels of
capability and the chances that attempts at each level would succeed. The probability that
such an attempt would occur at all is a judgment; it is higher where threats are higher (clearly
such theft attempts are much more likely in Russia than in Japan, for example), reduced
somewhat where security is higher and reduced somewhat where the quantity and quality of
the material available to be stolen is lower. In what follows, I discuss the ratings for threats,
security levels, and quantity and quality of material in Table 4.12, for each of the countries
considered.
Russia
Threat. The threat in today's Russia is very high, as discussed in Chapter 2 and in the
section on threat indicators, above. Russia is the only country in the world where senior
officials have confirmed that terrorist teams are carrying out reconnaissance at nuclear
warhead storage sites; some terrorist attacks have involved scores of well-trained suicidal
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 4274
attackers armed with automatic weapons and explosives, striking without warning; corruption
is endemic, as are major insider thefts of non-nuclear items, including from guarded facilities;
and while nuclear workers are now paid a living wage, on time, wages for conscript guards at
some remote nuclear facilities remain low, and these guards sometimes become "the most
dangerous internal adversaries."27 4
Hence, in Table 4.12, I suggest that there is a significant (10%) probability that a theft
attempt in Russia would involve a level of capability higher than the highest level specifically
described in the table and a large probability (30%) that it would involve the highest level
described, 10-15 well-armed outsiders and/or 1-4 insiders. The probability of a theft attempt
at the next lower level of capability would be even higher (40%), while the probability of
attempts at lower levels of capability would be rather modest (based on the assumption that
most potential thieves unable to put together a more substantial theft attempt would be
deterred from trying any theft attempt at all).
Security. As discussed in Chapter 2, security for nuclear weapons and materials has
improved substantially since the mid-1990s, but significant weaknesses remain. Hence, in
Table 4.12, 1 suggest that while single outsiders and single insiders with no particular plan
succeeded in stealing HEU in the mid-I 990s, such thieves would have very little chance of
success today. Even for a threat of 1-3 well-armed outsiders working with an insider, I
suggest only a 20% chance of a theft attempt being successful. But for larger threats, I
suggest that the probability of success would increase dramatically.
Quantity and quality of material. Russia has many thousands of nuclear weapons
and sites with huge quantities of HEU and separated plutonium, in metal, oxide, and a wide
variety of other forms. The discount factor at the sites with the best material (some of which
are civilian sites with comparatively modest on-site armed guard forces compared to military
sites) is 1.0, the highest possible.
Overall risk rating. With a 50% probability that a major theft attempt would be
successful, a 50% probability that such an attempt would occur, and a discount factor of 1.0,
Russia gets an overall risk rating of 0.25, in the same range as Pakistan, which is the highest
of all the countries in the table. Russia's risk rating is almost four times higher than the rating
for the United States. Moreover, two factors that are not considered in this country-rating
approach are the huge number of buildings and bunkers where nuclear weapons and weapons-
usable materials exist in Russia and the frequent transports that take place there. As discussed
in Chapter 3, while the risk of theft does not increase linearly with the number of facilities
(because the frequency of theft attempts is determined primarily by the number of groups
attempting to get nuclear weapons or materials and the frequency with which they make
attempts), more facilities does generally mean more risk, as it means more different groups of
people that may include insider thieves and more opportunities for at least one facility to have
security weak enough that thieves may observe and successfully exploit the weakness.
274 Igor Goloskokov, "Refomirovanie Voisk MVD Po Okhrane Yadernikh Obektov Rossii (Reforming MVD
Troops to Guard Russian Nuclear Facilities)," trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Yaderny Kontrol 9,
no. 4 (Winter 2003; available at http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yk4-2003.pdf as of 28 February
2005).
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Hence, if the risks over all the facilities and transport legs in Russia were considered
individually and aggregated, the risk would be increased compared to a country with a small
number of facilities and few transports, such as Pakistan. This effect - not included in this
country-level rating approach - is probably larger than the small difference between Russia's
score and Pakistan's score using the methodology shown in the table.
Pakistan
Threat. Both the outsider and insider threats in Pakistan are extraordinarily high, as
discussed in Chapter 2. The presence of armed remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban, along
with other highly capable jihadi terrorist groups, along with the frequent terrorist attacks that
take place (including the assassination attempts against President Musharraf, some of which
have come quite close to succeeding) make clear that high-capability outsider attacks on
nuclear facilities are a real possibility. Similarly, the history of the A.Q. Khan network selling
highly sensitive nuclear technology across the globe, along with the endemic corruption and
insider theft in Pakistan, suggests that major insider theft attempts are a real possibility.
Hence in Table 4.12, the probability of a beyond-design-basis theft attempt (15%) and
the probability of a theft attempt at the level of 10-15 well-armed outsiders and/or 1-4 insiders
(40%) are both considered to be even higher than in Russia, while the likelihood of attempts
involving lower levels of capability is correspondingly lower.
Security. As discussed in Chapter 2, Pakistan's small nuclear stockpile is thought to
be heavily guarded, though modern physical protection technologies may not be used. The
ratings in Table 4.12 for the probability of success of various types of theft attempt are the
same as Russia's for high-capability threats; for lower-capability threats, Pakistan's system is
judged slightly more likely to provide effective protection, since it does not have Russia's past
record of small threats being able to succeed in defeating the system.
Quantity and Quality of Material. Like Russia, Pakistan has actual nuclear weapons
(though Pakistan's are thought to be stored in disassembled form), and substantial quantities
of HEU metal. The discount factor at the best sites is 1.0.
Overall risk rating. With a 55% probability that a major theft attempt would be
successful, a 50% probability that such an attempt would occur, and a discount factor of 1.0,
Pakistan gets an overall risk rating of 0.27, the highest of the countries in the table (though the
difference from Russia is easily within the uncertainties of the method). Pakistan's risk rating
is over four times higher than the rating for the United States.
United States
Threat. Terrorists are highly motivated to attack the United States, and official
assessments suggest that there remains a significant potential for terrorists to operate within
the United States. But there is little evidence that large, well-armed, and highly capable
terrorist groups are still operating in the United States without detection; since 9/11, the
United States has taken a variety of domestic security measures to try to prevent that from
happening. Moreover, while there are substantial rates of corruption and major theft in the
United States, those rates are much lower than they are in Russia or Pakistan. Nuclear
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workers in the United States are far better paid in the United States than in Russia or Pakistan.
In short, there is little doubt that the probability of any type of theft nuclear theft attempt is
lower in the United States than it is in Russia or Pakistan. Similarly, it seems clear that the
probability that an attempt that did occur would involve the highest levels of capability in the
table is substantially lower in the United States than it is in Russia or Pakistan. At the same
time, however, the possibility of such high-capability theft attempts remains real and the
probability of modest-capability theft attempts is probably substantial.
Security. The United States probably spends more on securing its nuclear stockpiles
than any other country in the world. At DOE alone, annual security spending (which includes
not just physical protection, but also management of secret information, security clearances,
and more) is now well over $1 billion per year.27s DOE facilities with nuclear weapons or
weapons-usable nuclear materials are required to be defended against a large, well-armed, and
well-trained commando team of outsiders, against insider theft attempts, and against both
working together.276 While important weaknesses remain at some sites, 277 sites such as
Pantex and the nuclear weapons storage at Kirtland Air Force Base are probably among the
most secure nuclear facilities in the world. Hence, in Table 4.12, even highly capable threats
are considered to have a somewhat lower chance of succeeding than they would in Russia or
Pakistan, and the probability that low-capability threats would succeed is judged to be quite
low.
Nuclear security in the United States is by no means uniform, however. Private
Category I facilities regulated by the NRC, not by DOE, are required to defend only against a
smaller and less capable DBT, even though the two remaining NRC-regulated Category I
facilities both handle large quantities of HEU metal.278 (A more complete tabulation would
treat these facilities separately, with separate security ratings for them.) NRC-regulated
nuclear research reactors, as discussed above, are exempt from all but very modest NRC
security requirements. The "facility environment" at these sites, however - such as fuel that
typically would require tens of minutes to get out of the pool and remove to a waiting vehicle
- does, in most cases, provide an additional level of security beyond what is available from
the measures specifically designed for physical protection. In Table 4.12, U.S. research
reactors (referring primarily to those regulated by the NRC, which are the majority of U.S.
HEU-fueled reactors) are treated separately. It seems virtually certain that a high-capability
theft attempt at such a research reactor would succeed, and even modest threats would have
some chance of success.
Quantity and quality of material. Like Russia, the United States has thousands of
nuclear weapons and huge quantities of both HEU and plutonium, in metal, oxide, and many
275 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Other Defense Activities.
276 While the specific DOE DBT is classified, an informative review of its general characteristics and how they
have evolved in the several changes since the 9/11 attacks can be found in Project on Government Oversight, Y-
12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory at High Risk.
277 See, for example, discussion in Project on Government Oversight, Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory
at High Risk.
278 For a discussion of this point, see Project on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex:
Homeland Security Opportunities.
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other forms. Hence, the discount factor for the main U.S. column is 1.0, the highest possible.
NRC-regulated U.S. research reactors, however, are a different story. These facilities
typically use fuel where the uranium is mixed with aluminum or other elements, requiring
chemical separation before the uranium could be used in a bomb. These facilities never have
a Category I quantity of fresh, unirradiated fuel on-site. The fuel in the reactor cores ranges
from moderately to highly radioactive; for some reactors, all or nearly all of the fuel in the
pool is radioactive enough that the chemical processing would probably require remote
handling, though for others this is likely not the case. Only fuel quite recently discharged
from fairly high-power reactors would be radioactive enough to be immediately disabling.279
Overall, NRC-regulated research reactors are considered to have a discount factor of 0.4,
corresponding to modestly radioactive HEU in forms requiring chemical separation and in
amounts (in most cases) too small for a gun-type bomb with substantial yield.
Overall risk rating. With a 25% probability that a major theft attempt would be
successful, a 25% probability that such an attempt would occur, and a discount factor of 1.0,
the United States gets an overall risk rating of 0.064, substantially less than that of Russia or
Pakistan. More by coincidence than by regulatory intent, NRC-regulated HEU-fueled
research reactors end up with approximately the same risk rating, at 0.061, because their far
higher probability that a theft attempt would be successful is balanced by their much lower
discount factor, reflecting HEU that would require chemical separations before it could be
used in a bomb and often has radiation levels in the range of 1 00s or rem/hr at 1 meter. If
adversaries were confident in their chemical processing abilities, they might preferentially
choose to attempt to steal material from these less secure sites; in that case, the probability of
a theft attempt at these sites would be higher, rather than roughly equal, and the overall risk
for U.S. research reactors would be higher than at other sites in the United States.
Canada
Threat. Canada is an example of a comparatively low-threat country. Canada enjoys,
in many ways, a more civil society than the United States. In Table 4.11, it is rated as having
a lower terrorism risk, lower crime risk, and lower corruption than the United States. On the
other hand, Canada is also a good example of the global nature of the threat. There have been
cases of terrorist plotting by Islamic extremists in Canada, and with both relatively liberal visa
and immigration policies and many thousands of kilometers of effectively deserted border, it
would be very difficult for Canada to prevent modest teams of well-trained individuals from
entering the country. For these reasons, in Table 4.12Error! Reference source not found.,
Canada is rated as having probabilities of high-capability theft attempts that are significantly
smaller than those in the United States (though still significant), with most of the theft attempt
probability clustered at the lower levels of capability. Canada is also rated as having a lower
probability that any type of nuclear theft attempt would occur.
279 Calculations provided by Bryan Broadhead, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, suggest that fuel elements from
relatively high-power Materials Test Reactor (MTR) or IRT-3M (36% enriched) reactors would continue to have
radiation fields that would be acutely disabling (10,000 rad/hr at 1 meter) for over 1,000 hours after discharge,
while TRIGA fuel elements might only maintain such a dose rate for some 20 hours after discharge. Personal
communication, October 2006.
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Security. The modest amount of publicly available information suggests that Canada
has significantly increased security for nuclear facilities in response to new concerns
following the 9/11 attacks. Prior to those attacks, Canada's published physical protection
regulations did not require facilities to have security measures in place capable of defeating
any particular DBT; sites were only required to have on-site guards sufficient for tasks such as
access control, occasional perimeter patrols, and searches of personnel, not to engage and
defeat armed attackers. While there was a general requirement that sites "ensure" that
individuals did not bring in explosives or take out nuclear material, searches of individuals
were only required when they were justified by "reasonable suspicion" of a particular
individual, and there was no specific requirement for portal monitors to detect removal of
nuclear materials. 280 Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
(CNSC, which has responsibility for regulating both nuclear safety and nuclear security)
issued orders requiring high-risk licensees (including nuclear power plants and sites with
weapons-usable nuclear material) to beef up nuclear security measures, including adding on-
site armed guard forces and a variety of other steps.
In the fall of 2006, the requirements of these orders and some additional requirements
were incorporated into amended regulations.281 Now, Canadian nuclear power plants and
facilities with Category I and II nuclear material are required to design their physical
protection systems "taking into account" a DBT set by the CNSC (as well as credible local
threats that may turn up in analyses the licensees are required to do); they are required to have
on-site armed guard forces capable of providing "effective intervention" preventing the DBT
from succeeding in either theft or sabotage; key personnel are required to have security
clearances; access control requirements are much tougher; personnel and vehicles need to be
searched for explosives, nuclear material, and other contraband; and so on. The CNSC
estimates that meeting the new security requirements cost licensees $300 million in initial
capital investments and is costing roughly $60 million per year in increased operating
expenses.282 Today, one key Canadian site with a significant quantity of HEU is reported to
have security measures that include searches of all personnel and vehicles, beefed-up access
control measures, delay barriers, and an armed "nuclear response force," backed up by troops
at a military base not far away.283
While these measures have clearly increased security for nuclear materials in Canada,
the publicly available evidence does not indicate that the security measures in place are
comparable to those at Category I facilities in the United States. There is no publicly
available information describing the DBT that the CNSC will require facilities to take into
280 For the text of these pre-9/1 I regulations, see Government of Canada, "Nuclear Safety and Control Act:
Nuclear Security Regulations," Canada Gazette Part // 134, no. 13 (21 June 2000; available at
http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partll/2000/20000621/pdf/g2-13413.pdf as of 20 November 2006).
281 Government of Canada, "Nuclear Safety and Control Act: Regulations Amending the Nuclear Security
Regulations," Canada Gazette Part / -- Extra 140, no. 4 (7 September 2006; available at
http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partll/2006/20060907-x4/pdf/g2-14Ox4.pdf as of 20 November 2006).
282 Government of Canada, "Nuclear Safety and Control Act: Regulations Amending the Nuclear Security
Regulations," p. 27.
283 Ian McLeod, "Bombs Away: Forty-Five Kilograms of Bomb-Grade Uranium Are Stockpiled at Chalk River,
Awaiting the Long-Delayed Startup of Two Nuclear Reactors," Ottawa Citizen, 17 June 2006.
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account, but it is very unlikely that these facilities will be required to defend against a threat
as challenging as those DOE facilities are now required to defend against. Although the new
rules require facilities to conduct "security exercises" every two years (involving both on-site
and off-site response forces), they do not include a requirement for realistic force-on-force
tests of the ability of the security systems to defeat the DBT (or comparable realistic tests of
insiders' ability to smuggle material out); the CNSC is reportedly considering requiring such
284tests. In many respects, the Canadian regulations are much less specific than those that
exist in the United States.
Overall, in Table 4.12, the security measures in Canada are rated as being somewhat
less able to defeat various levels of threat than those in the United States (other than at NRC-
licensed research reactors), but roughly comparable to the security measures now in place in
Russia.
Quantity and quality of material. Most sites in Canada have only modest quantities
of weapons-usable nuclear material. A small number of locations, however, have tens of
kilograms of fresh, unirradiated HEU.2 85 This material deserves a discount factor of 1.0 or
close to it.
Overall risk rating. With a 32% probability that a major theft attempt would be
successful, a probability of only 15% that such an attempt would occur, and a discount factor
of 1.0, Canada gets an overall risk rating of 0.049, significantly lower than that for the United
States - in essence because the reduction in threat levels in moving from the United States to
Canada is judged to be somewhat larger than the reduction in security levels.
Japan
Threat. Japan perceives itself as a civil society where firearms have been outlawed
for hundreds of years and large-scale armed attacks are almost inconceivable. 286 Part of this
perception is undoubtedly correct: with Japan's ethnic homogeneity and traditions of
communal cooperation, it would be very difficult for any substantial armed group of non-
Japanese individuals to enter Japan and operate there. As shown in Table 4.11, Japan is rated
as having lower terrorism risks, crime risks, and corruption than the United States.287 But it
284 Ian McLeod, "How to Keep Nuclear Sites Safe: Stage Mock Terror Attacks: Chalk River Considers U.S.-
Style Security Drill," Ottawa Citizen, 17 June 2006.
285 See, for example, McLeod, "Bombs Away."
286 See, for example, H. Kawai, H. Kurihara, and M. Kajiyoshi, "Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in
Japan," in Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials: Experience in Regulation, Implementation, and
Operations: Proceedings of an International Conference, Vienna, 10-14 November 1997 (Vienna: International
Atomic Energy Agency, 1997). This article asserts, as of two years after the Aum Shinrikyo attacks, that "Japan
is still the safest country in the world," and provides a table listing underlying factors such as the ban on private
possession of swords and firearms, the registration of all citizens and families, and the lifelong employment
system as "the premise for considering physical protection of nuclear material in Japan." Similarly, in an
interview in November 2006, a senior Japanese physical protection regulator expressed the view that while
insider threats at Japanese nuclear facilities were possible, his "personal view" was that armed outsider attack at
these facilities was "not credible."
287 Japan does score higher in several of these respects than Canada, but some of those ratings may not be
justified. It seems difficult to argue, for example, that facilities in Canada, with a number of incidents involving
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should also be remembered that Japan was the homeland of the Japanese Red Army in the
1970s- I 980s, and of Aum Shinrikyo, the terror cult that launched the nerve gas attack in the
Tokyo subway in the 1990s - and established an entire factory to manufacture AK-47s. (The
key leaders who organized those 1990s attacks were imprisoned, but the cult itself continues
to exist, under the new name Aleph.) Japan is also the home of brutal organized crime groups
known collectively as the yakuza. Moreover, most of Japan's nuclear facilities with weapons-
usable nuclear materials are on the seacoasts, where foreign attackers might well arrive by
boat with little warning (though how they would elude pursuit after an attack is not clear).
Japan's strong communal traditions - and lack of sympathy for jihadi ideologies - reduce the
insider threat, but at the same time, they tend to create an atmosphere in which insiders are
trusted, with few specific measures in place to address insider threats, creating opportunities
for any bad apples that do exist.
Overall, in Table 4.12, Japan is rated as having a lower threat level than any of the
other countries considered, with a very small (1%) chance that a theft attempt would be
beyond any of the categories of capability described and only a 5% chance that it would be in
the highest described category of capability.
Security. Japan, like Canada, significantly strengthened security for nuclear facilities
after the 9/11 attacks, but Japan's security upgrades appear not to have gone as far as
Canada's. 28 In particular, immediately after 9/11, Japan added armed guards at its nuclear
facilities (who were not present previously); 2 89 in late 2005, new physical protection
regulations went into effect that, for the first time, require facilities to "take into account" a
DBT specified by the Japanese regulators in designing their nuclear security systems; create a
program of inspection of physical protection for the first time; and create, for the first time, an
obligation to keep nuclear security information confidential. 290 The limited information
publicly available suggests that significant weaknesses in the Japanese physical protection
program remain, however.
home-grown jihadi extremists in recent years, face a substantially lower terrorism risk than facilities in Japan,
but the WMRC terrorism risk rating is lower for Canada.
288 For a useful discussion of physical protection in Japan before the 9/11 attacks, including the lack of armed
guards at nuclear facilities and the absence of any specific measures to address insider threats, see Hiroyoshi
Kurihara, "The Protection of Fissile Materials in Japan," in A Comparative Analysis ofApproaches to the
Protection of Fissile Materials: Proceedings of the Workshop at Stanford University, July 28-30, 1997
(Livermore, Cal.: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1997). For other discussions, see Kawai, Kurihara,
and Kajiyoshi, "Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in Japan"; H. Nakata, T. Misaka, and H. Tsuruta,
"Experience in the Implementation of Physical Protection Measures of Nuclear Material at the JAERI Tokai
Establishment," in Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials: Experience in Regulation, Implementation, and
Operations: Proceedings of an International Conference, Vienna, 10-14 November 1997 (Vienna: International
Atomic Energy Agency, 1997).
289 See, for example, Tatsujiro Suzuki, "Implications of 09/11 Terrorism for Civilian Nuclear Industry and Its
Response Strategy," paper presented at Japan Atomic Industrial Forum-Harvard University Nonproliferation
Workshop, Cambridge, Mass., 30-31 January 2002.
290 For a summary of the amended Japanese physical protection law, see Shin Aoyama, "Current Nuclear
Physical Protection Measures in Japan," paper presented at Seminar on Strengthening Nuclear Security in Asian
Countries, Tokyo, 8-9 November 2006. For a brief critique from a Japanese source, see Hiroshi Masumitsu,
"Revised N-Law Inadequate to Cover All Terrorism Scenarios," Daily Yomiuri, 18 June 2005.
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Under Japanese law, private individuals, including employees of nuclear facilities, are
not allowed to have firearms. Shortly after 9/11, therefore, the ministries responsible for
nuclear energy asked the heads of the national police and the coast guard to provide armed
guards for nuclear facilities (and armed boats to patrol off-shore), which they agreed to do, at
their own ministries' expense. These guards remain at Japanese nuclear facilities at this
writing, but are not required by any law or regulation; they could be removed at any time the
leaders of the national police and coast guard decide that they no longer wish to have their
ministries bear the costs of this form of protection.29 1 Moreover, these guards are modest in
number, largely patrol at the perimeters of facilities (where they might be quite vulnerable to
being shot in the opening moments of an attack) and are not integrated into site security plans.
Information on the adequacy of their armament, armor, and training in tactical response is not
publicly available.
The guards who are employees of the facilities and included in site security plans are
armed only with nightsticks.292 These guards perform functions such as searching personnel
and vehicles (a process that has been greatly stepped up in recent years), access control,
manning central alarm stations, alarm assessment, and checking the perimeter for
vulnerabilities. The sites' security plans for defeating the DBT still rely primarily on off-site
response forces, since the armed guards from the national police are not integrated into
293
security plans. Yet in some cases the first fence with intrusion detection in place is only a
10-30 meters from the building where nuclear material exists, suggesting that unless there are
very sophisticated multi-layer delay systems within the building, the time it would take after
detection for well-trained attackers to get into the material area, steal the material, and depart
may be smaller than the time it would take off-site response forces to arrive. 294
There continue to be few explicit measures taken to address insider threats in Japan.
In particular, because of privacy concerns in investigating employees of private institutions,
no background checks are performed on employees of nuclear facilities, even those who are
295guards or who have direct access to weapons-usable nuclear material. On the other hand,
technological measures such as portal monitors when entering or leaving nuclear facilities are
in place.
Overall, Japanese regulators estimate that meeting the new physical protection
regulations has cost licensees - both nuclear power plants and facilities with weapons-usable
nuclear material - a total of some $50 million. Most of this rather modest sum has gone for
adding additional unarmed guards.296 In stark contrast to the situation in the United States,
maintaining a building as a Category I facility is apparently not very expensive. For example,
at one large nuclear site with major plutonium facilities, there is a small building with critical
291 Interview with Japanese physical protection regulator, November 2006.
292 See, for example, Masumitsu, "Revised N-Law Inadequate to Cover All Terrorism Scenarios." This was
confirmed in an interview with Japanese physical protection regulator, November 2006, and personal
observations on a visit to a Category I nuclear facility, November 2006.
293 Interview with Japanese physical protection regulator, November 2006.
294 Author's observations from a visit to a Category I nuclear facility in Japan, November 2006.
295 Interview with a manager at a Japanese Category I nuclear facility, November 2006.
296 Interview with a Japanese physical protection regulator, November 2006.
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assemblies, where more than a significant quantity of plutonium is stored. Although funds are
not available to make any use of this plutonium in the near term, no one has bothered to move
it to one of the major plutonium facilities less than five minutes away on the same site, so that
the critical assembly building would no longer require Category I protection.297
Material quantity and quality. While most of Japan's separated plutonium stocks
are located in France and the United Kingdom, Japan has tons of separated plutonium on its
own soil. 298 In addition, Japan has hundreds of kilograms of weapon-grade HEU, a
substantial amount of it in metal form. 299 The material at some Japanese sites deserves a
discount factor of 1.0, the highest possible.
Overall risk rating. With a 43% probability that a major theft attempt would be
successful, a probability of only 10% that such an attempt would occur, and a discount factor
of 1.0, Japan gets an overall risk rating of 0.043 - roughly similar to Canada's, as a higher
probability that a theft attempt would be successful (resulting from weaker physical protection
measures) is balanced by a lower estimated probability that a theft attempt would occur (given
the generally low state of the threat in Japan). This represents the lowest overall risk rating in
the table. Given that key elements of the estimate, particularly the relative probability of a
theft attempt being made, are little more than educated guesses, this low risk rating should be
taken with considerable caution. As noted at the outset, especially where risk estimates are
quite uncertain, policy should be risk-informed, not exclusively risk-based. The estimated
probability that a theft attempt would be successful in Japan is far higher than it is in the
United States, and some of Japan's material is extremely high quality: the risk estimate is low
only because of a low estimated chance that a major theft attempt will occur in Japan.
Wherever it may be in the world, very high quality material should have security sufficient to
reduce the probability that a theft attempt would succeed to a very low level, even if the best
guess is that the probability of such an attempt occurring in that country is modest.
Uzbekistan
Threat. The threat in Uzbekistan is very high. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
is a well-armed terrorist group closely linked to al Qaeda. The bloody crackdown in Andijon
in May 2005 was preceded by groups of armed individuals seizing control of a military
297 Author's observations from a visit to a Category I nuclear facility in Japan, November 2006. Specifics of the
facilities involved available to qualified researchers on request.
298 As of the end of 2005, there were more than 5 tons of separated plutonium on Japanese soil, and more than 37
tons of Japanese separated plutonium stored abroad. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication
Receivedfrom Japan Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium, INFCIRC/549/Add. 1/9
(Vienna: IAEA, 2006; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc549al-9.pdf
as of 21 November 2006).
299 See, for example, David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Civil HEU Watch: Tracking Inventories of Civil
Highly Enriched Uranium," in Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
Science and International Security, 2005; available at http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/end2003/
tableofcontents.html as of 21 July 2005).
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garrison (where they seized a large number of weapons), a police station, and a prison. 300
There seems little doubt that a similar group would have been able to seize control of a
nuclear research reactor should they have chosen to do so. Uzbekistan's rating for terrorism
risk in Table 4.11 is lower than that for the United States, which appears unjustifiable; it
seems clear that the terrorism risk in Uzbekistan is high, though perhaps not quite as high as
the risk in Russia or Pakistan (given the Uzbek government's brutal suppression of such
activities). As shown in Table 4.11, Uzbekistan's ratings for security risk and corruption are
very high, and its GDP per capita is below even that of Pakistan. Hence, in Table 4.12, the
probabilities of the various levels of high-capability theft attempts and the probability that a
theft attempt would occur at all in Uzbekistan, are rated as being equal to Russia's. This may
somewhat exaggerate the likelihood of a theft attempt in .Uzbekistan, however, as it does not
take into account the poor quality and quantity of the material available to be stolen there,
which might affect target selection by potential thieves.
Security. Like other non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union, Uzbekistan had
only modest and antiquated security measures in place at its civilian nuclear sites when the
Soviet Union collapsed and a government with no previous experience in physical protection.
Since then, with U.S. and other international funding and assistance, Uzbekistan has
drastically improved the security measures at sites with HEU. The first round of
internationally-financed physical T rotection upgrades at Uzbekistan's main research reactor
was declared completed in 1996. 1 These upgrades were designed to meet IAEA physical
protection recommendations (INFCIRC/225), which were then in their third revision. In
September 2000, following terrorist attacks by the IMU in Tashkent, the president of the
Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences sent an urgent request to the U.S. government for assistance
with further upgrades at this reactor site.302 Further upgrades were also needed to comply
with the fourth revision of INFCIRC/225, issued in 1999. This second round of U.S.-
sponsored upgrades, completed in 2002, included installing a new fence with intrusion
detectors, a new external access control site, replacing wooden interior doors with doors
designed for high security, and more.30 3 The site now has a modern double fence with
intrusion detection, portal monitors, security cameras, a protected central alarm station, and
on-site armed guards. 304 Information is not publicly available on the kinds of threats the site's
security system and guard forces (backed up by whatever off-site forces could respond in
time) could defeat, or on the measures in place to address insider threats. U.S.-sponsored
300 For an official description of these events, see, for example, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices: 2005 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 2006; available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/ as of 22 November 2006).
301 U.S. Department of Energy, Improving Nuclear Materials Security at the Institute of Nuclear Physics -
Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 1996; available at
http://www.nti.org/eresearch/profiles/Uzbekistan/index_6084.html as of 2 June 2006).
302 "Physical Protection Upgrades for the Uzbekistan VVR-SM Reactor," International Security News 2, no. 2
(May 2002; available at www.cmc.sandia.gov/isn/may02isn.pdf as of 22 November 2006), pp. 14-15.
303 "Physical Protection Upgrades."
304 Some of these measures are described, for example, in Holbay Halilov, "Minimizing Security Risks in
Uzbekistan," paper presented at Seminar on Strengthening Nuclear Security in Asian Countries, Tokyo, 8-9
November 2006.
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physical protection upgrades at a second site in Uzbekistan with a small amount of HEU were
completed in fiscal year 2005. 305
Overall, in, Uzbekistan's physical protection measures are judged to be slightly more
effective in defeating various levels of threat than Japan's, but slightly less effective than
Canada's. (The uncertainties in all of these judgments are larger than the estimated
differences between these countries.)
Material quantity and quality. The United States, Russia, Uzbekistan, and the
IAEA have cooperated to remove most of the HEU from Uzbekistan, leaving relatively
modest stocks of fairly poor-quality material remaining. Shipment of approximately 63
kilograms of uranium in irradiated HEU research reactor fuel back to Russia was completed
in April 2006 (including a substantial quantity of fuel that had originally been 90% enriched,
along with material that had originally been 36% enriched). 306 Roughly 3 kilograms of fresh
HEU had been shipped back to Russia in September of 2004.30
The HEU remaining in Uzbekistan includes in-core material in its two research
reactors and presumably also a modest amount of irradiated fuel that was not yet cool enough
to ship in April 2006. There may also be a modest amount of fresh fuel for use before the
reactors' planned conversion. One of Uzbekistan's research reactors is a pulse reactor with
uranium in a liquid solution, reportedly containing several kilograms of 90% HEU in the
solution; this would be a Category II quantity in either current IAEA categorizations or the
categorization proposed above. Since a pulse reactor generates a modest total number of
fissions, this material is not very radioactive. But stealing it would not be trivial to do: it
would require figuring out how to drain the solution from the reactor core, carry it away, and
recover the HEU from the solution.
The other Uzbek research reactor now operates on 36% enriched fuel. A typical
loading would include somewhat more than 5 kilograms of U-235 in HEU that was originally
36% enriched (though at any given time, a smaller amount of U-235 would still be present in
the core, as some of it would have been consumed).30 s This represents just under 2 effective
305 Data provided by DOE, December 2005. Names and locations of relevant facilities available to qualified
researchers on request.
306 U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, "Secret Mission to Remove Highly
Enriched Uranium Spent Nuclear Fuel from Uzbekistan Successfully Completed: Four Shipments Have Been
Sent to a Secure Facility in Russia" (Washington, D.C.: NNSA, 27 September 2006; available at
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/newsreleases/2006/PR_2006-04-20_ NA-06- I 0.htm as of 16 May 2006). For a
table of how many 90% and 36% assemblies were included in each shipment, see Halilov, "Minimizing Security
Risks in Uzbekistan."
307 "Secret Mission to Recover Highly Enriched Uranium in Uzbekistan Successful: Fuel Returned to Secure
Facility in Russia" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 13 September 2004; available at
http://www.energy.gov as of 16 February 2005).
308 A typical core loading includes 18 assemblies which each contain 300 grams of U-235. See N. A. Hanan et
al., "Feasibility Studies for LEU Conversion of the Wwr-SM Reactor in Uzbekistan Using Pin-Type and Tubular
Fuels," in Proceedings of the 25th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test
Reactors, Chicago, Ill., 5-10 October 2003 (Argonne, Ill.: Argonne National Laboratory, 2003; available at
http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR25/PDF/Hanan.pdf as of 22 November 2006). I am grateful to Ethan Stillman
for research on the nuclear facilities in Uzbekistan, including locating this reference.
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kilograms (even not taking account of the burnup of U-235), making this a Category II
quantity of material in the categorization system proposed here, even if it were not
radioactive. Since the reactor has a thermal power of 10 megawatts and reportedly is heavily
used (with more than 6,000 hours of reactor operation per year), much of the in-core material
would be quite radioactive, certainly enough so to require remote processing, even if it were
not radioactive enough to be immediately disabling during the course of a theft. Similarly,
any discharged fuel not yet shipped is likely to be modest in quantity; its remaining
enrichment level is likely to be in the 20-25% range; and it is likely to be radioactive enough
to require remote processing, though not radioactive enough to be disabling during a theft.
In short, the nuclear material that remains in Uzbekistan is not very attractive: it is
predominantly in reactor cores; it is not in Category I quantities; and it is either in a difficult-
to-remove solution or it is only medium-enriched and quite radioactive. Overall, I assign a
discount factor of 0.2 to the best remaining Uzbek material.
Overall risk rating. With its very high threat and moderate security measures,
Uzbekistan has one of the highest estimated probabilities that a nuclear theft attempt would be
successful (62%) on in Table 4.12, along with a high estimated probability that a theft attempt
might occur. But with only modest quantities of relatively low-quality material, the overall
risk rating is 0.062, comparable to the remaining risk at the well-protected facilities at DOE in
the United States. Even that risk rating may be too high, as it may be that the probability of a
theft attempt should be lower, given the modest contribution to an adversary nuclear weapons
effort that theft from these facilities would make. Prior to the recent removals of material
from Uzbekistan, however, the overall risk was far higher: the material recently removed
included a substantial quantity of irradiated fuel that had originally been 90% enriched (and
was probably still in the range of 80% enrichment), much of which was probably not emitting
even 100 rem/hr at 1 meter. Hence, that recent removal operation made a dramatic difference
in reducing a particularly urgent risk of nuclear theft. Although the remaining risk in
Uzbekistan is moderate, it remains important to convince Uzbekistan to convert these reactors
to LEU if they are still needed, or shut them if they are not, and remove the last of the HEU -
both because the remaining HEU still poses some risk, and because the high-power reactor
will require regular shipments of fresh HEU (and generate increasing quantities of irradiated
HEU) as long as it continues to operate with HEU fuel.
Unnamed Country
Threat. Like Uzbekistan, the rating for terrorism risk in Table 4.11 for the unnamed
developing country - which is slightly lower even than Japan's - seems unreasonably low.
This country has little recent record of major terrorist activity, but it is difficult to argue that
the terrorism risk there is not higher than the risk in Japan. The country has wide disparities
of wealth, with many living in grinding poverty; a range of ethnic groups competing for
political power and resources; widespread possession of guns; and relatively lightly-
controlled borders and rural areas, increasing the possibility that terrorist operatives from
outside could operate there. As shown in Table 4.11, the country has high crime risks and
substantial corruption (though the latter is not quite as severe as in the cases of Pakistan,
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 4286
Uzbekistan, and Russia). It has a moderate per-capita income, roughly comparable to
Russia's.
Overall, as shown in Table 4.12, I estimate that the probabilities of the highest-
capability categories of nuclear theft attempt in this country are modestly higher than those in
the United States, though lower than those in Russia. Similarly, I judge the probability of any
type of nuclear theft attempt taking place in this country to be somewhat higher than the
probability in the United States, but substantially lower than the probability in Russia.
Security. The major site with HEU in this country does have a perimeter fence and
on-site guards. Site reviews by foreign experts, however, have concluded that the security at
the site does not meet IAEA recommendations, and U.S. officials consider security upgrades
at this site to be a matter of some urgency.309 Hence, in Table 4.12, I have rated the security
measures in this country as having modestly less chance of stopping theft attempts at each
level of capability than the measures in place in Japan have. In general, however, very little
information about the specifics of the physical protection arrangements in this country is
publicly available.
Material Quantity and Quality. There are hundreds of kilograms of HEU at this
country's one major site with weapons-usable nuclear material, much of it in metal form.
Hence, this country's material rates a discount factor of 1.0.
Overall risk rating. This country has a moderate to high threat and modest security
measures, leading to a 67% estimated probability that a nuclear theft attempt, if made, would
be successful - comparable to the probability for Uzbekistan, or for U.S. research reactors.
But the material available in this country is much higher quality than the material in
Uzbekistan or at U.S. research reactors: with a discount factor of 1.0, the overall risk rating is
0.20, almost as high as those for Russia and Pakistan.
In short, in this approach to rating relative risks, Russia and Pakistan leap out as
posing higher risks than the other countries, despite having substantial security measures in
place, because of the immense threats there. Efforts to reduce risks in those countries should
focus not only on strengthened security measures at nuclear sites, but just as importantly (if
not more so), on programs to reduce both insider and outsider threats, through improved
counter-terrorism and anti-corruption programs, among other measures. The unnamed
country also poses a particularly high risk, despite its more moderate threat environment,
because of its comparatively weak security measures and the high quality of the material
there. Uzbekistan posed almost a comparable level of risk (because, again, of the immense
threats there) until its best nuclear material was removed, but now poses a significantly lower
risk because of the small quantity and poor quality of material remaining at its sites with
HEU. This makes clear that the recent removals of material from Uzbekistan were major
successes in risk reduction.
By this estimate, the well-protected sites in DOE's complex in the United States pose
only a moderate risk, despite the high-quality material there; NRC-regulated research reactors
309 Interview with DOE officials, October 2006.
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pose a far higher probability of successful nuclear theft, because of their weak security
measures, but a similar estimated overall risk, given the lower quality of material available to
be stolen at such sites. Canada and Japan both appear to pose relatively low risks, largely
because of the low threats in these countries; Japan in particular, however, continues to have
fairly modest security measures in place, and if a theft attempt with high levels of capability
did occur, its probability of success would be distressingly high. That latter point emphasizes
the large uncertainties in these assessments: if, for example, the probability of a theft attempt
occurring at all in Canada or Japan turned out to be higher than estimated here, the estimate of
the risk posed by these countries' nuclear stockpiles could increase very substantially. The
same can be said for, for example, U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors (or those with similar
levels of security in other countries): if the probability of a theft attempt at these sites were
judged to be higher because of the higher probability of success, compared to better-defended
sites, then the overall risk they pose could be substantially higher than that estimated here.
The second, rating-based approach involves establishing a set of criteria by which to
give facilities and transport legs (or entire countries, as in this example) ratings for both the
threat they face and the effectiveness of their security arrangements. I have chosen to use a 1-
5 scale in both cases (with one being the lowest and five the highest). I then provide a very
rough estimate of how the probabilities of theft attempts and of those attempts being
successful, relate to the differences between the threat rating for one location and the security
rating for that location. Combined with the discount factors for the materials available to be
stolen, this again offers the opportunity to estimate overall risks of nuclear theft at different
locations. First, I describe proposed criteria for different threat and security ratings.
In assessing the level of threat in different countries:
" A country with a rating of "5," the highest level of threat, would be expected to be one
that has large and highly capable terrorist groups operating on its soil; where multiple
large terrorist attacks have taken place; where corruption and insider theft (or insider
participation in terrorist conspiracies) is high; and where either per-capita GDP is below
$3,000 per year, or there are other indications that pay for nuclear workers and guards is
low enough to provoke at least intermittent desperation.
" A rating of "4" would correspond to a country with capable terrorist groups operating on
its soil; where multiple terrorist attacks have taken place; where corruption and insider
theft is above average, compared to other countries; and where either per-capita GDP is
below $10,000 per year, or there are other indications of low pay for nuclear workers and
guards.
* A rating of "3" would correspond to a country with at least some record of terrorist groups
on its soil in recent times; where at least one or two significant terrorist attacks have taken
place; where corruption and insider theft is roughly average compared to other countries;
and where per-capita GDP is below $20,000 per year.
" A rating of "2" would correspond to a country with only few and modest cases of
terrorism on its soil in recent times; where corruption and insider theft are below average,
compared to other countries; and where per-capita GDP was above $20,000 per year.
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* A rating of "I" would correspond to a strongly socially cohesive country, with little or no
record of terrorism, very low levels of corruption and insider theft, and per-capita GDP
above $20,000 per year (above that level, it appears unlikely that further increases would
much reduce the chance of desperation driving theft - and if sheer greed is the driver,
even much higher pay may not solve the problem). Realistically, in the current age of
terrorists with global reach, a "2" is probably the lowest rating that can be justified for any
country.
While most of these factors are at least somewhat judgmental, this system provides a
framework in which generally consistent judgments about the relative risks in different
countries can be made. The threat variables mentioned do not always vary together, so some
countries may have some variables in one category and others in another. If several variables
together are in a high-threat category, the country deserves that high-threat ranking, even if
one or two are in a lower-threat category.
In assessing the level of security in different countries:
" A country with a rating of "5" would be expected to require its nuclear facilities to have:
security measures in place capable of defeating a highly capable DBT including both
outsiders and insiders, good training and information, and a wide range of weapons and
tactics; a rigorous regulatory system for nuclear security, including detailed inspections,
realistic tests of the systems' performance in defeating both insider and outsider threats,
and effective enforcement; effective approaches for investigating and monitoring the
trustworthiness of all personnel with important roles in nuclear security and limiting
access to key areas to such cleared personnel; well-armed and well-trained on-site guards,
coupled with tested procedures in place for local police or military forces to provide
backup in the event of an emergency; extensive police and intelligence efforts focused on
preventing nuclear terrorist conspiracies; sufficient resources allocated so that all security
measures required by regulations can be taken in a timely way; and an effective process in
place for regularly reviewing and adapting its approaches on the basis of experience and
changing threats.
" A rating of "4" would correspond to a country that has a regulatory DBT in place (or a
rule-based system resulting in comparable performance), including both outsider and
insider threats, but a threat that is somewhat less capable than would be the case for a state
rated "5" (for example, possibly including fewer attackers, or less capable weaponry, or
less access to inside information on the site's security system). A country with a rating of
"4" would be expected to have: a system of nuclear security regulations in place
(including both inspections and enforcement); some process for background checks on
personnel granted access to weapons-usable nuclear material or charged with guarding
such material; some armed on-site guards, coupled with tested procedures in place for
local police or military forces to provide backup in the event of an emergency; at least
modest police and intelligence efforts focused on preventing nuclear terrorist conspiracies;
and resources allocated that are generally sufficient, but sometimes require important
security measures to be foregone or postponed.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 4 289
" A rating of "3" would correspond to a country whose nuclear security systems are
designed for reasonable performance against at least modest threats. A country with a
rating of "3" might have: no regulatory DBT, but instead have a rule-based regulatory
approach (compliance with which would provide reasonable protection against modest
threats); a weak, but not totally ineffective, system of inspections and enforcement; and
some process for background checks on personnel granted access to weapons-usable
nuclear material or charged with guarding such material, though possibly with significant
gaps. Such a country might have small numbers of armed guards at nuclear sites, but they
might not be very well-armed or well-trained, or be well-integrated into the site security
plans; there would likely be some planned procedure in place for local police or military
forces to provide backup in the event of an emergency, but it might not have been very
well-planned or tested, and these backup forces might not be especially well-armed, well-
trained, or numerous either. There would probably be little police and intelligence efforts
focused on preventing nuclear terrorist conspiracies, and cases where security measures
were not taken because of lack of resources would occur regularly. A country rated "3"
would usually comply with IAEA physical protection recommendations.
" A rating of "2" would correspond to a country with some basic nuclear security measures
in place, but where these measures would, at best, be able to protect against a very modest
number of armed outsiders (2-3) or one insider without an effective plan. There would
likely be some nuclear security regulations in place, but they would have major
weaknesses, and there would typically be no regulatory DBT; inspections might be neither
frequent nor effective; the regulatory agency might lack the power and independence
required for tough enforcement. On-site armed guards might range from zero to one or
two lightly armed individuals, and arrangements for armed response from off-site would
typically be weak. Measures to check the trustworthiness of individuals before granting
them access to nuclear material or a role in guarding such material might be cursory or
nonexistent. Such a country would typically have many cases where important security
measures were not taken because of lack of resources. Some facilities might comply with
IAEA physical protection recommendations, others might not.
" A rating of "1" would correspond to a country where at least some nuclear facilities with
potential nuclear bomb materials have very few security measures in place. In a country
rated "I", there might be: no fences at all around such facilities, or fences with gaping
holes; no on-site armed guards at nuclear facilities and no recently-tested arrangement for
rapid armed response from off-site; an absence of portal monitors to detect unauthorized
removal of HEU or plutonium and of security cameras to monitor activities in nuclear
material areas; few measures in place for checking the trustworthiness of key personnel
before hiring them, or monitoring trustworthiness afterward; and nuclear material
accounting systems that would not be capable of detecting a substantial theft in a timely
way. A country rated "1" would clearly not comply with IAEA physical protection
regulations.
As with the threat ratings, these variables may vary independently; countries may not
fit the entire description for a particular rating perfectly. Some countries, for example, may
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have a heavy reliance on armed guards but little application of modern security technologies
and few detailed regulations. Other countries may have an extensive regulatory
infrastructure, a great deal of technology in place, but be weak on armed response to potential
threats. Moreover, the publicly available information on which to rate the security systems in
different countries is quite limited. (Here, too, governments, with access to classified
assessments and a broader range of actual visits to facilities in many countries, would be in a
better position to provide accurate ratings; those used here are only intended to be
illustrative. As with the threat ratings, a substantial degree ofjudgment is inevitably
involved.
There is no rigorous means of converting these threat and security ratings into
probabilities of nuclear theft; only educated guesses as to the likely relationship are possible.
Again, however, for estimates of relative risks between different facilities, these estimates
may be somewhat less problematic than they would be for making estimates of the absolute
magnitude of risks from different facilities - and they are surely better than not even
attempting to take a risk-based approach. Here, I use two roughly estimated factors to
translate the ratings into relative risk estimates. In this approach, the "attempt probability
factor" is based solely on the threat level: in states with higher threats, there will be higher
probabilities of a nuclear theft attempt being made. The "attempt probability factor" is simply
the threat rating divided by ten. A more sophisticated approach would also include security
levels at sites (taking into account that theft attempts might well be deterred by high security
levels, or that opportunistic thieves might be tempted by very low security levels), and also
the discount factor (taking into account that thieves would be less likely to attempt to steal
material that would be very difficult to make a bomb from). Yet there is reason to focus first
on threat levels: intuitively, it seems likely that the probability of a theft attempt in a country
such as Japan, for example, with its low threat levels, is fairly low despite the high quality of
the material that could be stolen and the relatively modest nature of the security measures in
place to protect it, while the probability of a theft attempt in Pakistan seems quite high, given
the very high threat there, despite what are believed to be fairly substantial (though not
necessarily very high-tech) security measures at its sites.
The second factor is a normalized "theft probability factor," describing the relative
likelihood that a theft attempt would be successful, which is based on the difference between
the threat level and the security level. This is 1.0 for the extreme case in which the threat is
rated 5 and security is only rated 1 (that is, a difference of four points in the ratings); this
would be reduced only modestly (to 0.8) when the threat was still three points higher than the
security level, but would decline more rapidly as the two ratings neared equality (where the
value would be 0.3), eventually dropping to 0.05 at the other extreme, where the security level
4 I have not used, in this example, a rating scale based on the level of threat the security system at the facility or
transport leg being examined was estimated to be able to defend against, as proposed earlier in this chapter,
preferring instead to describe an approach based on criteria that could more easily be assessed from outside the
country. Governments will full access to relevant classified information may be more able to use a rating system
based on the level of adversary capability the security system is estimated to be able to defeat. In any case, such
a rating system would be extremely similar to the first approach described in this example, based on estimating
the probability that the security system would defeat various levels of threat.
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Table 4.13: Attempt and Theft Probability Factors for
Different Threat/Security Ratings
Threat Attempt ThreatlSecurity Normalized
Rating Probability Rating Theft Prob.
Factor Difference Factor
5 0.5 4.0 1
4.5 0.45 3.0 0.8
4 0.4 2.0 0.65
3.5 0.35 1.0 0.45
3 0.3 0.0 0.3
2.5 0.25 -1.0 0.2
2 0.2 -2.0 0.13
1.5 0.15 -3.0 0.08
1 0.1 -4.0 0.05
was four points higher than the threat level. In other words, the probability that a nuclear theft
attempt would be successful would be rated as being roughly six times higher if the threat and
security ratings were equal than it would be for facilities with the highest possible level of
security and the lowest possible level of threat; the probability that a threat would be
successful would be somewhat more than three times higher again in the opposite case, where
the threat level was as high as possible and the security level was as low as possible. See
Table 4.13.
The attempt probability factor and the theft probability factor would be used in the
same way as the discount factor described earlier - they would be multiplied by the other
factors in the equation in coming to the overall risk rating.
Table 4.14 shows the results of this rating-based approach. Russia and Pakistan are
again rated as posing clearly the highest risks, with the unnamed country not far behind. In
this approach, however, NRC-regulated HEU-fueled research reactors in the United States are
rated as posing higher risks than other U.S. facilities (as opposed to essentially similar risks in
the previous approach), despite the moderate quality of the material available to be stolen.
Similarly, the material in Uzbekistan is rated as posing higher security risks than the material
at non-research-reactor facilities in the United States, despite the relatively low quality of the
material there. Moreover, in this approach, Japan and Canada are rated as posing security
risks roughly comparable to those for U.S. non-research-reactor facilities (with Canada posing
a somewhat lower risk because of the somewhat more extensive security measures there),
rather than significantly lower. (This is driven by the fact that in the previous approach, using
judgment rather than a fixed rating system to assign the probability of theft attempts, the
difference between the theft attempt probability in the United States and that in Japan or
Canada was much larger than it is in this approach; even in this approach, lower estimate of
the attempt probability factor for countries with a threat rating of 2 would lead to lower
estimated risks for Japan and Canada.)
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 4292
Table 4.14: Country Risk Estimates With a Rating-Based Approacha
Country Threat Sec. At. Theft Discount Risk
Level Level Prob. Prob. Factor Rating
Russia 4-5 3 0.45 0.55 1.0 0.25
Pakistan 5 3-4 0.5 0.55 1.0 0.27
United States 3 4-5 0.3 0.16 1.0 0.049
U.S. res. reactors 3 1-2 0.3 0.55 0.4 0.066
Japan 2 2-3 0.2 0.25 1.0 0.050
Canada 2 3 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.040
Uzbekistan 4-5 2-3 0.45 0.65 0.2 0.058
Unnamed Country 3-4 2 0.35 0.55 1.0 0.19
Source: Author's estimates, explained in the text.
In short, as might be expected, where the differences between countries are large (such
as the difference in threat levels between Russia and Pakistan and most of the other countries
in the example), both methods are quite consistent, but where the balance of different factors
is a close call (such as the difference between the low-threat, moderate-security environment
in Japan and the moderate-threat, high-security environment for most U.S. facilities), different
methods may lead to modestly different results.
To the extent governments and international organizations adopt the basic risk-based
approach advocated in this chapter, it would make sense to have several experts give
independent ratings to each of the facilities or transport legs being considered, which can then
be discussed to arrive at consensus ratings. In either of the approaches described here, a
process with multiple different perspectives being considered and debated would likely
improve the quality of the outcome.
Using Both Risk and Opportunity to Prioritize Action
Effective policies to reduce the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism must focus not only
on where the highest risks lie, but on where the greatest opportunities to reduce those risks lie.
One facility may pose a very high risk, but may be located in a country that has flatly refused
to cooperate in reducing the risk, while another facility may pose only a moderate risk, but
may be located in a country that perceives the danger and is eager to cooperate to reduce the
risk. It would be foolish to ignore the opportunity to reduce the danger at the moderate-risk
site. But it would also be foolish not to attempt new approaches to convincing the country
with the high-risk site of the urgency of action - from raising the issue to higher political
levels to offering different sets of approaches and incentives.
In short, risk assessments must be balanced with opportunity assessments, to identify
those facilities or transport legs where the largest and fastest reductions in risk can be
achieved for any given level of effort available.
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Information on which to base assessments of the opportunities at different facilities
and transport legs can be drawn from discussions with both on-site officials and national or
regional officials - who may have quite different perspectives. An operator of a research
reactor, for example, may be absolutely determined to keep the reactor open and may be
highly skeptical of converting to LEU fuel, while officials at a national agency that provides
the reactor's funding may be facing budget constraints that are already leading them to
consider cutting off the reactor's funding and shutting the facility down. A conversation only
with the operator might lead to the conclusion that there was little opportunity for progress in
eliminating the HEU from that site, while a conversation with the national-level officials
might lead to the equally unjustified conclusion that it would be easy to do so; only by
understanding the incentives and views of all the relevant stakeholders can a balanced picture
of the opportunities be drawn. Often, however, informal conversations by visitors to a site
can identify new opportunities quite quickly: in one case, for example, a U.S. expert visiting a
small HEU-fueled research reactor was told that the reactor operator would be quite willing to
shut down in return for receiving an appropriate radioactive source for seed irradiation, which
was more urgently needed than were the missions the reactor was performing.m3 1
311 Personal communication from Jack Edlow, Edlow International, 2003.
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5. The Global Nuclear Security System
No engineer in his or her right mind would design a system with hundreds of only
loosely controlled nodes, the failure of any one of which could lead to a catastrophic system
failure endangering hundreds of thousands of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars in
value. Yet, as previous chapters have described, that is a reasonable description of the global
system for nuclear security as it exists today. To develop the most effective policies for
improving that system and reducing the dangers it poses, it is important to understand the total
system and the factors that influence it. This chapter analyzes global nuclear security as a
complex, large-scale, integrated, open system (CLIOS)' and examines the system's response
to past efforts to improve nuclear security. It then examines the record of several policy tools
that have been used to try to achieve improvements in nuclear security, in order to make
preliminary judgments concerning which policy tools are likely to be most effective in
improving nuclear security in the future, under which circumstances. If the qualitative and
quantitative arguments presented in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that improvements in security
for nuclear stockpiles could significantly reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, and the
approach presented in Chapter 4 makes it possible to identify the facilities and transport legs
where security improvements could make the largest risk-reduction contributions, this chapter
asks: how can policy-makers best achieve the needed security improvements for those most-
urgent facilities and transport legs?
System Components and Architecture2
The fundamental purpose of the global nuclear security system is to prevent hostile or
unauthorized acts at nuclear facilities. The most important of these in terms of risks to society
as a whole are theft of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials and sabotage
resulting in major radiation releases. For many facilities, unauthorized transfer of information
designated as national security secrets is also considered to be a high-consequence event the
nuclear security system must be designed to prevent (and this aura of secrecy poses very real
constraints on international cooperation to improve nuclear security, as discussed below). But
acts with far smaller consequences - anti-nuclear protests, petty theft of cash or equipment,
mishandling of documents and information, and petty sabotage intended to express frustration
rather than to cause a major radioactive release - are the hostile or unauthorized acts that
'For an introduction of the CLIOS concept, see Joseph M. Sussman, "Toward Engineering Systems as a
Discipline" (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 6
September 2000; available at http://esd.mit.edu/wps/esd-wp-2000-01.pdf as of 30 December 2006). For a
description of a 12-part process for analyzing a CLIOS and designing improvements to it, used in part in this
chapter, see Rebecca S. Dodder, Joseph M. Sussman, and Joshua B. McConnell, "The Concept of the 'CLIOS
Process': Integrating the Study of Physical and Policy Systems Using Mexico City as an Example" (Cambridge,
MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 5 March 2004; available at
http://esd.mit.edu/symposium/pdfs/papers/dodder.pdf as of 30 December 2006).
2 This section will, in essence, cover the first three steps of the CLIOS process as described in Dodder, Sussman,
and McConnell, "The Concept of the 'CLIOS Process"'. These include providing an overarching description of
the system, including its principal goals; listing its major subsystems; and developing a diagram of the system
that includes its major components and their linkages, as an aid to understanding.
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actually occur frequently and hence take up a substantial fraction of the time and attention of
those involved in the nuclear security system, substantially shaping the system's behavior.
If the system is thought of primarily in terms of the system for preventing theft of
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials (the principal subject of this
dissertation), then the essential components of the system include:
* Nuclear facilities where nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials are located
(numbering a few hundred worldwide);
" Institutions that transport nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials between these
facilities;
* The physical equipment used to contribute to security at these facilities, or in transport
(from fences and barriers to intrusion detectors and access control systems);
" The personnel at these facilities and transport institutions that play roles important to
nuclear security (including not only guards but everyone who handles nuclear weapons
and materials, makes decisions on nuclear security matters (including their financing), or
is involved in controlling access or deciding on operations that will increase or decrease
security risks);
* The firms or institutions that develop, manufacture, sell, install, and maintain the physical
equipment used to contribute to nuclear security;
" The firms or institutions that recruit, train, and in some cases manage the personnel
involved in nuclear security;
" National regulatory agencies that set nuclear security rules, carry out inspections, and seek
to encourage or enforce compliance with those rules;
* National operating agencies that manage and finance government-run nuclear facilities
(and that, in some cases, also regulate nuclear security for the facilities under their
control);
. National legislatures that pass laws regarding nuclear security and its financing and can
exert influence in other ways (such as through holding embarrassing hearings and
investigations);
" Central national administrations (such as the Executive Office of the President in the
United States, or the prime minister's office in many other countries) that propose laws
and budgets for nuclear security and often play a major role in setting the direction for
regulatory and operating agencies (whether by appointing their leaders, expressly
instructing them to take certain actions, setting their budgets, or other steps);
* International organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
the United Nations (particularly the Security Council), that make recommendations
concerning appropriate approaches to nuclear security (and in some cases provide
international peer reviews or help to coordinate international assistance);
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* Industry associations that play a role in advising or lobbying national governments on
nuclear security, representing the interests of the facilities and transporters that are their
members;
* International industry associations (such as the World Nuclear Association) and
professional societies (such as the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management), that play
a role in sharing experience, ideas, and concerns within countries and across international
borders; and
* Media and non-government organizations that provide information to the public and
policy-makers on nuclear security matters, sometimes resulting in substantial pressure for
change.
The purely technological aspects of the system, from intrusion detectors and access
control systems to barriers and vaults, are capable of providing high levels of security at
virtually any site (if combined with appropriate numbers of effectively trained, equipped, and
motivated guards and other personnel), at a cost that varies depending on the site and the
threats it faces. The key problems in this technical-policy system are not with the technology
but at the policy levels and in the "human factor" at individual sites and transport legs. The
key problems are: (a) how to ensure that policy-makers (from facility managers to national
leaders) will in fact make the investments of money, time, and political capital needed to put
effective security in place and sustain it, and (b) how to ensure that personnel on the ground
will in fact implement security measures effectively.
Figure 5.1 provides a rough sketch of many of these components and how they
interact, focusing on the problematic policy levels of the system. To limit the complexity of
the figure to a reasonable level, the figure only outlines the components within one particular
national system; other governments and their national systems are shown only as unitary
components, without internal detail. In some countries, the specifics of the component
interactions are different from those shown (which represent roughly the division of
responsibilities in the United States). For example, in the United States, nuclear facilities
owned by the Department of Energy (DOE) or the Department of Defense (DOD) are also
regulated by DOE and by DOD. In other countries there is one nuclear regulator for all
facilities, or the division between one regulator and another may relate to military or civilian
roles rather than ownership. In Russia, to take a particularly important case, the regulatory
agency Rostekhnadzor (the agency into which the former Gosatomnadzor was folded in the
2004 administrative reform) regulates all civilian nuclear activities. But a group within the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) regulates all MOD nuclear activities (including both nuclear
weapons and nuclear materials, such as the HEU fuel for the nuclear navy) and those
activities at the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom, formerly Minatom) that relate
to nuclear weapons and their components.
Other aspects of the figure may also vary from one country to another. In some
countries, for example, there are no privately-owned nuclear facilities (or no government-
owned ones); in other countries, the interests of the media and non-government organizations
(and their ability to examine such matters within the constraints of secrecy and government
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interference) are so minimal that they should hardly be included as major components of the
nuclear security system.
Several aspects of the system shown in Figure 5.1 are worth noting. First, the nation-
state is the fundamental unit of organization for nuclear security; each state where these
stockpiles exist largely makes its own decisions about what approaches to take to nuclear
security, an approach that many states have asserted is a fundamental matter of national
sovereignty, as discussed in detail below.3 To date, the international organizations such as the
IAEA and the UN have provided recommendations, but have not asserted the authority to set
or enforce binding nuclear security rules; to carry out inspections of nuclear security
practices; or even to collect and analyze comprehensive information on nuclear security
practices worldwide.4 Hence, in Figure 5.1, the lines from these international organizations
run only to governments that are their member states, not directly to facilities, and represent
only recommendations and advice, not setting of rules. Individual governments discuss
nuclear security arrangements with each other in a variety of contexts, ranging from bilateral
assistance to upgrade material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) at individual
sites, to requirements by supplier states (especially the United States) that materials and
technologies they export must receive adequate protection in the recipient countries - but in
most cases these relationships largely take the form of advice and recommendations. When
nuclear material is being transported from one country to another, both countries may be
involved in setting the nuclear security rules for the trip, as reflected in the rule lines coming
from two governments to "international transporters" in Figure 5.1 (though it is also often the
case that the supplier country sets these rules essentially unilaterally). Fundamentally, each
state is free to determine most of what it will do about nuclear security.
3 For a discussion of this point and of the need to get beyond exclusive national sovereignty in a situation in
which poor nuclear security in any country could endanger all other countries, see Lawrence Scheinman,
"Transcending Sovereignty in the Management and Control of Nuclear Material," IAEA Bulletin 43, no. 4 (2001;
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull434/article7.pdf as of 10 August 2005).
4 In recent years, international organizations have begun to try to take some steps leading in the general direction
of these kinds of activities, but their impact has been modest to date. For example, in April 2004, the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed UNSC Resolution 1540, which, inter alia, legally required all states
with nuclear stockpiles to provide "appropriate effective" security for them. But there has as yet been no
international effort to define what the essential elements of an "appropriate effective" nuclear security system
are, or to encourage, assist, and pressure states to put those elements in place. Similarly, the IAEA has
established a system in which it organizes international peer reviews of a particular state's nuclear security
arrangements if that state requests such a review - but there is no current effort to carry out such reviews
everywhere, or to collect in-depth information on nuclear security practices in countries that have not been
subject to such a review. These points are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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Figure 5.1: The Global Nuclear Security System
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Second, from the point of view of an individual facility (or nuclear material
transporter), the key input on nuclear security comes from the government agencies that set
the nuclear security rules and (in the case of government-run facilities) provide the facilities'
direction and funding. Thus, in the figure, the flow of influence is primarily vertical, with
rules and in some cases funding flowing to the facilities and transporters from the government
agencies and information about the difficulties of implementing these rules (and often
lobbying to change them) coming back to the government agencies from the facilities and
transporters.
It appears that on nuclear security matters, there is remarkably little horizontal flow of
information - between facilities, or between governments - about issues they are facing or
incidents that have taken place. (Figure 5.1 includes no links at all between facilities, which
may overstate the case somewhat, but apparently not by a great deal.) In a Moscow
roundtable with Russian participants in the U.S.-Russian MPC&A program in October 1999,
for example, it was clear that the representatives from different sites had not previously had a
chance to discuss the problems they were having in cooperating with the United States and
were extremely interested in the approaches other sites had taken in the face of similar
problems.5 Similarly, in discussions with Russian experts at several sites in 2005, none of
them were aware of the incident at Sarov in which a Russian businessman had been offering
$750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium - surely an important event in considering the
likely magnitude of the insider threat.6 In the United States, the situation appears to be only
modestly different - facilities have few regular channels for discussing their nuclear security
issues with each other, rather than with headquarters.
In the United States, and to varying degrees in other countries, other actors play
substantial roles in the system as well. Industry organizations actively seek approaches to
nuclear security that they see as serving industry's interests and therefore provide information
and lobbying to regulators, central governments, and legislatures. International industry
organizations, such as the World Nuclear Association, play a more modest role in this respect.
The press and non-government organizations (NGOs) outside the nuclear industry often
provide information (and lobbying, in the case of NGOs) to the same parties in government,
often swaying the balance toward greater concern and more stringent regulation.
System Properties and Behavior7
System Drivers: Incidents and Investigations
Long-time observers make the point that the nuclear security system in the United
States and worldwide is "incident-driven." A major incident - such as a large loss of nuclear
s Workshop on MPC&A, sponsored by the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 1999.
6 Interviews, May and July 2005.
7 For economy of space, this chapter does not pursue a detailed description and characterization of each
component and linkage in the system, the fourth step of the CLIOS process as described by Dodder, Sussman,
and McConnell, preferring to leave it with the summary description just provided. The section that follows,
describing the behavior of the system, corresponds to the fifth step of the CLIOS process. See Dodder,
Sussman, and McConnell, "The Concept of the 'CLIOS Process"'.
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material or a terrorist attack - highlights the dangers and convinces policy-makers and
regulators that more stringent nuclear security measures are needed. For a period, there is a
great deal of spending and activity to upgrade security; then, as the incident recedes into the
past, complacency begins to set in, and budgets begin to be reduced again.8 Examples
include:
* the substantial improvements in accounting for nuclear materials introduced after the
apparent loss of nearly 200 kilograms of HEU from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment
Corporation (NUMEC) in 1965;9
" the significant changes in security rules and organizations (including the establishment of
the National Nuclear Security Administration) following the allegations of Chinese
espionage in the 1990s; and
" the major changes in approaches to nuclear security in the United States and many other
countries around the world following the 9/11 attacks.
The events that laid the foundation for modern approaches to physical protection of
nuclear sites in the United States and around the world, from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s,
are also, in part, a reflection of this incident-driven pattern. Concerns provoked by the
outbreak of international terrorism (and domestic hijackings) in the years following the 1967
Arab-Israeli war, culminating in the 1972 terrorist attack on the Munich Olympics,
contributed substantially to major changes in U.S. physical protection rules and practices
(including the establishment of the first real systems-engineering approaches to nuclear
security, beginning in the early 1970s); the development of the first IAEA recommendations
on physical protection; the imposition of U.S. requirements for adequate physical protection
of U.S.-supplied nuclear material in other countries; and the U.S. initiative to include physical
protection requirements in the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.' 0 But the string of
8 Dennis Mangan, Sandia National Laboratory, remarks to the workshop on "Comparative Analysis of
Approaches to Protection of Nuclear Materials," Stanford University, 28-30 July 1997. Mangan was one of the
first employees of the physical protection group at Sandia National Laboratories when it was established in the
early 1970s and has been working in the field ever since.
9 The apparent HEU loss at NUMEC from startup to October 31 1965 was 178 kilograms. See W. Altman, J.
Hockert, and E. Quinn, A Safeguards Case Study of the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation Uranium
Processing Plant: Apollo, Pennsylvania, vol. NUREG-0627 (Washington, DC.: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 1979), p. 18. Some of this was losses to waste, but some appeared difficult to explain. There were
a series of investigations of the possibility that facility head Zalman Shapiro, who had close ties to leading Israeli
defense and intelligence officials, had provided the missing HEU to Israel, but nothing was ever proved. A
substantial amount of HEU was found when the facility was decommissioned years later, suggesting the
possibility that nothing was ever stolen from the facility, as Shapiro had argued all along. See Seymour Hersh,
The Samson Oplion: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991),
p. 257. The impact of this incident on new material accounting rules, reviews of physical protection procedures,
and the establishment of a nuclear safeguards research and development program at Los Alamos is mentioned in
William J. Desmond, Neil R. Zack, and James W. Tape, "The First Fifty Years: A Review of the Department of
Energy Domestic Safeguards and Security Program," Journal ofNuclear Materials Management 26, no. 2
(Spring 1998). See also discussion in J. Samuel Walker, "Regulating against Nuclear Terrorism: The Domestic
Safeguards Issue, 1970-1979," Technology and Culture 42, no. 1 (January 2001).
'0 Mangan's 1997 remarks emphasized the importance of Munich, as did J.D. Williams (another of the first
employees of the Sandia physical protection group, who continued in the field until his death), in an interview in
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terrorist incidents that occurred in this period were not the sole cause of these changes in
nuclear security approaches. Other trends and events that contributed to the public and
government concerns that led to these changes included:
* a rapid expansion of the nuclear industry, with a planned reliance on reprocessing and
recycling of plutonium, creating expectations that tens or hundreds of tons of separated
plutonium would soon be in circulation among scores of facilities every year;
" the rise of general public concern over nuclear energy (of which concerns over security
were only one part) and the establishment of well-informed anti-nuclear organizations
who were able to channel that concern into pressure for more stringent regulations;
* the experiences of Vietnam and other events of the 1960s and early 1970s, which
undermined public confidence in government and industry assurances that all appropriate
measures to manage complex technologies were already being taken;
* the critiques of insiders within the nuclear establishment who raised major concerns over
the adequacy of nuclear security arrangements (most notably Theodore B. Taylor, profiled
in John McPhee's classic book from the period, The Curve ofBinding Energy); and
* the Indian nuclear test in 1974, which heightened fears of nuclear proliferation in general
and concerning the availability of separated plutonium in ostensibly civilian nuclear
programs in particular.
These incidents and trends led a dramatic increase in public concern over nuclear
security in the 1970s, which was the first time when the danger of nuclear theft and terrorism
was publicly debated. But as the nuclear security system was structured (and even more as
the structure has evolved since then) such major shifts in the public view were only weakly
coupled to comparably large changes in approaches to nuclear security. At the time, the
nuclear industry argued that these public concerns were overblown, and while significant new
nuclear security rules were imposed, the industry was successful in limiting their scope and
cost. By the 1980s much of the public concern over nuclear security (and the resulting
pressure for tighter nuclear security rules) had dissipated: the Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl accidents focused public concern over nuclear energy on safety, rather than
security, and made clear that the previously projected rapid growth of nuclear energy was not
going to happen; plans for a plutonium economy fizzled, except in a few countries; with the
escalating U.S.-Soviet competition, nuclear fears centered on nuclear war rather than
terrorism; security regulations were already in place that regulators and the industry argued
were adequate; and there were few dramatic incidents to drive public concern. In short, long-
September 2002. Major revisions of U.S. physical protection rules were issued in 1970 and 1973; the first IAEA
recommendations on physical protection, known as the "gray book" was published in 1972; a physical protection
research and development program was established at Sandia in 1973, following Munich; also after Munich,
major upgrades were undertaken in protection for U.S. nuclear weapons; the U.S. imposition of physical
protection requirements for U.S. nuclear exports evolved over roughly 1972-1975; the Nuclear Suppliers Group
meetings that worked out the initial guidelines, including the physical protection requirements, were in 1975.
See, for example, Desmond, Zack, and Tape, "The First 50 Years"; Walker, "Regulating against Nuclear
Terrorism"; Victor K. McElheney, "U.S. Adding to Safeguards in Tactical Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 18
December 1973.
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term changes in public opinion do occur, and do have an effect on the nuclear security system,
but the coupling is weak and it is rare for public opinion to focus on nuclear security and
terrorism for long."
Major investigations that produce embarrassing findings - whether internal to the
executive branch, initiated by the legislature, or carried out by the press or non-government
organizations - can also be system drivers, acting in much the same way as major terrorist
incidents. (In the case of external investigations, however, there is a greater tendency to resist
the resulting pressure for action than in the case of a major terrorist incident, as the
investigation itself and the calls for action resulting from it can be dismissed as the work of
anti-nuclear critics.) The most prominent example here (but by no means the only one) is the
series of congressional investigations of security at DOE nuclear sites led by Rep. John
Dingell (D-MI) in the 1970s and 1980s, which created immense pressure for action to upgrade
security at DOE.'2
Figure 5.2 illustrates this basic trend.'3 As noted in the figure, an organization cannot
focus exclusively on protection or it will go bankrupt; and it cannot ignore protection or it will
face a catastrophe. Between these extremes, the figure shows a hypothetical organization
moving through what Reason calls the "production-protection space." It begins with
somewhat more emphasis on protection than production; as no incidents occur, efforts are
made to cut back on protection costs, and the organization drifts toward increasing emphasis
on production. A small incident occurs and pushes the organization to focus more on
protection again, but this is again followed by drift toward a production emphasis, until a
larger incident occurs. That then leads to renewed commitment to protection. But after a
prolonged period without incidents, the "unrocked boat" drifts so far away from protection
that a catastrophe occurs. While this was intended as a description of the behavior of a single
organization, it is a reasonable first approximation to the behavior of the entire nuclear
security system. In a similar vein, the U.S. General Accounting Office has described airline
security efforts over the years as "a cycle of limited action," in which the absence of a "major
" For a discussion of how politics and public opinion have shaped government oversight and regulation of
nuclear energy in the United States more generally, see Robert J. Duffy, Nuclear Politics in America: A History
and Theory of Government Regulation (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1997).
12 See, for example, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Nuclear Weapons Facilities: Adequacy of Safeguards
and Security at Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities, U.S. Congress, House of
Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, 6 March 1986. For examples of investigations by non-government
organizations that created substantial pressure for change, see Project on Government Oversight, US. Nuclear
Weapons Complex: Security at Risk (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2001; available at
http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-0 I1003-nuclear.html as of 4 December 2006); Project on Government
Oversight, Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voices from inside the Fences (Washington D.C.: POGO, 2002;
available at http://www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-020901-nukepower.html as of 2 January 2007).
13 Figure is from James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate,
1997), p. 5. The figure originally illustrated a discussion of safety, but is equally applicable to security.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 5 303
Figure 5.2: An Incident-Driven Passage Through the Production-Protection Space
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Accidents (Aldershot, U.K: Ashgate, 1997), p. 5.
security incident.. .could breed an attitude of complacency.. .Improving security in such an
environment is more challenging and difficult." 4
Officials charged with appropriating funds for nuclear security and drawing the
protection-production balance - from cabinet ministers to facility managers - often find it
difficult to judge, when security officials request additional funds for security improvements,
whether those additional resources are really needed. Security can always be improved, and
security officials are often seen as professional paranoids always demanding more, yet the
minister or manager does not want to spend his organization into bankruptcy. Institutional
mechanisms for determining whether security at a given site is adequate to defend against a
particular specified threat, with results that are clear and demonstrable to policymakers, are
crucial to help policy-makers navigate the protection-production space. One such mechanism
that has been used extensively in the United States is performance testing - observing how the
security system does in realistic tests of the ability of outsiders to shoot their way in, or of
insiders to smuggle out nuclear material or conduct a successful sabotage.' 5
" Quoted in Max H . Bazerman and Michael D. W atkins, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have
Seen Coming and How to Prevent Them (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2004), pp. 1t7-
35.
"~ For discussions of performance testing and its importance (along with its weaknesses), see, for example, Oleg
Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing: Assessing U.S. NRC Experience," Journal of Nuclear
Materials Management 28, no. 4 (Summer 2000); Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Kenneth N. Luongo,
Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former
Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2000; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/mpca2000.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
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System Constraints I: Complacency, Structural Disincentives, and Policy
Resistance
Of course, when an incident or investigation occurs, the global nuclear security system
does not immediately shift to a new state reflecting what a classical rational actor might judge
was an appropriate response. Rather, the impulse is mediated through a range of
organizations, many of which tend to be reluctant to change established policies - and many
of which have only limited ability to cause other actors in the system to change their policies,
even should they wish to do so.
Complacency, in particular, is a major constraint on the system's ability to respond
appropriately to new conditions. In nuclear agencies and facilities worldwide, many officials
believe that a major outsider attack on a nuclear facility (either for theft or sabotage) in their
country is so unlikely as to be essentially implausible; that similar insider actions are also
implausible; that it would be so difficult for terrorists to make a nuclear bomb, even if they
got the nuclear material, that this danger can be effectively dismissed; and that existing
nuclear security measures are sufficient, or even excessive.16
The problem of complacency and how to counter it permeates the nuclear security
system. A government minister who is complacent about the threat is unlikely to impose
more stringent nuclear security rules or allocate additional funds to nuclear security. A
facility manager who is complacent about the threat is likely to put nuclear security low on his
or her list of priorities for allocation of money and management attention - an attitude that
will be quickly communicated to all of the facility's staff, whether it is ever publicly stated or
not. Guards and other security-relevant personnel who are complacent about the threat are
unlikely to go the extra mile to check out every suspicious event and are likely to cut corners
on nuclear security rules. James Reason's remark about safety is equally applicable to
security: the key to maintaining an adequate focus on protection within an organization is "not
forgetting to be afraid."'7
There are good reasons for this complacency, making these views easy to defend and
quite difficult to change. For example, although there have been a variety of incidents of
different types over the years, there has never been a major terrorist attack on an operating
nuclear facility that was intended either to steal nuclear material or to cause a major
radiological release. Similarly, there is no conclusive evidence that there has ever been a
successful insider theft of enough material for a nuclear bomb, or an incident of insider
sabotage that was really intended to cause a major radioactive release. As discussed in
Chapter 2, there is as yet no convincing evidence that terrorist groups have in fact pulled
together the needed capabilities or made much progress in getting hold of stolen plutonium or
HEU to build a bomb from (let alone a stolen nuclear weapon). In all likelihood, 99% of the
16 For a discussion of these and other "myths" that cause many to downplay the danger of nuclear terrorism, with
quotes from leading officials expressing these views, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb:
An Agendafor Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard
University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/
analysis cnwmupdate_052404.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
* Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, p. 195.
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guards and other security-relevant personnel at nuclear facilities around the world will never
experience a real attempt to steal nuclear material or cause a radioactive release at their
facility during their entire careers. Ensuring that nuclear organizations and their personnel do
not become complacent about the risk of events that never occur is one of the most difficult
policy problems facing the global nuclear security system.
The alert reader, however, will notice that most of the sentences in the preceding
paragraph include a variety of caveats. Without those caveats, they would not be true. There
have been, for example, numerous terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities over the years, though
none of these were clearly intended to steal nuclear weapons or materials or cause a major
radioactive release.18 Most appear to have been intended to protest nuclear energy or stop the
construction of a particular plant (as was the case with the large number of Basque separatist
attacks on nuclear facilities in the 1970s and 1980s in Spain and the firing of a rocket-
propelled grenade - a commonly available terrorist weapon that facilities regulated by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are still not required to defend against - at the
French Superphenix plant in 1982). Many nuclear officials dismiss the likelihood of a
terrorist attack on a guarded nuclear facility, arguing that terrorists will prefer to strike soft,
undefended targets. But there has in fact been a case of a group of heavily armed terrorists
attacking a military base with nuclear weapons (the 1977 attack on the U.S. base at Giessen,
in Germany, by the Baader-Meinhof gang);' 9 there has also been a case in which a group of
15 armed terrorists attacked a nuclear facility, overwhelmed the five guards on duty at the
time, and seized control of the facility (this was the 1973 attack on the Atucha Atomic Power
Station in Argentina, which was not yet operating at the time). Similarly, there has been a
case of an attacker hijacking a civilian passenger aircraft and threatening to crash it into a
nuclear facility, something often dismissed as extremely unlikely in the months after 9/11
(this was the plane that hijackers threatened to crash into the Oak Ridge National Laboratory
in 1972)."
18 See, for example Konrad Kellen, "Appendix: Nuclear-Related Terrorist Activities by Political Terrorists," in
Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear
Terrorism, ed. Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (Cambridge, Mass.: Lexington Books for the Nuclear
Control Institute, 1987). For a partial update, see William Robert Johnston, "Nuclear Terrorism Incidents" (28
September 2003; available at http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/wrjp1855.html as of 5 January 2007).
19 A somewhat exaggerated account of this attack is provided in the opening chapter in Andrew Cockburn and
Leslie Cockburn, One-Point Safe (New York: Anchor Books/Doubleday, 1997). In an interview, the
commander of the base at the time (who appears to have been a major source for the Cockburns' description of
the incident), argued that the terrorists who attacked were not attempting to seize the nuclear weapons at the base
(which would have required more firepower than they attacked with) and may have been unaware that there were
any nuclear weapons present at the time; in his view, the weapons at the base were never in any danger.
Interview with Maj. Gen. William Burns (U.S. Army, Ret.), August 2002.
20 For a discussion of this episode, see Kellen, "Appendix: Nuclear-Related Terrorist Activities by Political
Terrorists." The terrorists seized II guns from security posts at the site, painted revolutionary slogans on the
walls, and then departed. As they were leaving police responders arrived, and there was a shoot-out that left two
policemen wounded before the terrorists disappeared into the jungle. As of 1987, they had not been identified or
apprehended.
21 Malcolm Gladwell, "Safety in the Skies: How Far Can Airline Security Go?" The New Yorker (1 October
2001; available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/011001faFACT as of 24 August 2005).
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While there are no successful confirmed incidents of theft of enough nuclear material
for a bomb, there are numerous confirmed incidents of theft of smaller quantities of plutonium
or HEU. As discussed in Chapter 3, the CIA has assessed that undetected thefts have
probably occurred. Moreover, Russian officials have confirmed that in 1998, at a major
nuclear facility in the Chelyabinsk region, there was an insider conspiracy that attempted to
steal 18.5 kilograms of HEU - potentially enough for a bomb, depending on the enrichment.
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 2, there is ample evidence that terrorists are seeking nuclear
weapons, and a range of government studies have convincingly demonstrated that
constructing a crude nuclear bomb is well within the plausible technical capabilities of a well-
organized terrorist group. If incidents such as these were widely known and regularly
discussed in the nuclear industry, complacent attitudes might begin to change; that they are
not well known among officials deciding on the levels of effort to devote to nuclear security
has to do in part with the pervasive secrecy surrounding nuclear security matters, another
important system constraint discussed below.
Because stringent nuclear security measures are expensive, nuclear industry officials
have strong incentives to maintain complacency and convince themselves that additional
security measures are not needed. The tendency to downplay risks that would be expensive or
inconvenient to address is only one example of the human tendency to believe what it is in our
interest to believe, present in essentially every human industry and activity; who among us
has not, at some point in our lives, put off practicing what we would do in the event of a fire
in our home, reasoning (contrary to the available evidence) that this risk is so low as not to be
worth bothering with? Cognitive dissonance - which often leads people to focus on those
facts that support what they already believe, while ignoring facts that challenge those views -
plays a very critical role in maintaining such complacency. People in the nuclear industry,
like people everywhere else, tend to convince themselves that the ways they are doing things
now are appropriate and reasonable, finding reasons to dismiss evidence to the contrary; no
one is easily able to accept that the standard practices they and their friends and colleagues
have been following may pose a serious danger to the world. Hence, nuclear security officials
tend to press for less stringent nuclear security rules, in the sincere belief that their
recommendations are justified. This is but one example of the common saying "where you
stand is where you sit."
Because of people's ability to focus on confirming evidence and ignore contrary
evidence, the perception that the security measures in place are already sufficient does not
appear to be closely related to what those security measures actually are; that view was
widespread in the nuclear industry even when only the most minimal security measures,
which would now be agreed by all to be grossly inadequate, were in fact in place. In 1973,
22 It was the Federal Security Service that first announced that it had foiled an insider conspiracy to steal 18.5
kilograms of nuclear material from a major facility in Chelyabinsk. A MINATOM official later provided
somewhat more detail in an interview. See Yevgeniy Tkachenko, "FSB Agents Prevent Theft of Nuclear
Materials," iTAR-TASS, 18 December 1998; "Interview: Victor Yerastov: Minatom Has All Conditions for
Providing Safety and Security of Nuclear Material," Yaderny Kontrol Digest 5, no. I (Winter 2000). That the
material concerned was HEU was confirmed by a MINATOM official in an interview with the author, June
2000.
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for example, representatives of the U.S. nuclear industry reacted sharply against what they
called a "regulatory flash flood" of new security rules, specifically arguing, for example, that
there was no need for the then-new requirements that plutonium reprocessing plants and
transports of plutonium and HEU have armed guards.
Security rules that do not seem to make sense are one important source of
complacency in nuclear organizations (as in any organization). Virtually everyone who has
ever worked in any large organization has had the experience of being confronted with rules
that seemed to make no sense and which most people violated. When security rules are put in
place that seem to those who have to implement them to be burdensome and costly without
providing any real security benefit, they will tend to violate those rules. If this is a common
situation, then each employee will be making frequent judgments as to which rules to follow
and which rules to ignore, and a culture of frequent violation of security rules will be the
inevitable result. People will tend to do what they believe it is important to do;24 if security
rules are set and employees are trained so that all security-relevant employees understand
what the rules are and come to believe that they are important, the rules will be followed.
Minimizing "stupid rules" is a key part of building an effective security culture.
Nuclear security is only one of a large class of problems in which complacency and
reluctance to change past practices are reinforced by large structural disincentives that deter
participants from addressing the problem. The costs of action are certain and present, while
the benefits of action are highly uncertain and accrue at some unknown point in the future.
Affected constituencies will notice the costs of action immediately, but when a disaster does
not occur, may not believe that this is the result of the action taken. In many cases the costs
of action are borne by a small minority (which therefore has very strong incentives to oppose
action) and the benefits are spread thinly over the general public (which therefore has little
incentive for focused support for action). Max Bazerman and Michael Watkins have recently
categorized this class of problems as "predictable surprises" - cases in which most
organizations fail to act to prevent disasters they should have seen coming.2 5 Nuclear
terrorism is a classic predictable surprise, incorporating essentially all the causes of such
surprises Bazerman and Watkins identify. Bazerman and Watkins outline a wide range of
both cognitive and organizational problems that make it difficult to address predictable
surprises. In the case of nuclear security, the structural disincentives to action are substantial,
as every dollar a senior official devotes to nuclear security is a dollar not devoted to other
activities that may well be more politically popular; every dollar a facility manager devotes to
nuclear security is a dollar not devoted to activities that would generate revenue; and every
23 See, for example, the magazine Nuclear Industry, issues of February 1973, March 1973, and May 1973,
quoted in Walker, "Regulating against Nuclear Terrorism," p. 116.
24 In one intriguing study, for example, researchers found that a perception that compliance with a rule was
important reduced the probability of non-compliance to very low levels even if the chances that violation would
be detected were seen as "low to moderate." By contrast, if there was a personal benefit in violating the rule, the
chances of violation were several times higher even if the perceived likelihood of detection was moderate to
high. See Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, p. 145.
2 Bazerman and Watkins, Predictable Surprises.
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hour that a worker at a facility devotes to following nuclear security rules is an hour not
devoted to activities more likely to result in a raise or a promotion.
The complacency and structural disincentives to action just described often motivate
nuclear managers to resist efforts to tighten nuclear security rules and to seek exemptions or
other cost-saving measures to ameliorate the effects of the rules already in place. These
efforts typically take the form of lobbying and providing advice to the institutions which set
and enforce these rules, arguing for looser rules, interpretations of the rules that would allow
lower-cost approaches to their implementation, and the like. On an issue like nuclear security,
such industry advice and lobbying can be extremely influential, for reasons discussed in more
detail below.
Hence, the global nuclear security system exhibits substantial policy resistance - the
tendency of a system to resist policy initiatives and to drift back toward the system state that
existed prior to the initiative. In essence, outside advocates for increased nuclear security
(who typically are not among those who have to pay for it) and the nuclear industry have
competing goals (increased nuclear security in one case, minimized costs in the other), and
the effect of advocates working to achieve these goals is that the overall system will tend to
come into balance between them. A redoubled effort by one faction to shift the system
balance in its direction will result in redoubled efforts by the opposing faction to drag the
system back the other way.
Of course, participants in the nuclear industry are at the same time members of the
broader society and will reflect broader societal concerns as well. If a major incident causes a
broad consensus to develop that increased security measures are needed - as occurred with
the 9/11 attacks - the industry will generally support some new security measures, while at
the same time seeking to ensure that they do not unduly undermine the industry's interests. In
the United States after 9/11, for example, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the lobbying
arm of the nuclear industry, supported more stringent nuclear security rules, while at the same
time launching a major campaign to convince the NRC and the public that NRC-regulated
facilities were already so secure that only modest further improvements were necessary.28
26 Matthew Bunn, "Incentives for Nuclear Security," in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute
for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005).
27 For a discussion of policy resistance in the context of the dynamics of complex policy-technical systems
(which may have been the article that first introduced the term "policy resistance" in this context) see Donella H
Meadows, "Whole Earth Models and Systems," CoEvolution Quarterly (Summer 1982; available at
http://www.oss.net/dynamaster/filearchive/040324/48c97c243f534eee32d379e69b039289/WER-INFO-73.pdf
as of 15 August 2005), pp. 98-108. See also John Sterman, Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling
for a Complex World(Irwin: McGraw-Hill, 2000), pp. 5-14.
28 The Nuclear Energy Institute's argument that U.S. facilities have greatly improved security since 9/11 and are
now highly secure, without requiring further improvements, is summarized in Nuclear Energy Institute, "Fact
Sheet: Nuclear Power Plant Security" (Washington, D.C.: NEI, March 2005; available at http://www.nei.org/
index.asp?catnum=3&catid=48 as of 18 August 2005). For a detailed discussion of the NRC's approach to
improving security since 9/11 and the role that the nuclear industry has played in it, see Committee on
Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Nuclear Security: Has the NRC Strengthened Facility Standards since 9/11? U.S. House of Representatives,
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Nuclear Regulation Within the Overall System
Effective nuclear security rules that are effectively enforced are critical to the
maintenance of appropriate nuclear security programs, because managers will generally avoid
making expensive investments in security, rather than in other activities that could bring in
revenue, unless they have to. Hence, the nuclear regulatory agencies are key points of policy
leverage in the overall nuclear security system.
But in many cases, the regulatory agencies charged with setting and enforcing nuclear
security rules are in a very difficult position within the system. Many regulatory agencies are
a good fit for James Q. Wilson's model of agencies created in response to "entrepreneurial"
politics: some perceived crisis makes it possible for policy entrepreneurs to create an agency
to "rein in" a particular industry, even though the industry is initially hostile. But the costs of
the regulation are focused in one industry, giving it strong incentives to devote substantial
efforts to influencing the regulatory agency to moderate its rules, while the benefits of
stringent rules are broadly distributed across society as a whole, giving the general public only
modest incentives to support stringent rules. Hence, after the initial crisis is past and interest
flags, the agency "may find itself confronting an environment where much of the information
it needs and many of the political resources to which it must respond will be in the hands of
an interest fundamentally hostile to its purposes."29 Agencies in this position, Wilson warns,
are in danger of "capture" - of coming to serve the interests of the industry they were
intended to control - though this is not inevitable.
The nuclear industry is often in a position to be very persuasive with nuclear
regulatory bodies in the security area, for several reasons. In most cases, the regulatory
agencies are substantially smaller than the industries and agencies they are supposed to
control and have less expertise and political power. Most of the relevant technical expertise
needed to address the issues persuasively resides in the industry itself. Most of the relevant
information is classified, limiting the effectiveness of outside parties who might disagree with
industry's view; industry has access to the relevant information about its security practices
and the specifics of the security rules it faces, and outside critics usually do not. The nuclear
regulatory agencies not only get much of their information and perspectives from the industry,
but they typically draw most of their personnel from the industry - and many of these
personnel plan on returning to the industry after their stint at the regulatory agency. Under
these circumstances, it is not surprising that the predominant views and approaches held in the
regulatory agencies would in many cases come to closely reflect the views and approaches
that are dominant in the industry they regulate.
Moreover, the regulatory agencies are often under considerable pressure from central
governments and legislatures not to impose rules that would be unduly costly and thereby
potentially undermine the future of nuclear energy. While these regulatory agencies are, in
109th Congress, 2nd Session, 4 April 2006 (available at http://reform.house.gov/NSETIR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventlD=41937 as of 6 May 2006).
29 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, 2nd ed. (New York:
Basic Books, 2000), p. 78. See also "The Regulator's Unhappy Lot," in Reason, Managing the Risks of
Organizational Accidents.
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Figure 5.3: Influences at the Regulator and Facility Level
some cases, simultaneously under pressure from non-government organizations and others to
fix perceived nuclear security weaknesses, the advocates of more stringent rules usually have
much less expertise and power to bring to bear on the problem than the industry does. Given
these constraints and pressures, it is remarkable that nuclear regulatory agencies in some
countries have been as effective as they have.30
Figure 5.3 illustrates some of the inputs and feedbacks operating between a regulatory
agency and the facilities it regulates. A major incident or investigation leads to public and
government concern and pressure for tighter nuclear security rules - pressure the officials of
the regulatory agency feel themselves after the incident or investigation, but pressure that also
comes from central governments, legislatures, the media, and NGOs. After a period of review
and input from both industry and other parties, the regulatory agency revises its rules. The
facilities then provide feedback to the agency on the costs and inconveniences caused by the
new rules and in many cases may suggest modifications or approaches to implementing the
rules that could save money or reduce the inconvenience of following the new rules. Industry
organizations representing the interests of the facilities help carry the messages the facilities
30 For a discussion of interactions between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the nuclear industry, and
NGOs advocating tighter nuclear security in the United States in the years after the 9/11 attacks, see Nuclear
Security: Has the NRC Strengthened Facility Standards since 9/11?
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are sending, to the regulator and to others who might pressure the regulator (such as the
legislature and the central government). Outside critics, at the same time, may press for even
tighter rules, but are likely to have less influence than the more powerful and better-informed
industry. This sets up a classic cycle of tugging and hauling - but one in which the industry is
generally better positioned than outside critics are. Thus, until the next driving event, the
general trend (though often a very slow one) is likely to be toward relaxation rather than
further ratcheting up of the rules.
System Time Lags, Delays, and Lock-In
Time lags and delays are an important property of the nuclear security system. The
delays imposed by the technical components of the system are modest. In principle, for
example, with sufficient political agreement, nuclear material can be airlifted out of a
vulnerable site in days or weeks. In many cases in U.S.-Russian cooperation, very significant
initial "rapid" security upgrades - fixing holes in fences, installing equipment to detect
plutonium or HEU being removed, bricking over windows, placing material in steel cages -
have been accomplished in six months or less from the start of work, and "comprehensive"
security and accounting upgrades, involving installation of an entire suite of modern nuclear
security and accounting equipment (with associated training) have been completed in 18
months.31
The typical delays in the policy components of the system are usually substantially
longer - though if political actors at a high enough level push hard enough, such delays can be
dramatically reduced. In most cases, however, such high-level pressure for immediate action,
sweeping aside the usual bureaucratic processes, is absent or modest; in such cases, rules take
years to write, more years to implement, and the time from policy initiative to result can be
very long. This is a problem, because the galvanizing effect of the incident that originally
drove a decision to require more stringent rules tends to fade at a rate comparable to the rate
at which the new rules are developed and implemented. In the United States after the 9/11
attacks, for example, it took the NRC more than 19 months (and DOE 20 months) to issue
new rules requiring facilities to be able to defend against larger and more capable threats.32
DOE then issued a further revision in the fall of 2004 (three years after the 9/11 attacks); DOE
31 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security
Administration--Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, vol. 1, DOE/ME-0046 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2005;
available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/06budget/Content/Volumes/VollNNSA.pdf as of 27 February
2006), p. 486. Even without major upgrade initiatives of this kind, the technical turnover time of the nuclear
security system is much shorter than that, say, of typical large energy facilities: rather than being replaced only
every 40-50 years, most of the components of a nuclear security and accounting system are designed to be
replaced roughly every 10 years.
2 NRC issued its new DBT on April 29, 2003, though it had issued a number of previous advisories and orders.
See U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Security at
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to Be Strengthened, GAO-03-752 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2003;
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03752.pdf as of 15 August 2005). DOE's first post-9/11 DBT was
issued May 20, 2003, though limited "interim guidance" on upgraded security measures and several drafts of the
DBT had been released before. See U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: DOE
Needs to Resolve Signficant Issues before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat (GAO, 200423 December
2006).
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facilities have until late 2008 - seven years after the attacks - to comply with the new
requirements. 33
The more extreme and better-known example of these kinds of delays is in U.S.-
Russian cooperation to upgrade security for weapons-usable nuclear materials: as of the end
of fiscal year 2004, some 13 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, only a little over half
of the buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in the former Soviet Union had yet had
U.S.-sponsored security upgrades completed.34 In mid-1995, when President Bill Clinton was
briefed on the problem of inadequate security for nuclear stockpiles in the former Soviet
Union and was told of a dispute between the Department of Defense and DOE over who
would pay for particular activities that had delayed upgrades at one vulnerable site for several
months, he told his national security advisor: "I want that resolved by Friday." In fact, the
dispute in question was not resolved for another year.35 The problem, of course, is that
terrorists and other potential adversaries may act, react, and adapt far more quickly than the
global nuclear security system does.
Both at the national level and at the international level, the nuclear security system
also appears to exhibit some lock-in, or ratcheting, effects - in both directions. Once a
particular rule or approach on nuclear security has been put in place and become generally
accepted, it becomes quite difficult to change. It is difficult to make the rule more stringent,
because the regulated parties will resist and major investments will have already been made
on the basis of the rule as it stands; in most cases, some kind of major incident or external
pressure is needed before decisions are taken and followed through to make nuclear security
rules significantly more stringent. (Although various parties had been pressing NRC to
require U.S. nuclear facilities to be defended against truck bombs for years, particularly after
the 1982 destruction of the U.S. marine barracks in Lebanon by a massive truck bomb, NRC
did not put such a requirement in place until 1994, after the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing and the incident in which a mentally disturbed person crashed his car through the
gate at Three Mile Island and disappeared into the plant for hours before he was found.) It is
also difficult to make a nuclear security rule much less stringent, as this inevitably requires
arguing that some security measures considered important before are no longer needed;
particularly in the post-9/1 1 world, this is usually a very difficult case to make. Thus, there is
some degree of a ratchet effect in the system, which counters to some extent the tendency to
drift shown in Figure 5.2. At the same time, however, modest changes in the rules, going in
33 See discussion in U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Doe 's Office of the
Undersecretaryfor Energy, Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2005; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05611 .pdf as of 18 August 2005).
3 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, Mass.,
and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2005;
available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/report-cnwmupdate2005.pdf as of 2 January 2007), pp. 27-43.
* Author's personal experience. This was a briefing that John P. Holdren and I gave, in May 2005, on the
results of Panel on U.S.-FSU Cooperation to Protect, Control, and Account for Weapons-Usable Nuclear
Materials, President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology, Securing Weapons- Usable Nuclear
Materials in the Former Soviet Union: Urgent Measures to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation (U). Secret/Noforn
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Science and Technology Policy, 1995).
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both directions, can often get in "under the radar screen," and, when accumulated over a
period of time, can mean significant drift of the system toward a different state - usually
toward less protection.
An Example of System Behavior Within One Country
The classic system behavior of event leading to policy initiative leading to policy
resistance can be seen in countless nuclear security controversies over the years. Consider, to
take just one example, the history of efforts to actually test the performance of overall facility
security systems with groups of testers pretending to be terrorists attempting to shoot their
way in - so-called "force-on-force exercises" - at facilities regulated by the NRC in the
United States. Realistic performance testing can play a very critical role in maintaining a
strong nuclear security program, identifying vulnerabilities that need to be fixed and which
were not apparent on paper; highlighting the reality of the threat and of the difficulty of
defending against it, for plant management and staff (and thereby undermining complacency);
providing clear evidence of the need for additional security measures to senior officials who
might be less convinced by the results of computer vulnerability analyses or expert judgment;
giving facilities reason to invest in additional security measures and training, in preparation
for the test, in order to do well; and generally focusing regulation on real security
performance, rather than on compliance with particular rules that may or may not lead to a
high-performing system overall.
NRC first imposed a requirement that facilities have security arrangements able to
defend against a particular specified threat (known as the Design Basis Threat, or DBT) in
1979. The first reviews intended to assess whether facilities' security arrangements would in
fact be able to defeat the DBT, known at the time as the Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews
(RERs), began two years later, in 1981. The NRC had been created by Congress a few
years before, in an atmosphere of broad public concern over the safety and security of nuclear
energy and the problematic nature of the Atomic Energy Commission's dual role as promoter
and regulator of these technologies.38 Moreover, the newly created DOE had established a
DBT and a program of force-on-force exercises to test security at its sites in the late 1970s.
The testing program rapidly found a wide range of weaknesses at DOE sites. When, in 1981,
a new administration more focused on Cold War weapons production and concerned about
security cost canceled the testing program, Congress, which had been conducting extensive
36 For a discussion of the importance of performance testing and the difficulties with it, see Bukharin, Bunn, and
Luongo, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the
Former Soviet Union; Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing."
37 For a review of this history, see Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing."
38 For an account of the breakup of the Atomic Energy Commission, the establishment of the NRC, and the
forces that drove this process, see Duffy, Nuclear Politics in America. For a discussion of NRC's initial
legislative mandate on nuclear security in particular, see, for example, Walker, "Regulating against Nuclear
Terrorism."
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investigations of nuclear security, intervened to ensure that it was restarted, presumably
sending a message to NRC as well.39
Like the DOE effort, the RER program (which originally focused on security hardware
and did not include force-on-force testing of the response forces) quickly found a wide range
of severe weaknesses requiring correction, ranging from unprotected ventilation shafts going
into vital areas to fences arranged in a way making it possible to jump over the intrusion
detectors fairly easily. "At virtually every site, RER team members were able to avoid
detection in several of the perimeter's zones." 40 Getting sites to resolve these hardware
problems took the inspectors some years, and it was not until 1988 (almost a decade after such
a testing program had first been instituted at DOE) that the RER teams began to observe
force-on-force exercises to assess each site's response force capabilities.4 1 By 1991, the worst
problems with security hardware found in the previous decade had largely been fixed, but
"significant weaknesses" remained in the sites' armed response to a possible attack.42 As a
result, the hardware testing was folded into regional inspections, and a new program, the
Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations (OSREs) was launched, focused on force-on-
force exercises designed to test the site's ability to defend against armed attack by outside
intruders. The initiative to begin force-on-force exercises in particular was reportedly the
result of heightened terrorism concerns in the aftermath of the 1991 Iraq war (in which
Saddam Hussein had threatened to use terrorism against the United States).43 The OSRE
program focused on power reactors; a similar program, the Comparability Performance
Evaluation Reviews (CPERs) tested the fuel cycle facilities handling large quantities of
weapons-usable nuclear material.4
In each OSRE test, there would typically be four drills over several days in which a
group pretending to be terrorist attackers, with the size, skills, weapons, and equipment
specified in the DBT, would attempt to get through the facility's defenses and reach a
particular target set (a set of equipment whose sabotage would cause substantial damage to
the reactor core, a prerequisite for a major release of radiation).4 5 In order to avoid people
actually being shot during such an exercise, facilities were given extensive warning of when
the exercise would occur, and both the attackers and the defenders used mock weapons rather
than real guns; similarly, rather than using actual explosives to blast through walls or doors,
times were assigned for such tasks based on earlier tests involving real explosives. Each drill
typically lasted only a few minutes before either the defenders had successfully fought off the
39 Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing," p. 25. See also discussion in Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Nuclear Security Coverup, U.S. Congress, House of
Representatives, 98th Congress, 2nd Session, 3 February 1984.
40 Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing," p. 23.
41 Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing," p. 26.
42 Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing," p. 23.
43 Paul Leventhal, "Testimony of Paul Leventhal on Behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute on the
Recommendations of the NRC Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force, to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission" (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Control Institute, 5 May 1999).
44 Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing," p. 23.
45Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing," pp. 23-24.
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attackers, or failed to do so - because of the speed at which it is possible to climb fences, blast
through walls or doors, and the like.
Like the earlier RER tests, the OSREs rapidly revealed a wide range of vulnerabilities.
In over 40 of the drills conducted by May 1999, at 27 plants of the 58 reviewed by that time,
the defenders failed to protect the critical target set from being destroyed by the attackers -
that is, the plants were not able to fulfill their regulatory obligation to be able to defend
against the DBT.46
As can be imagined, many in the nuclear industry did not appreciate the OSRE
program. The test failures were seen as giving embarrassing ammunition to anti-nuclear
critics and possibly undermining the morale and professional standing of the security
managers and security forces. Industry representatives complained that the tests were
expensive and disruptive to prepare for; that the practice of giving the attackers extensive
information about the plant's security plan (done because the DBT included possible help
from an insider, and it was assumed the attackers might get such information from an insider)
was unfair; that the tests did not adequately take into account the plant staff's potential ability
to mitiate the results of a sabotage after it occurred, avoiding a radioactive release; and
more.4
The nuclear facilities subject to OSREs therefore worked to ensure that they would be
conducted in a way that would have the minimum negative impact. Many aspects of the
OSRE approach that the NRC ultimately adopted limited its effectiveness:48
* Facilities were not only warned months in advance of when the tests would take place, but
were allowed to beef up their security systems and have more guards on duty for the test
than they normally would - and then were not required to maintain those beefed-up
capabilities after the test. Thus, the tests were often testing a security system that was
significantly better than what was actually available at the plant day-to-day.
* The members of the attacking forces were not trained in the best tactics for getting
through barriers, protecting themselves from defender's fire, and the like.
* The facilities, to a large extent, were able to choose the members of the attacking team,
which often included members of the facility management and guard force, who had a
vested interest in seeing the facility do well in the test.
. At many sites, the tests did not make use of realistic mock weapons (such as the Multiple
Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) used for similar testing at DOE and in the
military), but instead relied on rubber guns, making it very difficult for the test judges to
46 Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing," p. 24.
47 These complaints are discussed briefly inBukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing," pp. 24-25.
See also Edwin S. Lyman, "Radiological Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants: A Moving Target Set," in
Proceedings of the 41st Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, New Orleans,
Louisiana, 16-20 July 2000 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2000; available at http://www.nci.org/e/el-inmm2000.htm
as of 18 August 2005).
48 Except where otherwise noted, the points below are from U.S. Congress, Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Oversight of Security at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to Be Strengthened.
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determine when an attacker or a defender should be considered to have been shot. (In this
respect, even paintball guns would be an improvement.)
* The possibility of an insider who would actively participate with the attackers, taking
actions such as disabling intrusion detectors or shooting guards from within, rather than
merely providing information to the attackers, was included in the DBT the plants had to
defend against, but was never tested.49
* The tests were quite rare, typically occurring only once every eight years at each plant -
thus making it difficult to observe security trends and nip security problems in the bud.
* Facilities where the defenders did not succeed in protecting the target set suffered no
consequences; although the NRC's regulations required facilities to put in place security
systems designed to be able to defeat the DBT, failing to do so was not considered an
enforceable violation of rules if the facility fulfilled its NRC-approved security plan.5 1
Given these constraints on the realism of the OSRE tests and given the very small size of
the attacking force used in these tests (while the pre-9/1 1 DBT is officially not public
information, it is widely reported to have been three outside attackers),52 it is remarkable that
such a substantial fraction of the sites did not succeed in protecting the vital targets.
After several years, the industry became sufficiently unhappy with the OSRE tests that
they began to attempt to get the program canceled. Advocates for a strong nuclear security
program were fortunate that the program ended up being managed by a former military officer
who was very dedicated to nuclear security, David Orrick, who defended the effort
tenaciously. Nevertheless, in 1998, NRC decided to terminate the OSRE effort. Orrick filed
a dissent to this decision, and the controversy within the NRC leaked to the Los Angeles
Times, which ran a major story under the headline "U.S. Drops Anti-Terrorist Tests at Nuclear
Plants."53 This press account caused a stir in Congress, among interested non-government
organizations, and at the White House, which successfully urged the NRC (which, in the U.S.
system, is independent and does not have to follow White House directives) to reinstate the
program.
The industry and the NRC then began to develop an alternative approach that would
substitute for the OSREs, in which the NRC-observed OSREs would be replaced by an
industry self-assessment program. (Originally called the "Self-Assessment Program" or SAP,
49 Lyman, "Radiological Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants."
50 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Response to Letters to NRC Chairman Nils J. Diaz Regarding
Security at Nuclear Power Plants" (Washington, D.C.: NRC, October 2004; available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/for-the-record/2004/nsir-response.pdf as of 18 August 2005).
51 Leventhal, "Testimony of Paul Leventhal on Behalf of the Nuclear Control Institute on the Recommendations
of the NRC Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission".
52 Daniel Hirsch, "The NRC: What, Me Worry?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 1 (January/February
2002; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art-ofn=jfD2hirsch as of 8 January 2007), pp. 38-44.
" Frank Clifford, "U.S. Drops Anti-Terrorist Tests at Nuclear Plants Security: Shrinking Budget Is Cited:
Simulated Attacks Had Found Serious Lapses at Half of Nation's Reactors," Los Angeles Times, 3 November
1998.
14 Lyman, "Radiological Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants."
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this was eventually labeled the "Safeguards Program Assessment" or SPA.) The original plan
for this effort was drafted by the industry's lobbying group, the Nuclear Energy Institute.
While the revised plan did call for the tests to be conducted more frequently (every three
years rather than every eight), the industry sought to include a much more demanding
definition of when the attackers could be considered to have succeeded and to take credit for
actions operators might take to save the plant from a major release, even though the operators'
ability to perform these actions in such a crisis had never been tested, and in the event there
might be armed terrorists actively preventing them from taking these actions.55 Outside
critics criticized this plan as likely to greatly undermine the realism of the OSREs, putting the
testing even more firmly in the hands of people with a vested interest in ensuring that the
plants would pass. 6
Nevertheless, SPA was in the process of replacing the OSRE effort when the 9/11 attacks
occurred. At that point, SPA as originally conceived was abandoned. All tests were called
off for a period after the 9/11 attacks, in order to deal with other security upgrades being
undertaken at the time. "Pilot" versions of a new approach began in 2003, and graded
exercises resumed in 2004. Under the new approach, tests will occur every three years at
each reactor, rather than every eight; the tests will use MILES equipment for enhanced
realism; the new, larger DBT will be tested; and the NRC has set standards to ensure that the
adversary force in the tests is trained in appropriate terrorist tactics.57 As part of this new
approach, however, the NRC went ahead and put the industry in charge of conducting the
tests and did not object when the industry chose Wackenhut, the firm that provides the
security forces for roughly half the U.S. nuclear power plants, as the firm to provide the
attacking forces for the tests - so that Wackenhut will, in effect, be testing its own
performance. Although NRC required the industry to ensure that the part of Wackenhut
providing the attacking force would be independent of the part providing the guards, this
provoked howls of protest from some non-government organizations and members of
58Congress. Those criticisms, however, do not appear to have had any effect on the outcome.
This history provides a classic illustration of the policy resistance cycle in the nuclear
security system. Initial concern in the 1970s, provoked in part by major terrorist attacks
around the world, led NRC to put in place a DBT and later to begin increasingly extensive
reviews to assess whether facilities could successfully defend against it; but by the time the
force-on-force exercises got under way, it was years later and much of the initial public
concern and congressional pressure had dissipated. Industry objected to the new efforts and
worked with NRC first to ensure that the testing program was sharply limited and then sought
to get it canceled outright. That cancellation proved a bridge too far, provoking policy
s Lyman, "Radiological Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants."
56 Lyman, "Radiological Sabotage at Nuclear Power Plants."
57 See, for example, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Response to Letters".
58 For discussions, see, for example, Matthew L. Wald, "Battle Swirls on Security at a-Plants," New York Times,
6 August 2004 (available at http://pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-nytimes-08062004.pdf as of 18 August 2005); U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Response to Letters"; Danielle Brian and Peter Stockton, "POGO
Presentation to NRC Security Inspectors" (Washington, D.C.: Project on Government Oversight, 16 December
2004; available at http://pogo.org/m/hsp/hsp-NRCPhysSeclnsp-041216.pdf as of 5 January 2007).
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resistance on the other side, seeking to drag the system back toward its previous state.
Industry then worked with the NRC to develop a new approach whose intrusiveness industry
could control. That effort was interrupted by the 9/11 attacks, which provoked sufficient
public and government concern that industry and the NRC moved forward with a much more
extensive approach to the sort of performance testing that the industry had sought to cancel -
but still took a decision to put industry in charge of the testing program and to have the same
firm provide both the testers and many of the tested. In short, the concerns provoked by
major incidents such as 9/11 do move the system toward a higher-security state - but this
takes time, and policy resistance limits the magnitude of the shift.
System Constraints 1l: Secrecy and Sovereignty
Two additional key constraints on efforts to effect substantial improvements in the
performance of the global nuclear security system are secrecy and sovereignty; with respect to
international cooperation to improve nuclear security, the two are closely related.
Secrecy permeates every aspect of the global nuclear security system. There is good
reason for this secrecy: no one wants to provide information that would be helpful to terrorists
in organizing their efforts to steal nuclear material or build a nuclear bomb. Denis Flory, then
head of the nuclear security regulatory agency in France and chairman of the international
experts group that negotiated proposed amendments to the Convention on Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material, put the issue in stark terms: "if in Nuclear Safety, transparency is an
obligation, in Physical Protection, it is an offence."59
Secrecy constrains efforts to improve nuclear security, both within individual
countries and internationally. Within countries, it is well-understood that government
activities conducted in secrecy are often done less well than those in the sunlight; secrecy
inevitably means less oversight and fewer people keeping an eye on the progress of an effort,
which can allow a wide range of problems, from sloppy thinking and implementation to
outright corruption, to fester uncorrected. As the Moynihan commission on government
secrecy put it:60
Secrecy has the potential to undermine well-informed judgment by limiting the
opportunity for input, review, and criticism, thus allowing individuals and groups to avoid
the type of scrutiny that might challenge long-accepted beliefs and ways of thinking.
Some form of "sunlight" that permits views to be challenged while they are still in the
formative stage can help reveal any institutional biases or preconceived ideas about how
to approach a particular issue.
In the United States, more information related to nuclear security is made publicly
available than in virtually any other country (though this openness has been scaled back
59 Denis Flory, "Revising the CPPNM: Challenges and Constraints," in Proceedings of the 44th Annual Meeting
of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 13-17 July 2003 (Northbrook, I ll.: INMM,
2003).
60 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, chair, Secrecy: Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government
Secrecy, Senate Document 105-2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997; available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/ as of 18 August 2005).
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substantially since the 9/11 attacks). There is almost certainly some information that would
be useful to terrorists that has been released. But at the same time, the availability of at least
limited information has made it possible for the Congress, the media, and non-government
organizations to intervene repeatedly to push for action to address nuclear security
vulnerabilities. The net effect of this somewhat greater openness has almost certainly been
greater security than would otherwise have been the case.
Internationally, secrecy is a very fundamental constraint on any effort to cooperate to
improve nuclear security. Secrecy concerning how large nuclear stockpiles are and at what
sites and buildings they are located makes it extraordinarily difficult to assess the size of the
problem and plan programs to address it. Secrecy concerning the specific security
arrangements in place makes it extremely difficult to assess whether those arrangements need
to be strengthened. Secrecy that makes it difficult or impossible for foreigners to visit
relevant sites enormously complicates efforts to assist or cooperate in upgrading security at
those sites - and in particular to confirm that the donor state's taxpayer's funds are being
spent appropriately - a problem that has continually pla ued U.S.-Russian cooperation to
improve security and accounting for nuclear stockpiles . Secrecy limits the opportunities for
transparency measures that would help identify security weak points requiring corrective
action; that might encourage states to fix embarrassing problems before opening themselves
to review; and that could identify when thefts have occurred, or confirm that all material was
present and accounted for.63 For example, although international peer reviews of safety at
nuclear facilities are common, international peer reviews of security and a suggestion to
include a provision making them mandatory in an amended physical protection convention
was rejected by nearly all the parties participating in the discussions.
Similarly, states' efforts to protect their sovereignty over nuclear security matters have
tightly constrained efforts to set binding international rules for nuclear security. Among the
major powers particularly, each has its own approach to nuclear security and none is
interested in being told what to do by the others. This emphasis on each state maintaining
complete freedom to control its own nuclear security affairs has made it extremely difficult to
reach agreement on any form of binding international standards for nuclear security, or any
form of mandatory international peer review that might imply judgments that nuclear security
in a particular country was not being handled as well as it should be. In particular, by a stroke
61 Of course, just as nuclear industry officials have strong incentives to convince themselves that expensive
additional security measures are not needed, I have a strong incentive to convince myself that some degree of
transparency with respect to nuclear security is desirable, since a dissertation like this one (along with much of
my other work) would not be possible without it. The reader should keep this likely bias in mind.
62 For discussions, see Bukharin, Bunn, and Luongo, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendationsfor
Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union; Matthew Bunn, "Cooperation to
Secure Nuclear Stockpiles: A Case of Constrained Innovation," Innovations 1, no. 1 (2006; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/INNOVO10 lCooperationtoSecureNuclearStockpiles.p
df as of 4 April 2006).
63 For a discussion of these points, see, for example, U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on
International Security and Arms Control, Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2005; available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11265.html as of 8
August 2005).
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of historical bad luck, the second half of the 1970s, the time when the United States first
began attempting to convince other states to agree on stringent nuclear security standards, was
also the time when the United States reversed its position on the back end of the nuclear fuel
cycle, abandoning reprocessing and attempting to convince others to do likewise. Since then,
other countries that continued to pursue reprocessing (including the major European powers,
Japan, and Russia) have often regarded U.S. attempts to ensure that high standards of security
were maintained for weapons-usable materials such as separated plutonium as a back-door
means of interfering with their fuel cycle choices. This attitude has contributed to their
insistence that nuclear security is a matter of national sovereignty and should not be
controlled in detail by international agreements and organizations.64
An International Example of System Behavior: Responding to 9/11
The reaction to the 9/11 attacks provides a useful current example of the behavior of
the nuclear security system at the international level. The attacks immediately aroused public
and government concern over whether security for nuclear security was sufficient, in
countries around the world.
At first it appeared that this event - a carefully planned suicide attack involving 19
individuals in four independent but well-coordinated teams, succeeding in killing over 3,000
people and striking both the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, global symbols of
American economic and military power - would be enough to shock the global nuclear
security system into taking action to protect nuclear facilities against threats of comparable
magnitude (for example, 19 well-trained, well-equipped attackers in several teams). In the
United States, DOE immediately beefed up guard forces at nuclear facilities, and several
governors sent National Guard units to guard nuclear facilities (though others did not).65 In
France, air defense missiles were deployed to protect the La Hague reprocessing facilities
from attacks by hijacked aircraft.66 In Japan, units of the national police were deployed to
provide the first armed guards for nuclear facilities.67 In Russia, Britain, and elsewhere,
additional armed guards were deployed to protect nuclear facilities, controlled areas around
facilities were widened, and other steps were taken to heighten security. Russian officials
publicly warned that terrorist teams had been carrying out reconnaissance at Russian nuclear
warhead storage facilities, 68 and Alexander Rumiantsev, then Minister of Atomic Energy,
agreed with U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham that the two sides should accelerate
their efforts to install improved security and accounting systems at Russian nuclear sites. 69 At
" For a good discussion of these issues, see Scheinman, "Transcending Sovereignty."
65 Matthew Bunn, "Nuclear Security in the United States: Response to 9/11 " (unpublished: 3 February 2005).
66 "French Air Force Installs Radar System at Nuclear Site," Agence France-Presse, 19 October 2001.
67 Tatsujiro Suzuki, "Implications of 09/11 Terrorism for Civilian Nuclear Industry and Its Response Strategy,"
paper presented at Japan Atomic Industrial Forum-Harvard University Nonproliferation Workshop, Cambridge,
Mass., 30-31 January 2002.
68 "Russia: Terror Groups Scoped Nuke Site," Associated Press, 25 October 2001; Pavel Koryashkin, "Russian
Nuclear Ammunition Depots Well Protected - Official," ITAR-TASS, 25 October 2001.
69 U.S. Department of Energy, "U.S. And Russia Agree to Strengthen Nuclear Material Protection" (Washington,
D.C.: DOE, 29 November 2001; available at http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/releases01/novpr/pr0 1200_v.htm
as of 9 January 2003).
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a summit meeting two months after the attacks, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian
President Vladimir Putin called for "urgent attention" to improving physical protection of
nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.70
Despite the IAEA's usual practice of caution and of waiting until all the views of the
member states could be heard and weighed, IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei
issued a sweeping statement warning that "September 1 1 presented us with a clear and present
danger and a global threat that requires global action." Pointing out that "nuclear security is
only as strong as its weakest link," and that "radiation knows no frontiers," ElBaradei called
for major modifications of the traditional approach of putting nuclear security exclusively in
the sovereign hands of each state, saying that an "unconventional response" was needed, in
which "the whole world needs to join together and take responsibility for the security of
nuclear material." Strongly implying that some form of international system to verify that
adequate nuclear security measures were in place was needed, ElBaradei argued that
"countries must demonstrate, not only to their own populations, but to their neighbors and the
world that strong security systems are in place.... Countries will have something to gain from
allowing international assessments to demonstrate to the world that they are keeping their
nuclear material secure." ElBaradei indicated that an IAEA program costing "at least $30-
$50 million annually" was needed to meet the new threat.
But the system constraints of complacency, policy resistance, sovereignty, and secrecy
remained very much in place. Most of the key officials in most states considered public
concerns over the nuclear terrorism threat to be overblown and the need for additional
security measures to be modest. Few states had any interest in compromising on the
traditional emphasis on secrecy and exclusive national sovereignty in managing security for
nuclear stockpiles, even if allowing some international intrusions on their sovereignty and
secrecy might lead to increased confidence that that other countries were putting appropriate
nuclear security measures in place.
The commercial nuclear industry was placed in a difficult position by the wave of
public concern over nuclear security following the attacks. The industry took three tacks:
emphasizing the high levels of security already in place and the low likelihood that an attack
on a nuclear facility would be successful (including, in the heat of the moment, a number of
statements from industry spokesmen that were patently false - such as the claim by a
representative of the Nuclear Energy Institute that U.S. nuclear facilities were "more secure
than Fort Knox," the major U.S. gold depository); 7 2 offering public support for improved
70 "Joint Statement on New U.S.-Russian Relationship" (Crawford, Texas: The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, 13 November 2001; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-4.html
as of 22 August 2005).
71 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Calculating the New Global Nuclear Terrorism Threat" (Vienna:
IAEA, 1 November 2001; available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2001/
nt_pressrelease.shtml as of 16 September 2005).
72 Michael Mansur, "Nuclear Plant Security Stirs Concern," Kansas City Star, 18 September 2001. To be fair,
anti-nuclear critics offered a number of assessments of nuclear security in the weeks following the 9/11 attacks
that were equally wide of the mark.
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security measures; 73 and working behind the scenes to ensure that the new measures did not
go too far, from the industry's perspective.
Because of these types of policy resistance from many of the key states in the global
nuclear security system and from their nuclear industries, the actual international response to
the 9/11 attacks has fallen far short of ElBaradei's vision. As discussed in more detail below,
suggestions to set specific standards for nuclear security internationally (based on the IAEA's
recommendations in this area); to call for international peer reviews of nuclear security in
individual countries; and even to establish a system of reporting about nuclear security (in
which states would have been able to report at whatever level of detail they felt comfortable
with) were all summarily rejected by experts negotiating a draft amendment to the convention
on physical protection of nuclear material as representing too great an intrusion on secrecy
and sovereignty, just as they had been before the 9/11 attacks. Even so, the amendment to
the physical protection convention was not approved until mid-2005, almost four years after
the 9/11 attacks, and it will be several years more before it enters into force.75 Similarly, after
delaying for years both before and after the 9/11 attacks, the United Nations finally approved
a convention on nuclear terrorism in mid-2005, nearly seven years after it had first been
proposed - but it includes no provisions requiring states to provide high security for their
nuclear material, the most effective means to prevent nuclear terrorism.
In April 2004, the UN Security Council did pass Resolution 1540, legally requiring
every UN member state to provide "appropriate effective" security for their nuclear stockpiles
(among other things) and to report on what it has done to implement the resolution. While
this is potentially very promising, as of late 2006 there had been no effort to define what the
essential elements of an "appropriate effective" nuclear security system were and to convince
states to put them in place. Neither the United States nor any other major exporter (or the
Nuclear Suppliers Group) has tightened its requirements for physical protection of the nuclear
material it exports. In short, states today face few more international requirements for or
constraints on their approach to nuclear security than they did before the 9/11 attacks
occurred.
Nor has the IAEA's response gone as far as the agency once hoped. The IAEA Board
of Governors approved the general outlines of the agency's proposed program to counter
nuclear terrorism, but refused to include such measures in the agency's regular budget,
forcing the agency to rely on voluntary contributions to fund this work. As of mid-2005, the
Nuclear Security Fund had spent $19.5 million in the nearly four years following the 9/11
attacks - far more than had been available for such purposes previously, but substantially less
73 See, as one of many examples, World Nuclear Association, "World Industry Lauds IAEA Initiative on Nuclear
Safety and Security" (London: WNA, 2 November 200 1).
74 Flory, "Revising the CPPNM: Challenges and Constraints."
75 Patricia A. Comella, "Revising the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material--Chapter VI,"
in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz.,
10-14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005).
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than the amount the IAEA had argued after 9/11 was necessary for a single year.76 (For
context, extensive security and accounting upgrades at a single building typically cost in the
range of $10 million.) Within the agency, a great deal of time has been spent on squabbling
over where the boundary between safety and security lies; on how many resources to devote
to protection against nuclear theft, nuclear sabotage, and misuse of radiological sources; and
over who would have control over the nuclear security efforts."
Individual states, in many cases, have made substantial improvements in nuclear
security in the months and years since 9/11 - because they chose to do so for their own
reasons. But in other states, little has changed, and there has been precious little of the whole
world joining together for global action, as ElBaradei envisioned. ElBaradei's call for states
to demonstrate to each other and the world that their nuclear security systems are effective has
been almost entirely ignored. In short, rather than the bold and "unconventional" response
ElBaradei envisioned, the international response to 9/11 has been quite conventional -
highlighting the difficulty of overcoming the system's constraints, even in response to a major
incident.
Policy Tools for Improving System Performance
Reduced risk of nuclear theft and terrorism is the obvious measure of performance
improvements in the global nuclear security system. The cost of those improvements is also
important (particularly as perceptions of that cost will lead to policy resistance that will create
important constraints on the ability to reduce risk). But if the parameter values used as
examples in the nuclear terrorism risk model in Chapter 3 are remotely close to representing
reality, the costs of proposed nuclear security measures are modest by comparison to the
reductions in expected losses that might be achieved. The costs of nuclear security are
certainly quite modest if compared to the sums states routinely pay to improve their military
security, or to the revenue generated from nuclear energy.
Faced with a system with hundreds of almost entirely independent nodes, failure of
any one of which could lead to catastrophic system failure, an engineer asked to suggest steps
to reduce the risk of system failure would recommend: (a) reducing the failure risks of
individual nodes (especially the highest-risk ones); (b) reducing the number of nodes
(preferentially eliminating the highest-risk ones); and (c) increasing the system's capacity to
identify high-risk nodes and to cause them to reduce the risks they pose. With respect to the
global nuclear security system, these approaches correspond to recent recommendations to
urgently upgrade security measures for nuclear stockpiles worldwide; to undertake a rapid
"global cleanout," removing weapons-usable nuclear material entirely from as many sites as
76 International Atomic Energy Agency, "States Agree on Stronger Physical Protection Regime" (Vienna: IAEA,
8 July 2005; available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2005/prn200503.html as of 22 August
2005).
" Interviews with IAEA officials, November 2001, September 2002, May 2003, June 2004, and May,
September, and October 2005. For a recent assessment of the IAEA nuclear security program, see U.S.
Congress, Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards
and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93 (Washington, D.C.: GAO,
2005; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0693.pdf as of 10 May 2006).
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possible worldwide; and to create stringent global standards of nuclear security, with some
mechanism for international organizations or states in the international community to confirm
that states are complying.78
The system behavior just described, however, suggests that the obstacles to
implementing such proposals are substantial. The United States and other participants in the
global nuclear security system have tried a variety of policy tools to improve system
performance over the years, including: seeking to negotiate binding global nuclear security
standards; working out non-binding international recommendations and encouraging states to
follow them; organizing voluntary international peer reviews; providing various types of
international training and advice; imposing requirements for nuclear security as a condition of
nuclear supply; improving nuclear security and accounting measures at individual sites
through direct technical cooperation; and seeking to remove nuclear weapons or weapons-
usable material entirely from particular high-risk sites. What does the record say about how
effective these different policy tools are, under what circumstances? A full exploration of this
history, providing convincing tests of different hypotheses as to what caused the outcomes
observed, is beyond the scope of this chapter (and likely beyond the scope of the available
data as well). The discussion below, therefore, is no more than a best judgment as to the
factors that limited the success of some policy tools and contributed to the progress made by
others.
Criteria are needed to compare the relative efficacy of the different policy tools as they
have been attempted so far. The discussion below will employ three principal criteria: the
speed of any improvements in nuclear security resulting from the use of a particular policy
tool; the security level achieved through the use of that policy tool; and the breadth of
applicability of that tool. Each of these is a crucial ingredient of effectiveness: speed is key,
as even substantial nuclear security improvements, if they took decades to implement, might
not come in time; security level is equally crucial, for even rapid and broadly implemented
security improvements might not solve the problem if the improvements were minimal and
did little to reduce the probability that terrorists and thieves could overcome them; and
breadth of applicability is another essential ingredient, as even substantial security upgrades,
implemented rapidly, might do little to address the threat if they could be implemented at only
a small fraction of the sites requiring upgrades. There may be trade-offs among these criteria,
however: measures that are more broadly applicable, for example, may be less effective in
leading to large and rapid improvements at particular sites.
Each policy tool will be given a 1-5 rating on each of these criteria, as follows:
Speed:
1: 20 years or more between the time when an attempt to use a policy tool was initiated and
when significant improvements in actual nuclear security arrangements occurred
2: 10 years or more between initiation and significant improvements
78 For recent recommendations in all three of these areas, see Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005; Graham
T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1st ed. (New York: Times Books/Henry
Holt, 2004).
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3: 5-10 years between initiation and significant improvements, or possibility that such a pace
could be achieved with that tool with a different approach
4: 2-5 years between initiation and significant improvements, or possibility that such a pace
(or an even faster pace) could be achieved with that tool with a different approach
5: Less than 2 years between initiation and significant improvements
Security Level:
1: Minor improvement in risk of nuclear theft
2: Noticeable improvement, but sites likely still vulnerable to even a small group of
determined attackers, or 1-2 well-placed insiders
3: Substantial improvement, but sites likely still vulnerable to well-planned attacks by a
modest group of attackers, or 1-2 well-placed insiders, or both working together
4: Major improvement, sites probably protected against attacks by modest groups of outside
attackers, 1-2 well-placed insiders, or both working together
5: Dramatic improvement, sites probably protected against squad-size force of well-trained
and well-armed attackers, 1-4 well-placed insiders, or both working together. (This
corresponds roughly to the new rules DOE facilities are being required to meet over the next
few years; few nuclear facilities in other countries are believed to be intended to be protected
at this level.)
Breadth of Applicability:
1: Successfully applied only to 0-9 facilities, little likelihood of broader application.
2: Successfully applied or likely to be applicable to only a small fraction of the facilities with
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide.
3: Successfully applied or likely to be applicable to a substantial fraction of the facilities with
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide, but major classes of
facilities (e.g., all military facilities, or all facilities in countries outside the NPT) excluded.
4: Successfully applied or likely to be applicable to the majority of facilities with nuclear
weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide.
5: Successfully applied or likely to be applicable to all or nearly all facilities with nuclear
weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide.
Binding Multilateral Agreements
As described earlier in this chapter, a series of events and trends in the early-to-mid-
1 970s, particularly the 1972 attack on the Munich Olympics and public concern about the
growth of nuclear energy, contributed to a sharp increase in concerns about the possibility of
nuclear terrorism, particularly in the United States. It was in this context that in 1974, the
Ford administration proposed negotiating an international convention on security for nuclear
material; at the time, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphasized that such a "convention
should set forth specific standards and techniques for protecting materials," whether in
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domestic use or in international transport. 79 The final declaration of the 1975 review
conference for the Nonproliferation Treaty called on all states engaged in peaceful nuclear
activities to "enter into such international agreements and arrangements as may be necessary"
to ensure effective physical protection for nuclear material worldwide.80
After some preliminary meetings, the United States proposed a draft text of an
agreement in mid-1977.81 The U.S. draft would have covered all civilian nuclear material and
facilities; would have required not only measures to prevent theft, but steps to prevent
sabotage as well; and would have required all parties to provide "appropriate measures" to
prevent theft and sabotage, citing the IAEA's physical protection recommendations as a
"useful basis for guiding" states in putting appropriate physical protection in place. Even this
initial U.S. draft was far weaker than previous statements had suggested. It included none of
Kissinger's "specific standards and techniques," specifying no particular security measures to
be taken or specific threat to be defeated; it excluded all military nuclear materials (which
were even more dominant in the world's nuclear stockpiles then than they are today); and it
did not include any verification or compliance measures.82 It appears that this initial draft
represented a U.S. estimate of the most that might potentially be negotiable.
As it turned out, this estimate was incorrect. While some countries argued for going
further than the U.S. draft (for example, extending it to cover military materials and
specifying minimum security measures to be taken), others argued that it intruded too far into
national sovereignty over control of nuclear materials and that it was unwise to even refer to
the IAEA recommendations as a guide, as this would effectively make them mandatory (or so
it was argued). In the end, a decision was taken to pursue a convention with a scope that
could get support from the largest number of countries participating in the talks. Hence, the
final convention, opened for signature in 1980, only required physical protection measures for
nuclear material in international transport (the area that all agreed was a legitimate concern of
the international community), excluding material in domestic use from the physical protection
requirements and did not refer at all to the IAEA recommendations. (The bulk of the
convention's text focuses on useful provisions requiring states to cooperate in the event of a
real theft and establishing procedures for arresting and trying those who participate in real or
attempted nuclear thefts, whichever party to the agreement may catch them.)
What specifics there are on security for material in international transport in the final
convention are extremely broad: states are required to take "appropriate steps" to ensure "as
79 Kissinger's remarks, in a speech to the UN General Assembly, are excerpted in U.S. Senate, Committee on
Government Operations, Peaceful Nuclear Exports and Weapons Proliferation: A Compendium (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 553-554.
80 The full text of the 1975 final declaration can be found in Emily Bailey et al., eds., Briefing Book: Volume //:
Treaties, Agreements, and Other Relevant Documents (Southampton, U.K.: Programme for Promoting Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, 2000).
8 The IAEA has compiled much of the negotiating history of the physical protection convention in International
Atomic Energy Agency, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Legal Series No. 12
(Vienna: IAEA, 1982).
82 The U.S. draft is reproduced in International Atomic Energy Agency, Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material, pp. 7-15.
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far as practicable" that nuclear materials being transported are protected at the levels specified
in an annex. The annex indicates that "Category I" material (the most sensitive weapons-
usable nuclear material), when in storage incidental to international transport, should be in an
area with a fence around it, which only people "whose trustworthiness has been determined"
can enter, and which is under continuous watch by guards (who need not be armed) who are
"in close communication with appropriate response forces." Under the convention,
international transport should only take place once the shipper, receiver, and carrier have
agreed on arrangements, and, for Category I materials, under "constant surveillance" by
escorts in "close communication with appropriate response forces." But there is no
requirement for armed guards, for systems able to defeat any particular level of threat, for any
particular speed at which response forces would arrive, or for any type of intrusion detectors
or portal monitors to detect removal of nuclear material. There are no specifics on how strong
the fence must be or how effective the approaches to determining trustworthiness must be
(and no requirement that the transport be conducted by people whose trustworthiness had
been determined). These requirements are far more general and vague than the IAEA
recommendations on physical protection (which were themselves quite general at the time).
The convention did not gain enough parties to enter into force until 1987, and many key states
(such as India, Pakistan, and Israel, among others) did not become parties until more than a
decade later.83
In 1998, the United States took another run at the idea of creating genuine binding
global nuclear security standards, proposing that the Convention be amended to (a) extend its
coverage to civilian nuclear material in domestic storage, use, and transport; (b) require that at
a minimum, states provide levels of protection comparable to those called for in the IAEA
recommendations; and (c) require that states provide reports on their physical protection
arrangements every five years, to be discussed at international conferences that would also
take place every five years." IAEA staff outlined additional possibilities, including
provisions for protecting against sabotage of facilities as well as theft of materials and
extending the convention's coverage to protection of military as well as civilian nuclear
material.
The IAEA Director General then convened an experts' meeting, which, after some
initial disagreement, recommended drafting an amendment to the Convention extending its
coverage to civilian nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport; adding a
requirement to protect against sabotage of nuclear facilities as well as theft of nuclear
83 For the current list of parties to the convention and the dates at which they acceded, see International Atomic
Energy Agency, "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" (Vienna: IAEA, December 2006;
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm status.pdf as of 5 January 2007).
84 For a discussion of the early stages of these discussions, see George Bunn, "Raising International Standards
for Protecting Nuclear Materials from Theft and Sabotage," Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000;
available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol07/72/72bunn.pdf as of 2 January 2007). For reviews of more recent
discussions, see Comella, "Revising the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material--Chapter
VI.". See also the papers with the same title presented by Comella in each of the previous five years. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright first proposed amending the convention in a 1998 speech surveying the future of
arms control. See Madeleine Albright, "Arms Control in the 21st Century" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department
of State, 10 June 1998; available at http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/albr0610.htm as of 9 May 2006).
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material; stating 12 fundamental principles for physical protection that parties should follow;
and including some additional issues related to confidentiality and national responsibility. As
noted earlier, however, the group opposed including any requirement that states prepare any
form of reports on their physical protection arrangements and regulations; any mechanism for
international peer review of such arrangements; any reference to the much more detailed
IAEA physical protection recommendations, even a requirement to give them "due
consideration" or take them "into account"; and any extension of the convention to material in
military use.85
Ironically, the experts group finished its work and reached these conclusions just
before the 9/11 attacks took place. Those attacks led much of the world public to assume that
increased security measures for nuclear facilities would be put in place, and in many countries
they were. But the conclusions of the pre-September 11 experts' group that there was no need
for specific binding standards, no need for any form of reporting on or review of measures in
place, and no need to cover military stockpiles, were still accepted as gospel. A separate
group was put together to negotiate an amendment to the convention based on the experts'
group recommendations - a process that proved so contentious that the participants were
unable to reach consensus on final language. Austria therefore took it upon itself to circulate
a text where it put in, at each bracketed point, the language it believed had the most
international support. With one modest modification, that text became the agreed amendment
to the convention, which was approved at an international conference in mid-2005, seven
years after the United States had first proposed such an amendment and nearly 4 years after
the 9/11 attacks.
The amendment includes some useful provisions (particularly in extending the
convention's criminal provisions to cover nuclear sabotage as well as nuclear theft), but it is a
far cry from what advocates once envisioned or the United States once proposed. While it
extends the convention's coverage to domestic material, even the extremely vague provisions
on physical protection for material in international transport in the original convention were
8s See discussion in International Atomic Energy Agency, Measures to Improve the Security ofNuclear
Materials and Other Radioactive Materials, GC(45)/INF/14 (Vienna: IAEA, 2001; available at
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC45/Documents/gc45inf-14.pdf as of 9 May 2006). As it turned out, the
United States concluded that not only were all the other participants opposed to making security measures
consistent with the IAEA recommendations mandatory, the U.S. Department of Energy was as well, because
DOE rules categorizing nuclear material were quite different from those recommended by the IAEA, and some
material that should have had substantial protection under the IAEA recommendations was considered under
DOE's rules to be in a lower category requiring minimal protection. See Marshall D. Kohen and Joseph D.
Rivers, "DOE's Involvement in Negotiations on the Question of Whether to Revise the Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," in Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear
Materials Management, Indian Wells, Cal., 14-18 July 2001 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2001). Indeed, by the end
of the talks, the United States was, by some reports, actively opposing proposals to make the proposed
amendment stronger and more specific. As one negotiator for a European country put it, "the U.S. delegation
supports any proposal, as long as it is utterly ineffective." Interview, September 2002. U.S. negotiators deny,
however, that DOE's opposition was influential in the U.S. decision to abandon the notion of incorporating a
requirement to take the IAEA recommendations into account into the amendment, arguing that this requirement
was so broadly opposed it was essential for the United States to drop the idea in order to move forward with the
amendment. Interview with State Department official, July 2003.
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considered too specific to be applied domestically; the amendment only requires that
protection for domestic material be "appropriate" and that parties "insofar as is reasonable and
practicable" follow a variety of "fundamental principles" of physical protection. These
principles are extremely general, in effect requiring that states take responsibility for physical
protection and establish rules for what levels of physical protection there should be, but not
detailing any specific measures that should be taken.86 Kissinger's "specific standards and
techniques" are still nowhere to be found. The amendment will not enter into force until two-
thirds of the parties have ratified it, a process expected to take years.
Similarly, as noted above, while UN Security Council Resolution 1540 legally
requires all states to provide "appropriate effective" security for any nuclear stockpiles they
may have, there has as yet been no national or international effort to define what that means
and to ensure that states are putting the essential elements of an appropriate effective system
into place. 87 And the new nuclear terrorism convention focuses primarily on criminalizing and
prosecuting nuclear terrorism offenses, rather than on physical protection. Article 8 of the
convention, however, does require all parties to make "every effort to adopt appropriate
measures to ensure the protection" of nuclear and radioactive material, "taking into account"
the IAEA's recommendations on physical protection. This reference to the IAEA
recommendations, at least as something to be taken into account (if not necessarily complied
with in full) is particularly interesting, as it proved impossible to get identical language in the
physical protection convention amendment. In part, the explanation may be that the
negotiation of the nuclear terrorism convention was largely carried out by lawyers in New
York, less directly familiar with any concerns their countries' nuclear establishments may
have had about the IAEA recommendations. Moreover, as the nuclear terrorism pact was a
new negotiation, not an amendment to a previous one, there was no prior history of rejecting
attempts to include references to the IAEA recommendations, as there was in the case of the
physical protection convention.
Ratings: This effort to negotiate multilateral agreements to improve nuclear security
rates badly on each of the three criteria described above.
Speed: 2
The pace was glacially slow, from a first proposal in 1974 to entry into force in 1987
for the original convention and first proposal in 1998 to entry into force still years away for
the amendment. Any improvements in nuclear security rules in response to the amendment to
the convention will presumably take years to work their way through the governmental
processes in each country. Even the goad of the 9/11 attacks seems to have done little to
accelerate the process or strengthen the amendment that was ultimately agreed.
86 For the full text of the agreed amendment, see International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Security -
Measures to Protect against Nuclear Terrorism: Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, GOV/INF/2005/10-GC(49)/INF/6 (Vienna: IAEA, 2005; available at
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/Documents/gc49inf-6.pdf as of 9 May 2006).
87 For discussion, see Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005, pp. 110-112.
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Security Level: I
The level of security reached was low, since the original convention offered only very
general requirements for only a tiny fraction of the world's material (that which was under
international transport at any given time), and the amendment has even less specific
requirements for domestic material.
Breadth ofApplicability: 2-3
The breadth of application the physical protection convention negotiations have
achieved was limited. The original convention applied to only a tiny fraction of the world's
nuclear material - the material in international transport at any given time. Even the
amendment excludes the military material that makes up some four-fifths of the world's
stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials. While the original convention now includes a
large fraction of the states with weapons-usable nuclear material on their soil, it will be years
before the same can be said of the amendment. The UNSC 1540 requirement is applicable to
all the world's nuclear stockpiles, but so far has not been used to attempt to achieve
significant improvements in security for these stockpiles.
Summed effectiveness rating: 5-6 (of possible 15)
While the effectiveness of this approach has been limited to date, that does not mean
these efforts have had no value. In several countries, for example, advocates for putting basic
physical protection regulations in place have indicated that the amended convention requiring
such measures would help them convince others in their governments of the need to move
forward. 8 Several tentative lessons can be drawn from this experience.
Lack of belief in the threat will stymie progress. Many states simply do not believe
the threats of nuclear theft and sabotage are as urgent as the United States believed they were
in the mid-I 970s or after the 9/11 attacks. Seeing only modest threats to be addressed, states
were not willing to agree to far-reaching steps to address them.
Differing national approaches and concerns over sovereignty make it difficult to
agree on specific measures. States' desire to maintain the freedom to take whatever approach
to nuclear security they think best stands out as a recurring theme of the physical protection
convention negotiations. The United States believes its approaches to nuclear security are
better than those of other countries; Russia believes its different approaches are equally good;
France prefers its approaches; and so on. A successful global nuclear security standard would
have to be specific enough to be effective, but general enough to allow each country freedom
to pursue its own approach to implementation.
Lack of top-level political attention makes it difficult to push for more effective
measures. Negotiations carried forward at a low political level among "experts" have tended
to mean that the negotiators are closely linked to the nuclear establishments of their respective
countries and do not feel they have the authority to agree to anything that would cost those
establishments more money or force them to change the way they do business. Only at much
88 Flory, "Revising the CPPNM: Challenges and Constraints."
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higher political levels, or with backing from high political levels, would negotiators have the
political leeway to take broader interests more effectively into account.
The search for broad support leads to weak agreements. As the talks have been
structured so far, they have been built around searching for consensus, or, in some cases, for
the language that provoked the fewest objections from participating states. That has
inevitably driven them toward weakened, least-common-denominator approaches. This is not
an inevitable aspect of multilateral negotiations. In cases where many participants believe the
treaty is addressing a serious threat and where top political leaders take a personal interest in
ensuring that the treaty includes effective language, stronger language is often reached in
multilateral fora (the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
being two recent examples). In some multilateral talks, such as the negotiation of the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), key provisions have been worked out between the most
powerful and most interested states, making it possible to develop stronger approaches. In the
case of the physical protection negotiations, negotiators - virtually none of whom had
themselves ever designed or operated a physical protection system - came to focus more on
finding language that would bridge the gaps between different countries' proposals than on
finding language that would make a real difference on the ground, if accepted.
International Recommendations
Another approach that has been pursued for decades is working through the IAEA to
promulgate international "recommendations" on physical protection. The IAEA called
together the first advisory group on physical protection at U.S. instigation in 1971. Led by the
U.S. and Soviet representatives, but with active involvement from several other countries as
well, the group quickly agreed on the first IAEA recommendations for all states on physical
protection, which were published in 1972 and were known as the "Grey Book."89
These recommendations were revised and issued as Information Circular 225
(INFCIRC/225) in 1975. A minor first revision was published in 1977; a more substantial
second revision in 1989; a minor third revision in 1993 (intended only to make slight
modifications to the table for categorizing nuclear materials, so that it was consistent with the
table in the physical protection convention); and the most recent revision, a substantial one
that included extending the recommendations' scope to cover protection against sabotage as
well as theft, was published as INFIRC/225/Rev. 4 in 1999. This most recent revision was
the result of two meetings of a group of international experts, for several days each in June
and October of 1998.90 A new review, intended to produce a fifth revision of INFCIRC/225,
is now beginning. 91
89 The text of the Grey Book is reproduced in U.S. Senate, Peaceful Nuclear Exports.
90 See discussion in the preface of the revised recommendations, in International Atomic Energy Agency, The
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (Vienna:
IAEA, 1999; available at http://www.iaea.or.at/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1999/infcirc225r4c/
rev4_content.html as of 22 December 2006).
91 Interview with Anita Nilsson, head of the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security, October 2005.
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The 1972 recommendations were very general (as U.S. physical protection regulations
were themselves at the time), though still more specific than the physical protection
convention. The recommendations have become more specific and detailed over time.
INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 contains 21 paragraphs of steps to be taken to protect Category I nuclear
material. Such material should be stored and used in inner area within a building, inside a
protected area with a fence or other physical barrier around it; only personnel whose
trustworthiness has been determined are to be allowed access to it; whenever anyone is with
such material they are to be kept under surveillance at all times; the facility should have a 24-
hour guard force (and if the guards are not armed, "compensating measures should be
applied"); all such nuclear material should be stored in a locked and alarmed "strong room"
when not in use; there should be intrusion detectors at the perimeter of the protected area that
communicate to a central alarm station manned by the guard force; the central alarm station
should have "dedicated, diverse, and redundant" two-way voice communication with both the
guard force and off-site response forces; the guard force should have reliable communications
to appropriate armed response forces; regular tests or evaluations of the system's overall
performance should be carried out; and so on. Perhaps most important, states should require
facilities to put in place security arrangements and plans able to defeat a design basis threat
which the state should specify.
While considerably more specific than the physical protection convention, these
recommendations are still extremely general - in part because countries have widely varying
approaches to nuclear security, and experts from those countries, familiar and comfortable
with those pre-existing approaches, did not want to agree to measures that would require them
to be substantially changed. Armed guards are not necessarily required. No minimum threat
to be defended against is mentioned. There is no discussion of how good the fence should be,
how strong the strong-room should be, how reliable the intrusion detectors should be, how
numerous the guards should be, and the like. It is certainly possible to comply with the IAEA
recommendations and have a very modest level of security, not likely to be able to defeat
either a determined outside attack by even a relatively small group of well-trained and well-
armed adversaries, or an insider threat of, say, two well-placed and dedicated insiders
working together.
This international recommendations approach rates significantly better, using the
criteria described above, than the attempts to negotiate binding global standards for nuclear
security.
Speed: 3
Negotiation of each version of the IAEA recommendations has generally been quick
(typically one to two years or less). But implementation in individual countries has often
been slow (often taking years, even for those countries that base their policies on the IAEA
recommendations, to revise their approaches to reflect a new revision of the
recommendations.)
92 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.
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Security Level: 3
Those countries that follow the recommendations reach a security level significantly
higher than would be ensured from following the convention alone (even if a state were to
apply the convention's most specific provisions, intended only for material in international
transport, for domestic material as well). But because the recommendations remain quite
general, the security level ensured by complying with them remains fairly modest by
comparison to the threats terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose in many
countries.
Breadth ofApplicability: 4
With respect to breadth of applicability, the recommendations have been surprisingly
successful. Most of the countries with weapons-usable nuclear material say, in principle at
least, that they comply with the IAEA recommendations. In many countries, physical
protection laws and regulations are explicitly based on - in some cases essentially lifted from
- the IAEA recommendations. Indeed, as discussed below, a variety of nuclear supply
agreements and other bilateral undertakings effectively require a substantial number of
countries to comply with the IAEA recommendations.93 Unlike the convention, the
recommendations are not specifically limited to civilian nuclear material; some countries with
military nuclear material may have implemented additional security measures for those
stockpiles with the IAEA recommendations in mind.
Summed Effectiveness Rating: 10 (out of possible 15)
This experience suggests a number of lessons learned.
Purely advisory recommendations can have substantial impact. While the
recommendations are sometimes disparaged as purely advisory, they have become the de
facto international standard. A variety of countries have in fact changed their physical
protection practices because more secure arrangements were recommended in the latest
revision of INFCIRC/225. Developed countries using nuclear technology typically do want to
be seen as laggards in any aspect of technology, safety, or security and take recommendations
from the IAEA as defining the acceptable level of effort on nuclear security. And as noted
above, many are required by supplier agreements to follow the INFCIRC/225
recommendations, at least for material they received from abroad.
Discussions among technical experts on physical protection lead to more
specifics. While most negotiators for the physical protection convention and its amendment
were foreign ministry representatives, most of those taking part in discussions of
INFCIRC/225 have been technical people who have actually worked on physical protection
systems. They have tended to be willing to engage with each other on the technical specifics
of physical protection systems and to have a certain professional respect for each other,
leading to more rapid agreement on recommendations that were much more detailed.
93 See discussion in Bonnie Jenkins, "Establishing International Standards for Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material," Nonprohiferation Review 5, no. 3 (Spring-Summer 1998; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/
vol05/53/jenkin53.pdf as of 19 July 2005).
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Measures that are not mandatory may be easier to negotiate. Part of the reason
for the rapid negotiation of more specific provisions in the several revisions of INFCIRC/225
may be precisely because states did not have to comply with the measures the experts agreed
to recommend. Because any state could always say "we do not believe implementing that
particular recommendation makes sense," the participants in the discussion likely felt more
freedom to agree to specific measures without digging in their heels on each one they might
not fully support.
Differing national approaches and levels of priority still limit what can be agreed.
It is clear that the widely varying national approaches - and differing views of how urgent the
threat of nuclear theft and terrorism really was - have still limited how far the IAEA
recommendations could go, leaving them still often focused on a least common denominator.
The issue of armed guards for weapons-usable nuclear material is a case in point. In tests in
the United States, well-planned outsider attacks on nuclear facilities sometimes move so
quickly that there is no time for outside response forces to arrive: armed guards on-site are
essential to hold off the attackers until more capable response forces can get to the scene. But
some countries argue that on-site armed guards are not necessary. Japan, in particular, has
argued vociferously over the years that armed guards on-site are not needed if other protection
measures are taken. INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 compromises on this issue, recommending that
sites have guard forces and that if the sites have no armed guards, "compensating measures"
should be taken.
International Peer Reviews
In the area of nuclear safety, as opposed to security, international peer reviews -
organized by both the IAEA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) -
have become a commonplace part of doing business in the nuclear industry. International
peer reviews of security arrangements are far more problematic, because in most countries,
the specifics of nuclear security arrangements are secret. (As noted above, the idea of
requiring such international peer reviews, even if only for civilian facilities, was rejected out
of hand by the negotiators of the amendment to the physical protection convention.)
Nonetheless, in 1996, the IAEA established the International Physical Protection
Advisory Service (IPPAS). 94 IPPAS reviews are purely voluntary; they occur only when a
state asks the IAEA for a review. In most cases, IPPAS reviews have been requested by
countries in transition from communist economies, or developing countries, who were aware
that they needed help with physical protection. In 2003, Norway became the first developed
country to host an IPPAS mission, and Norway subsequently indicated that the results of the
94 For a useful description of IPPAS from a key participant, see Mark Soo Hoo, " IAEA Activities for the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities -- the Role and Importance of IPPAS Missions," in
Eurosafe 2002, Berlin, 4-5 November 2002 (Berlin: Forum for Nuclear Safety, 2002; available at
http://www.eurosafe-forum.org/products/data/5/pe_253_24_1_euro2_5_7_iaeajphysjpro.pdf as of I1 May
2006).
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mission were being used to improve nuclear security in Norway and urged all member states
to make use of this service.95
To date, IPPAS has been based on comparing the physical protection measures in
place to those recommended in INFCIRC/225; hence the security levels recommended as a
result of an IPPAS mission would be no higher than those of INFCIRC/225. An IPPAS
review typically consists of a team of several physical protection experts from different
countries, who might spend a week in a particular country, reviewing physical protection laws
and regulations and the actual security measures in place at one or more facilities in the
country. The team then prepares a report to the state that requested the review, often
suggesting various improvements. These reports are confidential and are not distributed.
The IAEA has no funds for actually carrying out upgrades of nuclear security
hardware at the reviewed sites, and often the requesting states do not have funds available
either. Hence, following IPPAS missions, the IAEA often works with donor states to attempt
to arrange funding for implementing the recommended improvements. In many cases, some
of the experts on an IPPAS review team are from donor states and can make the case directly
to their governments for paying for the improvements the team recommended. Unfortunately,
because the IAEA's role typically ends once a donor state gets involved in implementing the
recommended upgrades, the IAEA does not have complete data on how many IPPAS
missions have in fact resulted in substantial security upgrades being performed.96
Nevertheless, it seems clear, for example, that a significant number of the sites where the
United States has sponsored security upgrades in the former Soviet Union and at research
reactors in other countries had been the subject of IPPAS missions before the upgrades began.
Overall, however, in the decade since IPPAS began, there are probably fewer than 20 sites
with Category I quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials where IPPAS missions have
led to implementation of substantial security upgrades.97
After the 9/11 attacks, with the establishment of the Office of Nuclear Security and the
Nuclear Security Fund at the IAEA, resources became available to do more IPPAS missions.
The IAEA also added other types of international reviews. Now, the most common IAEA-led
reviews are International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) missions, which are
much broader (but shallower) reviews of all aspects of nuclear and radiological security,
ranging from physical protection to capabilities to detect illicit trafficking in radioactive
materials at borders; these are, in effect, preliminary needs assessments, which might
conclude that physical protection at a particular facility required a more detailed IPPAS-type
95 Government of Norway, "Statement by Norway," in 48th IAEA General Conference, Vienna, Austria, 20-21
September 2004 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004; available at
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Statements/norway.pdf as of 10 May 2006).
96 Interview with Anita Nilsson and Richard Hoskins, IAEA Office of Nuclear Security, September 2005.
97 Even if 100% of the 10 sites with weapons-usable material in the non-Russian states of the former Soviet
Union are included, an all seven of the HEU-fueled research reactors where the United States has sponsored
upgrades outside the former Soviet Union are added, this comes to 17 sites. There are likely to be few, if any,
sites where substantial upgrades were implemented as a result of IPPAS missions where the United States was
not involved in some way.
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assessment.98 By the end of 2004, it appears that just under 30 IPPAS missions had been
conducted, in over 20 countries, all but Norway being transition countries or in the developing
world. 99 Since IPPAS missions cover protection from sabotage as well as theft of nuclear
material, by no means all of the countries where IPPAS missions have taken place are
countries with weapons-usable nuclear material.
To date, there is no industry organization providing industry-led peer reviews of
nuclear security and sharing of best practices in security, as WANO does in the area of safety.
This international peer review approach gets mixed reviews using the criteria described
above.
Speed: 4
Typically an IPPAS mission is implemented within a year or less of when it is first
requested; when the team recommends significant upgrades and the requesting state and a
donor state are both willing, these have in some cases been implemented in 2-3 years after the
review. But IPPAS has so far only been able to address a few countries, with only a few sites,
per year; at that rate, it would take an extremely long time to review and recommend upgrades
for all of the most vulnerable nuclear sites worldwide.
Security Level: 3
Because IPPAS recommendations are based on INFCIRC/225, the security level
achieved, if the IPPAS mission and subsequent upgrades are successful, should be the same as
that achieved by compliance with INFCIRC/225. Since INFCIRC/225 is quite general and
does not specify any particular design basis threat that facilities should be defended against,
many facilities may still be vulnerable to capable outside attacking groups, or to theft by 1-2
well-placed insiders, even after upgrades are accomplished.
Breadth ofApplicability: 2
As noted above, IPPAS reviews are limited to those countries that request them, and a
relatively modest number of countries have done so to date. (INSServ missions have been
more widely requested, since a much larger number of countries need to address issues related
to border controls, control of radioactive sources, and the like, than need to address security
for weapons-usable nuclear materials.) It is extremely unlikely that any state will request a
peer review of security at a military site (unless circumstances radically change). It would be
desirable for a wide range of developed states to request IPPAS reviews of their physical
protection arrangements, at least at civilian facilities, making security peer review a normal,
regular part of the nuclear business, as safety peer reviews are. This does not appear to be
likely in the near term, however, despite Norway's good example.
Summed Effectiveness Rating: 9 (out of possible 15)
98 For a discussion of the INSServ and IPPAS missions conducted in 2004, see International Atomic Energy
Agency, Annual Report 2004 (Vienna: IAEA, 2005; available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/
Anrep2004/anrep2004_full.pdf as of 3 January 2007), p. 54.
99 Data compiled from IAEA Annual Reports. Data for 2005 had not yet been published as of spring 2006.
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This experience suggests a number of lessons learned.
Secrecy and confidentiality concerns can be overcome enough to allow useful
international peer reviews of security. While many states are concerned about keeping
their nuclear security approaches secret, a significant number of other states have hosted
IPPAS reviews without noticeable ill effect. IPPAS has established a reputation for discretion
and for keeping security information confidential. The IAEA has long had procedures for
handling confidential safeguards information and has established strengthened procedures for
handling security information that could be helpful to terrorists if made public. All states
could host IPPAS reviews at least of physical protection for civilian nuclear activities without
compromising information that must genuinely remain secret.
Linking reviews to the likelihood of funding for implementing their
recommendations is important. Although the IAEA has no funding to implement upgrades
recommended by IPPAS reviews, it is clear that many of the countries which have requested
IPPAS missions did so in the hope that such a review would be the first step toward receiving
assistance to improve their physical protection arrangements. The perception that funding to
implement IPPAS recommendations is likely to be available is an important part of IPPAS'
effectiveness.
Additional means to convince states to accept IPPAS missions are needed if the
effort is to have broader impact. To date, neither developed countries (except Norway) nor
countries with military nuclear materials (e.g., Russia, China, India, Pakistan) have been
interested in accepting IPPAS missions. The point the Norwegian experience makes is that
everyone, not just countries that "need help," can benefit from independent review and advice
by international experts. With UNSC 1540's creation of a binding obligation on all states to
provide effective security, there would be a justification for pressuring states around the world
to accept IPPAS reviews, at least of non-sensitive civilian facilities. Those states that also
have military nuclear activities could, as they chose, make use of the approaches suggested
during reviews of their civilian activities to improve security for their military activities as
well.
International Training and Guidance
In addition to peer reviews, the IAEA offers a wide range of training courses and
guidance documents related to nuclear security. This approach began with the International
Training Course, focusing on the design and evaluation of physical protection systems,
offered every year or two at Sandia National Laboratories since 1978. Similar courses have
now been offered in several locations around the world. Other courses that are now being
offered range from a workshop on development of a national design basis threat for use in
setting nuclear security regulations to a course on operational use of physical protection
systems. (The IAEA also provides courses on later lines of defense, such as on radiation
detection at borders, and on control of radiological sources.) The IAEA has published or is
developing a wide range of guidance documents on physical protection issues, from a detailed
handbook on how to implement INFCIRC/225 to guidelines still in development on
strengthening nuclear security culture. Indeed, the IAEA now plans a "Nuclear Security
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Series" of publications, paralleling the "Nuclear Safety Series" that have become, in essence,
the global standards for good practice in nuclear safety.100
It is difficult to assess the impact of these training courses and guidance documents on
actual nuclear security levels at sites around the world. There is anecdotal evidence that the
impact has been significant. Many of those in charge of designing or regulating nuclear
physical protection systems in different countries have, at one time or another, been students
in the Sandia course or related courses elsewhere in the world. Some of them have indicated
that these courses significantly affected their careers in physical protection and their thinking
about how best to design a nuclear security system.' 0' Experts in many countries look to the
IAEA for guidance on nuclear security matters. But tracing back the recommendation in a
particular guidance document, or a particular participant in a training course, to specific
improvements in physical protection in a particular country, is a very difficult task.
Speed: Unknown
In some cases, a participant in an international training course may return to his or her
home country and be asked to design a new physical protection system for a site shortly after
participating. Similarly, in some cases countries have essentially developed their regulatory
design basis threat during the course of the IAEA workshop on how to do so, or shortly
thereafter, and this may have resulted in significant upgrades of their physical protection
systems within a year or two thereafter. In other cases, it may take years to draft a guidance
document or prepare a course, and it may be many years after the guidance document is
issued or the course offered that some aspect of it is taken up and implemented in a particular
country.
Security Level: 3
None of the IAEA guidance documents go beyond the INFCIRC/225
recommendations, so one would not expect that the security levels achieved by use of the
guidance documents or training courses would be noticeably higher than those achieved by
compliance with INFCIRC/225. On the other hand, the design basis threat workshop
encourages countries to think through what threats really exist in their country; it may lead to
some countries requiring nuclear facilities to be defended against threats substantial enough
that they will have to have nuclear security systems going far beyond the requirements of
INFCIRC/225.
Breadth of Applicability: Unknown
No one knows exactly how many nuclear facilities in how many countries have
security measures in place that are noticeably better than they would be if these training
courses and guidance documents had not been provided, nor how many facilities might be
affected by these efforts in the future. It seems likely, however, that many states have
implemented at least some improved security measures as a result of these training courses
and guidance documents.
"" Interview with Anita Nilsson, director of the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security, September 2005.
101 Interview with John Matter, Sandia National Laboratory, July 2003.
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Summed Effectiveness Rating. Unknown
It is difficult to draw lessons from this experience, because so little is known about
how effective these guidance documents and training programs are in improving nuclear
security around the world. From anecdotal evidence from participants, however, it seems
clear that these efforts are well worth their very modest cost. The design basis threat
workshops, which help countries put in place a regulatory design basis threat that all their key
nuclear facilities must be prepared to defend against, may have particularly large impacts; the
creation of such a regulatory design basis threat in the 1970s had a major impact on
improving nuclear security in the United States.
Supplier Requirements
Remarkably, for many years the United States exported large quantities of HEU with
absolutely no requirements that it be protected from theft. The United States began requiring
that recipient states maintain acceptable levels of security for U.S.-origin HEU in the mid-
1970s. It appears that West Germany may have been the first state to host a U.S. team to
review the adequacy of its physical protection arrangements before approval of a large U.S.
export.' 02 Also in the mid-1970s, with the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
the United States convinced the other major suppliers to require at least a minimum level of
physical protection for nuclear materials and technologies they exported.' 03 In 1978, the
requirement that recipient states agree to maintain effective security for U.S.-origin material
was written into law, in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
These supplier requirements have never been especially stringent. The United States
requires recipients to protect U.S.-origin material in a manner consistent with the IAEA
recommendations. The NSG guidelines only require that Category I material be in a building
with a fence around it, under constant watch by guards who are in communication with
response forces, to which access is limited to people who have been determined to be
trustworthy.104 The NSG guidelines describe the IAEA recommendations as a "useful basis
for guiding" physical protection efforts in recipient states. Despite the many efforts in
different states to improve nuclear security since the 9/11 attacks and despite a variety of
102 This review is described in an April 1975 Commerce Department document reviewing the then-planned
shipment of HEU to Germany, reproduced in U.S. Senate, Peaceful Nuclear Exports, p. 689. The Commerce
Department report describes the policy of requiring adequate security for HEU in recipient states as "recently
instituted." It indicates that the review concluded that German physical protection arrangements were
comparable to those required in the United States at that time.
103 See the NSG guidelines: International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications Receivedfrom Certain
Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology,
INFCIRC/254/Rev. 7/Part I (Vienna: IAEA, 2005; available at http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PDF/
infcirc254r7pl-050223.pdf as of 20 July 2005). For a discussion of these legal requirements and other legal
agreements in which some states have committed to comply with the IAEA recommendations, at least for
particular designated stocks of material, see Jenkins, "Establishing International Standards for Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material."
1"4 International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/254.
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ongoing efforts to revise the NSG guidelines, there appears to have been no effort to make
either U.S. or NSG physical protection requirements more stringent since the 9/11 attacks.
The United States makes a modest effort to check that countries are complying with
their commitments to provide effective security (as required by U.S. law). Small U.S. teams
occasionally visit recipient states to check on this but this effort is very small: prior to 9/11,
only one to two such visits typically took place per year, meaning that it would be many
years, on average, between one visit to a particular country and the next. The teams do not
have the resources to perform real vulnerability assessments at the sites they visit; instead,
they check off the requirements of the IAEA's recommendations.10 5 It is not clear whether
any of the other suppliers perform similar checks.
Many countries that have been subject to these supplier requirements are also leading
countries which do not want to be seen as laggards in either nuclear safety or nuclear security.
It is difficult to determine whether their actions to comply with the IAEA recommendations
would have occurred regardless of supplier requirements, or were driven by the legal
requirement to comply with their supply agreements. Hence, it is difficult to determine how
much independent effect these supply conditions have had.
Speed: Unknown
No data is publicly available concerning how rapidly, after the policy of requiring
nuclear security consistent with IAEA recommendations as a condition of supply was
adopted, countries changed their physical protection arrangements to come into compliance.
Security Level: 3
Since the level of security the United States has required has been consistency with
IAEA recommendations, the security level rating is the same as that given those
recommendations.
Breadth ofApplicability: 3
A substantial fraction of the civilian nuclear material worldwide is subject either to the
U.S. requirement or to requirements from other supplier states party to the NSG guidelines.
Military material and civilian material not supplied by NSG members, however, is not subject
to these requirements.
Summed Effectiveness Rating: Unknown
A number of lessons can be drawn from this experience.
Many states are willing to legally commit to minimum levels of physical
protection if doing so is part of receiving technology and material from leading
suppliers. A remarkable number of states have been willing to commit to follow the IAEA
recommendations in negotiating nuclear supply agreements with the United States - and to
accept U.S. reviews of physical protection arrangements - even though many of the same
states vociferously rejected requirements to comply with the IAEA recommendations and
accept peer reviews in negotiations over the physical protection convention and its recent
11 Interview with DOE official, April 2002.
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amendment. This suggests that the sovereignty barrier to agreeing on effective international
nuclear security standards is not absolute, but depends on the incentives offered in the
negotiation.
Most suppliers put low priority on ensuring effective security for the material
they supply. It is remarkable that the NSG agreed in 1975 on physical protection
requirements so much less specific than the IAEA guidelines and has not seriously considered
toughening those requirements in the three decades since. Most suppliers appear to make
little effort to ensure that recipients have effective security measures in place. Even the
United States, which has the toughest supplier requirements in this area and does do some
limited checks to ensure that states are complying with those requirements, has given the
effort to ensure security for U.S.-supplied material quite low priority over the years, except at
moments when security for these materials became a political issue (as occurred when
separated plutonium from reprocessing began being shipped from Europe to Japan, for
example, and again in recent years when U.S. weapons-grade plutonium was shipped to
France for fabrication into lead test assemblies of plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX)
fuel).
Technical Cooperation
As the Soviet Union teetered toward collapse in 1991, the U.S. Congress approved the
Nunn-Lugar initiative, authorizing $400 million to assist in dismantling Soviet weapons and
preventing their proliferation. Over the 15 years since, cooperative threat reduction has
grown into a sprawling enterprise addressing many different types of threats, with U.S.
expenditures totaling over $1 billion per year, nearly matched by other participants in the
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,
announced at the 2002 summit of the Group of Eight industrialized democracies.
As part of this enterprise, the United States has worked with Russia and the other
states of the former Soviet Union to install modern security and accounting systems for both
nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear materials. Other donor states have taken part
as well, though on a much smaller scale. Building this cooperation has required overcoming
immense obstacles, from secrecy and distrust to unwieldy contracting procedures.106 For a
period, laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation, with only limited oversight and interference
from central government officials, proved remarkably successful, with technical people
empowered to work directly with their colleagues at individual sites, offering respect, money,
and interesting work that clearly served both countries' security interests, building trust step-
by step. The Russian participants were highly motivated to move the cooperation forward and
pushed for approval within their own government in ways the Americans could not. This
worked far better, in many cases, than government-to-government talks in which mid-level
officials - none of whom would benefit directly from upgrades and each of whom faced
106 For discussions of this history, see, for example, Bunn, "Cooperation to Secure Nuclear Stockpiles"; Caitlin
Talmadge, "Striking a Balance: The Lessons of U.S.-Russian Materials Security Cooperation," Nonproliferation
Review 12, no. 1 (March 2005; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol12/121/121talmadge.pdf as of 2
November 2005); Bukharin, Bunn, and Luongo, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated
Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union.
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significant career risks if the work proved to compromise secrets or lead to the diversion of
funds - sought to negotiate overall agreements at headquarters before any work was done.
Today, although there is much left to do, nuclear security in the former Soviet Union
is very noticeably improved: it would be surprising if there is any facility remaining that is not
protected against the kinds of thefts that occurred in the mid-1990s - a single insider
pocketing material without being noticed, or a single outsider walking through a gajing hole
in a fence, stealing material, and retracing his steps without setting off any alarm.'0 Security
and accounting upgrades have been completed at all the facilities with weapons-usable
nuclear material in the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union (though whether these
upgrades are sufficient to meet the threats that exist in these countries and whether they will
be sustained as U.S. assistance ends remain critical questions). As of the end of fiscal year
(FY) 2005, U.S. and Russian experts have completed all planned security and accounting
upgrades for 54% of the buildings in Russia where weapons-usable nuclear materials are
located (and an initial suite of rapid upgrades for another 23%); similar upgrades have been
completed for some 45% of the sites where nuclear warheads are located in Russia.108
Following a summit accord on nuclear security between President George W. Bush and
Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bratislava in February 2005, progress has accelerated
noticeably, and the two sides have agreed on a joint plan to complete upgrades at all but a few
nuclear material sites (and most nuclear warhead sites) by the end of 2008.
The United States and some other donor states have also pursued technical
cooperation to upgrade security in several other states, as noted above. The United States and
China began a lab-to-lab cooperation on nuclear security and accounting in the 1990s, but this
foundered amid mutual accusations of nuclear spying.109 U.S.-Chinese nuclear security
cooperation recently restarted, and a modem security and accounting system had been
installed at one civilian site with Category I nuclear material in China by the end of 2005.
India has not yet agreed to nuclear security cooperation with the United States, though it has
sponsored IAEA regional workshops on nuclear security issues in India. There have been
some public reports suggesting that Pakistan and the United States are cooperating to some
degree on nuclear security, but no official information is available." 0 Security upgrades have
been completed for several HEU-fueled research reactors in Eastern Europe and for facilities
in Portugal and Greece. Such upgrades are planned for several more facilities as part of
DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).'"
107 For a recent discussion, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006; available at
http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb as of 23 July 2006).
108 See discussion and references in Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006.
109 Nancy Prindle, "The U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program," Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 3
(Summer 1998; available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/53/prindl53.pdf as of 1I May 2006).
"0 Kenneth N. Luongo and Isabelle Williams, "Seizing the Moment: Using the U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal to
Improve Fissile Material Security," Arms Control Today (May 2006; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/
act/2006_05/usindiafissilesecurity.asp as of 12 May 2006).
"' Data provided by DOE, December 2005.
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This cooperation gets higher ratings than some of the other approaches, using the three
criteria outlined earlier.
Speed: 3
The speed of such technical cooperation has varied, in different parts of the program at
different times. When there is political agreement and the pace is limited only by what the
technical experts can get done, comprehensive upgrades for an entire site have in some cases
been implemented within 18 months of the beginning of work. But at many sites, a variety of
bureaucratic obstacles and other problems have delayed the work for years at a time, with the
result that after a dozen years of work, the full set of needed upgrades is completed at only
modestly more than half of the buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia.m
Security Level: 4
Currently, cooperative upgrades in Russia are being designed to provide protection
against a significant group of well-armed and well-trained outside attackers or one to two
insiders, or both working together - a substantially higher security level than required by the
IAEA recommendations (though less than the post-9/1 I design basis threat DOE facilities are
required to defend against). Whether corruption and lack of security culture among the
guards and staff at some sites will undermine security even after modem equipment is in place
remains an open question, however. Whether high levels of security will be sustained after
U.S. and international assistance comes to an end remains an equally difficult question.
Breadth of Applicability: 4
After years of negotiation, U.S. and Russian experts are working together throughout
Russia's nuclear weapons complex, its civilian nuclear complex, its naval complex, and at
many of Russia's nuclear warhead facilities. The two remaining nuclear warhead
assembly/disassembly facilities are the main nuclear material sites that are still off-limits to
cooperation. In principle at least, some of the approaches developed in Russia - with
modifications to address the even greater secrecy barriers in some other countries, cultural
differences, and other issues - could be applied for a large fraction of the world's nuclear
stockpiles. In the cases of high-income developed countries, cooperation would be more
likely to take the form of technical interchange than U.S.-funded assistance.
Summed Effectiveness Rating: 11
As efforts to improve nuclear security worldwide move forward, lessons should be
drawn from the experience in Russia - though the approaches developed in this cooperation in
Russia will have to be modified substantially to succeed in other contexts where the United
States is now pursuing nuclear security cooperation, from China to India and Pakistan. Four
lessons from U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation over the last 15 years will be crucial
to success.' m
Top-down, bottom-up, but not middle-through. The effect of the Bratislava
summit demonstrates that presidential leadership can have a major effect in breaking through
112 See discussion in Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006.
113 This discussion is drawn from Bunn, "Cooperation to Secure Nuclear Stockpiles."
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obstacles to nuclear security cooperation. Presidential initiatives are particularly effective
when powerful and motivated actors are assigned to follow through. As the remarkably
successful experience with U.S.-Russian laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation lab-to-lab
experience shows, bottom-up initiatives starting with technical experts at individual sites can
also be remarkably powerful, if they remain beneath the radar of officials who may be
motivated to put obstacles in their path. Mid-level nuclear officials, by contrast, usually have
little flexibility to introduce major changes in approaches to nuclear security and usually resist
foreign attempts to convince them to do so. The bottom-up approach, however, is more likely
to work in countries undergoing revolutionary transformation, as Russia was in 1992, or in
more stable countries where the necessary work is modest in scale and not especially sensitive
(such as upgrading security or converting the fuel at a single HEU-fueled research reactor, the
only nuclear facility of concern in many countries), or where cooperation at sensitive nuclear
installations has a public imprimatur from the highest levels.
In general, the experience of the past 15 years suggest that innovations in nuclear
security are most likely to be successful when they are driven forward by a small group of
committed and well-connected individuals who are able to take advantage of events that
create a sense of urgency (as in the cases of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
nuclear material seizures in 1993-1994). Such small groups are able to maintain substantial
creativity and flexibility in their approaches and to build trust with foreign partners.
Innovations are most likely to be blocked, slowed, or overturned when large numbers of
officials and agencies become involved, many of whom may be committed to past approaches
or may not see the advantages of new ones.
Partnership works. As the lab-to-lab effort (and the nuclear security cooperation
with the Russian Navy that followed it) show, cooperation on nuclear security is most
effective when it incorporates ideas and resources from both sides. Countries such as China,
India, and Pakistan are far more likely to join an effort framed as a partnership of the leading
nuclear states to ensure nuclear security worldwide than one described as assistance to
countries too weak and uninformed to take care of nuclear security themselves. Building trust
among the participants in such a partnership is crucial to gaining the flexibility needed to
overcome the inevitable obstacles. Despite the urgency of the problem, in some cases it is
necessary to start with small projects to build trust before expanding to more substantial
efforts. It is also essential to follow through on what has been agreed, rather than ripping up
previous agreements. Only when the people who will use and maintain an improved nuclear
security system are directly involved in conceiving, designing, and implementing the new
approach are they likely to work their own government to overcome obstacles and to use and
maintain the new system effectively after foreign assistance comes to an end. This lesson is
not unique to nuclear security cooperation: a major World Bank study, for example, pointed
out that 62% of rural water projects that promoted extensive participation by the recipients
were successful, compared to only 10% that did not." 4
"4 World Bank, Assessing A id: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford
University Press, 1998). For a useful discussion of the specific differences between partnership-based
approaches and donor-recipient approaches, see Albert R. Wight, "Participation, Ownership, and Sustainable
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Building commitment and a sense of urgency is crucial. If senior officials and
facility managers are to assign sufficient resources to nuclear security and do the political
work to change approaches, they must be convinced that the threat of nuclear theft and
terrorism is real and urgent. Measures that might be taken include joint threat briefings by
senior experts from the United States and the potential partner country; war games and similar
simulations of nuclear terrorism scenarios, which engage hearts and minds in a way that paper
reports and briefings never do; putting together teams of security experts from potential
recipient countries to do rapid assessments of vulnerabilities at their own nuclear facilities (as
DOE did for its facilities after the 9/11 attacks); working with countries to help them identify
insider and outsider threats their facilities should be defended from (as the IAEA has been
working to do in recent years); and producing training videos for facility managers and staff
outlining the dangers of nuclear theft and sabotage, including emotional ima es of Hiroshima
and Chernobyl to highlight the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism.1 5
Flexible approaches on secrecy and access are needed. To be successful, security
upgrade programs in many cases will have to acknowledge that countries are simply not going
to reveal all of their nuclear security secrets. For example, Pakistan is very unlikely to allow
U.S. or other foreign experts to visit all its nuclear weapon storage facilities and fully
understand their security vulnerabilities; Pakistan is legitimately concerned that the United
States might at some time want to destroy or seize control of its nuclear arsenal, or might
inadvertently leak secrets to India. India has similar concerns, as does China. But there is a
great deal that can be done to improve security for nuclear sites without actually seeing them
or learning anything very specific about them - from detailed discussions of techniques and
best practices for assessing vulnerabilities to outsider and insider threats, to identifying some
of the best commercially available equipment, to training and other help with writing and
enforcing effective nuclear security rules. Using methods developed in the lab-to-lab
program, the United States or other donor countries can finance security upgrades at sites their
experts will never visit, while ensuring that their money is being spent appropriately.
Material Removals
Improved security arrangements can only reduce, never eliminate, the risk that
nuclear material will be stolen from a particular site. The risk of nuclear theft from a site can
be entirely eliminated only by removing the nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear
material from that site, so that there is nothing left to steal. Moreover, if the number of sites
to be protected can be reduced, higher security levels can be purchased at lower total cost.
Hence, efforts to convince sites around the world to abandon the use of weapons-usable
nuclear material and allow the material at their sites to be removed are another key policy tool
for strengthening the global nuclear security system.
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Development," in Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries,
ed. Merilee S. Grindle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
115 For a discussion of such measures, focused primarily on their potential use in Russia, see Bunn and Wier,
Securing the Bomb 2005, pp. 96-97.
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Such efforts began in earnest in 1978, with the launch of the Reduced Enrichment for
Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, whose goal has been to convert as many as
possible of the world's HEU-fueled research reactors to use LEU instead. By late 2005, 32
reactors had fully converted to the use of LEU fuel (with 10 more in the process of
conversion), and DOE was hoping to convert the remaining 74 reactors on its target list of 106
facilities by the end of 2014.116 Unfortunately, however, DOE's list excludes nearly half of
the HEU-fueled reactors currently operating in the world, which are judged to be too difficult
to convert to LEU, for one reason or another (some, for example, are fast reactors, which
would have difficulty achieving criticality with LEU). 7 Moreover, over the years it has
become clear that many reactor operators are reluctant to convert to LEU, and substantial
incentives are required to convince them to do so. Under a U.S. law known as the Schumer
amendment, passed in 1992, U.S. HEU can only be exported to research reactors that (a)
cannot use existing LEU fuels, and (b) commit to convert to LEU as soon as suitable fuels
become available. Similarly, the U.S. offer to take back irradiated U.S.-origin research
reactor fuel excludes reactors that could convert to LEU but refuse to do so. These steps have
given those reactors that need regular supplies of fresh fuel and need a place to send their
irradiated fuel strong incentives to agree to convert. But for reactors that have other supplies
of fresh fuel and other plans for their irradiated fuel, along with reactors that fuel cores that
will last for many years or for the lifetime of their facilities, there are few incentives to
convert to LEU.
The U.S. take-back offer, renewed in 1996, represents a complementary effort to
reduce the number of sites around the world where poorly protected HEU continues to exist.
Unfortunately, however, to date the offer does not cover some two-thirds of the U.S.-supplied
HEU abroad (because the 1996 renewal was limited only to types of material the United
States had facilities ready to process), and only about half of the material that is covered is
expected to be returned, unless stronger incentives are put in place to convince facilities to
take advantage of the offer.118 In any case, after a 2005 extension of the deadline for the take-
116 Christopher Landers, "Reactors Identified for Conversion: Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test
Reactors (RERTR) Program," in RERTR 2005: 27th International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research
and Test Reactors, Boston, Mass., 6-10 November (Argonne, Ill.: Argonne National Laboratory, 2005; available
at http://www.rertr.anl.gov/RERTR27/PDF/S9-1 _Landers.pdf as of 20 June 2006). For useful recent overviews
of efforts to remove HEU from reactor sites around the world, see Frank von Hippel, "A Comprehensive
Approach to Elimination of Highly-Enriched Uranium from All Nuclear Reactor-Reactor Fuel Cycles," Science
and Global Security 12, no. 3 (November 2004); Alexander Glaser and Frank N. Von Hippel, "Thwarting
Nuclear Terrorism," Scientific American 294, no. 2 (February 2006).
117 Data compiled by Frank von Hippel and Alexander Glaser of Princeton University. Frank von Hippel,
personal communication, December 2005.
118 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Report: Recovery of Highly Enriched
Uranium Provided to Foreign Countries, DOE/IG-0638 (Washington, D.C.: DOE OIG, 2004; available at
http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0638.pdf as of 3 March 2005); U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Office,
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Consider Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable
Uraniumfrom Other Countries to the United States and Russia, GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004;
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0557.pdf as of 2 February 2005).
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back, this take-back effort is not expected to be completed until 2019.'19 In recent years, the
United States and Russia have been cooperating on similar efforts to convert Soviet-supplied
research reactors to LEU and to return Soviet-supplied HEU to Russia (or blend it to LEU
outside of Russia).
In 2004, all of these reactor conversion and take-back efforts were consolidated in the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which was given a mission to accelerate and strengthen
efforts to remove weapons-usable nuclear material from vulnerable sites around the world.2N
HEU has been removed from several Soviet-supplied sites in the last several years. In the
aftermath of the Bush-Putin Bratislava summit in 2005, Russia and the United States agreed
on a schedule for returning Soviet-supplied HEU to Russia by the end of 20 10.121 DOE
expects, however, that some countries with Soviet-supplied HEU will prefer to use it as
reactor fuel or blend it down outside of Russia, rather than sending it back in the near term,
and these steps may take longer. As a result, DOE does not expect to complete its efforts to
eliminate these Soviet-supplied HEU stockpiles until 2013.m In this case, too, DOE is
finding that some facilities are quite reluctant to give up their HEU and that substantial
incentives may be needed to convince them to do so.
Before the launch of GTRI, there had also been several ad-hoc efforts to remove HEU
from vulnerable sites, including Project Sapphire (which air-lifted some 580 kilograms of
HEU from the Ulba fuel facility in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, to the United States);
Operation Auburn Endeavor (which airlifted several kilograms of HEU from a small research
facility in Tbilisi, Georgia, to the British reprocessing facility at Dounreay in 1998); and
Project Vinca (which airlifted 48 kilograms of HEU from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear
Sciences near Belgrade to Russia in 2002). Although each of these was considered urgent, for
security reasons, each took years to organize, and each required a different package of
incentives to close the deal. Indeed, in the case of Project Vinca, the U.S. government
concluded that none of its agencies had the authority or funding to offer to pay for managing
the institute's spent fuel, which was the Yugoslav price for sending away the fresh HEU at the
119 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security
Administration--Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, vol. 1, DOE/CF-002 (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2006;
available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/07budget/Content/Volumes/VollNNSA.pdf as of 3 January
2007), p. 562.
120 Spencer Abraham, "International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna: Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary
Spencer Abraham" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, 26 May 2004; available at
http://www.energy.gov/news/1800.htm as of 12 May 2006). Several colleagues and I had been pressing for the
establishment of such a program for years, and administration officials have indicated privately that these
recommendations were influential in the establishment of GTRI. For an early proposal, see Matthew Bunn, John
Holdren, and Anthony Wier, Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action
(Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear
Threat Initiative, 2002; available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/securingnuclearweapons-and-materials_
May2002.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
121 "Statement on Nuclear Security Cooperation with Russia" (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of
the Press Secretary, 30 June 2005; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050630-
4.html as of 7 July 2005).
122 Interview with DOE officials, December 2005.
123 U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2007 Defense Nuclear Nonprolferation Budget Request, p. 562.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 5348
site, and the private Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) had to step in with a $5 million
commitment. This experience helped drive the decision to establish the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative.124
Individual states have also taken steps to consolidate their nuclear stockpiles. In the
United States, for example, the number of private facilities with weapons-usable nuclear
material has declined dramatically since the 1970s, in part because the cost of meeting new
security requirements for such material created an incentive to get rid of it. The Department
of Energy has consolidated its nuclear material holdings in fewer buildings at some sites and
has closed other major sites entirely (such as Rocky Flats), saving hundreds of millions of
dollars a year in safety and security costs. DOE is continuing its effort to consolidate its
stocks.2  In Russia, the number of nuclear warhead facilities has been reduced substantially
with the pull-back of nuclear weapons from Eastern Europe and the non-Russian states of the
former Soviet Union and the large-scale removal of tactical weapons from front-line
deployments that accompanied the Bush-Gorbachev nuclear initiatives of 1991-1992.126 But
the number of nuclear warhead sites is still far larger than seems necessary for post-Cold War
nuclear needs, and Russia appears to have had little interest in planning and implementing a
large-scale consolidation of weapons-usable nuclear materials. (U.S. efforts to convince
Russia to remove material entirely from some sites as part of the Material Consolidation and
Conversion sub-program have run into strong resistance.)
This complex of approaches receives mixed ratings using the criteria above.
Speed.: 2-4
Different parts of the material removal effort have moved at different speeds. The
pace of reactor conversion has been glacially slow, amounting to just over one reactor
converted per year in the nearly three decades since the effort began; while DOE now plans to
accelerate that pace dramatically, to meet its goal of converting 74 more reactors by 2014,
whether it will succeed remains an open question. The ad-hoc efforts to remove material
from particular vulnerable sites seemed painfully slow given participants' fears that the
material would be stolen before it was removed, but most of these efforts did succeed in
getting material removed within a couple of years of when the initiative began in earnest -
and it appears this pace is accelerating with the more focused, less ad-hoc approach being
taken in GTRI.
124 For a useful discussion of these cases, see Philipp C. Bleek, Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the
Civil Nuclear Material Threat (Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, 2004;
available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/bleekglobalcleanout.pdf as of 13 April
2005).
125 For a far-reaching set of non-government proposals for consolidation, see Project on Government Oversight,
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2005; available
at http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ho-050301 -consolidation.html as of 30 December 2006).
126 For useful discussions, see Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia 's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part
11: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations, vol. FOI-R-1 588-SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense
Research Agency, 2005; available at http://www.foi.se/upload/pdf/FOI-RussiasTacticalNuclearWeapons.pdf as
of 12 April 2005); Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part I:
Background and Policy Issues, vol. FOI-R-- 1057--SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2003).
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Security Level: 5
Where the weapons-usable nuclear material is removed entirely, the probability of
nuclear theft is reduced to zero.
Breadth of Applicability: 3
While international cooperative efforts to remove weapons-usable nuclear material
have been completed at only a modest number of sites to date, they are potentially applicable
to a much broader range of facilities. IAEA experts, for example, estimate that of the roughly
270 research reactors operating in the world today (roughly half of which use HEU fuel), only
30-40 are needed for the long term 2 7 - meaning that 80-90% of the world's research reactors
can be shut down and their material removed. Many of the remainder can be converted to
LEU. In the United States, Russia, and potentially some other nuclear weapon states,
substantial consolidations of military nuclear stockpiles into fewer locations remain feasible
and desirable.
Summed Effectiveness Rating: 10-12
A variety of lessons can be drawn from this experience.
Rapid success in material removals requires packages of incentives to convince
states and facilities to give up their weapons-usable material. The experience to date
suggests that incentive packages are needed that are targeted to the needs of each individual
facility. Needed incentives could include: help converting a reactor to LEU; help shutting a
facility down and decommissioning it; contracts for the site's scientists to do other research
not requiring the weapons-usable material in question; help managing irradiated fuel and
radioactive waste at the site; or, in some cases, incentives to motivate the government to
cooperate, which may be unrelated to the particular facility in question (as was the case with
some of the incentives package provided to Kazakhstan as part of Project Sapphire, for
example). 2 8 Unfortunately, to date GTRI has taken the view that it will provide assistance to
reactors to convert to LEU and will seek to ensure that conversion does not make them worse
off, but will not fund any incentives that would make them better off as a result of
conversion. 129
Success requires a focused, comprehensive approach, with a comprehensive set of
tactics. The establishment of GTRI, pulling together and expanding what had previously
been a set of small, stove-piped programs working on pieces of the material-removal problem,
has already accelerated the pace of removals. GTRI still needs to expand its approach,
however, to cover the full universe of potentially vulnerable materials and reactors, to include
offers of targeted incentives, to include shut-down as well as conversion as a policy option,
127 International Atomic Energy Agency, "New Life for Research Reactors? Bright Future but Far Fewer
Projected" (Vienna: IAEA, 8 March 2004; available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/
ResearchReactors/reactors2004O3O8.html as of 5 January 2007).
128 Bleek, Global Cleanout.
129 Interview with DOE officials, December 2005.
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and to more regularly call in high-level political leaders when needed to press a particular
country to cooperate. 130
Some Overall Lessons From Past Efforts to Improve Nuclear Security
There are several overarching lessons from the experience with the policy tools just
discussed that will be applicable to any near-term effort to improve the performance of the
global nuclear security system. First, building the sense of urgency and commitment in other
countries is absolutely critical. If other countries do not believe there is a real threat to their
own security that needs to be addressed, any attention they devote to nuclear security will be
grudging and half-hearted. Second, in most cases mid-level officials are simply not able to
overcome the systemic obstacles to agreement on in-depth nuclear security cooperation or
stringent nuclear security standards. If a really fast-paced global effort to improve security for
nuclear stockpiles or a stringent global nuclear standard are to be put in place, this will have
to be done at the highest political levels - and probably in a way that largely bypasses the
relevant bureaucracies as was done, for example, in the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev nuclear
initiatives (which led to the pull-back and dismantlement of many thousands of nuclear
weapons) or, more recently, in the Bush-Singh accord on civil nuclear cooperation with India.
Those past accords, along with the results of the Bush-Putin Bratislava summit, make clear
that presidential intervention can make a real difference in overcoming apparently systemic
obstacles. Third, approaches based on real partnership, demonstrably serving the interests of
all parties and incorporating ideas and resources from all parties, are likely to be far more
effective than approaches where this sense of partnership is missing. The days when the
United States could simply dictate nuclear approaches to other countries are long gone.
Fourth, incentives are critical - at the levels of states, of key ministries within those states, of
facility managers, and of individuals and teams on the staff of particular sites. As effective
nuclear security measures are expensive and often inconvenient, the incentives to cut corners
on security are high; strong incentives pointing the other direction are essential to ensuring
effective and sustainable security for the world's nuclear stockpiles.
130 Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006. GTRI managers have been reluctant to pursue a shut-down agenda
out of fear that reactor operators who see them as coming to shut their facility will react negatively and be
unwilling to cooperate on conversion to LEU. This is a legitimate concern. It is possible that a shut-down
initiative should be pursued separately, perhaps as an IAEA-led "Sound Nuclear Science Initiative," focused on
getting the needed nuclear science, testing, training, and isotope production done at the least cost.
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations
In this dissertation, I have examined several of the most important elements of the
problem of nuclear terrorism:
* How big is the risk?
" How can we assess which nuclear facilities and transport legs are the biggest contributors
to this risk?
" What policy tools can be expected to be most effective in improving security at these
facilities and transport legs, so as to reduce the risk or nuclear theft and terrorism?
How Big is the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism?
In Chapters 2 and 3, I provided both a qualitative assessment of the risk of nuclear
terrorism and a quantitative model for structuring thinking about this risk. The qualitative
assessment made clear that:
" Some terrorist groups have actively sought the means to make nuclear bombs;
" It is plausible that a well-organized and sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude
nuclear bomb if they got the needed weapons-usable nuclear material;
" World stockpiles include tens of thousands of nuclear weapons possessed by possessed by
nine countries (and deployed on the territory of a few more) and many hundreds of tons
of weapons-usable nuclear material, which exists in more than forty countries worldwide;
" Security measures currently in place for nuclear weapons and materials vary widely, with
some stockpiles very secure and others demonstrably not secure enough to protect against
some of the threats that terrorists and criminals have shown that they can pose; and
" There are so many ways to introduce nuclear material or a nuclear bomb across the border
of a major state that measures to prevent nuclear smuggling can only make a modest
contribution to reducing the overall threat of nuclear theft and terrorism.
At the same time, however, this assessment also indicated that:
* The few terrorist nuclear weapons efforts about which data has become available to date
have largely been fairly unsophisticated and do not appear to have achieved an in-depth
understanding of the technical subjects that would have to be mastered to build a bomb
(though other terrorist groups or cells may, for all we know, have mastered those subjects
or be in the process of doing so);
" There is no conclusive evidence that either a nuclear weapon or the materials to make one
have yet fallen into the hands of terrorist groups or hostile states;
e Security for many nuclear stockpiles around the world has improved markedly in the years
since the 9/11 attacks;
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 6 353
* The spotty evidence available suggests that the difficulty of making connections and
closing deals between people in a position to steal nuclear material and potential buyers is
a significant obstacle to nuclear terrorism; and
" The overthrow of the Taliban regime that gave al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan and the
substantial damage inflicted on the old centrally-controlled al Qaeda since the 9/11 attacks
have probably significantly reduced al Qaeda's chances of success in carrying out a
complex project like getting a nuclear weapon or weapons-usable material and
transforming them into workable nuclear explosive.
In Chapter 3, I presented a mathematical model of the risk of nuclear terrorism, based
on assigning estimated probabilities to an event tree of various possible terrorist decisions
about how to attempt to get nuclear weapons and the probabilities of success or failure at
various steps on those paths. I then discussed the publicly available information that could
inform judgments about how large or small each of the key parameters might be. A numerical
example of the use of the model, using plausible values for each of the model parameters,
resulted in an estimated 29% probability of a terrorist attack using a nuclear explosive
somewhere in the world over the next decade, leading to an estimated expected cost over 10
years of over $1 trillion. While this probability estimate is extremely uncertain, even far more
optimistic values for key parameters still led to an estimated 8% 10-year probability; reducing
the estimated probability to I % over 10 years would require very optimistic estimates - and
would still result in an expected cost of some $40 billion over 10 years.
In short, Chapters 2 and 3 together made a strong case that the risk is big enough to
justify a substantial effort to reduce it. No one in their right mind would operate a large
nuclear power plant upwind of a major city that had a one-in-a-thousand annual probability of
a catastrophic radioactive release; that would correctly bee seen as far too high a risk to be
acceptable. Yet the arguments in Chapter 2 and 3 strongly suggest that the way the global
nuclear security system is operating today imposes at least this high an annual risk of the
destruction of a major city somewhere in the world - and probably a much higher risk.
Chapter 3 strongly suggested that the most effective measures to reduce the risk of
nuclear terrorism are those that have their effect early in the event tree - in particular,
counterterrorism efforts that reduce the number of plausible nuclear terrorist groups and their
effectiveness and improvements in nuclear security that reduce the probability that nuclear
material could be successfully stolen. The key advantage of nuclear security efforts, even
over counter-terrorism efforts, is that they do not require intelligence breakthroughs: most of
the locations where security improvements are needed are well known, as are the technologies
and approaches that offer improved security. The key obstacles to be overcome are political,
centering around complacency, secrecy, and national sovereignty. Once a nuclear weapon or
nuclear material has left the facility or transport leg where it is supposed to be, by contrast,
efforts to recover it and prevent it from being used in a terrorist nuclear attack are all
variations on looking for needles in haystacks - except that there are intelligent adversaries
trying to keep the needles hidden.
A key result in Chapter 3, which was not derived from the model but based on analysis
of how large the estimated probability of successful insider and outsider thefts should be in
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the model, was that it is not the average nuclear security measures in a particular country that
are important, but their distribution - and in particular whether there are some facilities with
particularly weak security measures. In essence, the probability of successful theft is only
substantial where the distribution of security levels and the distribution of capabilities thieves
can bring to bear overlap - that is, where there is a good chance thieves can pull together a
level of capability beyond the level the security system can cope with. Hence, the small
portion of facilities and transport legs that are most vulnerable and face the highest threats
pose a large fraction of the total risk - both because thieves are more likely to choose to try to
steal from them (if they correctly detect these security weaknesses) and because they are more
likely to succeed if they do. This suggests that relatively modest investments in improving
security (or removing the stockpiles to be stolen) at a few especially vulnerable sites facing
especially high threats might lead to a large reduction in overall risk. If, on the other hand,
terrorists are able to detect and respond to the increased security levels - for example
recruiting additional participants for the theft attempt - the reduction in risk from improving
security at the most vulnerable sites would be less.
How Can We Assess Where the Biggest Risks Lie?
In Chapter 4, I laid out a detailed methodology for assessing which nuclear facilities
and transport legs posed the greatest risks of nuclear theft. In this approach, the overall risk is
assessed by combining the probability of successful theft and the probability that a successful
theft would lead to successful bomb-making.
The probability of successful theft is determined by the threat level (that is, the kinds
of capabilities thieves are able to bring to bear for a theft attempt in that country) and the
security level (that is, the kinds of capabilities the nuclear security system at a particular
facility or transport leg are able to defeat). In Chapter 4, I described a wide range of types of
capabilities thieves might bring to bear in attempting to steal nuclear weapons or materials
and a wide range of information and sources for acquiring it that analysts should make use in
making estimates of threat levels and security levels.
The probability of successful bomb-making after a successful nuclear theft is
determined by the quantity and quality of the nuclear material stolen, as it relates to the
capabilities of the recipients of the material (or the particular safeguards against unauthorized
use in place and the quantity and quality of the material contained, in the case of theft of an
actual nuclear weapon). In Chapter 4, I assessed the difficulties sub-national adversaries
would face in overcoming a wide range of isotopic, chemical, radiological, and other barriers
to bomb-making that might be posed by different types of material that might be stolen.
Based on these assessments, I assigned "discount factors" - estimated factors by which the
probability of successful bomb-making would be reduced by the characteristics of the
material, compared to the probability in the case of large quantities of weapon-grade HEU
metal - to a wide range of types of material.
A key result from this examination was that current systems for categorizing nuclear
materials in use by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the purposes of
assigning different levels of security requirements are badly flawed and allow some materials
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that potentially might be quite attractive for sub-national bomb-making to have only modest
levels of protection. In particular, I argued that many of the systems represented not "graded
safeguards" but "cliffed safeguards," in which, once nuclear material reached an essentially
arbitrary threshold (such as emitting more than 100 rad per hour at one meter), the protection
it was afforded plummeted. I offered an alternative categorization approach based on the
discount factors I had developed, the use of which would result in a more genuinely graded
approach to physical protection.
I then offered an illustrative example of how the method for assessing the relative
security risks posed by different nuclear facilities and transport legs that I was proposing
could be implemented in practice. In this example, I used two modestly different
implementations of the proposed method to rate the risks of nuclear theft in several countries,
ranging from countries with very high threats (such as Russia and Pakistan) to countries with
quite low threat levels (such as Japan). One of these implementation approaches focused on
directly estimating the probability that a theft attempt that occurred in a particular country
would be in each of several bins of capability and the probability that an attempt in any
particular bin of capability would be successful in defeating the security measures in place in
that country. The other approach focused on giving each country a 1-5 rating on threat level
and a 1-5 rating on security level, based on as objective criteria as possible, and estimating
how such ratings might translate into probabilities of successful theft. Both approaches used
the discount factors developed earlier in the chapter. The results of the two approaches were
generally consistent, though not in every detail.
This illustrative assessment made clear that the risks of nuclear theft in Russia and
Pakistan remain unacceptably high, given the extremely high threats in these countries, the
nuclear weapons and high-quality nuclear materials that exist there, and the improved but still
moderate security measures in place. It also made clear, however, civilian research reactors
fueled with HEU may pose significant risks even if they are in relatively low-threat countries,
if they have significant amounts of relatively high-quality HEU on-site and modest security
measures.
In the final section of Chapter 4, 1 pointed out that in assigning policy priorities, such
risk assessments have to be integrated with opportunity assessments, so that easy
opportunities for further reducing risk at moderate-risk sites or transport legs will not be
missed (and the need for new approaches can be identified early for high-risk sites or
transport legs where lack of cooperation seems to suggest little opportunity for progress).
What Policy Tools Are Likely to be Most Effective?
In Chapter 5, I examined the structure and dynamics of the global nuclear security
system - how security levels at different facilities and transport legs are determined in an
ongoing dynamic between the management of those elements and national regulators, with
only limited international influences on the performance of the nuclear security systems in
individual countries. There are no specific, binding global standards for nuclear security,
though international recommendations, very general international agreements, and
international technical cooperation have had a substantial influence on national approaches in
many countries.
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This examination first outlined the global nuclear security system's structure, with the
system elements and feedbacks among them. I then examined the great extent to which
changes in the system are driven by responses to particular incidents or investigations. I
highlighted the importance of regulation in the overall nuclear security system, as few
managers will invest their scarce resources in nuclear security when they are not required to
do so. The next sections outlined certain key properties of the system and contraints on
improved system performance (as measured by reduced risk of nuclear theft), including:
" Constraints imposed by complacency about the threat and the adequacy of existing
measures to address it; structural disincentives (in particular, the circumstance that the
costs of preventive action are immediate and visible while the benefits from thefts
prevented that might not have occurred anyway are highly uncertain and accrue at some
unknown point in the future) and effective policy resistance (the tendency of affected
parties to push back against those attempting to impose new policies, such as stricter
regulations, that impact their own interests).
" Delays and institutional lock-in, each of which greatly limit the system's ability to
respond to changing threats and adapt as quickly as terrorists and other potential
adversaries may be able to do. This discussion described cases in which new security
rules or new cooperative programs to improve security took years to have their effect -
during which time they tend to be weakened, as the compelling urgency felt in the
aftermath of a particular incident (such as the 9/11 attacks) tends to decline over time.
" Constraints on what international agreements and cooperation are feasible imposed by the
secrecy surrounding nuclear stockpiles and their security arrangements and concerns over
national sovereignty. These issues have repeatedly slowed or prevented cooperation and
agreements that would otherwise have served all parties' interests.
As illustrations of these constraints, Chapter 5 recounted (a) the history of delays and
policy resistance in implementing realistic testing of security system performance in defeating
armed outsider attacks at sites regulated by the U.S. NRC and (b) the degree to which, even
after the 9/1 1 attacks, it proved impossible internationally to reach international agreement on
the need for stringent nuclear security measures, or to rapidly expand cooperation to improve
nuclear security. This assessment of the global nuclear security system's structure and
behavior is a tool for structuring thinking about how different proposed policy measures
might fare in seeking to improve the system's performance.
The second half of Chapter 5 then turned to a discussion of the record of various
policy tools, from negotiation of binding multilateral agreements to bilateral technical
cooperation, in seeking to improve security for nuclear stockpiles around the world. For each
policy tool, after examining the record, I assigned ratings on a 1-5 scale on each of three
criteria: the speed with which the policy tool achieved security improvements; the magnitude
of the improvements achieved; and the breadth of applicability of the tool. I then drew
tentative lessons learned from the experience with each tool.
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This examination led to four overall conclusions:
" Success requires convincing countries that there is a real threat to their own security that
needs to be addressed.
" Negotiations by mid-level officials are not likely to overcome the huge systemic obstacles
to agreement on in-depth nuclear security cooperation or stringent nuclear security
standards. There is some record, however, of accords at top political levels succeeding in
sweeping these obstacles aside.
" Partnership-based approaches, demonstrably designed to serve the interests of all parties
and incorporating ideas and resources from all parties, tend to have higher success rates
(though they may take longer to start up, given the need to build in the ideas of multiple
actors).
" Success is likely to require putting in place strong incentives to achieve effective nuclear
security - at the levels of states, of key ministries within those states, of facility managers,
and of individuals and teams on the staff of particular sites.
All of the policy tools examined showed a significant degree of effectiveness. In
particular, purely advisory international recommendations have been more effective than
many people might expect, as many countries with relatively little indigenous expertise in
these areas have effectively adopted them wholesale (and some suppliers have required them
to do so, shifting them from purely advisory to binding requirements). The optimal policy
approach to this problem is likely to combine all or nearly all of these tools, with different
emphases in different circumstances.
One clear conclusion, however, is that global nuclear security standards sufficient to
ensure that nuclear stockpiles are well protected against the threats that terrorists and
criminals have shown they can pose are not likely to be achieved through multilateral
negotiation of binding treaties or conventions. These talks, carried out at a working level
where each countries' representatives tend to be closely tied to the industries and institutions
that would have to bear the costs of more stringent standards and where these representatives
have little authority to agree to arrangements that would require significant changes in their
own countries' practices, have so far resulted in least-common-denominator outcomes that
have only a modest effect on security on the ground and take a very long time to achieve that
effect. Rather, it seems likely that the best chances for achieving effective global nuclear
security standards will be through voluntary political commitments made at a high political
level. The challenge is to develop approaches that are specific enough to be effective and that
countries can be held accountable for meeting, while being general enough to be accepted by
many countries at a high political level.
A second striking result of the examination was the high effectiveness of both on-the-
ground technical cooperation and material removals. Material removal, of course, achieves
the highest possible level of security, eliminating the risk of theft from a particular site
entirely; in some cases, material removal policies have succeeded in doing so relatively
rapidly, and the approach is potentially applicable to a large number of nuclear sites around
the world. Technical cooperation can never reach quite the same level of security and raises
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inevitable issues relating to security culture and sustainability - but large improvements in
security have been achieved at a wide range of sites in the former Soviet Union and other
countries, sometimes quite rapidly.
Extendable Knowledge
This dissertation has focused very specifically on the issues of nuclear theft and
terrorism; it includes a relatively modest quantity of readily extendable knowledge. Perhaps
the most important extendable contribution is the approach of explicitly modeling terrorist
threats not as a particular point-level of capability as suggested by the design basis threat
(DBT) methodology, but as a spectrum with different probabilities of different levels of
threat. This conceptual approach is comparable to the transition in safety analyses from
focusing on a system's ability to survive a particular design-basis level of earthquake or storm
to looking at the system's probability of surviving given the expected frequency of events of
different magnitudes. This threat-spectrum approach can and should be applied more broadly
to assessing how resources for protecting targets from terrorist attack should be allocated. A
paper on conceptual approaches to allocation of protection resources, using this approach
among others, is in preparation.
More broadly, the explicitly risk-based approach used here is only occasionally used
in assessing security problems, as opposed to safety problems. I would argue that while such
probabilistic approaches inevitably require some educated guesses about the chances of
different types of threats, more qualitative approaches involve such guesses as well, but in an
implicit manner that often leaves room for important misjudgments to go undetected and
undebated. This probabilistic approach should be more broadly applied to a wide range of
security problems, whether they relate to security against terrorism or against crime.
Similarly, the approach used in Chapter 4, making judgments about the probability that
particular classes of adversary could accomplish particular goals with particular kinds of
nuclear material, could be applied more broadly to analyses of proliferation resistance of
nuclear energy systems.
The methodologies used in Chapter 5, including (a) attempting to understand the
structure of the elements in a policy system and the feedbacks among them, in order to
understand the system's overall behavior; and (b) applying consistent criteria to judge the
record of a range of competing or complementary tools for addressing a particular policy
problem, are not novel. But they are remarkably rarely used and should probably be used
more frequently, to improve the quality of policy choices. In particular, I am not aware of
other studies that have used them together, so that an understanding of system structure and
behavior can help improve the understanding of the record of different tools in improving the
performance of that system.
Areas for Further Research
This dissertation is by no means the final word on the subjects discussed; a broad
range of additional research is needed to clarify the risks of nuclear terrorism and how they
might best be reduced. The mathematical model presented in Chapter 3 provides a structure
for thinking through areas where additional research would be most fruitful, and many of the
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most important uncertainties and areas of research that could reduce them are discussed there.
In essence, the key questions are: what barriers have been most important in preventing
nuclear terrorism to date; how might those barriers (and means and motivations for
overcoming them) change in the future; and what policy measures are likely to be most
effective in raising or maintaining these barriers, reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism in the
future?
In particular, more research is needed to clarify:
* Which terrorist groups are currently interested in nuclear terrorism; what relevant
capabilities they have or may be putting together; what level of organizational effort they
are devoting to nuclear projects; what factors have so far prevented these efforts from
progressing further; what factors have so far limited the level of organizational effort these
groups have devoted to nuclear matters and led other terrorist groups not to pursue
nuclear terrorism seriously; and how might these factors change in the future;
* What role organized terrorist groups or organized criminal groups have so far played in
nuclear theft and smuggling, and what factors might cause this past experience to be
different in the future;
" The quantity and quality of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material at all relevant
sites around the world (including, for example, the amounts of both fresh and irradiated
highly enriched uranium (HEU) at research reactors throughout the world) and the types
and frequency of transports of these items that occur in different countries;
" Plausible insider and outsider threats in different countries - including the types of
capabilities that terrorists and criminals have brought to bear in attacks or thefts from
guarded facilities in each country; morale, pay, corruption, ideology, and crime among the
staff and guards at nuclear facilities and transport legs; and related factors;
" The specific security measures in place for different nuclear facilities and transport legs,
and how effective they would likely be in defeating different types of insider and outsider
capabilities that might be brought to bear in a theft attempt (taking into account both
equipment in place and personnel performance);
" Processes for making decisions on nuclear security measures and resources for them in
different countries and approaches to influencing those decisions (including the attitudes
of key players toward the threat and toward specific means for reducing it);
* The range of different policy options available for achieving increases in security for
nuclear stockpiles in different countries and which, in which combinations, are likely to be
most effective, under which particular circumstances;
* The chances that states might consciously decide to provide nuclear weapons or the
materials to make them to terrorist groups; what factors affect these probabilities and how
those factors might change in the future; what policy steps could reduce the probability
that a state such as North Korea would decide to transfer nuclear weapons or materials to
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others and the probability that they would succeed in doing so, and what magnitude of
reduction in these probabilities might plausibly be achieved; and
* What other policy measures, in addition to improved nuclear security, could be most
effective in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism (from strengthened counterterrorism
efforts focused on plausible nuclear terrorist groups to beefed-up efforts to interdict
nuclear smuggling).
In particular, there are two issues that are essential to the success of efforts to achieve
effective security for nuclear stockpiles for the long haul, which I have only briefly discussed
in this dissertation: security culture and sustainability. A great deal of additional research is
needed to understand the most effective approaches to achieving these objectives.
Security Culture
Security culture - the habit, among all security-relevant personnel, of taking security
seriously and taking the actions needed to ensure high security - is a critical element of
nuclear security. If security doors are left propped open for convenience, guards patrol
without ammunition in their guns to avoid accidental firing incidents, and security personnel
turn off alarm systems out of annoyance with their false alarms,1 good security is not likely to
be achieved.2 As Gen. Eugene Habiger, former DOE "security czar" and former commander
of U.S. strategic forces, put it: "good security is 20% equipment and 80% culture." 3
Unfortunately, changing any deeply ingrained aspect of organizational culture,
including security culture, is very difficult to do.4 In general, these changes do not occur
'All of these are behaviors that have been observed at sites in Russia where U.S.-funded Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) cooperation is taking place. All of these are also behaviors that have been
observed at U.S. sites in the past.
2 Approaches that provide "inherent security" with limited reliance on human intervention - putting nuclear
material in a steel cage that would take a long time to cut through, piling huge concrete blocks in front of the
door, and the like - are a partial exception. Such technologies, however, are typically only applicable to items
that are in long-term storage, not in regular use. Moreover, staff with little regard for security can undermine
even these approaches' effectiveness - by not replacing the concrete blocks after the room has been accessed, for
example, to make it more convenient to get in again the next day or the next week. And even these approaches
offer only delay, ultimately relying on human intervention to stop adversaries from getting at the weapons or
materials being protected.
3 Interview by author, April 2003.
4 A classic text on organizational culture (though one much critiqued in some circles) is Edgar H. Schein,
Organizational Culture and Leadership, Third ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004). For a shorter and
less theoretical account from the same author, see Edgar H. Schein, The Corporate Culture Survival Guide (San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1999). For an assessment of different approaches to analyzing organizational
culture that critiques the "functionalist" approach of these volumes (that is, an approach that focuses on
analyzing which elements of a culture supposedly contribute to or detract from a particular function and then on
changing those elements so that the organization performs that function better), see Joanne Martin,
Organizational Culture: Mapping the Terrain, First ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2002). There
are countless corporate how-to books on corporate cultures and how to change them to improve an
organization's ability to meet a particular goal (some of which include quite a number of cases of failure of such
culture-change efforts). See, for example, John P. Kotter, Leading Change, First ed. (Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Press, 1996). Some of these how-to books are focused on how to change an organization's
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unless the top leaders of the organization dedicate themselves to making them happen and
devote a substantial and sustained effort to the task 5 - which means that the first job is to
convince senior nuclear managers of the importance of achieving strong security cultures in
their organizations. As the string of security incidents at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
in recent years makes clear, the United States still faces major challenges with security culture
even at facilities where the U.S. government sets all the rules and provides all the funding.6
Trying to improve security culture in other countries, whose national cultures U.S. officials
may not understand well and where U.S. programs have their hands on few of the levers of
power, poses a far greater challenge - but a crucial one. Assessing how well programs are
doing in meeting this challenge is also extraordinarily difficult, requiring the development and
use of a variety of partial and indirect indicators of progress.
Of course, organizations have been attempting to select, train, and motivate people to
provide high levels of security for valuable goods for centuries. But the literature actually
analyzing how to achieve strong security cultures is surpringly thin. Government efforts to
improve nuclear security culture that are now underway are largely learning by doing while
drawing heavily on analogies from the decades-long effort to improve safety cultures, in the
nuclear industry and elsewhere. The IAEA, for example, has issued dozens of publications
over almost twenty years on safety culture and has an extensive and successful program in
promoting safety culture, but has yet to complete its first publication specifically on security
culture (though one is in development). U.S. and Russian officials have agreed to work to
promote security culture and have launched a program for doing so, but often run into debates
concerning not only what specific steps should be taken but even what issues are or are not
part of the concept of "security culture." Only recently have in-depth examinations of the
safety culture: see, for example, Terry E. McSween, The Values-Based Safety Process: Improving Your Safety
Culture with Behavior-Based Safety (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Interscience, 2003).
5 See, for example, discussion in Kotter, Leading Change.
6 For statements attributing the ongoing problem at Los Alamos to the security culture at the laboratory, see, for
example, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Energy and Air Quality Subcommittee, A Hearing to
Review Proposals to Consolidate the Offices of Counter Intelligence at NNSA and DOE, 13 July 2004 (available
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/07132004hearing1346/hearing.htm as of 15 August 2005).
For a remarkable official excoriation of the security culture at the Department of Energy and its predecessors,
stretching back over decades, see President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Science at Its Best, Security
at Its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at the US Department of Energy (Washington D.C.: PFIAB, 1999;
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/pfiab/ as of 13 December 2006). This report lays blame for much of
the security problem at DOE on cultural attitudes toward security, which it describes in stark terms: "Never have
the members of the Special Investigative Panel witnessed a bureaucratic culture so thoroughly saturated with
cynicism and disregard for authority.... DOE and the weapons laboratories have a deeply rooted culture of low
regard for and, at times, hostility to security issues... The predominant attitude toward security and
counterintelligence among many DOE and lab managers has ranged from half-hearted, grudging
accommodation to smug disregard."
' A workshop on security culture has been developed and offered on a couple of occasions, but is still considered
developmental; a publication with guidance on improving security culture is still in preparation. Interviews with
officials from the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security, November 2004, October 2005, and July 2006.
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problem of security culture begun to appear - but even these recent treatments do not present
detailed, actionable recommendations for improving nuclear security cultures.
There is an urgent need for further research to better understand what approaches to
strengthening security culture are likely to be most effective and how these might vary from
one national and organizational context to the next. Remarkably little work has been reported
in the open literature to date that focuses on soliciting the views of people who currently
manage high-security organizations - whether nuclear facilities that have a reputation for
particularly strong security culture, or other facilities where high levels of security are
required.
In particular, in the nuclear world, most managers take primarily the security measures
the government requires them to and have little direct incentive to think creatively about how
security performance might be improved. For some private sector facilities, however, security
(especially against insider theft) is crucial to the bottom line, and managers of these facilities
have for many years had direct profit incentives to find ways to strengthen security culture
among their employees. Case studies and interviews with managers of casinos (where large
amounts of money are constantly changing hands, and the profit margin may be a few
percent), gold processing facilities (analogous in some ways to HEU or plutonium processing
facilities), and plants that legally manufacture narcotics and other drugs that command high
prices on the black market (also analogous to HEU or plutonium processing facilities) could
provide substantial new insights into measures to develop and improve security culture,
especially if coupled with similar case studies and interviews with managers of nuclear
facilities and high-security military facilities. There is also much more to be done in
exploring the analogy with safety culture (and that analogy's limits), focusing particularly on
learning lessons from the comparison of successful and failed efforts to improve safety culture
in different organizations.
Sustainability
If the United States and other nations spend billions of dollars installing improved
equipment for securing and accounting for nuclear stockpiles around the world, and that
equipment is broken and unused five years later, the objective of ensuring that these
stockpiles are not stolen will not be achieved. Hence it is critical that efforts to upgrade
nuclear security be designed not only to get the job done quickly, but also to include putting
in place an overall system of resources, incentives, and organizations that will ensure that
effective security for these stockpiles is maintained for the long haul, long after international
assistance comes to an end. The watchword used for this objective in the U.S.-funded
programs to improve nuclear security is "sustainability." 9
8 The best of these recent accounts is Igor Khripunov and James Holmes, eds., Nuclear Security Culture: The
Case of Russia (Athens, Georgia: Center for International Trade and Security, The University of Georgia, 2004;
available at http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/Security%20Culture%20Report%2020041118.pdf as of 18
February 2005).
9 A committee of the National Research Council has suggested using the term "indigenization" instead, arguing
that "sustainability" implies sustaining exactly the approaches put in place with international assistance, rather
than adapting those approaches to local circumstances over time. See Committee on Indigenization of Programs
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Here, too, U.S., Russian, and other officials are working diligently to put in place
measures to ensure that improved nuclear security will be sustained after international
assistance phases out. But with very little research on the determinants of sustainability in
this context, they are, in effect, learning by doing.
Sustainability can be broken into two parts: the ability to provide effective nuclear
security for the long haul and the motivation to apply the necessary resources to do so. Most
sustainability efforts to date have focused on ability - establishing training programs so that
there will be adequate trained personnel to operate and maintain effective nuclear security
systems, creating maintenance and spare parts infrastructures so that equipment can be fixed
and replaced, and contracting with sites to lay out plans for operating and maintaining their
new security systems and estimate the money and manpower needed to implement them.
But motivation, or commitment, will be equally important: the United States and other
donor countries are making investments in improving nuclear security in foreign countries
largely because those foreign countries do not assign as high a priority to nuclear security as
the donors think they should. Russia, in particular, with a sophisticated nuclear infrastructure,
a growing economy, and a federal budget in surplus, would certainly be able to provide
effective security for its nuclear assets without U.S. help, if it made nuclear security a real
priority. But today, while major improvements have been made, Russia continues to
underinvest in nuclear security and to allow ineffectual regulation, corrupt and ineffective
guard forces, and other serious weaknesses to continue, as discussed in Chapter 2. Unless
Russia and other recipient states increase the priority they assign to nuclear security, much of
the progress made with international assistance may evaporate within a few years after
international assistance phases out.
A critical question, then, is how to change a foreign government's assessment of the
level of priority it should devote to nuclear security. This, of course, is only one specific case
of a type of problem that arises frequently: what to do about cases where the allocations of
priorities or governance weaknesses in one country affect the well-being of other countries?
How can one country that thinks an issue is a high priority convince another country where
the issue is unfolding to take it seriously? Among the countless examples of this class of
problems are control of pollution in one country that affects the countries downwind or down-
river; effectiveness of efforts to prevent terrorist or organized crime groups from using
countries as bases of operations; control of illegal flows of drugs, money, and other
contraband; enforcement of export controls; and control of pirating of intellectual property.
We are moving into an age in which the quality of governance in every country is the
legitimate concern of all countries.
to Prevent Leakage of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium from Russian Facilities, Office for Central
Europe and Eurasia, National Research Council, Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security: Protecting
Weapon-Usable Material in Russia (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2005; available at
http://fermat.nap.edu/catalog/l1377.html as of 4 April 2006). While this suggestion has some merit, I have
stayed with the term "sustainability" here because it is much more broadly used among program participants, and
I do not believe that it strongly implies keeping nuclear security and accounting systems and approaches exactly
as they were.
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Yet remarkably little research seems to have been done on the questions of how
governments can seek to make long-term changes in other governments' assignment of
priorities to particular issues, or how a government's performance in particular government
functions can be improved in a way that will last long after the capacity-building assistance
has come to an end. The limited available literature suggests that improvements in such
activities are much more likely to be long-lasting when:
* The improved capacity provides very direct benefits to the participants that make it
profitable for them to invest their time and resources in continuing it after international
assistance comes to an end (and they have the capacity to do so). This might be the case,
for example, for projects that provide participants the resources to start sustainable and
profitable businesses. 10 This is not likely to be the case for nuclear security programs,
which cost money without generating revenue. There are a variety of options, however,
for providing incentives for strong security performance at the levels of individuals and
teams, facilities, and states, which could contribute significantly both to building strong
security cultures and to the prospects for sustainability."
* Recipient governments are motivated to improve performance in the area in question, and
international assistance focuses not only on providing technical equipment and training,
but on the entire governmental system for performing the function at issue, including the
power, resources, and effectiveness of the agencies responsible for the function, the
effectiveness of decision-making processes, and processes for recruiting, training, and
retaining appropriate personnel.12
* International assistance takes a partnership-based approach, in which recipients are
intimately involved in deciding what should be done and why - and in that process,
become convinced of the need for the new approaches.13
But these lessons are tentative and are not yet based on any in-depth comparisons of
successful and failed cases of attempts to make long-lasting improvements in the commitment
10 For a useful discussion of one such case and its implications, see Martin Fisher, "Income Is Development:
Kickstart's Pumps Help Kenyan Farmers Transition to a Cash Economy," Innovations 1, no. I (Winter 2006;
available at http:/www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/1 0.11 62/itgg.2006.1.1.9 as of 29 December 2006).
" Matthew Bunn, "Incentives for Nuclear Security," in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute
for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005).
12 See Merilee S. Grindle, ed., Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing
Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
13 For a detailed argument along these lines, see Albert R. Wight, "Participation, Ownership, and Sustainable
Development," in Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries,
ed. Merilee S. Grindle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). For arguments for the benefits of
such partnership-based approaches with respect to nuclear security, see U.S. and Russian Committees on
Strengthening U.S. and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation, U.S. National Academy of Sciences and
Russian Academy of Sciences, Strengthening US-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Recommendationsfor Action (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2005; available at
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/l1302.html as of 15 November 2005); Matthew Bunn, "Building a Genuine U.S.-
Russian Partnership for Nuclear Security," in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute for
Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-14 July 2005 (Phoenix, Ariz.: INMM, 2005; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent stage/documents/inmmpartnership2O5.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
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and performance of foreign governments in particular areas. Promising areas for further
research include: (a) case studies and interviews with managers and staff at key nuclear
facilities that appear to have either high motivation and capacity to sustain high levels of
nuclear security, or low motivation and capacity, to seek to tease out the causes of such
differences; (b) focused comparison case studies of past capacity-building assistance
programs, to try to learn lessons concerning what factors most affect the probability that
increases in government performance achieved through such programs will last;' 4 (c) focused
comparison case studies of past cases of attempts to convince countries to take actions to
which they initially assigned low priority (from rain forest preservation in Brazil to
intellectual property protection in China), to attempt to learn lessons concerning which
approaches seem to work more often than others; (d) focused comparison case studies of
attempts to build international norms of high performance in particular sectors (ranging from
airline safety to financial controls), looking for lessons on what factors most influence the
chance of success.
In the case of nuclear security in particular, it seems clear that both security culture
and sustainability depend fundamentally on a belief that the threat is real and urgent. Unless
the key officials of each government with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials
believe that nuclear terrorism is a real threat to their country's security, not simply something
the Americans are worried about, they are unlikely to take the steps needed to build a strong
security culture and a lasting nuclear security system. Hence, policy measures focused on
getting key officials and managers to grasp the reality of the threat may be among the most
important steps that need to be taken - as discussed in the recommendations below.
Policy Recommendations
The United States and other leading governments should launch a fast-paced global
effort to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.15 As a first step, this effort should focus on
ensuring that every nuclear warhead and every significant stock of weapons-usable material
worldwide is secured and accounted for to standards adequate to defeat the threats that
terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose in the country where that stock exists.
Success will require a sea-change in the level of sustained leadership from the highest levels
of the governments involved, focused on overcoming obstacles to and identifying
opportunities for rapid progress.
Improving Nuclear Security
The United States and other leading governments should put improving security for
nuclear warheads and materials high on the diplomatic agenda - an issue to be addressed with
every country with stockpiles to secure or resources to help, at every level, at every
14 An initial step in this direction is offered by Grindle, ed., Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the
Public Sectors of Developing Countries. But that book and the subsequent literature does not really attempt to
examine capacity-building programs 5-15 years after they have come to an end, to see which ones in fact had a
lasting effect and which did not.
" These recommendations draw heavily on those in Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006
(Cambridge, Mass.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006;
available at http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb as of 23 July 2006), pp. 121-157.
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opportunity, until the job is done. The effort should be driven by a genuinely prioritized plan,
adapted as the effort proceeds, focusing on those sites and transport legs where there are the
largest opportunities for reductions in risk (as described in Chapter 4). Each of the policy
tools described below, from a global coalition to forge new political-level commitments to
nuclear security, to bilateral cooperation on security upgrades, to negotiation of more
effective global standards for nuclear security, should be used in an integrated way to achieve
the overall objective of ensuring that every nuclear warhead and every stock of HEU and
plutonium worldwide is secure enough so that the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism it poses
is very low - rather than each of these tools being pursued independently, often by officials
with little awareness of what efforts on other tracks are doing and the potential implications,
as is currently the case. That effort will not only require flexible use of several policy tools,
but several key changes in approach as well, which are also described below.
There is still much to be done in Russia, to complete the cooperative upgrades now
under way, ensure that security measures are put in place that are sufficient to meet the threats
that exist in today's Russia, forge a strong security culture, and ensure that high levels of
security for nuclear stockpiles will be sustained after international assistance phases out. But
increasingly, the work with Russia should become a true partnership of near-equals, framed as
one part of a global approach - and the United States should redouble its efforts to expand its
programs to prevent nuclear terrorism across the globe.16 The recommendations below,
therefore, while applicable to the work in Russia, are global in nature.
A Global Coalition to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism
A number of authors, including this one, have long advocated the formation of a
global coalition of countries focused on pursuing their shared interest in reducing the risk of
nuclear terrorism.17 Such a coalition could provide a mechanism for gaining high-level
political commitment to taking the needed steps to reduce nuclear terrorism risks, potentially
overcoming the obstacles that tend to arise at the working level, as described in Chapter 5.
16 For an especially useful discussion of specific approaches to strengthening U.S.-Russian nuclear security
cooperation through partnership-based approaches, written jointly by U.S. and Russian experts, see U.S
Committee on Strengthening U.S. and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Research
Council, and Russian Committee on Strengthening U.S. and Russian Cooperative Nuclear Nonproliferation,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Strengthening US.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2005; available at http://fermat.nap.edu/catalog/1l302.html as of 2
January 2007). See also Bunn, "Building a Genuine U.S.-Russian Partnership for Nuclear Security."
" See, for example, Richard Lugar and Sam Nunn, "Connecting the Dots on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Terrorism: The Clear Danger and the Imperative of a Global Coalition Response" (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear
Threat Initiative, 27 May 2002; available at http://www.nti.org/c_press/statement nunnlugar _052702.pdf as of
22 December 2006); Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, 1 st ed.
(New York: Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004); Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb 2006. A somewhat similar
suggestion to create a "Contact Group to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism," including many of the G8 states along
with China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and other states with weapons-usable nuclear material that wish to join, is
outlined in George Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategyfor Nuclear Security (Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005; available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINA L3.pdf as of 21 March 2005), pp. 87-88.
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In July 2006, President Bush and President Putin announced the launch of the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 8 At the initiative's founding meeting, in Rabat,
Morocco, in October 2006, the initial participants agreed on a very general statement of
principles.19 These statements included few specifics, however: now is the time to put the
meat on these bones and to build the Global Initiative into the fast-paced global effort to
reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism that is urgently needed. President Bush should
immediately begin working with the founding Global Initiative members and other key states
with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials to gain agreement that the
participants in this initiative will:
* Ensure that all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials under their
control would be protected at least to a common security standard, sufficient to defeat the
threats terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they can pose. (Participants would be
free to protect their stockpiles to higher standards if they perceived a higher threat in their
country.) For example, the commitment could be to provide protection at least against
two small groups of well-armed and well-trained outsiders, one to two well-placed
insiders, or both outsiders and insiders working together.
* Work with other states to convince them to join the commitment to this common standard
and provide assistance where necessary to help countries put this level of security in place.
* Develop and put in place transparency measures that will help build international
confidence that the agreed security measures have in fact been taken, without providing
public information that would be helpful to terrorists.
* Sustain security levels meeting the agreed standard indefinitely, using their own resources,
after any international assistance they may be receiving comes to an end.
* Reduce the number of locations where nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear
materials are located, achieving higher security at lower cost.
* Put in place border and transshipment controls that would be as effective as practicable in
interdicting nuclear smuggling, as required by United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, and help other states around the world to do likewise.
" Drastically expand intelligence and law enforcement sharing related to indicators of
nuclear theft risks, nuclear smuggling and criminal networks that might contribute to those
risks, groups with ambitions to commit catastrophic terrorism, and other subjects related
to preventing nuclear terrorism.
18 "Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Russian Federation President V.V. Putin Announcing the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism" (St. Petersburg, Russia: The White House, Office of the Press
Secretary, 15 July 2006; available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060715-2.html as of
22 December 2006).
19 "Statement of Principles by Participants in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism" (Washington,
D.C.: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 31 October 2006; available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2006/75405.htm as of 22 December 2006).
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* Pass laws making actual or attempted theft of a nuclear weapon or weapons-usable
nuclear material, unauthorized transfers of such items, or actual or attempted nuclear
terrorism crimes comparable to treason or murder.
" Cooperate to strengthen nuclear emergency response capabilities - including nuclear
materials search capabilities that could be deployed rapidly anywhere in the world in
response to an unfolding crisis.
" Exchange best practices in security and accounting for nuclear warheads and materials -
to the extent practicable - as is already done in the case of nuclear safety.
" Strengthen the ability of the IAEA to contribute to preventing nuclear terrorism.
* Take such other actions as the parties agree are needed to reduce the risk of nuclear
terrorism.
This global coalition should include the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized
democracies, along with China, India, Pakistan, and, ideally, Israel (which is believed to have
a significant stockpile of nuclear weapons) and South Africa (which once had nuclear
weapons and still has one of the largest stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) among
the developing non-nuclear-weapon states). Offering these states roles as co-leaders, with the
world's leading nuclear states, of a global effort to improve all participants' security will be
much more politically appealing than framing cooperation as a matter of assistance
necessitated because they were unable to properly secure their own stockpiles. Between
them, these countries have all of the world's nuclear weapons (except for the handful that may
exist in North Korea) and more than 95% of the world's weapons-usable nuclear material. If
they were all participating, it is likely that other states with smaller amounts of HEU or
separated plutonium would sign up as well.
To be effective in accelerating and strengthening global efforts to reduce the risk of
nuclear terrorism, the coalition would need a strong mechanism for ensuring that the initial
commitments were followed through. The participants should each designate senior officials
to be responsible for all aspects of implementing the global coalition commitments, and these
senior officials should meet regularly to develop agreed plans with measurable milestones, to
oversee progress in implementation, and to develop means to overcome obstacles. In
particular, the coalition partners should agree on a target of putting in place security measures
sufficient to meet the agreed minimum standard for all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable materials worldwide within six years or less. Since this would be an
operational initiative going well beyond the G8, this group should be a standing organization.
It should report to the leaders of the participating states on a regular basis, perhaps once every
six months. Such a mechanism would help to avoid the fate of past summit initiatives, which
have sometimes been announced with great fanfare and then went nowhere when the summit
spotlight was gone.
This coalition would be focused on taking concrete actions to reduce the risk of
nuclear terrorism - and in particular, on ensuring that every nuclear weapon and every
kilogram of nuclear material worldwide is secure and accounted for. The goal would be to
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accomplish that objective as quickly and effectively as possible. In many cases, this would
mean countries taking action to improve security for their own stockpiles, perhaps with a
modest amount of international advice and exchange of best practices. In others, U.S. or other
international funding or expertise might be critical to getting the job done effectively and
quickly.
Those participating states in a position to help fund the efforts of others should
collectively make substantial pledges of funds for implementing the needed actions around
the world. These efforts could draw on funds pledged for an earlier initiative, the Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction announced at
the G8 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, in 2002.20 To date, unfortunately, the Global
Partnership has nothing global about it except its name, and only a dribble of non-U.S. funds
in the Global Partnership has so far been focused on improving nuclear security measures.
Instead, the Global Partnership is almost entirely focused within Russia (now with Ukraine as
an added recipient), and the non-U.S. funds have primarily been devoted to chemical weapons
destruction and submarine dismantlement (the two areas Russia's requests have focused on
most intensely). While the participants in the Global Partnership initially pledged $20 billion
to the effort over 10 years, pledges from specific countries remain more than $2 billion short
of that target and appear to have leveled off.
It may be that a new mission, to contribute to preventing nuclear terrorism throughout
the world - and to implementing the other steps to control weapons and materials of mass
destruction mandated by UNSCR 1540 (discussed in more detail below) - could convince
some states to provide additional contributions, bringing the total up to the $20 billion initial
target or more and providing sufficient funds to implement the needed steps for all countries
requiring assistance worldwide. (The number and magnitude of the upgrades needed around
the world are not publicly known, making it difficult to reliably estimate the total cost of the
needed upgrades, but it seems likely that a total substantially less than the $20 billion
originally pledged to the Global Partnership would be sufficient to drastically reduce the
global danger of nuclear theft and terrorism.) This mission would return the Global
Partnership to its original ambitions, which included a commitment to take the steps necessary
to "prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from acquiring" the materials needed for
weapons of mass destruction; specifically called on "all countries," not just Russia, to join in
providing effective security and accounting for their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable nuclear materials; and offered assistance to any country needing help to
provide such effective security. 2 The coalition participants should commit to providing the
20 "The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction" (Kananaskis,
Canada: Government of Canada, 27 June 2002; available at
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002kananaskis/arms.html as of 27 June 2006). For a useful summary of the
Global Partnership as of mid-2006, with recommendations for next steps, see Assessing the G8 Global
Partnership: From Kananaskis to St. Petersburg (Washington, D.C.: Strengthening the Global Partnership
Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006; available at http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/
SGPAssessment2006.pdf as of 22 December 2006).
2I am grateful to Robert Einhorn for this suggestion. Personal communication, December 2006.
22 "The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction".
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resources necessary to ensure that lack of funding does not constrain the pace at which
nuclear stockpiles around the world can be secured and consolidated. As the senior contact
group develops more detailed plans, they should be tasked with estimating the costs of
implementation, and coalition members should make pledges sufficient to implement them at
the fastest practicable pace.
The coalition partners should act to give states and facilities strong incentives to
provide effective security for their nuclear stockpiles.2 3 The United States should work with
all states with nuclear stockpiles to ensure that effective and well-enforced nuclear security
rules are put in place, giving all facilities with nuclear stockpiles strong incentives to ensure
they are effectively secured - including the possibility of being fined or temporarily shut
down if a facility does not follow the rules. It would also be desirable to work to convince
these states to structure financial and other rewards for strong nuclear security performance
(comparable, for example, to the bonus payments contractors managing DOE facilities can
earn for high performance). The United States should also establish a preference in all U.S.
contracts going to foreign facilities with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material
(not just those supporting DOE nonproliferation programs) for facilities that have positively
demonstrated effective security performance in realistic tests and should seek to convince
other leading nuclear states to do the same. Ultimately, effective nuclear security should
become a fundamental "price of admission" for doing business in the international nuclear
market.
Bilateral Cooperation to Upgrade Nuclear Security
Bilateral cooperation with Russia and with other countries to upgrade nuclear security
measures should remain a key policy tool, coming under the rubric of this global coalition.
U.S.-Russian cooperation is particularly important. As President Bush and President Putin
acknowledged in their Bratislava statement, as the countries with by far the world's largest
nuclear stockpiles, the United States and Russia bear a special responsibility for action. They
should seek to take such effective action in securing their own stockpiles that they set a strong
example for the rest of the global coalition participants. In addition, they should apply their
experience to work together to help other countries around the world to secure their
stockpiles.
U.S.-Russian bilateral cooperation on improving nuclear security is coming to a
climax, as the two sides have agreed on a joint goal of completing security upgrades at an
agreed list of nuclear warhead and material sites by the end of 2008. Even if that goal is met,
however, a great deal of work to build effective security cultures, ensure sustainability,
address the sites not yet covered by joint cooperation, ensure that security measures are
sufficient to defeat the large outsider and insider threats that exist in Russia, and embed all
these new measures in effective and effectively enforced nuclear security rules will remain to
be done. DOE envisions a period lasting from 2008-2013 during which U.S. funding will
23 Bunn, "Incentives for Nuclear Security."
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phase down and Russian funding will phase in, followed by continuing low-level cooperation
to exchange best practices and resolve ongoing issues either side may face.24
The two countries need to move quickly to agree on their approaches to cooperation in
2008 and beyond. In particular, it is very important for the United States to seek a
presidential-level Russian commitment to provide the resources needed to sustain high levels
of nuclear security in Russia after international assistance phases out - and to ensure that
mechanisms are in place to follow up on implementation of that commitment. Since most
nuclear managers will not implement security measures they are not required to put in place,
effective regulation will be absolutely central to achieving high levels of nuclear security that
last for the long haul, and ongoing cooperation with Russia and with other countries must
focus intensely on steps to put effective nuclear security regulation in place. It is also
important to work to forge strong security cultures. (See discussion of these points below.)
Whether in Russia or in other countries, the goal of cooperation to upgrade nuclear
security should not be only to meet a least-common-denominator standard such as the existing
IAEA physical protection recommendations, but to achieve a level of security that reduces the
risks of nuclear theft to a low level, given the threats that exist in the country in question and
the quantity and quality of the nuclear material at the facilities there. In many cases, this may
require more substantial upgrades - or more efforts to convince recipient states to provide
more numerous and effective guards - than have yet been undertaken.
Adapting the threat-reduction approaches developed in cooperation with Russia and
other former Soviet states to the specific circumstances of each other country where
cooperation must go forward is likely to be an enormous challen e. Attempts to simply copy
the approach now being used in Russia are almost certain to fail. Cooperation with states
with small nuclear weapons arsenals, such as Pakistan, India, China, and Israel, is likely to be
especially difficult. For all of these states, nuclear activities take place under a blanket of
almost total secrecy, and direct access to many nuclear sites by U.S. personnel is likely to be
impossible in the near term (an issue discussed in more detail below). In general, working out
arrangements to improve nuclear security - and to build confidence that effective nuclear
security really is in place - will require considerable creativity and persistence. Providing
security equipment and training in such cases in no way contravenes the United States'
24 U.S. Department of Energy, 2006 Strategic Plan: Office of International Material Protection and
Cooperation, National Nuclear Security Administration (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2006).
2' For discussion, see "Challenges of Adapting Threat Reduction to New Contexts," in Matthew Bunn and
Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor Action (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on
Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/
e_research/analysis cnwmupdate_052404.pdf as of 2 January 2007), pp. 104-105. See also James E. Goodby et
al., Cooperative Threat Reductionfor a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National
Security Policy, National Defense University, 2004; available at http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/
CTR%20for%20a%2ONew%2OEra.pdf as of 21 March 2005); Lee Feinstein et al., A New Equation: US. Policy
toward India and Pakistan after September II (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2002; available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp27.pdf as of 4 October 2006); Rose Gottemoeller and
Rebecca Longsworth, Enhancing Nuclear Security in the Counter-Terrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a
New Regionfor Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002; available
at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp29.pdf as of 21 March 2005).
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obligation under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) not to assist non-nuclear-weapon states in
acquiring nuclear weapons and can be done in a way that is consistent with all U.S. export
control laws as well.
Effective Global Nuclear Security Standards
Facing terrorists with global reach, nuclear security is only as good as its weakest link:
insecure nuclear material anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere. Hence, effective and
truly global standards for nuclear security are urgently needed. Because there is a global
threat applicable to even the most secure countries, but much higher threats in some countries
where terrorists and thieves are especially active and capable, there should be a minimum
level of security for all stocks of nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials
worldwide and more stringent security measures, going beyond the global minimum, where
those measures are needed. Recent agreements such as the nuclear terrorism convention26 and
the amendment to the physical protection convention 27 are useful, but provide no specific
standards for how secure nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials should be (nor
language from which such standards could be built by agreed interpretation.) The U.S.
government and other leading governments should use a variety of policy tools to try to forge
effective global nuclear security standards.
Gaining political-level commitments. As discussed in Chapter 5, efforts to negotiate
an effective global nuclear security standard in a treaty have not succeeded in the past and are
not likely to succeed in the near-term future, as such negotiations inevitably become bogged
down by country representatives who see little urgency for action and considerable potential
for added costs and unwanted intrusion for the organizations they represent. The most
plausible means to overcome such obstacles is for high-level leaders who see the need for a
minimum global nuclear security standard, in the interests of all, to quickly put in place a
broad political commitment to such a standard. The United States should immediately begin
discussions with other leading governments, as part of the effort to forge a global coalition to
prevent nuclear terrorism, on a common minimum standard for nuclear security, strong
enough to be effective and to make it possible to hold countries accountable for whether they
were fulfilling the commitment, but general enough to allow each state to follow the
approaches it has found best achieve the security objective in its own context. In some
countries, an approach focused on large numbers of armed guards may work best; in others, a
technology-heavy approach may be more appropriate. Performance in defeating plausible
threats is what is important, not the specific means by which that performance is achieved.
Hence, a commitment that nuclear stockpiles will be protected at least against a common
26 International Conventionfor the Suppression ofActs of Nuclear Terrorism (New York: United Nations, 2005;
available at http://www.un.int/usa/a-59-766.pdf as of 16 September 2005). This treaty's most specific provision
related to security of nuclear stockpiles is a requirement that all parties "make every effort to provide appropriate
measures to ensure the protection" of nuclear and radiological materials (Article 8).
27 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna: International Atomic
Energy Agency, 2005; available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/ccpnmdocs/cppnm_proposal.pdf
as of 16 September 2005).
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minimum design-basis threat is likely to be the most effective option for the structure of such
a standard.
Using UNSCR 1540. One promising approach to following through on such a high-
level political commitment is by fleshing out the specifics of what is required by UNSCR
1540. UNSCR 1540, passed unanimously in April 2004, created a new binding legal
obligation on every state to provide "appropriate effective" security and accounting for
whatever nuclear stockpiles it may have (along with a wide range of other legal obligations to
improve controls over weapons of mass destruction and related materials). Unfortunately,
little use of this remarkable tool has yet been made - no government or international
organization has yet sought to lay out what an "appropriate effective" nuclear security and
accounting system includes and to pressure (and help) states to put those legally required
measures in place.
This should change. UNSCR 1540 creates an opportunity for the United States to
work with other countries and the IAEA to: detail the essential elements of an "appropriate
effective" system for nuclear security; assess what improvements countries around the world
need to make to put these essential elements in place; and assist countries around the world in
taking the needed actions. If broad agreement could be reached on the essential elements of
an "appropriate effective" nuclear security system, that would, in effect become a legally
binding global standard for nuclear security.29 Indeed, the entire global effort to put in place
stringent nuclear security measures for all the world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable nuclear materials can be considered simply as the implementation of the
unanimously approved obligations of UNSCR 1540.
If the words "appropriate effective" mean anything, they should mean that nuclear
security systems could effectively defeat threats that terrorists and criminals have shown they
can pose. Thus one possible definition would be that to meet its UNSCR 1540 physical
protection obligation, every state with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear materials
should have a well-enforced national rule requiring that every facility with a nuclear bomb or
a significant quantity of nuclear material must have security in place capable of defeating a
specified set of insider and outsider threats comparable to those terrorists and criminals have
demonstrated in that country (or nearby). This approach has the following advantages: the
logic is simple, easy to explain, and difficult to argue against; the standard is general and
flexible enough to allow countries to pursue their own specific approaches as long as they are
effective enough to meet the threats; and at the same time, it is specific enough to be effective
and to provide the basis for questioning, assessment, and review.30 The United States and
28 The text of UNSCR 1540, along with many related documents, can be found at United Nations, "1540
Committee" (New York: UN, 2005; available at http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/meeting.html as of
25 February 2005).
29 For discussion, see Matthew Bunn, "UNSC 1540: Next Steps to Seize the Opportunity," paper presented at A
New Role for the United Nations Security Council: Criminalizing WMD Proliferation--The Impact of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1540, Arlington, Va., 15 March 2005 (available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/UNSCI 540.pdf as of 2 January 2007).
30 Questions designed to clarify a country's compliance with this standard could include such items as: is there a
rule in place specifying that all facilities with nuclear weapons or significant quantities of weapons-usable
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other nations agreeing to such a standard should then launch an intensive effort to persuade
other states to bring their nuclear security arrangements up to that standard and help them to
do so as needed.
The United States should also make clear to all countries where nuclear stockpiles
exist that with the passage of UNSCR 1540, providing effective security for these stockpiles
is now a legal obligation and a positive relationship with the United States depends on
fulfilling that obligation.
Strengthening IAEA recommendations. The current version of the IAEA
recommendations on physical protection, INFCIRC/225 Rev. 4, was issued in 1999, long
before the 9/11 attacks. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, its requirements are quite modest.
As of late 2006, international discussions of a fifth revision are expected to begin soon.3' The
United States and other leading governments should see these talks as another opportunity to
build toward commonly followed global standards of nuclear security that would be effective
enough to reduce the risk posed by potential nuclear theft to a low level.
INFCIRC/225 Rev. 4 already recommends that states develop a DBT and make it an
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"essential element" of their physical protection systems. But it does not specifly anything
about what the DBT should be or how exactly it should be used. The document is almost
nuclear material must have security in place capable of defending against specified insider and outsider threats?
Are those specified threats big enough to realistically reflect demonstrated terrorist and criminal capabilities in
that country or region? How is this requirement enforced? Is there a program of regular, realistic tests, to
demonstrate whether facilities security approaches are in fact able to defeat the specified threats? Are armed
guards used on-site at nuclear facilities, and if not, how is the system able to hold off outside attack or insider
thieves long enough for armed response forces to arrive from elsewhere? Others have proposed other standards
to meet similar objectives: Graham T. Allison, for example, has proposed a "gold standard," arguing that given
the devastating potential consequences of nuclear theft, all nuclear stockpiles should be secured to levels similar
to those used for large stores of gold such as Fort Knox. See Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate
Preventable Catastrophe. In 1994, a committee of the National Academy of Sciences argued that because
getting the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons was the hardest part of making a nuclear bomb, plutonium
should, to the extent practicable, be secured and accounted for to the same standards applied to nuclear weapons
themselves - and argued further that this "stored weapon standard" should be applied to all separated plutonium
and HEU worldwide (an approach that presupposes that nuclear weapons themselves have effective protection,
which may not always be the case). U.S. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security
and Arms Control, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1994; available at http://books.nap.edu/html/plutonium/0309050421.pdf as of 30 December
2006), pp. 31, 102. Other sources that could also be drawn on for insight in defining what should be included in
an "appropriate effective" physical protection system include the "principles and objectives" included in the
proposed amendment to the physical protection convention (though these are very general and include few
specifics) and the IAEA's recommendations on physical protection (INFIRC/225 Rev. 4). Unfortunately, while
both of these provide valuable considerations for physical protection, it is possible to comply fully with both of
them and still not have a secure system.
" Interviews with DOE and State Department officials, July 2006 and October 2006; interview with IAEA
Office of Nuclear Security official, July 2006. The new version may be renamed - the IAEA hopes to have it as
one entry in its new "Security Series" of publications, giving it a status comparable to the status of the "Safety
Series" documents, which have become de facto global standards on a variety of aspects of nuclear safety.
32 International Atomic Energy Agency, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities,
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) (Vienna: IAEA, 1999; available at http://www.iaea.or.at/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/l 999/infcirc225r4c/rev4_content.html as of 22 December 2006).
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entirely rule-based, rather than performance-based. A new revision should move in a more
performance-based direction, focused on providing capabilities to meet particular threats.
Ideally, a new revision should recommend that: (a) states should enact and enforce regulations
that will ensure that all facilities and transport legs with Category I material (at least) have
security systems in place able to provide a high probability of defeating the DBT;33 and (b)
that, while DBTs should vary from one state to another depending on the threat, at a minimum
all Category I material should be defended at least against a modest group of well-armed and
well-trained outsiders (capable of operating as two or more teams), with access to inside
information on the workings of the security system and the location of the material, against
one or two well-placed insiders, or against both outsiders and insiders working together.
Whether or not that level of specificity could be achieved, it would also be useful for a new
revision of INFCIRC/225 to specify that the DBT in each state should include at least the
level of capabilities that terrorists or thieves stealing from major guarded facilities or
transports have demonstrated they can pull together in that state, or in neighboring states with
similar threat conditions; this would provide a basis for detailed discussions with states about
whether their DBTs adequately reflected the threats they had experienced.
The minimum threat suggested above, if agreed to, would represent a very substantial
step forward in the way nuclear material is protected around the world. Most countries
comply with the recommendations of INFCIRC/225, either because they choose to follow
international guidelines, or because a variety of legal requirements oblige them to (in
particular, nuclear supply agreements which often contain a provision requiring that material
be protected at least to the levels called for in INFCIRC/225). The minimum DBT just
outlined corresponds roughly to the published version of the U.S. NRC DBT for theft. 4 This
DBT is less capable than it should be in a variety of respects and is far less capable than the
DOE DBT for identical material; 35 but it represents a level of protection well beyond that
which exists today at the most vulnerable facilities with HEU and separated plutonium around
the world, and it is the most that could reasonably be hoped for (and possibly more than can
33 To gain sufficiently broad support, it may be necessary to include language that makes it clear that states could
choose to achieve this level of performance either through a performance-based approach in which facilities are
required to be able to defeat a certain DBT but given significant flexibility in how to go about doing so; a rule-
based approach in which the regulations specify particular security measures to be taken, in the expectation that
if those measures are taken as specified, the result will be a system that provides protection adequate to defeat
the DBT; or a combination of performance-based and rule-based approaches. While a number of states have
adopted DBT-centered approaches to physical protection regulation, many others have not, and no state has yet
adopted an entirely performance-based approach without a substantial number of rule-based requirements.
3 See Section 73.1 in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Part 73-Physical Protection of Plants and
Materials," in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office;
available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part073/full-text.htm as of 28 September 2005).
3s For a more radical argument that INFCIRC/225 should be revised to incorporate a DBT comparable to that
now in use at DOE, see Edwin S. Lyman, "Using Bilateral Mechanisms to Strengthen Physical Protection
Worldwide," in Proceedings of the 45th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management,
Orlando, Florida, 18-22-July (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2004; available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
global security/nuclear terrorism/bilateral-mechanisms.html as of 21 November 2006). Unfortunately, given
the system constraints described in Chapter 5, I do not believe that such a far-reaching revision of INFCIRC/225
could be achieved; even the approach described in the text would be a stretch.
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actually be achieved) as an agreement resulting from the IAEA's least-common-denominator
discussion process.
Because of the likely difficulty of achieving such an objective in that process, the
United States should explore this possibility with a number of key like-minded states in
advance. If a substantial number of the major states had already reached consensus before the
formal discussions at the IAEA began, the chances of getting agreement on such a formal
discussions at the IAEA
A variety of other improvements should be made in INFCIRC/225 as well. More
measures are needed focused on the insider threat - likely the dominant theft and sabotage
threat in many countries - including more specifics on the need for in-depth background
checks and ongoing monitoring of personnel, continuous monitoring of areas with Category I
nuclear material (and vital areas in the case of sabotage), training to ensure that all personnel
are alert to the possibility of insider theft and know how to report any suspicions they may
have, and more. The document should recommend that the actual performance of physical
protection systems in defeating both outsider and insider threats be regularly probed with
realistic tests in which either test participants portraying outsiders attempt to get in and steal
material, or participants portraying insiders attempt to remove material. If agreement can be
reached, it would be highly desirable for the revised document to specifically call for on-site
armed guards numerous and effective enough to be able to defeat the DBT; if some states
insist on retaining something like the current language allowing for "compensatory measures"
instead of on-site armed guards, this language should be made more specific, recommending
that states not allow the substitution of compensatory measures for armed guards unless the
compensatory measures have proved, in realistic tests using teams trained in plausible
adversary tactics, that they can provide an equivalent level of protection. The points
emphasized in the fundamental principles of physical protection in the amendment to the
physical protection convention - including, among others, the importance of security culture -
should be included in INFCIRC/225, each with specific recommendations as to how they can
be addressed. The very brief discussion of measures to prevent sabotage in the current
document should be expanded. Finally, as discussed below, the approach to categorizing
nuclear material needs to be changed.
New approaches to categorizing nuclear material. As discussed in detail in Chapter
4, existing DOE, NRC, and IAEA approaches to categorizing nuclear material and assigning
levels of security for each of the categories should be modified. The United States and other
leading governments should adopt categorization tables based on an approach similar to that
outlined in Chapter 4. In particular, it is clear that nuclear material emitting 100 rad/hour at
one meter is not self-protecting against thieves willing to absorb substantial doses and
requires substantial security measures.
It may be difficult to reach agreement on modifying the categorization table in
INFCIRC/225, particularly since the identical table is incorporated in the text of the physical
protection convention, and no one has the stomach for undertaking another convention
amendment in the near term. If it proves unduly difficult to change the table itself, the
already-existing language recommending that states provide security for nuclear materials in
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proportion to their usability in nuclear explosives could be elaborated and spelled out in more
detail; the language indicating that states can reduce the category assigned to nuclear material
by one step (for example, from Category I to Category II) if it is emitting 100 rad/hr at one
meter (also incorporated in the physical protection convention) could be modified in
INFCIRC/225 by adding a recommendation that states should not make this reduction unless
compensatory measures were taken to provide equivalent levels of protection against thieves
not concerned with their own health.
Tougher export requirements. U.S. law requires that nuclear exports not be
"inimical to the common defense and security."3 6 To date, with respect to the threat to the
common defense and security posed by potential nuclear theft, the United States has
implemented this requirement by requiring that states receiving nuclear exports provide
security at least equivalent to that called for in the latest IAEA recommendations. U.S.
nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries typically reflect these requirements.
But a strong argument can be made that the requirements of INFCIRC/225 Rev. 4 are
not sufficient to ensure that exports of weapons-usable nuclear material will not pose a risk of
nuclear theft high enough to be inimical to the common defense and security. Existing
nuclear cooperation agreements referring only to the IAEA recommendations as the standard
of adequacy probably make it impossible for the United States to legally require that holders
of U.S.-origin material take measures going far beyond the IAEA recommendations; but there
is nothing preventing the United States from launching diplomatic efforts to convince these
states that in their own security interests, higher standards of security are needed. Moreover,
in compliance with the law, an argument can be made that future exports of HEU or separated
plutonium should only be made if they will be handled, as long as they remain in weapons-
usable form, with security measures adequate to reduce the risk of nuclear theft and terrorism
they pose to very low levels. As suggested above, the United States should take the position
that only nuclear facilities with security that has demonstrated high levels of effectiveness can
receive U.S. nuclear material or lucrative U.S. government contracts - and should work to
convince other leading states to do the same.
In addition, the United States and other leading governments should work to
strengthen the guidelines on physical protection of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
These guidelines, which appear not to have been modified significantly since they were
agreed to in 1975, refer to INFCIRC/225 as a "useful basis" for guiding individual states in
designing physical protection systems; but the specific measures the NSG members agree to
require are considerably weaker than those in INFCIRC/225.38 More than five years after the
9/11 attacks, it is past time to revise these guidelines so that all major suppliers agree to
36 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954; available at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0980/mI022200075-voll.pdf as of 22 December
2006).
37 Lyman, "Using Bilateral Mechanisms."
38 See Appendix C of the NSG guidelines, contained in International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications
Receivedfrom Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and
Technology, INFCIRC/254/Rev. 7/Part 1 (Vienna: IAEA, 2005; available at
http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PDF/infcirc254r7p1 -050223.pdf as of 20 July 2005).
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require physical protection sufficient to defeat the kinds of threats that terrorists and criminals
have shown they can pose. Ultimately, as suggested above, good security must become part
of the price of admission for operating in the international nuclear market.
National-level rules. Ultimately, the actual nuclear security measures taken in each
state are determined by that state. Hence the principal purpose of international standards,
commitments, and recommendations is to influence the nuclear security rules and practices
within each state. If it is possible to influence those rules and practices directly, so much the
better. The United States and other leading governments should substantially increase the
level of diplomatic effort they devote to convincing countries around the world to put in place
regulations requiring that every nuclear warhead or significant stock of HEU or separated
plutonium on their soil or under their control have security measures that will offer a high
probability of defeating the kinds of threats terrorists and criminals have shown they can pose
in that country. As discussed above, effective and effectively enforced nuclear security rules
are essential to achieving high levels of nuclear security that last for the long haul and should
be a fundamental goal of every bilateral effort to upgrade nuclear security.
Recently, for example, the United States has had an extended series of discussions
with Japan over physical protection regulations in Japan.39 Until recently, Japan's regulations
were still based on INFCIRC/225 Rev. 3, not Rev. 4, and did not incorporate a DBT.
Discussions with the United States (and the requirements of the U.S.-Japan nuclear
cooperation agreement) were among the factors that convinced Japan to undertake a
substantial revision of its physical protection regulations, requiring facilities to be able to
defend against a specified DBT for the first time. As noted in Chapter 4, however, Japanese
physical protection arrangements remain much less substantial than those in the United States
and a number of other countries, and the actual additional measures taken to comply with the
new regulations were modest. This experience demonstrates that U.S. pressure can contribute
to positive change but also suggests that more will be needed to convince states to go far
enough to reduce the threat to a low level.
In seeking to strengthen national nuclear security rules, the United States should begin
with its own. Effective nuclear security rules in the United States are important both to
reduce genuine risks within the United States and because it will be extraordinarily difficult to
convince other states to strengthen their nuclear security rules in ways that may be expensive
or inconvenient if they can readily observe that the United States has not taken similar steps
itself. The United States should take all of the following steps:
* NRC and DOE should act in concert to phase out the "interim" exemption from most
physical protection requirements that NRC-regulated research reactors were granted
almost three decades ago. NRC should change its regulations and DOE, which covers
most of the cost of operations at these research reactors, should pay the increased security
costs (which will be a tiny addition to what DOE is already paying for security at its own
facilities). Regulations should be set so that the probability of a theft attempt being
successful at a research reactor is no higher than it is at other NRC-regulated facilities
39 Interviews with DOE, State Department, and Japanese officials, November 2006.
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with HEU of similar quality, taking into account the security measures combined with the
inherent characteristics of the facility (such as the difficulty of accessing the HEU in a
research reactor pool).
" As discussed in Chapter 4, NRC should abandon its policy of exempting material emitting
100 rem/hr at three feet from virtually all security requirements.
" NRC should modify its requirements for special nuclear material of low and moderate
strategic significance, so that the security measures it requires decline in a more graded
way as the quality or quantity of nuclear material declines and do not fall off a cliff when
particular arbitrary thresholds are reached. (This issue is also addressed in Chapter 4.) In
particular, NRC's regulations should comply with the IAEA recommendation that
Category II material, like Category I material, should be stored in an area enclosed by a
fence with intrusion detection (and with the other IAEA recommendations for Category II
material).
* NRC and DOE should also act in concert to bring the NRC DBT for Category I material
into line with the DBT that DOE facilities must meet. When DOE and NRC were first
established, there was a doctrine of security "comparability" - that is, their security rules
for nuclear material need not be identical, but overall, the security measures should be
comparable, so that potential thieves would not have a much easier time stealing material
under one organization's jurisdiction than under the other's. The rationale for
comparability remains extremely strong, but the doctrine has fallen out the window in
recent years. The threat that the two major Category I sites regulated by NRC - which
handle tons of weapons-grade HEU metal - are required to be protected against is far less
than the threat DOE sites are now required to be protected against. Yet here, too, DOE
pays most of the costs of operation of these privately-owned facilities, through contracts
for their services doing various types of HEU processing. NRC should change its rules
for security for Category I sites to make them comparable to the security required at DOE
Category I sites, and DOE should agree to pay the costs of meeting these new security
requirements at these two facilities."
" NRC should reverse its decision that plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel poses
little theft threat and should require security measures at sites handling Category I
quantities of MOX that reduce the overall risk posed by nuclear theft and terrorism to a
level comparable to that at other Category I facilities. Such an approach should, however,
take into account the risk reduction arising from the material's characteristics, as
described in Chapter 4, and therefore the rules could allow security measures that would
result in a somewhat higher probability that a theft attempt would be successful than
would be allowed for HEU metal.
* DOE should adopt a more realistic approach to categorizing nuclear material for graded
safeguards, as described in Chapter 4. (A revision of DOE's categorization approaches is
40 For a similar suggestion, see Project on Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland
Security Opportunities (Washington, D.C.: POGO, 2005; available at http://pogo.org/p/homeland/ho-050301-
consolidation.html as of 30 December 2006).
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under way,4 1 but whether it will eliminate all of the aspects of the current categorization
approach that are unjustified and should be changed remains to be seen.)
Building confidence in nuclear security. A particularly difficult problem is how to
build confidence that nuclear security commitments have been implemented once they have
been made. Such confidence is critical, as every country has a direct national security interest
in making sure that all countries with nuclear weapons and weapons-usable materials provide
effective security for them. But in nearly every country with such stockpiles, the details of
nuclear security arrangements are highly classified, making it difficult to reveal enough
information to prove that the security measures in place are fully effective.42
For those countries willing to accept international peer reviews of their security
arrangements, IAEA-led peer reviews can be effective in building confidence. Such peer
reviews should increasingly become a normal part of the nuclear business for developed and
developing states alike, just as international safety reviews are. 43 But the reality is that some
nuclear stockpiles - from those at U.S. and Russian nuclear warhead assembly plants to those
in Pakistan and Israel - are extremely unlikely to be welcoming IAEA visitors anytime in the
next decade. Graham Allison has proposed that nuclear weapon states invite experts from
another nuclear weapon state with which they have good relations to review their nuclear
security arrangements and certify that they are effective. China, for example, which has long
had close nuclear relations with Pakistan, might review and certify Pakistan's nuclear security
system.4
Another approach might focus on providing, at least in general terms, the results of
tests of security system effectiveness. The United States, for example, already openly
publishes data on what percentage of DOE facilities have received high ratings in DOE
security inspections - and uses that percentage as a measure of the effectiveness of ongoing
steps to improve security. 45 In the case of U.S.-Russian cooperation, to build understanding
of what was being tested and how, U.S. and Russian adversary teams used to test the
' Joseph Rivers and D.L. Whaley, "Review of the Department of Energy Graded Safeguards Table," in
Proceedings of the 47th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, Nashville, Tenn.,
16-20 July 2006 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2006).
42 Even at sites in Russia where the United States has invested heavily in improving security, Russia does not
inform the United States about operational details of day-to-day security measures important to the effectiveness
of the overall system; and the United States has given Russia very little information about the day-to-day
effectiveness of U.S. nuclear security systems.
' Norway was the first major developed state to request such an international peer review and encouraged all
other states to do likewise, arguing that all states can benefit from international advice. Government of Norway,
"Statement by Norway," in 48th IAEA General Conference, Vienna, Austria, 20-21 September 2004 (Vienna:
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2004; available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/
Statements/norway.pdf as of 10 May 2006).
44 Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, pp. 150-153.
45 See, for example, U.S. Department of Energy, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear
Security Administration (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2005; available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/06budget/
Content/Volumes/Vol_1 NNSA.pdf as of 18 July 2005), pp. 416-419. Note that in fiscal 2004, the last year
whose actual results are reported here, DOE inspectors had rated the security at individual sites "effective" in
only 53% of their inspections - and the targets for fiscal 2005 and fiscal 2006 were only to achieve 65% and
70% "effective" ratings, respectively.
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effectiveness of nuclear security systems against outsider and insider threats might train
together and perhaps conduct tests with joint U.S.-Russian teams at one or two non-sensitive
sites in each country. Then the remaining sites could be tested by purely national teams,
using similar approaches and standards, and broad descriptions of the results could be
provided to the other country. In the case of tests that revealed vulnerabilities requiring
immediate corrective action, U.S. and Russian officials would probably not want to reveal the
specifics of those vulnerabilities to the other side until they had been corrected; the existence
of such vulnerabilities is considered a secret in each country. In cases where deficiencies
were found, they could simply be silent about the results of the test, leaving the other side to
draw its own conclusions, until after corrective action had been completed. Such an approach
could provide substantially increased confidence to each side that the other's nuclear
stockpiles were secure and were being tested effectively. In particular, an approach like this
one might be used to confirm that Russia had taken action to provide security at sites that had
been judged too sensitive to allow U.S. access that was comparable to the security measures at
sites where U.S.-Russian cooperation had taken place, particularly the two remaining nuclear
warhead assembly and disassembly facilities.
Approaches such as these are sensible goals to aim for, though they will be extremely
difficult to achieve. In the immediate term, states should do more to provide general
descriptions of their nuclear security approaches, photographs of installed equipment, and
related data that could be made public without providing data that could help terrorists and
criminals plan their attacks.
Strengthening the Nuclear Security Role of the IAEA
The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security, established in its current form in the wake of
the 9/11 attacks, can play a crucial role in helping to set standards and disseminate best
practices for nuclear security, in providing training, in assessing countries' needs, and in
coordinating nuclear security assistance to countries around the world. In many countries,
assessment teams and assistance organized by the IAEA would be far more welcome than
U.S. assessment and assistance. With UNSCR 1540, there are now scores of countries that
may require assistance to meet the binding legal obligations to provide effective nuclear
security that they now face. Yet the Office of Nuclear Security has so far labored with an
extraordinarily small staff and a tiny budget (expected to average in the range of $15 million
per year over the next several years - while the cost of substantially upgrading security at one
site often exceeds $10 million).
The United States should work with other leading governments to expand the mission,
personnel, and resources of the Office of Nuclear Security, allowing the IAEA to substantially
increase its contribution to preventing nuclear terrorism. Specifically, this office should be
given the resources to perform larger numbers of more in-depth nuclear vulnerability
assessments and other evaluations of needs for prevention of nuclear terrorism. It should have
a small fund for actually paying to implement needed security upgrades (possibly a rotating
fund to be replenished by donor states when expended) so that when IAEA-organized reviews
identify an urgent need for security upgrades, these can be implemented immediately without
waiting to negotiate new agreements with donor states to provide the necessary assistance.
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The Office of Nuclear Security should also be given the mission and resources to take a
leading role in assessing states' needs and coordinating assistance that would help them
comply with the nuclear provisions of UNSCR 1540. This office can also play a key role in
identifying and promoting best practices in nuclear security and organizing international best-
practice discussions; it should be given the resources and mandate to do so. Finally, the
Office of Nuclear Security manages the main global database on nuclear smuggling, but has
few resources available to analyze cases in depth and provide lessons learned to member
states; an IAEA-led effort to analyze not only nuclear smuggling cases but cases of terrorist
attacks and criminal thefts from guarded facilities worldwide, in order to identify the types of
adversary capabilities that nuclear sites should be prepared to defend against, could be
extremely important. The budget of the Office of Nuclear Security should be increased to at
least the range of $30-$50 million, and most of the office's budget should become part of the
IAEA's regular assessed budget, rather than relying entirely on voluntary contributions.
An Industry Nuclear Security Initiative
In addition to governments, the nuclear industry itself has a major role to play in
forging effective global nuclear security standards and exchanging best practices for
achieving high levels of security. A new Chernobyl caused by a terrorist sabotage, or worse
yet a city being destroyed by a terrorist nuclear bomb, would not only cause catastrophic
damage and human suffering, it would also be a political disaster of epic proportions for the
nuclear industry, spelling the end of any realistic prospect that nuclear energy could be
expanded to deal with the challenge of climate change. Hence, just as in the case of safety,
industry has a strong self-interest in helping those facilities with the worst security
performance reach the standards of the top performers. The nuclear industry should take the
lead, launching a World Institute of Nuclear Security (WINS) - modeled in some respects on
the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), which has played a key role in
improving nuclear safety around the world - which would develop standards, exchange and
circulate best practices, perform industry peer reviews and other advisory services on request,
and more. Just as has been the case with WANO's role in nuclear safety, such an industry-led
effort could effectively complement (rather than undermine) related ongoing work being done
by the IAEA and by national governments. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has
challenged the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) to play a central role in
46launching such an initiative. In response, a team of INMM experts developed a more
detailed concept of how such an organization might function, and several stakeholders are
now working to develop the concept in more detail.
To ensure that such an initiative has the necessary clout, it will be important to
develop it in a way that maximizes industry buy-in, particularly from those controlling the
purse-strings. What made WANO and its U.S.-based predecessor, the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations (INPO), so effective was that the industry perceived them as its own ideas,
operating to serve the industry's own interest. These organizations also had direct access to
46 Charles Curtis, "Promoting Global Best Practices," in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute
for Nuclear Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005; available at
http://www.nti.org/c_press/speech-curtisNMM_071105.pdf as of 8 June 2006).
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the utility CEOs, who could bring powerful peer pressure to bear on any CEO whose utility
was lagging behind.47
An Accelerated Global Cleanout
Nuclear security improvements only reduce risks; they can never eliminate them. The
only foolproof way to ensure that nuclear material will not be stolen from a particular site is to
remove it. The United States and other leading governments need to work together to
accelerate and broaden to consolidate both nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear
materials at the smallest practicable number of sites, achieving higher security at lower cost.
This effort should focus particularly on removing material from the highest-risk sites - sites
that are especially vulnerable and difficult to defend, and sites in especially high-threat
countries.
The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), launched in the spring of 2004, was
established to accomplish that goal - but there is still much to be done to accelerate and
strengthen that effort.48 The goal should be to remove the weapons-usable nuclear material
entirely from the world's highest-risk, least defensible sites within four years - substantially
upgrading security wherever that cannot be accomplished - and to eliminate all HEU from
civil sites worldwide within roughly a decade.49 The United States should make every effort
to build international consensus that the civilian use of HEU is no longer acceptable, that all
HEU should be removed from all civilian sites, and that all civilian commerce in HEU should
brought to an end as quickly as possible.
The global coalition described above should seek: to close and decommission HEU-
fueled research reactors and other sites with HEU or separated plutonium that are no longer
needed; to accelerate conversion of HEU or plutonium-fueled research reactors that will
continue to operate and for which replacement low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel is available;
to assure that fuels are developed as soon as possible to convert all or nearly all of the
remaining still-needed research reactors; and to ensure that effective security is in place
(meeting global standards such as those described above) and that both the on-site inventories
47 For a fascinating discussion of INPO, its record of effectiveness, and the factors that caused that outcome, see
Joseph V. Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety since Three Mile Island
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996).
48 GTRI also addresses radiological materials that could be used in a so-called "dirty bomb," both within the
United States and internationally. That important topic is not the subject of this dissertation, however.
49 In saying that all the H EU should be removed from the world's most vulnerable sites within four years - a
recommendation I have been making for several years - I am not suggesting that it is possible to convert every
HEU-fueled research reactor within four years. Rather, the argument is that all HEU should be removed from
those sites identified as having both (a) enough HEU for a nuclear bomb, and (b) inadequate security to meet the
threats they face, within that time. In some cases, this may mean encouraging reactors that are no longer needed
to shut down rather than converting; where neither conversion nor shut-down is realistically possible in a short
time span, substantial security upgrades need to be put in place rapidly, sufficient to remove the site from the list
of the world's most vulnerable facilities.
so For a similar recommendation, see Charles Ferguson, Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism
(Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006; available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/
attachments/NucTerrCSR.pdf as of 8 June 2006).
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of HEU and the enrichment of HEU are minimized, for those sites where all the HEU cannot
be removed immediately.
Success in achieving these goals will require focusing comprehensively on all the
facilities that have vulnerable potential nuclear bomb material, not just those that happen to be
operating civilian research reactors, or whose nuclear material happens to be Russian-supplied
or U.S. supplied. Success will require flexible and creative tactics, with approaches -
including incentives to give up the nuclear material - targeted to the needs of each facility and
host country. It will also require the United States to convert and adequately secure its own
HEU-fueled research reactors, not only to remove such threats from inside U.S. borders but
also to enable U.S. leadership in convincing others to do the same.
A comprehensive approach. GTRI was explicitly intended to take a comprehensive
approach to the problem of insecure nuclear material around the world. GTRI has established
an "emerging threats" sub-program which is intended to cover what GTRI refers to as "gap
materials" - those materials that fell through the cracks in pre-existing programs. To its
credit, DOE has prepared and revised a list of the facilities around the world where weapons-
usable nuclear materials exist, to provide the basis for a comprehensive approach, though
DOE officials report that as further visits to particular sites are conducted, new facilities using
HEU are still being identified.52
But major gaps remain:
" Some twelve tons of U.S.-origin HEU in foreign countries is not covered by the current
U.S. take-back offer; this represents some two-thirds of the U.S.-origin HEU that was still
abroad when the take-back offer was renewed in 1996. While most of this material is in
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, or Japan, significant quantities are not, and even
in advanced countries HEU at research reactors is often protected in a way that still leaves
a significant remaining risk of nuclear theft.
* Many HEU-fueled reactors are not yet slated for conversion to low-enriched uranium
(LEU) fuel or shut-down. In particular, a very large fraction of the world's critical
assemblies and pulse reactors, which often have huge quantities of weapons-usable
material on-site, are not yet slated for conversion or shut-down. Similarly, most producers
of medical isotopes using HEU targets have strongly resisted conversion to LEU. Some
HEU-fueled reactor types not yet covered by GTRI at all, such as icebreaker and
submarine reactors.
' A similar listing of steps was first proposed in International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material
2006: Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (Princeton, N.J.: Program on Science and Global
Security, Princeton University, 2006; available at http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/sitedown/
ipfmreport06.pdf as of 24 January 2007).
52 Interviews with DOE officials, February, April, and December 2005.
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* Similarly, some HEU does not come from either the United States or Russia and hence is
not covered by either the U.S. or Russian fuel take-back efforts - though in some cases
such material may be addressed by the "gap materials" effort.53
A creative and flexible set of tactics for addressing the problem. Rapidly
convincing facilities and countries all over the world to stop using potential nuclear bomb
material and allow the material they have to be removed will be an immense challenge. The
task will require considerable tactical creativity, flexibility, and perseverance. Several
additions to the set of policy tools currently being applied to the problem seem likely to be
essential:
* Packages of incentives targeted to the needs of each country or facility. Substantial
incentives will be needed to convince the operators of research reactors to convert their
facilities to LEU (or shut them down) and give up their HEU. The United States and its
international partners should offer packages of incentives that make it unambiguously in
the interest of the facility or the country that operates it to get rid of the HEU at vulnerable
sites. Such packages could include help with converting to LEU; help with improvements
that would make the reactor function even better after conversion than before; help with
shutting and decommissioning a reactor; contracts for other research by the scientists at a
site after agreement is reached to shut the site's reactor, including shared use of reactors at
other sites; help with managing the wastes from a research reactor; and other steps, many
of which will not even be thought of until a particular case arises.55 It appears that
additional incentives are also likely to be needed to convince facilities to return even that
portion of the U.S.-supplied HEU abroad that is covered by the current U.S. take-back
offer.s6
s3 Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: The New Global Imperatives (Cambridge, Mass.,
and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2005;
available at http://www.nti.org/e research/report-cnwmupdate2005.pdf as of 2 January 2007). See also
Alexander Glaser and Frank N. von Hippel, "Global Cleanout: Reducing the Threat of HEU-Fueled Nuclear
Terrorism," Arms Control Today (January/February 2006; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-
02/JANFEB-heuFeature.asp as of 8 June 2006); Frank von Hippel, "A Comprehensive Approach to Elimination
of Highly-Enriched Uranium from All Nuclear Reactor-Reactor Fuel Cycles," Science and Global Security 12,
no. 3 (November 2004).
1 For a discussion of some of the incentives packages that worked in past cases of HEU removals, see Philipp C.
Bleek, Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat (Cambridge, Mass.:
Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, 2004; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/
BCSIAcontent/documents/bleekglobalcleanout.pdf as of 13 April 2005).
s Where necessary, this should include help paying for the cost of new LEU fuel (especially in cases were
reactor otherwise would not buy new LEU fuel because it already has HEU that will last for many years, or for
the lifetime of the reactor).
56 U.S. Congress, Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonprohferation: DOE Needs to Consider
Options to Accelerate the Return of Weapons-Usable Uranium from Other Countries to the United States and
Russia, GAO-05-57 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2004; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0557.pdf as of
2 February 2005). Putting together such packages of incentives will require some broadening of current thinking
and an expansion of current budgets (which do not include any funding for incentives going beyond paying the
costs of conversion to LEU). Currently, for example, GTRI is willing to help research reactors convert to LEU,
so that conversion does not represent a substantial new cost to the reactor operator - but it is generally not
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" Providing incentives for shutting HEU-fueled reactors, in addition to conversion. Most of
the world's research reactors are aging and unneeded. The best answer for many of them
is to provide incentives to shut them down. Unlike conversion, shut-down need not wait
for the development of new fuels; it can be pursued immediately. For most of the dozens
of HEU-fueled research reactors not currently on the target list for conversion (and for
many of those that are), the shut-down option would be quicker, less costly, and more
likely to succeed than conversion. There is good evidence that such an approach can
work, as even in the absence of any effort to provide shut-down incentives, far more
HEU-fueled reactors have shut down since 1978, when the effort to convert reactors to
LEU began, than have successfully converted.57 Indeed, IAEA experts have estimated
that of the more than 270 research reactors still operating in the world (both HEU-fueled
and otherwise), only 30-40 are likely to be needed in the long term.58 No research reactor
operator wants to shut his or her facility. Convincing sites to shut down their reactors is
likely to require substantial packages of incentives. In some cases, the best route will be
through national governments, which may be growing tired of the drain on the budget
imposed by subsidizing these reactors and may be more willing to negotiate over these
reactors' fate than the operators themselves. Considerable care will be needed to avoid
having the efforts of officials seeking to build trust with reactor operators to convince
them to convert to LEU contaminated by suspicion that the real agenda is to shut these
reactors down.59
* Security upgrades and strengthened security rules, in concert with material removals. As
weapons-usable nuclear material cannot be removed from the world's most vulnerable
sites overnight, security should be upgraded at these sites for the period before material is
removed. Through GTRI or whatever other rubric is most appropriate, the United States
willing to make research reactors better off than they were before conversion, even if doing so would carry
modest cost while being crucial to gaining agreement to convert. This policy should be reversed. GTRI
program managers do not want to drive up the price that reactor operators demand for their cooperation, and that
is a legitimate issue. But within reason, price should not be allowed to stand in the way of success. U.S.
taxpayers would be better served by an $800 million cleanout effort that succeeded in convincing all of the
world's most vulnerable sites to give up their weapons-usable material than they would by a $400 million effort
that left dozens of vulnerable sites with HEU still in place.
s7 lain Ritchie, "IAEA Presentation on Threat Reduction Activities," paper presented at The Global Threat
Reduction Initiative International Partners' Conference, Vienna, Austria, 18-19 September 2004.
58 International Atomic Energy Agency, "New Life for Research Reactors? Bright Future but Far Fewer
Projected" (Vienna: IAEA, 8 March 2004; available at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/ResearchReactors/reactors20040308.htm as of 5 January 2007).
' No approach perceived by the world's reactor operators as anti-science or anti-nuclear is likely to succeed.
Indeed, it is quite possible that such an effort should be undertaken separately from the conversion effort, so that
those pursuing conversion will not be "tainted" in the minds of research reactor operators as people seeking to
shut them down. As part of such an effort, the international community should help establish a smaller number
of more broadly shared research reactors - the same direction that high-energy particle accelerators went long
ago. Scientists at sites whose reactors are shutting down should be given funding and access to conduct
experiments at other reactors (as is already routinely done in many countries). The best approach might be for
the United States and other interested countries to work with the IAEA to launch an IAEA-led "Sound Nuclear
Science Initiative," the goal of which would be to get the best science at the lowest cost by getting the research,
testing, training, and isotope production the world needs from the minimum number of research reactors.
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should assist countries around the world in strengthening security at small, vulnerable
sites with weapons-usable nuclear material, and should work with states to put in place
nuclear security rules requiring that every facility with significant quantities of weapons-
usable material on hand have security measures that are not only enough to comply with
the recommendations of INFCIRC/225 Rev. 4 but are sufficient to defeat plausible
terrorist and criminal threats. (The cost of complying with such regulations will provide a
strong incentive to facilities to eliminate the nuclear material they have on hand; hence,
the global cleanout and global nuclear security upgrade agendas go hand-in-hand.) In
particular, those remaining research reactors that are still genuinely needed and cannot
convert to available LEU fuels without a substantial degradation of their scientific
performance should be effectively secured for now and given incentives to convert when
development of new, higher-density LEU fuels is completed - which is not likely to occur
until early in the next decade.
o High-level, high-priority diplomacy. In the past, conversion of research reactors to LEU
and removal of HEU from vulnerable sites, have in most cases been handled by program
managers and technical experts, not by cabinet or subcabinet national security officials.
They have been treated, in essence, as "nice to do" nonproliferation initiatives, not as
urgent national security priorities deserving of attention from the highest levels. In part as
a result, discussions with many reactors around the world have dragged on for years, often
with the hope that agreement to convert the reactor is just around the corner, but with the
final deal never quite getting done. If the United States is now to succeed in drastically
increasing the pace of HEU removals around the world, the issue will likely need to be on
the agenda of senior officials, as one critical element of the global effort to keep nuclear
bomb material out of terrorist hands and therefore a high priority for U.S. diplomacy.
Conversion and shut-down in the United States. If the United States wants to
convince other countries to convert their research reactors to use fuels that cannot be used in
nuclear weapons, to put rules in place requiring high security for those facilities where HEU
is still present, and to ensure stringent security for all potential nuclear bomb material,
whether in military or in civilian use, it needs to be willing to do the same itself. In particular,
the United States should convert all U.S. HEU-fueled research reactors to LEU as soon as
possible - a worthwhile move on its own, but also one likely to be an essential element of
convincing foreign reactors to convert. If the United States is unwilling to phase out its own
civilian use of HEU and provide stringent security for all uses of HEU and separated
plutonium, there is little likelihood that it will be able to convince others to do so.
Fortunately, in recent years the United States has begun to take important steps in this
direction: the research reactors at Texas A&M and Florida State universities were converted
to LEU in the fall of 2006,60 the critical experiments using HEU and plutonium once located
at the difficult-to-defend TA- 18 site at Los Alamos have been relocated to the secure Device
60 U.S. Department of Energy, "GTRI: Two Successful Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats" (Washington, D.C.:
DOE, May 2006; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/factsheets/2006/NA-06-FS04.pdf as of21 June
2006).
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Assembly Facility in Nevada,61 and the pulse reactor at Sandia, fueled with a large quantity of
HEU, is being shut down.62 A major effort to consolidate weapons-usable nuclear material to
a small number of secure sites is now underway within DOE, intended in large part to achieve
better security at lower costs. 63
Consolidation and security for civilian plutonium. In addition to addressing
civilian HEU, the proliferation risks of separated plutonium must be addressed as well. Small
quantities of separated plutonium associated with research activities around the world should
be addressed by GTRI, removing material from vulnerable sites wherever possible and
ensuring that materials that remain are effectively secured.
But plutonium is in civil use on a far larger scale than HEU; it is not just a matter of
kilograms or tens of kilograms at research facilities, but tens of tons being separated, stored,
processed, and used around the world as fuel for large power reactors. As discussed in
Chapter 4, this material is weapons-usable, and it is essential that security and accounting
commensurate with post-9/ 11 threats be maintained throughout all stages of that process.
The large investments in plutonium separation facilities that have already been made make it
unlikely that proposals for an immediate moratorium on plutonium reprocessing will be
adopted.64 But the Bush administration should do what it can to discourage the spread of
civilian separation and use of separated plutonium and should renew the effort to negotiate a
U.S.-Russian moratorium on separating weapons-usable plutonium (a 20-year moratorium
was nearly agreed at the end of the Clinton administration, which would have ended the
accumulation of over a ton of weapons-usable separated plutonium each year at Mayak).
Ensuring that plutonium gets security commensurate with the risks it poses should be a high
priority throughout all stages of reprocessing, storage, transport, processing, and use. Over
the long term, civilian use of separated plutonium should be phased out, in favor of fuel
cycles that do not use weapons-usable separated plutonium.
In announcing its proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which it
hopes will ease nuclear waste management and thus contribute to the growth of nuclear
energy, the Bush administration agreed that traditional reprocessing approaches that fully
separate plutonium pose substantial proliferation risks.s The Bush administration argues that
61 U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, "Sensitive Nuclear Material out of Los
Alamos TA- 18 Facility" (Washington, D.C.: NNSA, 2 November 2005; available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/
docs/newsreleases/2005/PR_2005-11-02_NA-05-27.pdf as of 26 December 2006).
62 Project on Government Oversight, US. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities.
63 For a discussion arguing that substantially more still can and should be done at DOE, see Project on
Government Oversight, US. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities.
" For one such proposal, see Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategyfor Nuclear Security.
65 Specifically, U.S. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman stated, "we all would agree that the stores of
plutonium that have built up as a consequence of conventional reprocessing technologies pose a growing
proliferation risk that requires vigilant attention." See Samuel Bodman, "Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Moscow Center: Remarks as Prepared for Secretary Bodman" (Moscow: U.S. Department of Energy, 16
March 2006; available at http://energy.gov/news/3348.htm as of 29 December 2006). Critics argue that the
waste management approaches proposed in GNEP will undermine rather than promote the future of nuclear
energy, asserting that the future of nuclear energy will be brightest if it is made as cheap, simple, safe,
proliferation-resistant, and terrorism-resistant as possible, and that reprocessing using past technologies or those
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 6 389
its proposed new approach, known as UREX+, would be proliferation-resistant, since
plutonium would not be separated in pure form but would remain with some of the higher
actinides and perhaps the lanthanide fission products as well. Unfortunately, however, studies
have suggested that this would offer only a very modest proliferation-resistance benefit.66
And it seems very likely that a decision by the United States, with the largest number of
nuclear power plants in the world, to move toward reprocessing will make it more difficult to
convince states such as South Korea and Taiwan not to do likewise. (The administration
argues that by building a commercial consortium that would offer guaranteed fresh fuel and
spent fuel management to countries willing to forego enrichment and reprocessing facilities of
their own, they will reduce, not increase, the incentives for countries to build their own
reprocessing plants. This is a promising approach, but it does not require reprocessing in the
United States, which seems much more likely to convince other states to consider
reprocessing than to convince them not to do so.)
Consolidation for both civilian and military nuclear materials. In the United
States, DOE has already substantially reduced the costs of guarding plutonium and HEU by
closing major sites such as Rocky Flats and greatly reducing the number of buildings with
potential bomb material at other sites. Similarly, since the early 1970s, the number of U.S.
civilian facilities with licenses to manage Category I quantities of nuclear material has
declined dramatically, as the security requirements for such material have increased and
prospects for its commercial use have declined. As just noted, DOE is attempting a
substantial further reduction in the number of sites and buildings where its weapons-usable
nuclear material is located.
Similar efforts to consolidate both military and civilian stockpiles of nuclear material
should be made in other countries. Russia, in particular, still has the world's largest nuclear
complex, with weapons-usable nuclear materials believed to exist in well over 200 buildings
at scores of sites and nuclear warheads believed to exist in well over a hundred bunkers (and a
large number of temporary warhead transport or warhead handling areas) at scores of
additional sites. While a small number of sites and buildings that once had weapons-usable
nuclear material have been cleared out, overall, Russia's progress in consolidating this
complex has been modest. The United States should work with Russia to lay out approaches
to accomplishing the post-Cold War missions of both countries' nuclear weapons complexes
with the smallest possible number of sites and buildings still containing nuclear materials.
Russia should stop resisting such consolidation and undertake a focused effort to identify
facilities that no longer need HEU or plutonium and encourage or force them to allow their
nuclear material to be removed. Large-scale consolidation would greatly reduce the costs of
maintaining high levels of security for the long haul and increase the odds that effective
proposed in GNEP points in the wrong direction on every count. See, for example, testimony of Matthew Bunn
in Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, U.S.
Senate, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 September 2006.
66 Jungmin Kang and Frank Von Hippel, "Limited Proliferation-Resistance Benefits from Recycling Unseparated
Transuranics and Lanthanides from Light-Water Reactor Spent Fuel," Science and Global Security 13, no. 3
(2005).
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security will be sustained. On a much smaller scale, there are probably opportunities for such
consolidation in countries such as China, France, Britain, Japan, and Germany as well.
Consolidation for nuclear warheads. As discussed in Chapter 2, both the United
States and Russia have substantially reduced the number of sites (and countries) where their
nuclear weapons exist since the late 1980s. More remains to be done, however. In Russia in
particular, there is no reason whatever why nuclear weapons need to remain at scores of
separate sites (in addition to those on deployed strategic missiles); leaving the warheads in
these vast number of locations would greatly increase long-term security costs and risks. The
United States should work with Russia to consolidate warheads at a much smaller number of
locations.67 If existing storage facilities at a small number of sites do not have sufficient
capacity to receive warheads from other sites,68 simple but highly secure bunkers for large
numbers of warheads, such as those at the U.S. Pantex facility, could be built in one to two
years.
Beyond Improving Nuclear Security
In this dissertation, I have focused primarily on improving security for nuclear
stockpiles, as this appears to be the point on the path to nuclear terrorism where policy
intervention can have its greatest leverage. The countries that possess nuclear weapons and
materials know where they are and can take action to secure them effectively if they have the
ability and motivation to do so: the key policy problem is to find ways to provide both ability
and motivation where needed. Intervening earlier on the pathway requires successes in
detecting and disrupting highly secretive terrorist activities, or in addressing the factors that
allow terrorist groups to recruit the kind of people and get the kinds of resources required for
a nuclear effort. Intervening later on the pathway is an even greater challenge, as, once
stolen, nuclear weapons or materials could be anywhere, and all the things that might be done
to find and recover them, or prevent their use, are variations on looking for needles in
haystacks. Nonetheless, because efforts to lock down nuclear stockpiles around the world are
not likely to be 100% successful - and because some undetected thefts of nuclear material
may already have occurred - some investment in other lines of defense is important as well.
Counter-terrorism Efforts Focused on Nuclear Risks
As shown in Chapter 3, counter-terrorist efforts that succeeded in both reducing the
number of groups that could plausibly pursue nuclear terrorism and the effectiveness of the
remaining ones could substantially reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, even if they were only
67 For similar recommendations, see Harold P. Smith, Jr., "Consolidating Threat Reduction," Arms Control
Today 33, no. 9 (November 2003; available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_1 l /Smith.asp as of 22
March 2005), p. 19; Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part II:
Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations, vol. FOI-R--1588--SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research
Agency, 2005; available at http://www.foi.se/upload/pdf/FOI-RussiasTacticalNuclearWeapons.pdf as of 12 April
2005).
68 For a discussion of storage capacity constraints as of the late- 1990s, see Joshua Handler, Russian Nuclear
Warhead Dismantlement Rates and Storage Site Capacity: Implications for the Implementation ofSTART II and
De-Alerting Initiatives, AC-99-01 (Princeton, N.J.: Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton
University, 1999).
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partly successful. The United States and other leading governments should focus substantial
efforts on identifying and destroying terrorist groups with the combination of extreme
objectives, propensity to mass violence, and substantial financial and technical capabilities
that might make them plausible candidates for nuclear terrorism. They should also make a
determined effort to identify and track possible observable indicators of nuclear weapons
activities - not only statements about nuclear matters and explicit attempts to get nuclear
material or expertise, 69 but related activities such as the purchase of induction furnaces and
high-temperature crucibles suitable for casting uranium or plutonium, training in shaped
explosives suitable for explosive lenses, suspicious chemical leaks or fires, and more.
Terrorist efforts to recruit people with relevant expertise - such as nuclear physicists
or metallurgists - may be one of the more detectable activities associated with a nuclear
weapons effort. Police and intelligence agencies should seek to build relationships at
locations that may pose particular risks of such recruiting efforts, such as technical
universities in countries such as Pakistan or Egypt, or universities elsewhere in the world with
a substantial number of students from Islamic diaspora, to increase awareness of this potential
problem. They should widely disseminate information on easy and anonymous ways to report
on any suspicious activities (coupled with a program of rewards for doing so).
Since such activities could occur anywhere in the world, a sustained nuclear counter-
terrorism effort cannot succeed without a substantially increased effort to cooperate with
intelligence and police services around the world toward these objectives - including
improving other countries' efforts (and ability) to monitor indicators of terrorist nuclear
interest and activity.
While a terrorist nuclear bomb assembly effort would not require large fixed facilities
and might well take place in a developed country, it seems clear that a terrorist-dominated
failed state such as the Taliban's Afghanistan offers an even greater ability to work
uninterrupted at fixed facilities for prolonged periods, increasing terrorists' chances of success
in a nuclear effort. It would be effectively impossible to detect most indicators of such an
effort taking place in such a state. Hence, another focus of efforts to reduce the risk of
nuclear terrorism should be on efforts to rebuild failed states (including devoting greater
resources to preventing Afghanistan from sliding back in that direction), avoid future failed
states, and help countries gain control over "stateless zones."
The United States and other leading governments should also work closely with
governments that have nuclear stockpiles and face severe threats from terrorists and thieves -
such as Russia and Pakistan - to attempt to reduce the scale of those threats. Tougher
screening and monitoring of nuclear insiders, anti-corruption programs focused on the nuclear
69 It would be useful, as just one example, to track purchases of books such as The Los Alamos Primer and views
of particularly informative websites by individuals in countries with active terrorist organizations, or by
individuals on relevant watch lists.
70 For an unclassified summary of a classified study on the prospects for improving capabilities to detect such
indicators (which is much more optimistic on the subject than I am), see Michael V. Hynes, John E. Peters, and
Joel Kvitky, "Denying Armageddon," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 607
(September 2006).
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complex, cooperation to improve government capabilities to detect and stop large-scale
conspiracies before attacks occur, and efforts to change the conditions that allow terrorist
groups to thrive in these countries could significantly reduce the probability that terrorists or
thieves would be able to put together sufficient capabilities to overcome upgraded nuclear
security systems and carry out a successful nuclear theft. In other words, efforts to reduce the
probability of nuclear theft should focus not only on upgrading the defense but also on
reducing the threat.
At the same time, it is worth making a major effort to change the conditions that make
it easier for extreme Islamist terrorist groups to recruit and raise funds - to reduce the dangers
of all forms of terrorism, not just nuclear terrorism.' If the hatred of the United States and
the West and the tolerance for terrorism that have become distressingly common
commonplace in much of the Islamic world could be changed, through a combination of
changes in policies and more effective engagement with the moderate Islamic world, it would
have little effect on people who are already hard-core terrorists, but it might significantly
undermine their ability to put together the sophisticated technical expertise and substantial
resources needed for a nuclear weapons effort. A last resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, an end to the U.S. domination of Iraq, and consistent efforts seen as contributing to
justice and development in the Islamic world could potentially do a great deal to counter the
hatred that creates fertile ground for terrorist recruitment and fundraising.
In particular, a targeted discussion of the moral illegitimacy of mass violence on a
nuclear scale under Islamic law and other religious traditions - coupled with providing
detailed information on just how horrifying the effects of nuclear weapons truly are - could
make it more difficult for those terrorists wanting to pursue nuclear violence to convince the
people they need to join their cause. After 9/11, bin Laden spent a great deal of his public
statements justifying the mass slaughter of innocents (including some Muslims) as legitimate
under the circumstances, in response to criticisms from prominent Islamic scholars that this
was forbidden under Islamic law; awareness of such concerns may have been what provoked
bin Laden to seek afatwa from a radical Saudi cleric holding that the use of nuclear weapons
against U.S. citizens was permissible (discussed in Chapter 2). Convincing many of the
audiences that al Qaeda plays to that the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians
is a crime that cannot be justified under any circumstances might do as much to reduce the
danger of nuclear terrorism as any other step. It would be particularly worthwhile to engage
such a discussion at the places where the physicists and metallurgists for a bomb program are
most likely to be recruited - at nuclear facilities and universities in countries with
sophisticated terrorist groups, with Pakistan at the top of the list.
7' The effort to "diminish the conditions" that lead to terrorism is one of the key elements of U.S. counter-
terrorism strategy, but as has been widely noted, it is the one where the United States has been least successful.
See, for example, discussion in Bruce Hoffman, Does Our Counter-Terrorism Strategy Match the Threat? CT-
250-1 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005; available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2005/
RAND__CT250- I.pdf as of 28 December 2006). For the beginnings of a set of recommendations for changing
this, see, for example, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Next Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror
and a Strategy for Getting It Right (New York: Times Books, 2005).
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Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Transfers to Terrorists by States
As discussed in Chapter 3, deliberate decisions by hostile states to provide nuclear
bomb materials to terrorists are probably a smaller part of the danger of nuclear terrorism than
nuclear theft, because regimes focused on their own survival know that any such act would
risk overwhelming retaliation. Nevertheless, steps should be taken to reduce this element of
the risk of nuclear terrorism as well. The United States should seek to reduce this risk
through a combination of deterrence, disarmament, and efforts to make such transfers more
difficult to carry out. The United States should make clear that it will treat any terrorist
nuclear attack using a weapon or material provided by a state as an attack by that state and
respond accordingly - and should emphasize publicly that it is making every effort to improve
its capability to attribute the source of nuclear material in such an event. 72 The United States
should also abandon its reluctance to engage directly with Iran and its reluctance to offer
serious incentives to North Korea, working with other leading governments to gain
international agreement on packages of carrots and sticks large and credible enough to
convince Iran and North Korea that it is in their interests to verifiably abandon their nuclear
weapons efforts. (Given the events of 2006, including North Korea's partly successful
nuclear test and Iran's continued progress toward mastering centrifuges, the prospects for
success in this endeavor are now substantially lower than they once were - though the
February 2007 agreement with North Korea represents at least a first step in the right
direction.) The United States and other leading governments should also take steps to ensure
that states in a position to make such transfers do not become sufficiently desperate that such
transfers might be seen either as the last chance for regime survival or the last chance to
punish those whose actions led to the regime's collapse.
At the same time, the United States should work to make it more difficult and risky
for states such as North Korea or Iran to transfer to weapons-usable nuclear material beyond
their borders should they someday choose to attempt to do so. This would include working
with China and other states bordering North Korea to beef up border controls and nuclear
detection capabilities at key border crossings (an effort that was just beginning as of late
200673), attempting similar efforts with neighbors of states such as Iran and Pakistan 74 (an
even more difficult problem, given the scale of smuggling of all types of contraband that has
traditionally taken place across these loosely controlled borders), and continued efforts to beef
up international collaborations focused on blocking such transfers, such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI). There should be no assumption, however, that such efforts to
interdict transfers will decrease the probability of successful transfers by more than a few
percent: blocking transfers of material that would fit in a suitcase, across hundreds or
12 For discussions emphasizing this approach, see, for example, Michael Levi, "Deterring Nuclear Terrorism,"
Issues in Science and Technology 20, no. 3 (2004; available at http://www.issues.org/20.3/levi.html as of 28
December 2006); William Dunlop and Harold Smith, "Who Did It? Using International Forensics to Detect and
Deter Nuclear Terrorism," Arms Control Today 36, no. 8 (October 2006; available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_I0/CVRForensics.asp as of 28 December 2006).
73 Interview with DOE official, December 2006.
74 Pakistan's current government is supporting some U.S. anti-terrorist efforts, but Pakistan is clearly a plausible
location from which either a future government or a terrorist group might attempt to transfer nuclear material
beyond the state's borders.
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thousands of kilometers of often essentially unmarked and uncontrolled borders, is an
extraordinary challenge.
Countering the Nuclear Black Market
Beyond preventing nuclear theft in the first place, what can be done to reduce the
chance that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons or materials on a nuclear black market?
As discussed in Chapter 3, the United States and other leading governments should take steps
to make it even more difficult than it already is for potential thieves with access to nuclear
material and potential terrorist buyers to find each other and complete successful transactions.
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies should run additional stings and scams, posing as
either buyers or sellers of nuclear material, to catch participants in this market, collect
intelligence on market participants, and increase the fears of real buyers and sellers that their
interlocutors may be government agents. As most of the confirmed cases in which stolen
weapons-usable nuclear material was successfully seized involved one of the conspirators or
some one they tried to involve in the effort informing on the others, additional measures to
make such informing more likely - including anonymous tip hotlines that were well-
publicized in the nuclear community, and rewards for credible information - could also have
substantial benefit. All potential source states and likely transit states should have units of
their national police force trained and equipped to deal with nuclear smuggling cases, and
other law enforcement personnel should be trained to call in those units as needed.
Current efforts to put in place radiation detection at key border crossings (and to
improve nuclear detection within the United States) may also reduce risk somewhat, forcing
smugglers to pursue more difficult and chancier routes. The Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO), established after the 9/11 attacks, is focused on improving U.S. capability to
detect nuclear and radiological material coming into the United States, and within the United
States - as well as designing a "global detection architecture" to be implemented by other
agencies. At the same time, as of late 2006 there was broad support in Congress for
legislation that would require that every one of the millions of cargo containers arriving at
U.S. shores each year go through a radiation scan. But as just noted, given the immense range
of different methods available for smuggling items as small as the nuclear material for a
bomb, it is not likely that such border-detection and internal-detection measures will reduce
the probability of successful nuclear terrorism by more than a few percent." To gain the
maximum benefit attainable from such measures, a systems-engineering approach is needed,
looking not just at how well an individual detector may perform, but what options adversaries
would have to choose other routes, bribe participants to get past detectors, and take other
actions to overcome the detection system - and what options the defense might have for
countering those adversary tactics. Based on such an analysis, the United States and other
leading governments should seek to pull existing efforts together into a prioritized strategic
plan that goes well beyond detection at borders, detailing what police, border, customs, and
7s For a discussion of measures in this area and their strengths and weaknesses, see Anthony Wier, "Interdicting
Nuclear Smuggling," in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass., and
Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2002;
available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/cnwm/interdicting/index.asp as of 1 March 2005).
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intelligence entities in which countries should have what capabilities by when - and what
resources will be used to achieve those objectives.
Global Nuclear Emergency Response
Within the United States, the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST, formerly the
Nuclear Emergency Search Team) is charged with searching for and disabling a terrorist
nuclear bomb, in the event of a nuclear terrorist threat or other information suggesting that
such an attack may be imminent. NEST teams would also be called on to search for and
attempt to recover nuclear material if a major nuclear theft occurred within the United States.
NEST teams are equipped with sophisticated nuclear detection equipment and specialized
technologies which, it is hoped, would make it possible to disable even a booby-trapped bomb
before it went off. Because of the great difficulty of detecting nuclear material at long range,
broad-area searches are not practicable; if the only information available was that there was a
nuclear bomb somewhere in a particular city, the chances of finding it would be slim. But if
additional information made it possible to narrow the search to an area of a few blocks, the
chances of finding it would be substantial. The United States should work with other
countries to ensure that an international rapid-response capability is put in place - including
making all the necessary legal arrangements for visas and import of technologies such as the
nuclear detectors used by the NEST team (some of which include radioactive materials) - so
that within hours of receiving information related to stolen nuclear material or a stolen nuclear
weapon anywhere in the world, a response team could be on the ground, or an aircraft with
sophisticated search capabilities could be flying over the area.
Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel
With Russia's economy stabilized, nuclear workers in Russia are now paid an above-
average wage, on time; the desperation of the late 1990s has largely eased. The situation at
many nuclear facilities has substantially stabilized.77 With thousands of nuclear workers soon
to lose their jobs as major facilities close, however, serious proliferation risks remain. (In
early 2005, for example, a group of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces officers - people who
had spent their career working with nuclear weapons and presumably know a great deal about
security arrangements for them - became so desperate after having been left behind with their
families in a remote garrison when the missile base was closed down that they agreed to
bypass the Ministry of Defense and petition the United States directly for assistance.78) The
76 For a summary of NEST and its history, see, for example, Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Defusing Nuclear Terror,"
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58, no. 2 (March/April 2002; available at http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?
art_ ofn=ma02richelson as of 28 December 2006), pp. 38-43.
77 For an excellent update on the status and future of Russia's nuclear complex, see Oleg Bukharin, Russia's
Nuclear Complex: Surviving the End of the Cold War (Princeton, N.J.: Program on Science and Global Security,
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 2004; available at
http://www.ransac.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=bukharinminatomsurvivalmay2004.pdf as of 8 March 2005).
78 "US Money Lost on Way to Former Russian Army Servicemen," trans. BBC Monitoring Service, Ekho
Moskvy, 15 February 2005; Aleksey Terekhov and Yevgeniy Latyshev, "Russian Missile Officers to Petition US
for Resettlement Aid," Novye Izvestiya, 14 February 2005. 1 am grateful to Charles L. Thornton for pointing this
incident and its significance out to me.
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threat is not just nuclear weapons scientists who might help a foreign state develop a nuclear
bomb, but nuclear workers or guards who might help thieves steal the essential ingredients of
a bomb. 79 The United States should work closely with Russia and other countries to take a
broader approach, using all the economic tools available, to revitalizing the economies of
those nuclear cities where the major facilities are closing or shrinking and to reemploying
other nuclear workers and experts who could otherwise pose a proliferation threat.80 In
Russia, such efforts should not be limited to the closed nuclear cities, but should be pursued
for staff and guards at nuclear facilities at open sites as well. Individuals who have left the
nuclear facilities where they once worked but may still have proliferation-sensitive knowledge
- including particularly retired guards and nuclear material workers who still know the details
of the security arrangements at sites with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear
materials, many of whom face rather grim conditions - should also be targeted by such
programs, as they have not been before. The United States should put a particular focus on
working with Russia to increase the effectiveness of, and reduce the insider threats posed by,
the conscript Ministry of Interior guard forces that guard most nuclear sites, ideally moving to
the use only of well-trained and well-paid volunteer guards at these critical facilities (a
practice Russia already follows at nuclear warhead storage sites)."
Reducing Stockpiles and Ending Production
In addition to securing nuclear material at sites and removing material from especially
vulnerable sites, actually destroying weapons-usable nuclear material and avoiding the
accumulation of ever-larger stockpiles are also potentially important tools in the theft-
prevention toolbox. As noted in Chapter 3, however, a building with one ton of nuclear
material poses as great a theft threat as a building with 100 tons of nuclear material, so
reductions in the sheer size of nuclear stockpiles may have limited effects in reducing theft
risks (however worthwhile they may be for other reasons) unless they are targeted toward
achieving that purpose.
One targeted stockpile-reduction approach the United States should pursue would
focus on those nuclear warheads whose features to prevent unauthorized use if they are stolen
are weakest. A substantial fraction of Russia's remaining tactical nuclear warheads are
believed not to have modem difficult-to-bypass electronic locks to prevent unauthorized use,
and in some cases these warheads are stored at remote, difficult-to-defend storage sites.82 The
79 John V. Parachini and David E. Mosher, Diversion of NBC Weapons Expertise from the FSU: Understanding
an Evolving Problem (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, 2005).
80 See "Chapter 12, Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear Personnel," in Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John
Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Cambridge, Mass., and
Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2003;
available at http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/cnwm.pdf as of 2 January 2007), pp. 141-146.
81 For an alarming discussion of the weaknesses of these guard forces from an official Russian source, see Igor
Goloskokov, "Refomirovanie Voisk MVD Po Okhrane Yadernikh Obektov Rossii (Reforming MVD Troops to
Guard Russian Nuclear Facilities)," trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Yaderny Kontrol 9, no. 4
(Winter 2003; available at http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yk4-2003.pdf as of 28 February 2005).
82 Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton, Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part I: Background and Policy
Issues, vol. FOI-R--1057--SE (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2003); Arbman and Thornton,
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United States and Russia should launch another round of reciprocal initiatives, comparable to
the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992, but with two critical differences: this round
should be focused particularly on reducing risks of nuclear theft, and it should include some
monitoring to confirm that the pledged actions are being taken. As part of such an initiative,
the United States and Russia should exchange information on how many tactical nuclear
warheads they have, they should discuss means to reduce this number as much as possible,
and they should ensure that all of them are stored in facilities with the highest practicable
levels of security. In particular, the United States and Russia should each agree to: (a) take
several thousand warheads - including all of those posing the greatest risk of theft8 3 - and
place them in secure, centralized storage; (b) allow visits to those storage sites by the other
side to confirm the presence and the security of these warheads; (c) commit that these
warheads will be verifiably dismantled as soon as procedures have been agreed by both sides
to do so without compromising sensitive information; and (d) commit that the nuclear
materials from these warheads will similarly be placed in secure, monitored storage after
dismantlement.84
If effective security can be provided throughout the process, it would also make sense
to destroy much more of Russia's stockpiles of HEU than the 500 tons covered by the current
U.S.-Russian HEU Purchase Agreement, which expires in 2013. Russia has made clear that it
will not renew the existing agreement - but with both uranium and enrichment services
becoming scarce and expensive, there may be substantial opportunities for Russia to profit
from blending down additional HEU to LEU for use in its planned domestic reactors, or for
Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Part II: Technical Issues and Policy Recommendations; Anatoli Diakov,
Eugene Miasnikov, and Timur Kadyshev, Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Control and Reduction
(Moscow: Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and
Technology, 2004; available at http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/NSNWen vl b.pdf as of 17 March 2005).
83 Ultimately all nuclear warheads not equipped with modern electronic locks should be dismantled. In the near
term, however, neither side is likely to be willing to dismantle all such warheads, as U.S. strategic ballistic
missile warheads, the centerpiece of the U.S. deterrent, are not equipped with such locks integral to the
warheads, and the same is believed to be true of some warheads critical to the Russian deterrent. In general,
however, warheads on submarines or on ICBMs in concrete silos pose a lesser risk of theft than warheads
scattered in forward-deployed storage facilities. In particular, while these warheads may not have electronic
locks requiring insertion of a particular code to arm them, they are typically equipped with devices that will not
allow them to be armed until they have experienced the expected acceleration of ballistic missile flight followed
by a period of coasting through space; while these devices were designed for safety, not security, they would
make it quite difficult for a terrorist group not aided by someone familiar with their details to set off a stolen
weapon, as discussed in Chapter 2. Hence, for the immediate initiative, for all warheads not equipped with
modem electronic locks, each side should either (a) include them in the set subject to secure, monitored storage
and eventual verified dismantlement, or (b) provide the other side with sufficient information to build confidence
that they are highly secure. Where warheads not equipped with modern electronic locks are not in immediate
use, and are not mounted on SLBMs or ICBMs - as when they are being kept as spares, for example - they
should be stored in partly disassembled form, ideally with critical parts in separate locations, to make them more
difficult to steal.
84 For an earlier description of this idea, see, for example, Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear
Warheads and Materials, pp. 132-134. For an up-to-date discussion of the risks posed by tactical nuclear
weapons and steps to reduce them, see William Potter and Nikolai Sokov, "Practical Measures to Reduce the
Risks Presented by Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons," paper presented at The Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission, Stockholm2005 (available at http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No8.pdf as of 18 April 2005).
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sales on international markets. There are also opportunities for the United States and other
countries to offer increased access to their uranium and enrichment markets and other tools -
including, for example, providing some of their comparatively rich depleted uranium "tails"
for use in producing blendstock for blending down HEU - to encourage Russia to destroy
hundreds of tons of additional HEU. There may also be opportunities, through relatively
modest capital investments in expanding capacity, to accelerate the rate of blending beyond
the current 30 tons of HEU per year, so that the security benefit of destroying additional HEU
does not have to wait until well beyond 2013 to be achieved. The United States, for example,
could pay Russia a fee for service for blending HEU to 19% enriched LEU, which would be
placed in monitored storage until it could be blended to commercial levels and sold without
unduly interfering with commercial markets.85
At the same time, if high standards of security are maintained throughout, it would be
worthwhile to move forward as quickly as possible with safe, secure, and transparent
disposition of excess weapons plutonium. Disposition of the 34 tons of Russian excess
plutonium and the 34 tons of U.S. excess plutonium covered by the U.S.-Russian Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement will only be a substantial contribution to U.S. and
international security, however, if it is but the first step toward a much larger reduction in the
stockpiles of weapons plutonium that now exist.8 6
Efforts to end the accumulation of stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material
should also be pursued, particularly if they have ancillary benefits for reducing the dangers of
nuclear theft and terrorism. If a verified and global fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT)
could be achieved, for example, this would not only end further additions to the stockpiles of
plutonium and HEU available for weapons, but would likely bring to an end a substantial
amount of bulk processing of plutonium and HEU (one of the stages of the material life-cycle
that is most vulnerable to insider theft), and the verification would impose a multilateral
discipline on the quality of material control and accounting that is not present at military
facilities in the nuclear weapon states today. 87 The United States should reverse its misguided
opposition to a verified fissile cutoff, and the United States and other leading governments
should seek to overcome the obstacles to negotiating such a treaty - including the possibility
8 The Nuclear Threat Initiative has been sponsoring detailed studies of such accelerated blend-down options by
experts from the Russian facilities doing the blending work. See Laura Holgate, "Accelerating the Blend-Down
of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium," in Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting of the Institute for Nuclear
Materials Management, Phoenix, Ariz., 10-14 July 2005 (Northbrook, Ill.: INMM, 2005; available at
http://www.nti.org/c_press/analysisHolgate_INMM%2OPaper_061005.pdf as of 28 December 2006). For an
earlier description of such proposals, see Bunn, Wier, and Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and
Materials.
86 For an elaboration of this point, see Matthew Bunn, testimony in Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services, Plutonium Disposition and the US. Mixed Oxide Fuel Facility, U.S. House of
Representatives, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, 26 July 2006 (available at http://www.house.gov/hasc/schedules/
as of 10 August 2006).
87 I am grateful to William Walker for making this point to me. Personal communication, March 2003.
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of undertaking negotiations outside of the Conference on Disarmament if that body continues
to be unable to move forward.
The United States and other countries are also working with Russia to provide
alternative heat and power sources so that Russia's last plutonium production reactors can
shut down. Like the FMCT, this would also lead to the end of a large quantity of bulk
processing of plutonium and HEU each year (both at the reprocessing plants that recover the
plutonium produced in these reactors and at the facilities that produced HEU spike fuel for
these reactors - which is also transported over thousands of kilometers from the fabrication
facilities). These reductions in bulk processing would reduce the danger of nuclear theft from
these facilities. At the same time, though, the impending closure of these facilities means that
thousands of workers who have access to plutonium today know that they will soon be losing
their jobs, which may increase temptations for nuclear theft. If this effort is to have net
security benefits worth its very substantial costs, the participating countries should put high
priority on working with Russia to ensure that the displaced workers receive either suitable
employment or secure retirement packages and that high levels of security - including against
insider threats - are maintained throughout these facilities' remaining life.
Modified Approaches to Increase the Chances of Success
The steps outlined above represent a broad and ambitious agenda. That agenda can
only succeed if countries throughout the world actively cooperate toward these ends. Six key
changes in past U.S. approaches are likely to be needed to gain that cooperation and overcome
the obstacles to progress:
* new steps to build the sense of urgency about, and commitment to addressing, the threat of
nuclear terrorism among political and nuclear leaders around the world;
* sustained leadership from the highest levels (including the appointment, in the United
States and Russia, and possibly in other participating countries as well, of senior officials
with direct access to the head of state when needed, with full-time responsibility for
leading the myriad efforts directed toward preventing nuclear terrorism);
* development of an integrated and prioritized plan, tying together the many policy tools
focused on reducing the dangers of nuclear theft and terrorism;
* truly partnership-based approaches, incorporating ideas and resources from all
cooperating partners, moving away from donor-recipient relationships;
* more flexible approaches to nuclear security cooperation that can allow important
improvements to be made without in all cases requiring that U.S. personnel be able to
travel to the most sensitive nuclear sites; and
88 Matthew Bunn, "Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty," in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the
Bomb, ed. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing
the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at
http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/ending/fmct.asp as of 2 January 2007).
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* expanded efforts to ensure that high levels of nuclear security will be sustained for the
long haul and to build strong "security cultures," in which all staff relevant to security
give it the priority it deserves.
Approach 1: Strengthening the Sense of Urgency and Commitment
The single most essential ingredient of success in ensuring security for nuclear
stockpiles around the world is convincing political leaders and nuclear managers around the
world that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real and that improvements in nuclear security are
critical to their own national security and deserving of their own resources. If the leaders of
all the key states and nuclear facilities around the world were convinced of those two points,
they would be likely to take the actions needed to keep these stockpiles out of terrorist hands.
But if they are not convinced - as many of them are not today - there is little chance that they
will assign sufficient resources, impose stringent security rules, take political risks to allow
sensitive nuclear cooperation with foreigners, or take the other actions needed to achieve and
sustain security levels sufficient to defend nuclear stockpiles against demonstrated terrorist
and criminal threats. In maintaining a strong safety system, it is sometimes said that the most
important element is "forgetting to be afraid."8 9 The same is even more true for nuclear
security.
But today, many of the key players are not afraid. They believe, with Pakistani
President Musharraf, that the United States is "overly concerned" about the possibility of
nuclear terrorism. The common attitude was well summed up in a private interview with a a
leading Russian nuclear expert - who had played a key role in establishing cooperation to
improve security in the 1990s. Asked about the threat of nuclear theft in Russia today, he
leaned back in his chair, took a drag on his cigarette, and said: "I am not worried." 90 Several
key steps should be taken to try to build the sense of urgency and commitment among
political leaders, nuclear managers, and all key personnel involved in nuclear security.
Joint threat briefings. A series of briefings for political leaders of particular countries
participating in the global coalition (and their U.S. counterparts, for political symmetry),
given jointly by nuclear experts from the United States and each of the countries where the
briefings took place, could outline in detail the terrorist desire for nuclear weapons, their
proven efforts to get nuclear weapons, and the very real possibility that terrorists could make
at least a crude nuclear bomb if they got the needed nuclear materials. The briefings could
also highlight the likely global economic and political effects if a terrorist bomb were to be
detonated in a major city, along with the significant reductions in this risk that could be
achieved through improved nuclear security measures and other steps.
Fast-paced national surveys of nuclear security vulnerabilities. In the aftermath of
the 9/11 attacks, DOE dispatched a team of security experts to urgently review security
measures at all key DOE nuclear sites and make recommendations for improvement. As
noted in Chapter 1, a similar approach of sending out a trusted team for an urgent review had
89 James Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1997), p. 195.
90 Interview with Kurchatov Institute official, September 2003.
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been undertaken several times in the past as well. These reviews have typically identified a
wide range of vulnerabilities requiring correction.
President Bush should seek to convince the leaders of key states with nuclear
stockpiles to pick teams of security experts they trust to conduct fast-paced assessments of
potential vulnerabilities and to develop recommendations for fixing them at all sites with
nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material in their countries. These reviews could
ask whether the security measures in place are really good enough to defeat, for example, one
to three well-placed insiders conspiring to steal nuclear material, or two teams of well-armed
and well-trained outside attackers attempting to break in, who might have help from one or
more insiders. In many countries, any thorough review would conclude that for some
facilities, the answer is decidedly "no." Such reviews could give these leaders an
unvarnished, independent assessment, going around those with an incentive to tell them that
everything is secure. No U.S. personnel need take part, so there need be no revelation to the
United States or other foreigners of any specific security vulnerabilities. But the United
States should share, in general terms, the experiences it has had in performing such rapid
initial assessments, it should provide training in vulnerability assessment and testing
techniques, and, in those countries where assistance may be needed, it should offer to help
cover the cost of any security upgrades the reviews recommend.
Realistic security performance tests. A regular system of realistic testing of security
performance, where "red teams" playing the roles of outside attackers or insider thieves
attempt to overcome the system, can be a critical part of convincing non-expert political
leaders that more resources are needed for security. Short of real thefts, nothing demonstrates
more convincingly that there is a problem than spectacular failures of defense systems to
protect nuclear items in realistic tests. Moreover, if done properly, such tests can help
convince guards and other security personnel of the plausibility of the threat, provide
important training, and help them find and fix problems that may not have been obvious in
paper studies. Such performance testing has been a critical part of improved nuclear security
over the past two decades in the United States.91
The United States should work with key countries participating in the global coalition
to convince them to institute regular realistic testing of nuclear security, briefing them on the
U.S. experience, providing training in testing techniques, and offering to cover part of the cost
of conducting such tests. In cases like Russia's where cooperation with U.S. experts is
particularly extensive, the United States should seek to help establish joint security testing
teams, which could train together, share their techniques, and perhaps carry out joint tests at a
few non-sensitive facilities. This would provide both the United States and Russia with a
greatly increased understanding of the other side's approach to testing security.
Nuclear terrorism wargames. Wargames and similar exercises have been effective
in getting policymakers in a number of countries to understand at intellectual, emotional,
experiential levels the urgent challenges they face. A wargame or series of wargames for
91 For a good account of part of this experience, see Oleg Bukharin, "Physical Protection Performance Testing:
Assessing U.S. NRC Experience," Journal of Nuclear Materials Management 28, no. 4 (Summer 2000).
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Russia's national security policymakers, focused on nuclear theft and terrorism (similar to an
exercise recently conducted in Europe) could help convince participants that more needs to be
done to secure nuclear stockpiles. 92
Shared threat incident databases. Most nuclear managers and staff - even those
whose jobs are critical to security - do not receive regular information about terrorist attempts
to acquire nuclear materials or nuclear weapons, or other security incidents from which
lessons can and should be drawn about the kinds of threats nuclear facilities must be defended
against. In 2003, for example, a Russian court case revealed that a Russian businessman had
been offering $750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium for sale to a foreign client and had
made contact with residents of the closed nuclear city of Sarov in an attempt to get such
material.93 While he did not succeed, the fact that a Russian was offering what was then
roughly a century of the average nuclear worker's salary for such material is surely a relevant
fact of which security managers should be aware. No Russian nuclear expert or security
manager with whom I have discussed this case had ever heard of it before.94 Similarly, most
nuclear security managers around the world would probably be amazed to hear that there
really has been a case in the past of more than a dozen heavily armed terrorists overpowering
the armed guards at a nuclear facility and seizing complete control of the facility - a type of
threat that is sometimes dismissed as unrealistic.95
In organizational systems for safety (as opposed to security), keeping track of all such
incidents and "near-misses" and the lessons learned from them has proved to be absolutely
critical. It is a key part of convincing staff of the need to take safety seriously. Indeed,
extensive studies have concluded that "the two characteristics most likely to distinguish safe
organizations from less safe ones are, firstly, top-level commitment and, secondly, the
possession of an adequate safety information system." 96 In the United States, the Institute for
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO, the U.S. arm of WANO) distributes detailed analyses of all
safety-related incidents to all plants, with accompanying "lessons learned" to avoid such
92 The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) organized the
"Black Dawn" war game in Europe and are undertaking a similar effort in Moscow. These are very promising
first steps; more such games should be conducted, for key officials and facility managers in countries around the
world.
93 Matthew Bunn, "Anecdotes of Insecurity," in Nuclear Threat Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb
(Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear
Threat Initiative, 2004; available at http://www.nti.org/eresearch/cnwm/threat/anecdote.asp as of 2 January
2007).
"4 Interviews, May, July, and October 2005.
9s This was at the Atucha Atomic Power Station in Argentina in 1973. The facility was under construction at the
time and had no nuclear material on-site. The terrorists departed as a response force arrived, after a brief shoot-
out with the responders. Konrad Kellen, "Appendix: Nuclear-Related Terrorist Activities by Political
Terrorists," in Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on
Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, ed. Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (Cambridge, Mass.: Lexington
Books for the Nuclear Control Institute, 1987).
96 Reason, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, p. 11 3.
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problems in the future. It later inspects each plant's program for reviewing these incidents
and implementing the lessons learned.97
Although security matters face the constraints of secrecy, in many cases a similar
approach can and should be taken for nuclear security. The United States should work with
its international partners to establish a shared database of verified information on important
security-related incidents and related lessons for the future. Rules could then be put in place
requiring facilities to review these incidents and implement the applicable lessons. The
incidents included should go beyond the nuclear industry itself. Incidents that confirm the
ways that terrorists and thieves have used tactics such as bribing or blackmailing insiders (for
example by kidnapping their families), deception (such as fake uniforms and IDs), unusual
vehicles, tunnels into secure vaults, and attacks with substantial force and heavy armament
would be important for nuclear security managers around the world to understand. 98 Many of
these specifics of past incidents are not classified and could be included in a database that was
available to nuclear facilities around the world. Creating such a threat incident database and
ensuring that it was regularly updated and widely used could do a great deal to increase
security awareness and strengthen security culture. Such a threat incident database, like many
of the other commitment-building steps suggested here, could potentially be implemented by
an industry-led security initiative such as the proposed WINS.
A description of the 1992 theft of 1.5 kilograms of 90% enriched HEU from the Luch
Production Association in Podolsk, Russia, for example, might note that the thief stole the
material in small quantities at a time, to avoid detection by the crude accounting system in
place at the time at the facility; that the facility had no portal monitors in place at the time to
detect HEU being carried out the door; and that the thief was motivated by fear that the
hyperinflation in Russia at the time would make him unable to provide for his family.99 There
are several lessons to be learned from just this one case. Facilities should first of all ensure
that effective portal monitors are in place to detect any removal and that there are no means of
getting material out of a facility without going through a portal monitor (such as passing it out
a window). To prevent thefts like this example, facilities should ensure that portal monitors
provide their data not only to a guard by the portal monitor (who might be bribed or
threatened to ignore a signal), but also to a remote location. Facilities should put in place
accounting systems capable of detecting significant removals of nuclear material, or at least
measures to compensate if the accounting system was not sensitive enough to do that job in a
timely way. Finally, facilities would be wise to monitor the financial status of employees
with access to nuclear material, perhaps removing from access to nuclear material employees
identified as financially desperate.
Threat-focused training. Ongoing training for nuclear security personnel should
highlight the urgency of maintaining high security, ideally in graphic terms that get to the
97 Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The Transformation of Nuclear Safety since Three Mile Island, pp. 128-150.
98 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of a selection of incidents involving such tactics.
99 For an interview with the thief describing the crime, see "Frontline: Loose Nukes: Interviews" (Public
Broadcasting System, 1996; available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nukes/interviews/ as of
22 December 2005).
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heart, as well as the head. As a related example, as part of the safety training program for all
of those involved in building and maintaining U.S. nuclear submarines so that they will not
leak, key personnel are required every year to listen to a several-minute audiotape of a
submarine that failed, killing everyone aboard.100 Presentations to policymakers and key
nuclear security officials of images from Hiroshima and Chernobyl might similarly highlight,
in an emotionally gripping way, the scale of the catastrophe that could occur if nuclear
security measures failed and terrorists succeeded in detonating a nuclear bomb or sabotaging a
major nuclear facility. The United States and Russia should work together, for example, to
develop a training video for nuclear personnel highlighting terrorists' ongoing hunt for
nuclear material for nuclear weapons and the possibility that particularly sophisticated
terrorist groups might be capable of constructing at least a crude nuclear bomb.
Approach 2: Sustained High-Level Leadership
A second essential approach is sustained leadership from the highest levels of
government, focused on overcoming obstacles and moving these programs forward as rapidly
as possible. The job of keeping nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients out of
terrorist hands requires broad international cooperation affecting some of the most sensitive
secrets held by countries around the globe. A maze of political and bureaucratic obstacles
must be overcome - quickly - if the world's most vulnerable nuclear stockpiles are to be
secured before terrorists and thieves get to them.
The U.S.-Russian interagency nuclear security committee established by the Bratislava
summit, co-chaired by Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and his Russian counterpart,
Rosatom chief Sergei Kirienko, represents a major step in the right direction. This committee
has succeeded in reaching agreement on a plan for completing upgrades at all but a few
Russian nuclear weapon and weapons-usable material sites by the end of 2008 and a plan for
returning most Soviet-origin HEU to Russia by the end of 2010. Those agreed timetables,
coupled with a requirement to report to President Bush and President Putin every six months
on progress in meeting them, have focused managers' minds on moving these efforts forward
as quickly as they possibly can; indeed, DOE managers acknowledge "raiding" funds from
efforts not covered by the Bratislava mandates in order to find enough money to meet the
agreed Bratislava deadlines.'(' In other words, post-summit process is having precisely the
desired effect: forcing managers to do everything they can to move the targeted efforts
forward. The twice-yearly reports to the U.S. and Russian Presidents also provide a regular
mechanism that could be used to bring key issues forward for presidential decision (though it
does not appear to have been used for that purpose to date).
But the reality is that the necessary programs stretch across multiple branches of
government - in the United States, in Russia, and in other essential participants in the global
coalition described above. Many of the obstacles are not ones that a secretary of energy or a
100 See testimony of Rear Admiral Paul E. Sullivan, Naval Sea Systems Command, in Committee on Science,
NASA 's Organizational and Management Challenge, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 29 October
2003.
101 Interview with DOE officials, October 2006.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 6 405
Rosatom chief can realistically overcome; for better or for worse, neither of these agencies are
at the center of decision-making on matters of security, diplomacy, or secrecy and counter-
intelligence in their respective governments. Agencies such as these must inevitably take the
lead on implementation, but they need sustained help from the centers of political power in
overcoming the obstacles to implementation and seizing new opportunities as they arise.
To ensure that this work gets the priority it deserves, President Bush should appoint a
senior full-time White House official, with the access needed to walk in and ask for
presidential action when needed, to lead these efforts and keep them on the front burner at the
White House every day. That official would be responsible for finding and fixing the
obstacles to progress in the scores of existing U.S. programs scattered across several cabinet
departments of the U.S. government that are focused on pieces of the job of keeping nuclear
weapons out of terrorist hands - and for setting priorities, eliminating overlaps, and seizing
opportunities for synergy. Despite the creation of a Department of Homeland Security,
President Bush rightly considered it essential to continue to have a senior official in the White
House focused full-time on homeland security - to ensure that the issue continued to get the
needed sustained White House attention and to use the power of the White House to
overcome the obstacles to progress and cut through the disputes between the many
departments and agencies that continue to play essential roles. Much the same logic applies
in this case.
The fate of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) provides one graphic
example of the need for such a mechanism for sweeping aside bureaucratic obstacles. The
FMSF is a giant secure fortress for storing excess plutonium, built in Russia with over $300
million in U.S. funds, and was completed in 2003. But because of a variety of disputes over
transparency, adequate staffing, and other issues, it sat empty for three long years, with the
first plutonium loaded in the summer of 2006 (with the transparency issues still not
resolved). 02 These were three years that were taking place after the 9/11 attacks and after
Russian officials had acknowledged that terrorist teams were scoping nuclear weapon storage
facilities in Russia; half of the time was after the Bratislava summit had focused presidential
attention on accelerating progress on nuclear security. Faster mechanisms for overcoming
obstacles and escalating disputes to higher levels when necessary are urgently needed.
As part of this sustained leadership from the top, nuclear security needs to be moved
much closer to the front of the diplomatic agenda. Despite myriad statements about the
priority of the issue, there is little public indication that the subject of preventing nuclear
terrorism - and in particular urgent steps to secure nuclear stockpiles around the world - has
been a focus of any but two of President Bush's meetings with foreign leaders, or of Secretary
102 For an announcement of the initial loading of plutonium in July 2006, see "Nuclear Storage Facility
Commissioned in Russia's Chelyabinsk Region," iTAR-TASS, I I July 2006. For accounts of some of the
disputes about the facility, see Matthew Bunn, "Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility," in Nuclear Threat
Initiative Research Library: Securing the Bomb (Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing
the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004; available at
http://www.nti.org/eresearch/cnwm/securing/mayak.asp as of 2 January 2007); Carla Anne Robbins and Anne
Cullison, "Closed Doors: In Russia, Securing Its Nuclear Arsenal Is an Uphill Battle," The Wall Street Journal,
26 September 2005.
Bunn, Guardians at the Gates of Hell, Chapter 6406
of State Condoleezza Rice's meetings with any of her counterparts. The subject was entirely
absent from the U.S.-India nuclear deal, despite the fact that DOE experts had been
attempting to engage India on nuclear security cooperation for years. No public discussion of
Chinese leader Hu Jintao's April 2006 visit to Washington mentioned the subject, even
though DOE has placed high priority on trying to extend nuclear security cooperation with
China, but has not yet succeeded in getting Chinese agreement to expand beyond the civil
sector.
If an effective global coalition to prevent nuclear terrorism is to be forged, this has to
change. The leaders of the critical states need to hear, at every opportunity, that action to
ensure nuclear security is crucial to their own security and to a positive relationship with the
United States. The United States can no longer afford to let the issue languish when obstacles
are encountered, or to leave the discussion to specialists. The United States government
should make nuclear security a central item on the diplomatic agenda with all of the most
relevant states, an item to be addressed at every opportunity, at every level, until the job is
done."03
Approach 3: An Integrated, Prioritized Plan of Action
Literally dozens of different programs in several different agencies of the U.S.
government are addressing one aspect or another of reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Yet today, there is no integrated plan linking these efforts together, no systematic means of
identifying opportunities for synergy or gaps or overlaps to be corrected, and little effort to
prioritize which of these efforts are most important. When Congress passed legislation
requiring the administration to prepare a prioritized plan for securing the world's most
dangerous facilities, what they got were three prioritized lists from three of DOE's programs -
even within DOE, the programs were not able to negotiate out a consolidated set of priorities,
let alone doing so between DOE and other agencies.'0 4
103 The experience in Russia has been that cooperation has proceeded best when either (a) it was allowed to go
forward "under the radar screen," with technical experts communicating directly with each other with relatively
modest intervention from central governments, or (b) at the other extreme, when action was taken at the
presidential level to push the cooperation forward and overcome obstacles. When the discussion was lodged at
levels in between those extremes, officials who wanted to raise objections were able to do so, and officials who
wanted to sweep aside these obstacles did not have the power to do so. Matthew Bunn, "Cooperation to Secure
Nuclear Stockpiles: A Case of Constrained Innovation," Innovations 1, no. 1 (2006; available at
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/INNOV010 _CooperationtoSecureNuclearStockpiles.p
df as of 4 April 2006). In the case of countries such as Pakistan, India, and China, however, it appears likely that
nuclear security cooperation will be so sensitive and so closely monitored by conservative government security
agencies, that the "under the radar screen" approach may not be possible.
104 The unclassified version of this "plan" has almost no content, but does acknowledge that the classified
version includes three separate lists of the highest priorities for three different programs, based on each
program's own separate methodology for assessing priorities. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Report to the United States Congress under Section 3132 of the FY 2005 Defense
Authorization Act: Unclassified Executive Summary (Washington, D.C.: DOE, 2006). That this was because the
different programs each had their own priorities and did not come to any agreement on overall priorities is from
an interview with a DOE official, November 2005.
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One of the first jobs of a senior White House official to lead these disparate efforts
must be to establish priorities and put together a plan that includes objectives to be achieved,
assignment of responsibility for different aspects of achieving them, milestones for progress,
and the resources needed to get these jobs done. That official must then hold managers
accountable for making the progress needed and quickly identifying obstacles to progress and
possible ways to resolve them along with opportunities for new progress and ways to take
advantage of them. Of course, circumstances change - some tasks turn out to be more
difficult than expected and new opportunities arise. Hence the plan must be regularly updated
and modified. The President and Congress should act to ensure that sufficient resources are
assigned so that lack of money or personnel is never a substantial constraint on efforts that
could substantially reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism.
Approach 4: Building Genuine Nuclear Security Partnerships
Gaining both the in-depth cooperation required to improve security for all the
vulnerable nuclear stockpiles around the world and the buy-in of national experts crucial to
long-term sustainability will require approaches based on genuine partnership. Experts from
the countries where these stockpiles are located will need to play key roles in working with
foreign partners in the design, implementation, and evaluation of the entire effort.10 5 Indeed,
data from a wide range of other types of international assistance efforts makes clear that the
success rate is far higher when assistance recipients are deeply involved in project design and
implementation than when this is not the case.' 06 Moreover, whatever transparency a country
is willing to provide about the size and management of its nuclear stockpiles, that country's
experts will inevitably know more about those stockpiles, the specific approaches used to
secure them, their security, and the agencies charged with ensuring that security than
American experts ever will.
As noted earlier, for proud and secretive countries such as China, India, and Pakistan,
nuclear security cooperation that is portrayed as an opportunity for them to join in a co-equal
partnership with the leading nuclear states to address a global security problem will be far
more appealing than being seen as needing foreign assistance because they are too poor or
uninformed to adequately secure their own nuclear stockpiles. The specific tactics and sets of
incentives needed to move cooperation forward will vary with national and cultural contexts.
But in broad terms, approaches based on genuine partnership will work better than attempting
to impose "made in America" nuclear security approaches.
How would a real, and not just rhetorical, shift from assistance to partnership actually
be different from the approaches that have been taken in the past? In the case of cooperation
in Russia, there has already been a significant and positive shift in recent years. Russian
105 For discussions of such partnership approaches to nuclear security in the Russian context, see Oleg Bukharin,
Matthew Bunn, and Kenneth N. Luongo, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to
Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Russian American Nuclear Security
Advisory Council, 2000; available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/mpca2000.pdf as
of 2 January 2007); Bunn, "Building a Genuine U.S.-Russian Partnership for Nuclear Security."
106 See, for instance, World Bank, Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why (Oxford, United
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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experts are now responsible for designing, installing, and maintaining the upgraded nuclear
security and accounting systems (with substantial oversight from U.S. experts where the
United States is providing the funds). Since Bratislava, the two sides have begun a more open
discussion of both "best practices" in nuclear security and difficulties they have encountered
in providing security for their nuclear stockpiles. But there are still shifts to be made to make
this effort a genuine partnership. Russia would have to assign more of its own resources to
the effort, reversing the past habit, in many areas, of cutting Russian funding for activities the
United States is willing to help pay for. It would also need to be willing to openly discuss key
issues for the joint effort, such as how nuclear security arrangements are and will be funded,
or how good security performance by managers, guards, and workers is and will be rewarded.
The United States would have to be willing to bring Russian experts more fully into the
process by which decisions are made on what security upgrades will be done with U.S. funds.
Strategic plans, timetables, and milestones should be developed jointly by the country
where the nuclear stockpiles in question exist and its foreign partners, using both the
country's own funds and foreign funds. They should not be developed in Washington alone,
without consulting with the agencies which actually control those stockpiles, as has
sometimes been the practice in the past. Similarly, guidelines for the kinds of upgrades to be
put in place and the standards of security needed should be discussed and agreed wherever
possible. In the past, the United States has often decided what kinds of security measures to
tell its teams to put in place in Russia without consulting Russian experts - keeping those
experts from seeing those guidelines even as they were used as the basis to reject security
upgrade projects that Russian experts proposed. Progress should be reviewed by experts from
both sides working together, replacing the past U.S. practice of having U.S.-only evaluation
teams assess progress of each project and recommend changes. Key personnel should lead
the effort at particular sites for extended periods of time, so they can build the site-level
relationships needed for a real partnership to grow.
A partnership approach does not necessarily mean putting U.S.-funded projects under
management from the country where the nuclear stockpiles are located - an arrangement that
might well slow projects down rather than speeding them up. A good example of how the
kind of partnership recommended here works in practice can be found in the case of the work
to improve security and accounting for the nuclear warheads and materials of the Russian
Navy. In that case, a small, stable U.S. team has been leading the effort for years, building
confidence with Russian counterparts over time. A Russian team at the Kurchatov Institute
has taken the lead in overseeing much of the work. With a daily on-the-ground presence in
Moscow and Russian security clearances, the Kurchatov team has been able to overcome
obstacles far more effectively than remote U.S. managers would have been able to do.
Finally, a highly committed Russian Navy team has been willing to make the hard decisions
needed to move forward and has provided Navy resources for sustaining the new security and
accounting equipment once installed.'0 7
107 For an account, see, for example, Morton Bremer Maerli, "U.S.-Russian Naval Security Upgrades: Lessons
Learned and the Way Ahead," Naval War College Review 56, no. 4 (Autumn 2003; available at
http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Autumn/pdfs/art2-a03.pdf as of 18 April 2005).
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With the world's largest nuclear stockpiles, a growing cadre of specialists with
experience in modern security and accounting techniques, and political relationships with a
range of countries unlikely to be willing to cooperate with experts from the United States,
Russia is in an excellent position to make a major contribution to a global coalition. The
United States should encourage Russia to take a leadership role in the new Global Initiative
Russia co-founded, offering technical assistance in nuclear security and accounting to
countries around the world. Even at U.S. facilities, as part of the ongoing discussion of "best
practices," when Russian experts visit, the United States should actively solicit their
suggestions for security improvements and should make a conscious effort to adopt in the
United States any Russian equipment, software, or procedures that may be useful. Few steps
could more quickly dispel the perception of Russia as a passive recipient of U.S. assistance
than well-publicized U.S. adoption of an innovative piece of Russian equipment or a Russian
procedure superior to U.S. approaches for improving security at U.S. nuclear facilities.
Such genuine partnerships cannot be built in a political vacuum. Today, while
President Bush and President Putin have a good relationship, much of the Russian security
establishment is deeply suspicious of cooperation with the United States - and much of the
U.S. political establishment is becoming more and more suspicious of cooperation with a
Russia seen as sliding back toward authoritarianism and seeking to dominate its neighbors.'0 8
Similarly, many in the U.S. and Chinese nuclear establishments are deeply suspicious of the
other side, with each country seeing the other as bent on stealing nuclear secrets. Much the
same is true of India and Pakistan - though the specifics of the suspicions vary in each case.
A key focus of the top-level leadership needed to secure the world's nuclear stockpiles must
be to find the means to overcome these suspicious and build the partnerships needed to move
forward.
In many cases, a willingness to cooperate in other areas important to partner countries
will be one key to building an effective partnership. Though nuclear security was left out of
the U.S.-India agreement, the U.S. willingness to lift nuclear sanctions on India undoubtedly
increases the chances that nuclear security cooperation with India will finally move forward.
The recent U.S. decisions to invite Russia to join in the Generation IV International Forum, to
ask Russia to join in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), and to negotiate a
peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia (a so-called 123 agreement, after the
relevant section of the Atomic Energy Act) are steps in the right direction - though the United
States and Russia will have to be careful to ensure that such cooperation does not lead to
promoting fuel cycle strategies that increase proliferation risks rather than decreasing them.1 09
Overcoming the suspicions and political tensions standing in the way of effective
nuclear security partnerships with all the critical states will require a sustained diplomatic
effort. Doing so is nonetheless an essential ingredient of success in reducing the threats of
108 John Edwards and Jack Kemp, with Stephen Sestanovich, Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States
Can and Should Do, ed. Stephen Sestanovich, Independent Task Force Report No. 57 (New York: Council on
Foreign Relations, 2006; available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/RussiaTaskForce.pdf
as of 17 May 2006).
109 For a discussion of these dangers, see testimony of Matthew Bunn in Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.
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nuclear terrorism. As part of that effort, the United States should undertake a substantially
increased public diplomacy effort to build support for cooperation to secure, consolidate, and
eliminate nuclear stockpiles, in Russia and around the world. The United States should
sponsor articles, workshops, briefings, equipment displays, and related events and
publications that emphasize such matters as how much has been accomplished that serves the
security interests of Russia and the other states where this cooperation is taking place; how
limited the access to sensitive sites the United States has requested really is and how few
nuclear secrets are actually revealed; how willing the United States has been to give parallel
access at its own sites; how large the fraction of the equipment that is being installed that is
produced by local manufacturers, in systems designed and installed by local experts, not
American ones; and how beneficial to the local public's safety and security this cooperation
has been. Expanded efforts should be pursued to build support through engaging the
legislatures, the press, non-government organizations, and the rest of civil society in the
countries where such cooperation is taking place.
Approach 5: Cooperating Without Compromising Nuclear Secrets
Disputes over access to sensitive sites and protection of nuclear secrets have delayed a
wide range of cooperative nuclear security upgrade efforts, in Russia and elsewhere -
sometimes for years at a time. To ensure that taxpayers' funds are spent appropriately, the
United States has often demanded that U.S. personnel be allowed access to the sites where
U.S. money was to be spent on security upgrades. But some sites in Russia have simply been
too sensitive for Russia to allow foreigners to visit - and this is likely to be even more true in
countries such as Pakistan, India, and China, where the very existence of some of the
important sites (such as warhead storage sites) are closely guarded secrets.
The United States and other donor countries should take a flexible approach to these
issues, working creatively to find ways to cooperate to improve nuclear security within the
constraints of what partner states are willing to accept. In the end, it is more important to
make progress in ensuring that nuclear stockpiles are secure than it is to keep track of every
dollar of U.S. funds.
Approaches developed in the course of U.S.-Russian cooperation can be used in some
cases. For example, in a number of cases, the U.S. government has taken the view that if it
was only providing equipment to be installed by the partner country at its own expense, U.S.
personnel did not need to visit, or even know the location of, the places where the equipment
was installed. For particularly sensitive sites, U.S. and Russian laboratory experts worked out
approaches that can provide good assurance that U.S. funds are spent appropriately without
access by U.S. personnel, such as photographs and videotapes of installed equipment,
certification of installation by facility directors, and operational reports on the equipment's
use. Another innovative approach that has been implemented in some cases is reliance on
"trusted agents" - personnel who are citizens of the recipient country with security clearances
from that country, who can visit relevant sites and certify that work has been done
appropriately, but who are employed by a U.S. contractor.
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There are a wide variety of other steps that can be taken cooperatively to improve
nuclear security without compromising nuclear secrets. These include: training experts in
vulnerability assessment, physical protection system design, material accounting, nuclear
security regulation, and other areas of expertise critical to an effective nuclear security and
accounting system; discussions of "best practices" and means to find and fix nuclear security
vulnerabilities; and joint exercises and demonstrations of equipment and procedures, carried
out at non-sensitive facilities.
Approach 6: Ensuring Sustainability and Strong Security Cultures
As noted above, as U.S.-Russian cooperative security upgrade programs race toward a
2008 deadline for completing upgrades, the questions of how to ensure "sustainability" and
strong "security cultures" are among the most difficult remaining policy challenges facing
these efforts - not only in Russia, but everywhere where cooperation to improve nuclear
security will proceed around the world. Sustaining for the long haul the enhancements to
security made possible by one-time international investments in security systems will require
countries to indigenously finance, manage, and maintain their own security systems.
Therefore, working with partner countries to ensure that high levels of security will be
sustained for the long haul and that all personnel give security the priority it deserves are
absolutely essential if the risk of nuclear terrorism is going to be substantially reduced for an
extended period." 0
These are genuine concerns. Achieving sustainability will require a much higher
commitment to modern security and accounting measures, and far more resources for them,
than has been forthcoming from the Russian government or Russian facility managers to date.
Similar issues are certain to arise elsewhere as well. While many types of equipment are
being installed in cooperative nuclear security programs, substantial portions of the equipment
have expected lifetimes averaging around 5-15 years - meaning that some 10% of it might
have to be replaced in an average year. In Russia alone, the average annual cost of these
replacements - to say nothing of routine operations and maintenance, salaries and other costs
for guards and other security and accounting personnel, and other security costs - is likely to
come to over $100 million per year (if one considers both the equipment for nuclear material
sites and the equipment for nuclear warhead sites). The current sums allocated for nuclear
security and accounting equipment by the Russian government and by individual facilities are
not publicly known, but are clearly far below this figure. (As noted in Chapter 2, one leading
Russian expert estimated in 2005 that spending on physical protection comes to only 30% of
the need.) And resources are not the only issue: sustaining high levels of nuclear security
requires a high level of commitment to doing so throughout a country's nuclear infrastructure.
"0 For a recent discussion of steps toward ensuring security for the long haul in Russia by a committee of the
National Academy of Sciences, see Committee on Indigenization of Programs to Prevent Leakage of Plutonium
and Highly Enriched Uranium from Russian Facilities, Strengthening Long-Term Nuclear Security. For an
earlier discussion of sustainability in Russia and steps to achieve it, see Bukharin, Bunn, and Luongo, Renewing
the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet
Union. For a good discussion of the security culture issue in Russia, see Khripunov and Holmes, eds., Nuclear
Security Culture: The Case of Russia.
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Similarly, while some sites appear to have stronger security cultures in place than
others, there continue to be reports of guards patrolling with no ammunition in their guns,'
staff propping open security doors for convenience," 2 and guards turning off intrusion
detectors when they become annoyed by the false alarms." These events suggest that there
is a good deal of work to do to achieve the level of commitment by all security-relevant staff
needed for a truly effective nuclear security system.
DOE has recognized the challenge of ensuring sustainability and strong security
cultures. With respect to sustainability, DOE is working to build up Russia's capability to
sustain effective nuclear security. To provide the human capital needed to maintain an
effective MPC&A system, it is providing extensive training programs. It is letting contracts
to cover operations and maintenance costs for several years after new U.S.-funded equipment
has been installed. DOE is also working to build up the infrastructure of firms and experts
available for designing, building, installing, and maintaining nuclear security and accounting
equipment in Russia. In addition to these efforts, DOE is helping Russia write and enforce
effective nuclear security and accounting regulations, which, in principle, will still be forcing
sites to take effective security measures long after U.S. assistance has come to an end. In one
innovative and important move, DOE has negotiated contracts under which Russian facilities
estimate their costs to maintain good nuclear security and accounting systems and lay out
their plans for doing so." 4 Under the Bodman-Kirienko committee established at the
Bratislava summit, DOE and Rosatom are now developing a joint sustainability plan, which
explicitly includes the premise that U.S. resources devoted to nuclear security in Russia will
decline year by year and will be replaced by increasing Russian resources. As of late 2006,
however, that plan was not yet complete and agreed.15 DOD is also planning a program to
help ensure that the security measures it is financing at Russian nuclear warhead sites will be
sustained, but this effort appears to be much smaller in scope, and public information about it
is limited.
To build security culture, DOE and its Russian partners have included a focus on
security culture in training programs. At a few Russian sites, they have also put in place
"culture coordinators" on a pilot basis; these culture coordinators are comparable in some
ways to the security awareness coordinators at DOE sites. After the Bratislava summit, where
the two presidents emphasized the importance of security culture, efforts in this area have
" This practice, and many other issues that raise serious concerns about the effectiveness of the guard forces at
Seversk (one of Russia's largest plutonium and HEU facilities) is described in Goloskokov, "Reforming MVD
Troops to Guard Russian Nuclear Facilities [Translated]." At the time of the article, Goloskokov was the
security chief for the Siberian Chemical Combine, the nuclear facility at Seversk.
112 This is reported, with a photograph, in U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate US. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian
Sites, GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2003; available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03482.pdf as
of 4 March 2005).
"3 A number of Russian experts have reported this kind of incident to U.S. colleagues.
114 For a brief discussion of DOE's current sustainability work, see U.S. Department of Energy, 2006 MPC&A
Strategic Plan.
115 Interview with DOE official, December 2006.
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been slowly expanding and Rosatom security officials have become more receptive. 1 6 In
addition, DOE is sponsoring an "MPC&A Operations Monitoring" (MOM) project, in which
security cameras are installed to monitor how personnel are doing their jobs at key locations,
such as where staff are screened for nuclear material as they exit the building. This data
provides site management (and potentially regulators) insights into the strengths and
weaknesses of actual operations of the security systems. Awareness that they are being
monitored gives personnel strong incentives to implement security procedures correctly. In
some cases, the United States can even receive data from this monitoring - edited to remove
any sensitive information - that give U.S. program managers additional insights on how
systems are being operated and sustained. But there is still a great deal more to be done.
Sustainability. Steps like those taken thus far to improve sustainability and the
security culture are essential, but are not likely to be sufficient. To achieve sustainability, two
sets of recommendations above are likely to be especially important. Genuinely partnership-
based approaches are essential: only if the experts at the sites using this equipment see it as
having been in significant part their idea are they likely to have the necessary commitment to
using, maintaining, and replacing it over time. Steps to convince political leaders and facility
managers of the reality and urgency of the threat are equally critical, for those managers are
only likely to devote the resources and sustained attention needed to maintain high levels of
security if they genuinely believe that the threat is severe enough to require such measures.
Several additional steps are likely to be needed to get partner states to put in place the
resources, organizations, and incentives essential to sustaining nuclear security for the long
haul.
Resources. As a follow-up to the successful Bratislava summit initiative on nuclear
security, President Bush should seek an explicit commitment from President Putin that he will
assign sufficient resources from the Russian budget to ensure that security and accounting
measures sufficient to defeat the threats that terrorists and thieves have demonstrated they can
pose in Russia will be sustained after U.S. assistance phases out. Such a commitment should
include some mechanism for following through, such as a specific line-item for nuclear
security in the Russian state budget.
The possibility of creating a special fund for sustaining nuclear security should also be
considered."'7 One possible mechanism would be for the United States and other partner
countries to provide funding for sustainability projects that could only be used if matched by
dedicated, transparent funds provided from the Russian state budget. At first an exact one-to-
one match might not be necessary, but over time, the ratio of donor matching funds to
116 Interviews with DOE officials and U.S. laboratory experts, October 2005 and July 2006.
117 For a proposal for one particular approach to such a fund, see Committee on Indigenization of Programs to
Prevent Leakage of Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium from Russian Facilities, Strengthening Long-Term
Nuclear Security. For other approaches, see, for example, Matthew Bunn, John Holdren, and Anthony Wier,
Securing Nuclear Warheads and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action (Cambridge, Mass., and
Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2002;
available at http://www.nti.org/e research/securingnuclear-weapons-and materialsMay2002.pdf as of 2
January 2007).
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indigenous Russian funding should shift to reflect the increasing ability of Russia to secure its
own nuclear warheads and materials against the threats terrorists have demonstrated they can
pose. Such a matching fund would require mechanisms to show that work paid for was
actually being completed.
Another source of revenue could be generated if, as part of negotiating arrangements
for Russian commercial import of foreign spent fuel subject to U.S. veto rights, the United
States insisted that an agreed portion of the revenue be put into a fund to support nuclear
security. This would be Russia's own money, not U.S. taxpayer funds, and thus could be
spent at highly sensitive sites and on other purposes for which the United States is not willing
to allocate funds (such as actually paying the salaries of guards at nuclear sites) - but an
agreed arrangement should be worked out to provide enough transparency to offer some
confidence that the funds are indeed being spent on nuclear security.
As sustainability is not only a Russia problem, similar funding approaches should be
considered with other partner countries with large-scale nuclear programs. For countries with
only one or two nuclear facilities requiring high levels of security, more limited approaches to
ensuring resources for sustainability are more likely to suffice.
Organizations. It will be extremely difficult to sustain effective nuclear security
unless the organizations responsible have the personnel, expertise, resources, and authority to
do so. The United States should work with Russia and other partner countries to ensure that
every organization responsible for facilities with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear
materials has a dedicated organization charged with ensuring effective security and
accounting for those stockpiles and that every facility where these stockpiles are located has
sufficient personnel, with sufficient resources and authority, dedicated to this mission.
The United States should put very high priority on working with partner countries to
ensure that all nuclear regulatory bodies have the personnel, expertise, resources, and
authority to write and enforce effective nuclear security and accounting rules. In some cases,
this will mean going beyond providing training or equipment to regulatory bodies, to working
with political leaders of partner countries to convince them to give their nuclear regulatory
bodies enhanced authority or budgets. In the case of Russia, it will mean not only working to
strengthen Rostekhnadzor (the regulator for all civilian nuclear activities in Russia) and
Rosatom's internal regulation, but also working with the Ministry of Defense (MOD)
regulatory group that in principle regulates security for all MOD nuclear activities and for
those Rosatom activities involving nuclear weapons and components. Given the prominent
role of the U.S. NRC in regulating nuclear security and accounting in the United States, NRC
should be given the authority and budget to play a significant role in working with partner
countries to set and enforce effective nuclear security and accounting rules.
Incentives. Every dollar a facility manager invests in security is a dollar not spent on
something that would bring in revenue or accomplish the facility's core mission. It is
essential to create strong incentives for nuclear security to counteract this obvious incentive to
cut corners. Most facility managers simply will not make substantial investments in
improving and maintaining security and accounting measures unless they have to. In many
cases, "they have to" means that otherwise an inspector is going to come and find out that
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they have not done so, and the result may be a fine, temporary closure, or something else they
want to avoid. Hence, there could hardly be any subject more important to this entire agenda
than effective nuclear security and accounting rules, effectively enforced. As noted above, a
broad range of other steps can and should be taken to create and strengthen incentives for
nuclear security.'
Consolidation. Finally, consolidating stockpiles of both nuclear warheads and
weapons-usable nuclear materials into a much smaller number of sites (and a smaller number
of buildings within those sites) is likely to be crucial to sustainability, because it will make it
possible to achieve higher security at lower cost.
Security culture. As with sustainability, the steps above to build genuine nuclear
security partnerships and to convince political leaders and facility managers of the urgency of
threat are likely to be absolutely central to building effective security cultures. As already
noted, the most fundamental element of an effective security culture is never forgetting to be
afraid: the reality of the threat to be defended against needs to be inculcated constantly - in
initial training, annual training, regular security exercises, and by any other means managers
can think of. Convincing the top managers (and top security managers) of nuclear facilities is
particularly important, for a strong security culture at a facility is only likely to get built if the
facility management makes it a top mission to do so. Promoting an ongoing awareness of
security incidents and trends around the world is also key, as only by being confronted with
real data on ongoing incidents will people really be convinced about the scope and nature of
the threats they need to defend against. Indeed, as noted above, tracking and forcing
participants to confront such data on problems and near-misses, and the lessons drawn from
them, has proven to be absolutely crucial to building effective safety cultures in industries
throughout the world. As noted earlier, in the safety arena, management commitment and a
good system for collecting and learning from such near-miss data are thought to be the two
most important factors in achieving high levels of safety. Much the same is likely to be true
for security.
Information and Intelligence to Support Policy
As the report of the commission on U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass destruction
noted, good intelligence is crucial to the struggle to prevent nuclear terrorism, and this must
be a top priority for U.S. intelligence agencies (and those of other countries as well) - but
current U.S. intelligence in this area is weak.' 9 Since 9/11, the level of U.S. intelligence
focus on trying to figure out what terrorists might be doing related to weapons of mass
destruction has increased substantially. But short of success in penetrating a cell working on
118 Bunn, "Incentives for Nuclear Security."
"9 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: WMD Commission, 2005; available at http://www.wmd.gov/report/
as of 2 January 2007).
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weapons of mass destruction, it will always be very difficult to know what individual terrorist
groups may be doing relating to weapons of mass destruction. 20
Other kinds of information that are critical for policy-makers working this problem
and are quite easy to get have not yet been given priority for collection and assessment (either
by intelligence agencies or by policy and implementation agencies). How much are the
workers paid at, for example, civilian research reactors with HEU? Is there corruption and
theft among those workers? What are the conditions for the guard forces (if any)? What kind
of terrorist and criminal activity has there been in the areas where these facilities are located,
and what might that suggest about the threats that security at these facilities should be
designed to cope with? This kind of information could be critical in assessing risks and
setting priorities. Are particular reactors being used intensively, with plenty of funding, or are
they used hardly at all and struggling to find the money to stay open? What do the officials in
charge of providing the facilities' funding subsidies think about the possibility of shutting
them down? What do the reactor operators think about the possibility of converting to low-
enriched uranium? What do national policy-makers and facility operators think about the
dangers of nuclear theft and sabotage and the security measures that should be taken to
address them? This kind of information could be critical to identifying policy opportunities
and obstacles. Comparable kinds of questions can and should be asked about a wide range of
other types of facilities where nuclear weapons and materials exist as well.
Today, no one in the U.S. government (or other governments, as far as I am aware)
has been given the task of collecting this type of information in a focused way on facilities
with nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material throughout the world. To close that
gap primarily requires simply reallocating current collection and analysis efforts, to focus on
the issues that are most important to the problem that President Bush has identified as the
most urgent national security threat to the United States.
The U.S. government should immediately develop and implement an interagency plan
for collecting and analyzing the information most critical to assessing the risks of nuclear
theft at sites throughout the world. In doing so, the U.S. government should be
extraordinarily careful not to turn the experts attempting to build nuclear security partnerships
with foreign colleagues into spies (or make them perceived to be spies), as that would destroy
any hope of building the real partnerships that will be essential to success. In many cases, it
may be that collection and analysis should not be done by intelligence agencies, but by
implementation agencies or even by labs, companies, or universities on contract to the
government; these entities can collect open information without the taint of U.S. government
"spying."
A Prioritized Global Risk Assessment
Perhaps the first priority for information collection and analysis is a prioritized
assessment of which facilities worldwide pose the most urgent risks of nuclear theft to be
addressed, using the kinds of methodologies described in Chapter 4. DOE has developed a
120 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Report to the President.
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list of facilities believed to have weapons-usable nuclear material around the world and is
working to integrate what limited information is available about security arrangements and
threats at these sites.12 1 But to date, this list represents an inventory, not a risk-based
assessment of where the highest priorities for action lie. Such a prioritized global threat
assessment should be developed as quickly as possible - identifying not only what is known
that gives reason for concern, but what is not known, and using those knowledge gaps to drive
efforts to collect additional information to fill them. The record of past U.S. interactions with
nuclear facilities should also be documented to the extent possible, so that U.S. officials are
aware, in their discussions with facility operators, of what has gone before (DOE has in fact
begun to populate the global facilities database with some information gleaned from previous
interactions); in this way, judgments of where the highest-priority risks reside can be
integrated with judgments concerning where the highest-leverage opportunities may be, or
where higher-level political intervention may be needed to make progress.
A Long Road Yet to Travel
Real and important progress has been made in securing nuclear stockpiles in recent
years, particularly in Russia. But there is more to be done there, and the effort in much of the
rest of the world is just beginning. The steps recommended above could lead the way toward
a faster, more effective, and more comprehensive effort to reduce the risks of nuclear theft
and terrorism.
President Bush and President Putin, working with other world leaders, have the power
to take actions that would transform the global effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. Between
them, they have an historic opportunity to leave behind, as a lasting legacy, a world in which
the danger of nuclear terrorism has been drastically reduced.
121 Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor Action, p. 103.
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